Reference ID 09TRIPOLI417
Created 2009-05-26 14:02
Released 2011-02-25
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO2956
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0417 1461454
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261454Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4853
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5383
SECRET VZCZCXRO2956\
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN\
DE RUEHTRO #0417 1461454\
ZNY SSSSS ZZH\
P 261454Z MAY 09\
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4853\
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE\
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5383 S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000417 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/25/2019 \
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS LY
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI: NO LONGER RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE WITH AFRICOM \
\
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, \
Department of State. \
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) \
¶1. (S) Summary. Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi told visiting \
Commander of U.S. Africa Command General William Ward that Libya \
supported the establishment of common African institutions, such \
as an African Ministry of Defense, and expressed hope that the \
Obama administration would not pursue a policy of military \
intervention in Africa, as he felt a U.S. military presence on \
the continent could be a trigger for terrorism. Al-Qadhafi said \
he hoped President Obama could travel to Libya in early July to \
address the African Union summit, as well as meet him at the G-8 \
conference in Italy later in the month. Al-Qadhafi expressed a \
desire for cooperation with U.S. Africa Command in the fields of \
counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Gen. Ward's meeting with \
Foreign Minister Musa Kusa reported septel. End Summary. \
\
¶2. (S) On the afternoon of May 21, Muammar al-Qadhafi, hosted \
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William "Kip" \
Ward (Gen. Ward) in his tent at the Bab al-Aziziyah complex in \
Tripoli for an meeting that ran slightly over an hour. Also in \
attendance were Secretary of the General People's Committee for \
Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (GPCFLIC) (Foreign \
Minister) Musa Kusa, Secretary for American Affairs Dr. Ahmad \
Fituri, Ambassador, U.S. Defense Attache, and a member of Gen. \
Ward's staff. \
\
¶3. (S) After exchanging pleasantries, al-Qadhafi noted that \
during Gen. Ward's earlier trip to Libya, he had been visiting \
Mauritania, where a political crisis was ongoing. "Every time \
we put out a fire in Africa, another one breaks out. We used to \
say this was a US conspiracy, but not anymore." Al-Qadhafi then \
began a lengthy monologue during which he related the stages of \
governance in Africa from revolutionary liberation, to \
dictatorship, to multi-party elections, concluding that now was \
the time to establish common African institutions, such as a \
Ministry of Defense, that would better represent African \
interests before the world. \
\
¶4. (S) Al-Qadhafi turned to U.S. and Chinese involvement on the \
continent, characterizing the Chinese approach as soft, the U.S. \
as hard, and predicting that China would prevail because it does \
not interfere in internal affairs. He criticized what he said \
was a U.S. tendency to place military bases near energy sources, \
observing that the U.S. did this in the Gulf of Guinea, it would \
spark terrorism. Turning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, \
al-Qadhafi questioned what he characterized as U.S. support for \
Israel at the expense of Palestine, and advised that it would be \
in the best interest of the U.S. to support the Palestinians. \
He cautioned against trusting the advice of Arab leaders in the \
Gulf and Levant and offered to play a role in that region if the \
U.S. desired. The Leader concluded his remarks by expressing a \
desire for President Obama to come to the African Union Summit \
in Libya in July, and after that meet him in Italy at the G-8 \
conference. \
\
¶5. (S) In response to Gen. Ward's profession of respect for the \
sovereignty of African countries, al-Qadhafi said he understood \
the U.S. position, but questioned the U.S. military presence in \
Djibouti, noting military power would be used by extremists to \
justify terror. He then proceeded to identify two sources of \
terrorism, Wahabism and Switzerland. Qadhafi stated that the \
Swiss banking system was used to fund terrorists, and proposed \
that Switzerland be split among its neighboring countries, \
according to language. \
\
¶6. (S) On the topic of Somali piracy, al-Qadhafi asserted that \
"foreign entities" had violated Somalia's territorial waters. \
The solution to the problem of Somali piracy was therefore to \
forge an agreement between the countries exploiting Somali \
waters and the pirates. Al-Qadhafi offered to identify a pirate \
spokesman and broker this agreement. \
\
¶7. (S) Al-Qadhafi emphasized that as Libya now presides over the \
AU, there was a possibility for cooperation with AFRICOM in \
combating terrorism in the Sahara and piracy. He said that he \
could deal with "the new America without reservation", now that \
the United States was governed by "a new spirit of change." \
\
¶8. (U) This cable was cleared by U.S. Africa Command. \
\
CRETZ
Source: Wikileaks
Thursday, March 10, 2011
IRAN: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES "THE SWISS PLAN" WITH PRESIDENT CALMY-REY
Reference ID 07BERN171
Created 2007-02-23 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Bern
VZCZCXRO6253
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0171/01 0541446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231446Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3721
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
97841 2007-02-23 14:46:00 07BERN171 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN158 VZCZCXRO6253\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0171/01 0541446\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 231446Z FEB 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3721\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000171 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P -- U/S BURNS \
STATE ALSO FOR NEA, ISN, EUR \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017 \
TAGS: PARM KNNP PTER ETTC IR SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES "THE SWISS PLAN" WITH \
PRESIDENT CALMY-REY \
\
REF: BERN 00158 \
\
BERN 00000171 001.2 OF 002 \
\
\
Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b.d. \
\
1.(SBU) The Ambassador met with President and Foreign \
Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on February 22. Although the \
two had met and talked informally on several occasions since \
the Ambassador,s arrival in Switzerland last September, this \
was their first official meeting. Calmy-Rey,s Diplomatic \
Advisor Balzaretti and Americas Division Chief Baumann, as \
well as DCM Urban, joined the meeting. \
\
2.(SBU) Calmy-Rey began the meeting by expressing her \
personal satisfaction in successfully encouraging the Federal \
Council (Cabinet) in 2005 to broaden Switzerland,s \
perspective beyond the EU and in the fact that the first MOU \
on political cooperation Switzerland signed was with the U.S. \
The Ambassador and Calmy-Rey then briefly discussed the \
status of the MOU, the Operative Working Arrangement and the \
Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum. The Ambassador told \
Calmy-Rey of the strong relationship that he has developed \
with Ambassador Ziswiler and of their mutual goal to double \
the annual number of Fulbright grantees. After touching on \
the challenges both Switzerland and the U.S. face in dealing \
with agriculture in the Doha talks, the Ambassador asked to \
speak candidly and in good faith about two matters of \
importance: the image of the U.S. in Switzerland and the \
Iran nuclear issue. \
\
The Image of the U.S. in Switzerland \
--------------------------------------------- --- \
\
3.(C) The Ambassador carefully expressed his concern that the \
U.S. is constantly criticized in the Swiss media and only \
rarely is there recognition of the good things the U.S. does \
or that our two countries do together. He invited Calmy-Rey \
to work with us to find ways to get out the good news. \
\
4.(C) Calmy-Rey noted that Switzerland relies on \
international law and that is often the source of its \
differences with the U.S., Iraq and Guantanamo being the two \
most obvious examples. She added that there are many areas \
where we are in agreement and usefully work together. She \
referred to the MOU as a positive story that didn,t get the \
hoped-for media coverage, but cited the successful \
partnership between Switzerland and the U.S. on the MDA as a \
story that was reflected positively in the media. She noted \
that, "Switzerland can do things the EU can,t -- we can be \
useful in that regard," and added that Kosovo and Sudan were \
areas where our two countries could successfully work \
together and let it be known. \
\
Iran \
----- \
\
5.(C) Turning to Iran, Calmy-Rey said that Switzerland and \
the U.S. share the same goals, that Switzerland is supporting \
UNSC 1737, and that the goal of the Swiss plan is to bring \
the parties to the table. She also noted that Under \
Secretary Burns told State Secretary Ambuehl that he welcomed \
\
SIPDIS \
working closely with Switzerland on Iran. \
\
6.(C) Calmy-Rey went on to say she had been very upset with \
the Iranian press release that said Switzerland had proposed \
partial suspension. "We do not support partial suspension \
and I told Larijani: we are out if you say we do." She \
emphasized that the Swiss have been very insistent that the \
Iranians suspend enrichment and fulfill their obligations to \
the IAEA. She assured the Ambassador that the Swiss are firm \
that there is no way for the Iranians around suspension. And \
she made the point that Switzerland is not being \
"instrumentalized" by the Iranians but, rather, they are \
having tough and difficult conversations with Larijani. \
"Switzerland is a credible partner. I think if we talk with \
them we can make some progress," she concluded. \
\
7.(C) The Ambassdor responded by acknowledging that \
Switzerland plays an important role as our protecting power \
for which we are very grateful. He said that the U.S. is \
ready to sit down with the Iranians, but they must come to \
the table in good faith by first suspending enrichment. He \
added that while it is good that the Swiss have been firm \
with the Iranians on suspension, now would be a good time for \
silence. Iran knows what it needs to do. We need to be \
resolute and stand together, and we have a better chance of \
succeeding through tougher sanctions and not sending signals \
that could be misinterpreted by the Iranians, the media or \
anyone else. \
\
\
BERN 00000171 002.2 OF 002 \
\
\
8.(C) In reply Calmy-Rey said that the Iranians are not yet \
convinced that they must suspend enrichment. They must be \
convinced. "If we are silent, they won,t get it." The \
Ambassador counter-proposed, "If Switzerland is silent all of \
a sudden, Iran will wonder what that means. And that could be \
good." \
\
9.(C) Calmy-Rey reiterated that Iran must be transparent; \
must answer to the IAEA, and must suspend enrichment. She \
said there is much to discuss with them and that U/S Burns \
said he wants to work even more closely with Switzerland. \
She added that the Swiss always inform the Embassy of their \
discussions, and that they inform the EU-3, and the others \
(i.e., Russia and China), as well. "And we tell the Iranians \
that we are informing you." \
\
10.(C) The Ambassador promised to clarify U/S Burns, \
communications with State Secretary Ambuehl and give the \
Swiss something in writing. He expressed concern that the \
Iranians might assume that the US is encouraging \
Switzerland,s discussions with them "by virtue of the fact \
that you are keeping us informed," and that the media and the \
Iranians may not understand the separation between the Swiss \
role as our protecting power in Tehran and its independent, \
proactive discussions with them on the nuclear issue. \
CONEWAY
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-02-23 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Bern
VZCZCXRO6253
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0171/01 0541446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231446Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3721
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
97841 2007-02-23 14:46:00 07BERN171 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN158 VZCZCXRO6253\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0171/01 0541446\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 231446Z FEB 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3721\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000171 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P -- U/S BURNS \
STATE ALSO FOR NEA, ISN, EUR \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017 \
TAGS: PARM KNNP PTER ETTC IR SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES "THE SWISS PLAN" WITH \
PRESIDENT CALMY-REY \
\
REF: BERN 00158 \
\
BERN 00000171 001.2 OF 002 \
\
\
Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b.d. \
\
1.(SBU) The Ambassador met with President and Foreign \
Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on February 22. Although the \
two had met and talked informally on several occasions since \
the Ambassador,s arrival in Switzerland last September, this \
was their first official meeting. Calmy-Rey,s Diplomatic \
Advisor Balzaretti and Americas Division Chief Baumann, as \
well as DCM Urban, joined the meeting. \
\
2.(SBU) Calmy-Rey began the meeting by expressing her \
personal satisfaction in successfully encouraging the Federal \
Council (Cabinet) in 2005 to broaden Switzerland,s \
perspective beyond the EU and in the fact that the first MOU \
on political cooperation Switzerland signed was with the U.S. \
The Ambassador and Calmy-Rey then briefly discussed the \
status of the MOU, the Operative Working Arrangement and the \
Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum. The Ambassador told \
Calmy-Rey of the strong relationship that he has developed \
with Ambassador Ziswiler and of their mutual goal to double \
the annual number of Fulbright grantees. After touching on \
the challenges both Switzerland and the U.S. face in dealing \
with agriculture in the Doha talks, the Ambassador asked to \
speak candidly and in good faith about two matters of \
importance: the image of the U.S. in Switzerland and the \
Iran nuclear issue. \
\
The Image of the U.S. in Switzerland \
--------------------------------------------- --- \
\
3.(C) The Ambassador carefully expressed his concern that the \
U.S. is constantly criticized in the Swiss media and only \
rarely is there recognition of the good things the U.S. does \
or that our two countries do together. He invited Calmy-Rey \
to work with us to find ways to get out the good news. \
\
4.(C) Calmy-Rey noted that Switzerland relies on \
international law and that is often the source of its \
differences with the U.S., Iraq and Guantanamo being the two \
most obvious examples. She added that there are many areas \
where we are in agreement and usefully work together. She \
referred to the MOU as a positive story that didn,t get the \
hoped-for media coverage, but cited the successful \
partnership between Switzerland and the U.S. on the MDA as a \
story that was reflected positively in the media. She noted \
that, "Switzerland can do things the EU can,t -- we can be \
useful in that regard," and added that Kosovo and Sudan were \
areas where our two countries could successfully work \
together and let it be known. \
\
Iran \
----- \
\
5.(C) Turning to Iran, Calmy-Rey said that Switzerland and \
the U.S. share the same goals, that Switzerland is supporting \
UNSC 1737, and that the goal of the Swiss plan is to bring \
the parties to the table. She also noted that Under \
Secretary Burns told State Secretary Ambuehl that he welcomed \
\
SIPDIS \
working closely with Switzerland on Iran. \
\
6.(C) Calmy-Rey went on to say she had been very upset with \
the Iranian press release that said Switzerland had proposed \
partial suspension. "We do not support partial suspension \
and I told Larijani: we are out if you say we do." She \
emphasized that the Swiss have been very insistent that the \
Iranians suspend enrichment and fulfill their obligations to \
the IAEA. She assured the Ambassador that the Swiss are firm \
that there is no way for the Iranians around suspension. And \
she made the point that Switzerland is not being \
"instrumentalized" by the Iranians but, rather, they are \
having tough and difficult conversations with Larijani. \
"Switzerland is a credible partner. I think if we talk with \
them we can make some progress," she concluded. \
\
7.(C) The Ambassdor responded by acknowledging that \
Switzerland plays an important role as our protecting power \
for which we are very grateful. He said that the U.S. is \
ready to sit down with the Iranians, but they must come to \
the table in good faith by first suspending enrichment. He \
added that while it is good that the Swiss have been firm \
with the Iranians on suspension, now would be a good time for \
silence. Iran knows what it needs to do. We need to be \
resolute and stand together, and we have a better chance of \
succeeding through tougher sanctions and not sending signals \
that could be misinterpreted by the Iranians, the media or \
anyone else. \
\
\
BERN 00000171 002.2 OF 002 \
\
\
8.(C) In reply Calmy-Rey said that the Iranians are not yet \
convinced that they must suspend enrichment. They must be \
convinced. "If we are silent, they won,t get it." The \
Ambassador counter-proposed, "If Switzerland is silent all of \
a sudden, Iran will wonder what that means. And that could be \
good." \
\
9.(C) Calmy-Rey reiterated that Iran must be transparent; \
must answer to the IAEA, and must suspend enrichment. She \
said there is much to discuss with them and that U/S Burns \
said he wants to work even more closely with Switzerland. \
She added that the Swiss always inform the Embassy of their \
discussions, and that they inform the EU-3, and the others \
(i.e., Russia and China), as well. "And we tell the Iranians \
that we are informing you." \
\
10.(C) The Ambassador promised to clarify U/S Burns, \
communications with State Secretary Ambuehl and give the \
Swiss something in writing. He expressed concern that the \
Iranians might assume that the US is encouraging \
Switzerland,s discussions with them "by virtue of the fact \
that you are keeping us informed," and that the media and the \
Iranians may not understand the separation between the Swiss \
role as our protecting power in Tehran and its independent, \
proactive discussions with them on the nuclear issue. \
CONEWAY
Source: Wikileaks
IRAQ - AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETINGS WITH BAHRAINI LEADERSHIP
Reference ID 07MANAMA1010
Created 2007-11-06 10:10
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO4055
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1010/01 3101055
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061055Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7382
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001010
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IZ IR BA
SUBJECT: IRAQ - AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETINGS WITH BAHRAINI LEADERSHIP
MANAMA 00001010 001.2 OF 002 Classified by: Ambassador Adam J Ereli for reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: Crown Prince Salman took the lead for the GOB in pledging Bahrain's continued support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. It would examine positively the possibility of returning an ambassador if security concerns could be accommodated. But he also asked that the U.S. listen to the advice of its friends in the Arab world, and expressed concern over the direction of U.S. policies, whether on Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or democracy promotion in Iraq and the region. FM Shaikh Khalid suggested further discussion in Istanbul of a possible new initiative of Arab states and Turkey in support of Iraq. End summary.
2.(U) Bahrain's King Hamad, his son Crown Prince Salman, and Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad al Khalifa received visiting Ambassador to Iraq Crocker in Manama October 30 in separate meetings. Accompanying Crocker were Ambassador Ereli and Embassy Baghdad Senior Adviser Pearce. General Petraeus, in Bahrain to host the Iraq Coalition Conference, joined the meeting with the Crown Prince.
3.(C) Crocker and Petraeus thanked Bahrain's leadership for hosting the Coalition Conference. In each meeting, Crocker explained that he was visiting key partners in the region in preparation for the upcoming Istanbul Neighbors Conference. He reviewed recent developments in Iraq, pointing out that violence was down in many parts of the country, and that more Sunni and Shi'a leaders were working to repair sectarian divisions. A Shi'a backlash against the Jaysh al-Mahdi was growing. While there was still much to be done, the improved situation presented a key opportunity for shaping Iraq's future. Now was the time, he stressed, for Arab neighbors to step up their engagement with Iraq, and to offset Iran's influence there. Crown Prince: "I've received the message" on Iraq --------------------------------------------- -----
5.(C) The Crown Prince praised the strong positive relationship between the U.S. and Bahrain, and Bahrain's continued support for a robust U.S. presence in the Gulf. He also stressed the importance of the U.S. Department of Defense school in Bahrain, which he himself had attended, calling it America's most effective long-term ambassador.
6.(C) On Iraq, the CP expressed strong doubts about the Maliki government, calling it closely linked to Iran. The CP said the GOB had invited Maliki to visit Bahrain, but had received no response. The CP agreed that an independent Iraq was essential to counterbalance Iran and was indispensable if the region were to remain stable. He asked "what specifically do we need to do?"
7.(C) Ambassador Crocker responded that Arab governments must take the longer view; they should focus not on Iraqi personalities, which will change, but on Iraqi institutions. Everyone must help the Iraqis build governing capacity and institutions. Withholding support at this critical time only opened the door to Iran's malign influence. This was the time for Arab governments to establish a positive presence in Iraq and Arab ambassadors should return. He urged Iraq's Arab neighbors to host Iraqi official visitors. Both Petraeus and Crocker stressed that Gulf states and Iraq's neighbors needed to help more to limit the access to Iraq of Islamist extremists.
8.(C) The Crown Prince agreed that an Arab counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq was very important. The Arabs must seek to contain Iran's drive for hegemony. Iran was a "clear and present danger" because of its activities in Iraq and its nuclear program. Iraq must be secured as a stabilizing power, but Iraqis must take responsibility for their own government. The coalition could not prop up individuals - they inevitably fall. He endorsed U.S. activities at the local level and praised Coalition Forces work with the tribes and in limiting the activities of al Qaeda.
9.(C) The Crown Prince replied "I've received the message." He would press other Arabs to do more in support of stability in Iraq, but he stressed the need to back elements in Iraq that work "for stability" and not for Iran. If the U.S. wanted to "win the war in Iraq by using the democracy ticket," he said, "that requires rallying Iraq and regional opinion, which in turn requires resolving the Israeli-Palestinian question." If this was not possible, then the U.S. should drop democracy promotion as the main element of its strategy in Iraq and the region and rely instead on traditional power politics - i.e., identify strong groups that would support U.S. policies, and stand by them. "You did it in the Cold War," he said "and you can do it now." The Crown Prince complained that U.S. allies in the MANAMA 00001010 002.2 OF 002 Classified by: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reason 1.4 (b) (d) Arab world kept" sticking their necks out" for the U.S., while ever-rising popular frustration with U.S. policies put U.S. allies in an increasingly difficult position. Bahrain would rise to the challenge, but unless there is "a fundamental change, a rebalancing of power in Iraq," it would be difficult both to support U.S. policies and at the same time maintain current democratic openings; these would only provide opportunities for Iran to work further mischief. Meetings with King and Foreign Minister ---------------------------------------
10.(C) With King Hamad, Ambassador Crocker made the same points. The King expressed appreciation for Crocker's visit and his update, but offered little substantive comment. In a separate meeting, FM Shaikh Khalid reiterated the CP's concerns about the Maliki government and Iran's role in Iraq. He said Bahrain wanted to help, but must consider its own interests too. He wanted to re-establish a full-fledged Bahraini embassy in Baghdad and would examine this positively, but was limited by security concerns. (Bahrain currently maintains an Embassy in Baghdad staffed by local employees. Bahrain's previous Ambassador to Iraq, Hussain al Ansari, was shot and severely wounded in 2005. He joined the Foreign Minister's meeting with Ambassador Crocker.) Crocker welcomed Bahrain's intention to re-examine this issue, and offered to help in any way it can, e.g. moving it to the International Zone, and locating a suitable property in the International Zone.
11.(C) Shaikh Khalid suggested that the GCC, Jordan, Yemen and Turkey should coordinate action on Iraq and proposed a meeting for this purpose on the margins of the Istanbul Neighbors' Conference. The FM also said that the U.S. has Bahrain's full support for the expanded UNAMI mandate. He commented that, "Some neighbors are more capable than others" and specifically called on Abu Dhabi and Qatar to provide resources in support of UNAMI.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-11-06 10:10
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO4055
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1010/01 3101055
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061055Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7382
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001010
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IZ IR BA
SUBJECT: IRAQ - AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETINGS WITH BAHRAINI LEADERSHIP
MANAMA 00001010 001.2 OF 002 Classified by: Ambassador Adam J Ereli for reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: Crown Prince Salman took the lead for the GOB in pledging Bahrain's continued support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. It would examine positively the possibility of returning an ambassador if security concerns could be accommodated. But he also asked that the U.S. listen to the advice of its friends in the Arab world, and expressed concern over the direction of U.S. policies, whether on Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or democracy promotion in Iraq and the region. FM Shaikh Khalid suggested further discussion in Istanbul of a possible new initiative of Arab states and Turkey in support of Iraq. End summary.
2.(U) Bahrain's King Hamad, his son Crown Prince Salman, and Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad al Khalifa received visiting Ambassador to Iraq Crocker in Manama October 30 in separate meetings. Accompanying Crocker were Ambassador Ereli and Embassy Baghdad Senior Adviser Pearce. General Petraeus, in Bahrain to host the Iraq Coalition Conference, joined the meeting with the Crown Prince.
3.(C) Crocker and Petraeus thanked Bahrain's leadership for hosting the Coalition Conference. In each meeting, Crocker explained that he was visiting key partners in the region in preparation for the upcoming Istanbul Neighbors Conference. He reviewed recent developments in Iraq, pointing out that violence was down in many parts of the country, and that more Sunni and Shi'a leaders were working to repair sectarian divisions. A Shi'a backlash against the Jaysh al-Mahdi was growing. While there was still much to be done, the improved situation presented a key opportunity for shaping Iraq's future. Now was the time, he stressed, for Arab neighbors to step up their engagement with Iraq, and to offset Iran's influence there. Crown Prince: "I've received the message" on Iraq --------------------------------------------- -----
5.(C) The Crown Prince praised the strong positive relationship between the U.S. and Bahrain, and Bahrain's continued support for a robust U.S. presence in the Gulf. He also stressed the importance of the U.S. Department of Defense school in Bahrain, which he himself had attended, calling it America's most effective long-term ambassador.
6.(C) On Iraq, the CP expressed strong doubts about the Maliki government, calling it closely linked to Iran. The CP said the GOB had invited Maliki to visit Bahrain, but had received no response. The CP agreed that an independent Iraq was essential to counterbalance Iran and was indispensable if the region were to remain stable. He asked "what specifically do we need to do?"
7.(C) Ambassador Crocker responded that Arab governments must take the longer view; they should focus not on Iraqi personalities, which will change, but on Iraqi institutions. Everyone must help the Iraqis build governing capacity and institutions. Withholding support at this critical time only opened the door to Iran's malign influence. This was the time for Arab governments to establish a positive presence in Iraq and Arab ambassadors should return. He urged Iraq's Arab neighbors to host Iraqi official visitors. Both Petraeus and Crocker stressed that Gulf states and Iraq's neighbors needed to help more to limit the access to Iraq of Islamist extremists.
8.(C) The Crown Prince agreed that an Arab counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq was very important. The Arabs must seek to contain Iran's drive for hegemony. Iran was a "clear and present danger" because of its activities in Iraq and its nuclear program. Iraq must be secured as a stabilizing power, but Iraqis must take responsibility for their own government. The coalition could not prop up individuals - they inevitably fall. He endorsed U.S. activities at the local level and praised Coalition Forces work with the tribes and in limiting the activities of al Qaeda.
9.(C) The Crown Prince replied "I've received the message." He would press other Arabs to do more in support of stability in Iraq, but he stressed the need to back elements in Iraq that work "for stability" and not for Iran. If the U.S. wanted to "win the war in Iraq by using the democracy ticket," he said, "that requires rallying Iraq and regional opinion, which in turn requires resolving the Israeli-Palestinian question." If this was not possible, then the U.S. should drop democracy promotion as the main element of its strategy in Iraq and the region and rely instead on traditional power politics - i.e., identify strong groups that would support U.S. policies, and stand by them. "You did it in the Cold War," he said "and you can do it now." The Crown Prince complained that U.S. allies in the MANAMA 00001010 002.2 OF 002 Classified by: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reason 1.4 (b) (d) Arab world kept" sticking their necks out" for the U.S., while ever-rising popular frustration with U.S. policies put U.S. allies in an increasingly difficult position. Bahrain would rise to the challenge, but unless there is "a fundamental change, a rebalancing of power in Iraq," it would be difficult both to support U.S. policies and at the same time maintain current democratic openings; these would only provide opportunities for Iran to work further mischief. Meetings with King and Foreign Minister ---------------------------------------
10.(C) With King Hamad, Ambassador Crocker made the same points. The King expressed appreciation for Crocker's visit and his update, but offered little substantive comment. In a separate meeting, FM Shaikh Khalid reiterated the CP's concerns about the Maliki government and Iran's role in Iraq. He said Bahrain wanted to help, but must consider its own interests too. He wanted to re-establish a full-fledged Bahraini embassy in Baghdad and would examine this positively, but was limited by security concerns. (Bahrain currently maintains an Embassy in Baghdad staffed by local employees. Bahrain's previous Ambassador to Iraq, Hussain al Ansari, was shot and severely wounded in 2005. He joined the Foreign Minister's meeting with Ambassador Crocker.) Crocker welcomed Bahrain's intention to re-examine this issue, and offered to help in any way it can, e.g. moving it to the International Zone, and locating a suitable property in the International Zone.
11.(C) Shaikh Khalid suggested that the GCC, Jordan, Yemen and Turkey should coordinate action on Iraq and proposed a meeting for this purpose on the margins of the Istanbul Neighbors' Conference. The FM also said that the U.S. has Bahrain's full support for the expanded UNAMI mandate. He commented that, "Some neighbors are more capable than others" and specifically called on Abu Dhabi and Qatar to provide resources in support of UNAMI.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
IRAQ - AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETINGS WITH BAHRAINI LEADERSHIP
Reference ID 07MANAMA1021
Created 2007-11-12 12:12
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO4048
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1021/01 3161215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121215Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7396
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001021
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IZ IR BA
SUBJECT: IRAQ - AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETINGS WITH BAHRAINI
LEADERSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: Crown Prince Salman took the lead for the GOB in pledging Bahrain's continued support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. It would examine positively the possibility of returning an ambassador if security concerns could be accommodated. But he also asked that the U.S. listen to the advice of its friends in the Arab world, and expressed concern over the direction of U.S. policies, whether on Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or democracy promotion in Iraq and the region. FM Shaikh Khalid suggested further discussion in Istanbul of a possible new initiative of Arab states and Turkey in support of Iraq. End summary.
2.(U) Bahrain's King Hamad, his son Crown Prince Salman, and Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad al Khalifa received visiting Ambassador to Iraq Crocker in Manama October 30 in separate meetings. Accompanying Crocker were Ambassador Ereli and Embassy Baghdad Senior Adviser Pearce. General Petraeus, in Bahrain to host the Iraq Coalition Conference, joined the meeting with the Crown Prince.
3.(C) Crocker and Petraeus thanked Bahrain's leadership for hosting the Coalition Conference. In each meeting, Crocker explained that he was visiting key partners in the region in preparation for the upcoming Istanbul Neighbors Conference. He reviewed recent developments in Iraq, pointing out that violence was down in many parts of the country, and that more Sunni and Shi'a leaders were working to repair sectarian divisions. A Shi'a backlash against the Jaysh al-Mahdi was growing. While there was still much to be done, the improved situation presented a key opportunity for shaping Iraq's future. Now was the time, he stressed, for Arab neighbors to step up their engagement with Iraq, and to offset Iran's influence there. Crown Prince: "I've received the message" on Iraq --------------------------------------------- -----
5.(C) The Crown Prince praised the strong positive relationship between the U.S. and Bahrain, and Bahrain's continued support for a robust U.S. presence in the Gulf. He also stressed the importance of the U.S. Department of Defense school in Bahrain, which he himself had attended, calling it America's most effective long-term ambassador.
6.(C) On Iraq, the CP expressed strong doubts about the Maliki government, calling it closely linked to Iran. The CP said the GOB had invited Maliki to visit Bahrain, but had received no response. The CP agreed that an independent Iraq was essential to counterbalance Iran and was indispensable if the region were to remain stable. He asked "what specifically do we need to do?"
7.(C) Ambassador Crocker responded that Arab governments must take the longer view; they should focus not on Iraqi personalities, which will change, but on Iraqi institutions. Everyone must help the Iraqis build governing capacity and institutions. Withholding support at this critical time only opened the door to Iran's malign influence. This was the time for Arab governments to establish a positive presence in Iraq and Arab ambassadors should return. He urged Iraq's Arab neighbors to host Iraqi official visitors. Both Petraeus and Crocker stressed that Gulf states and Iraq's neighbors needed to help more to limit the access to Iraq of Islamist extremists.
8.(C) The Crown Prince agreed that an Arab counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq was very important. The Arabs must seek to contain Iran's drive for hegemony. Iran was a "clear and present danger" because of its activities in Iraq and its nuclear program. Iraq must be secured as a stabilizing power, but Iraqis must take responsibility for their own government. The coalition could not prop up individuals - they inevitably fall. He endorsed U.S. activities at the local level and praised Coalition Forces work with the tribes and in limiting the activities of al Qaeda.
9.(C) The Crown Prince replied "I've received the message." He would press other Arabs to do more in support of stability in Iraq, but he stressed the need to back elements in Iraq that work "for stability" and not for Iran. If the U.S. wanted to "win the war in Iraq by using the democracy ticket," he said, "that requires rallying Iraq and regional opinion, which in turn requires resolving the Israeli-Palestinian question." If this was not possible, then the U.S. should drop democracy promotion as the main element of its strategy in Iraq and the region and rely instead on traditional power politics - i.e., identify strong groups that would support U.S. policies, and stand by them. MANAMA 00001021 002 OF 002 "You did it in the Cold War," he said "and you can do it now." The Crown Prince complained that U.S. allies in the Arab world kept" sticking their necks out" for the U.S., while ever-rising popular frustration with U.S. policies put U.S. allies in an increasingly difficult position. Bahrain would rise to the challenge, but unless there is "a fundamental change, a rebalancing of power in Iraq," it would be difficult both to support U.S. policies and at the same time maintain current democratic openings; these would only provide opportunities for Iran to work further mischief. Meetings with King and Foreign Minister ---------------------------------------
10.(C) With King Hamad, Ambassador Crocker made the same points. The King expressed appreciation for Crocker's visit and his update, but offered little substantive comment. In a separate meeting, FM Shaikh Khalid reiterated the CP's concerns about the Maliki government and Iran's role in Iraq. He said Bahrain wanted to help, but must consider its own interests too. He wanted to re-establish a full-fledged Bahraini embassy in Baghdad and would examine this positively, but was limited by security concerns. (Bahrain currently maintains an Embassy in Baghdad staffed by local employees. Bahrain's previous Ambassador to Iraq, Hussain al Ansari, was shot and severely wounded in 2005. He joined the Foreign Minister's meeting with Ambassador Crocker.) Crocker welcomed Bahrain's intention to re-examine this issue, and offered to help in any way it can, e.g. moving it to the International Zone, and locating a suitable property in the International Zone.
11.(C) Shaikh Khalid suggested that the GCC, Jordan, Yemen and Turkey should coordinate action on Iraq and proposed a meeting for this purpose on the margins of the Istanbul Neighbors' Conference. The FM also said that the U.S. has Bahrain's full support for the expanded UNAMI mandate. He commented that, "Some neighbors are more capable than others" and specifically called on Abu Dhabi and Qatar to provide resources in support of UNAMI.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-11-12 12:12
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO4048
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1021/01 3161215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121215Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7396
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001021
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IZ IR BA
SUBJECT: IRAQ - AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETINGS WITH BAHRAINI
LEADERSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: Crown Prince Salman took the lead for the GOB in pledging Bahrain's continued support for U.S. efforts in Iraq. It would examine positively the possibility of returning an ambassador if security concerns could be accommodated. But he also asked that the U.S. listen to the advice of its friends in the Arab world, and expressed concern over the direction of U.S. policies, whether on Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or democracy promotion in Iraq and the region. FM Shaikh Khalid suggested further discussion in Istanbul of a possible new initiative of Arab states and Turkey in support of Iraq. End summary.
2.(U) Bahrain's King Hamad, his son Crown Prince Salman, and Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad al Khalifa received visiting Ambassador to Iraq Crocker in Manama October 30 in separate meetings. Accompanying Crocker were Ambassador Ereli and Embassy Baghdad Senior Adviser Pearce. General Petraeus, in Bahrain to host the Iraq Coalition Conference, joined the meeting with the Crown Prince.
3.(C) Crocker and Petraeus thanked Bahrain's leadership for hosting the Coalition Conference. In each meeting, Crocker explained that he was visiting key partners in the region in preparation for the upcoming Istanbul Neighbors Conference. He reviewed recent developments in Iraq, pointing out that violence was down in many parts of the country, and that more Sunni and Shi'a leaders were working to repair sectarian divisions. A Shi'a backlash against the Jaysh al-Mahdi was growing. While there was still much to be done, the improved situation presented a key opportunity for shaping Iraq's future. Now was the time, he stressed, for Arab neighbors to step up their engagement with Iraq, and to offset Iran's influence there. Crown Prince: "I've received the message" on Iraq --------------------------------------------- -----
5.(C) The Crown Prince praised the strong positive relationship between the U.S. and Bahrain, and Bahrain's continued support for a robust U.S. presence in the Gulf. He also stressed the importance of the U.S. Department of Defense school in Bahrain, which he himself had attended, calling it America's most effective long-term ambassador.
6.(C) On Iraq, the CP expressed strong doubts about the Maliki government, calling it closely linked to Iran. The CP said the GOB had invited Maliki to visit Bahrain, but had received no response. The CP agreed that an independent Iraq was essential to counterbalance Iran and was indispensable if the region were to remain stable. He asked "what specifically do we need to do?"
7.(C) Ambassador Crocker responded that Arab governments must take the longer view; they should focus not on Iraqi personalities, which will change, but on Iraqi institutions. Everyone must help the Iraqis build governing capacity and institutions. Withholding support at this critical time only opened the door to Iran's malign influence. This was the time for Arab governments to establish a positive presence in Iraq and Arab ambassadors should return. He urged Iraq's Arab neighbors to host Iraqi official visitors. Both Petraeus and Crocker stressed that Gulf states and Iraq's neighbors needed to help more to limit the access to Iraq of Islamist extremists.
8.(C) The Crown Prince agreed that an Arab counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq was very important. The Arabs must seek to contain Iran's drive for hegemony. Iran was a "clear and present danger" because of its activities in Iraq and its nuclear program. Iraq must be secured as a stabilizing power, but Iraqis must take responsibility for their own government. The coalition could not prop up individuals - they inevitably fall. He endorsed U.S. activities at the local level and praised Coalition Forces work with the tribes and in limiting the activities of al Qaeda.
9.(C) The Crown Prince replied "I've received the message." He would press other Arabs to do more in support of stability in Iraq, but he stressed the need to back elements in Iraq that work "for stability" and not for Iran. If the U.S. wanted to "win the war in Iraq by using the democracy ticket," he said, "that requires rallying Iraq and regional opinion, which in turn requires resolving the Israeli-Palestinian question." If this was not possible, then the U.S. should drop democracy promotion as the main element of its strategy in Iraq and the region and rely instead on traditional power politics - i.e., identify strong groups that would support U.S. policies, and stand by them. MANAMA 00001021 002 OF 002 "You did it in the Cold War," he said "and you can do it now." The Crown Prince complained that U.S. allies in the Arab world kept" sticking their necks out" for the U.S., while ever-rising popular frustration with U.S. policies put U.S. allies in an increasingly difficult position. Bahrain would rise to the challenge, but unless there is "a fundamental change, a rebalancing of power in Iraq," it would be difficult both to support U.S. policies and at the same time maintain current democratic openings; these would only provide opportunities for Iran to work further mischief. Meetings with King and Foreign Minister ---------------------------------------
10.(C) With King Hamad, Ambassador Crocker made the same points. The King expressed appreciation for Crocker's visit and his update, but offered little substantive comment. In a separate meeting, FM Shaikh Khalid reiterated the CP's concerns about the Maliki government and Iran's role in Iraq. He said Bahrain wanted to help, but must consider its own interests too. He wanted to re-establish a full-fledged Bahraini embassy in Baghdad and would examine this positively, but was limited by security concerns. (Bahrain currently maintains an Embassy in Baghdad staffed by local employees. Bahrain's previous Ambassador to Iraq, Hussain al Ansari, was shot and severely wounded in 2005. He joined the Foreign Minister's meeting with Ambassador Crocker.) Crocker welcomed Bahrain's intention to re-examine this issue, and offered to help in any way it can, e.g. moving it to the International Zone, and locating a suitable property in the International Zone.
11.(C) Shaikh Khalid suggested that the GCC, Jordan, Yemen and Turkey should coordinate action on Iraq and proposed a meeting for this purpose on the margins of the Istanbul Neighbors' Conference. The FM also said that the U.S. has Bahrain's full support for the expanded UNAMI mandate. He commented that, "Some neighbors are more capable than others" and specifically called on Abu Dhabi and Qatar to provide resources in support of UNAMI.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Reference ID 07MANAMA1045
Created 2007-11-19 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO0065
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1045 3231353
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191353Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7426
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0018
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 001045
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP IAEA EPET IR BA
SUBJECT: AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO BAHRAIN
REF: A. MANAMA 1012
¶B. MANAMA 922
¶C. MANAMA 873
¶D. MANAMA 666
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(S) Summary: The Iranian President stopped briefly in Bahrain to meet the King, Crown Prince, and Prime Minister. The King and Foreign Minister told him that Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. While the visit received positive coverage in the local press, Iranian press reports trumpeted the signing of a natural gas agreement. According to the GOB, the agreement was a framework agreement to continue ongoing discussions about the purchase of natural gas from Iran. End summary.
2.(S) Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad paid a brief visit to Bahrain November 17 on his way to the OPEC meeting in Riyadh. According to media, he met with King Hamad, Crown Prince Salman, and the Prime Minister, and was accompanied throughout his visit by Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid.
3.(S) In a meeting with DCM November 18, MFA Undersecretary Abdulaziz bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa claimed both the King and Foreign Minister told Ahmedinejad that Bahrain did not support war, but that Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. Sheikh Abdulaziz said that Ahmedinejad repeatedly referenced the most recent IAEA report as evidence that Iran's nuclear program had received a clean bill of health. The U/S added that, while Bahrain didn't buy Ahmedinejad's spin, he worried that it might gain traction in some quarters. He believed Ahmedinejad's visit was intended to show his domestic audience that Iran is not completely without friends.
3.(S) According to Sheikh Abdulaziz, the GOI pressed Bahrain to prepare 13 memoranda of understanding for signature during the short visit. In the event, two were signed: one relating to natural gas and the other on fisheries. According to Sheikh Abdulaziz, the gas MOU was an agreement only to continue discussions on the possible purchase of Iranian gas by Bahrain (refs B, C, and D).
4.(S) While Ahmedinejad was afforded all of the head-of-state courtesies, he was not given any opportunity to interact with Bahrain's Shi'a Arab population. Ahmedinejad's motorcade proceeded directly from the airport in the Sunni stronghold of Muharraq to the King's Gudabiya Palace, then back to the airport. Security for the motorcade was tight, with black-clad SWAT teams manning truck-mounted machine guns along the route and helicopters hovering overhead. By contrast, when former president Mohammed Khatemi visited Bahrain in February 2006, large crowds turned out to greet him.
5.(C) Ghanem Al-Buanain, the leader of the largest Sunni bloc in Parliament, perhaps summed up the ambivalence of this visit best in a meeting with the Ambassador. Asked to explain why Bahrain's leaders harshly condemn Ahmedinejad and his policies in private, but in public the Crown Prince greets him at the airport on arrival and the King sends him off on departure, Al-Buanain replied, "Because we're Arabs. We don't like them, but we need them."
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-11-19 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO0065
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1045 3231353
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191353Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7426
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0018
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 001045
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP IAEA EPET IR BA
SUBJECT: AHMEDINEJAD VISIT TO BAHRAIN
REF: A. MANAMA 1012
¶B. MANAMA 922
¶C. MANAMA 873
¶D. MANAMA 666
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(S) Summary: The Iranian President stopped briefly in Bahrain to meet the King, Crown Prince, and Prime Minister. The King and Foreign Minister told him that Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. While the visit received positive coverage in the local press, Iranian press reports trumpeted the signing of a natural gas agreement. According to the GOB, the agreement was a framework agreement to continue ongoing discussions about the purchase of natural gas from Iran. End summary.
2.(S) Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad paid a brief visit to Bahrain November 17 on his way to the OPEC meeting in Riyadh. According to media, he met with King Hamad, Crown Prince Salman, and the Prime Minister, and was accompanied throughout his visit by Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid.
3.(S) In a meeting with DCM November 18, MFA Undersecretary Abdulaziz bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa claimed both the King and Foreign Minister told Ahmedinejad that Bahrain did not support war, but that Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. Sheikh Abdulaziz said that Ahmedinejad repeatedly referenced the most recent IAEA report as evidence that Iran's nuclear program had received a clean bill of health. The U/S added that, while Bahrain didn't buy Ahmedinejad's spin, he worried that it might gain traction in some quarters. He believed Ahmedinejad's visit was intended to show his domestic audience that Iran is not completely without friends.
3.(S) According to Sheikh Abdulaziz, the GOI pressed Bahrain to prepare 13 memoranda of understanding for signature during the short visit. In the event, two were signed: one relating to natural gas and the other on fisheries. According to Sheikh Abdulaziz, the gas MOU was an agreement only to continue discussions on the possible purchase of Iranian gas by Bahrain (refs B, C, and D).
4.(S) While Ahmedinejad was afforded all of the head-of-state courtesies, he was not given any opportunity to interact with Bahrain's Shi'a Arab population. Ahmedinejad's motorcade proceeded directly from the airport in the Sunni stronghold of Muharraq to the King's Gudabiya Palace, then back to the airport. Security for the motorcade was tight, with black-clad SWAT teams manning truck-mounted machine guns along the route and helicopters hovering overhead. By contrast, when former president Mohammed Khatemi visited Bahrain in February 2006, large crowds turned out to greet him.
5.(C) Ghanem Al-Buanain, the leader of the largest Sunni bloc in Parliament, perhaps summed up the ambivalence of this visit best in a meeting with the Ambassador. Asked to explain why Bahrain's leaders harshly condemn Ahmedinejad and his policies in private, but in public the Crown Prince greets him at the airport on arrival and the King sends him off on departure, Al-Buanain replied, "Because we're Arabs. We don't like them, but we need them."
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR UNDERSCORES COMMITMENT TO DOLLAR REMAINS FIRM
Reference ID 07MANAMA1089
Created 2007-12-09 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO7244
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1089/01 3431438
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091438Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7478
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001089
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
COMMERCE FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/ONE/HOFFMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ECON IR BA
SUBJECT: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR UNDERSCORES COMMITMENT TO DOLLAR REMAINS FIRM ---------------------------------
1.(C) Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Governor Rasheed Al-Maraj told Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt and the Ambassador December 5 that despite controversy surrounding the decline of the dollar's value in relation to the euro, it remained unlikely that any additional GCC country beyond Kuwait would de-peg from the dollar. Certainly Bahrain would not. Al-Maraj said the euro was incapable of replacing the dollar as a world currency and that the recent squeeze in euro liquidity, even in government bonds, was evidence of this. "That would never happen with the dollar because of the breadth and depth of the U.S. currency's marketplace liquidity," Al-Maraj said.
2.(C) D/S Kimmitt responded that the fundamentals of the U.S. economy remained strong. Inflation and unemployment are low, and beyond present difficulties associated with the sub-prime mortgage issue, future prospects for the U.S. economy remained bright. Al-Maraj agreed, noting that U.S. unemployment, inflation, debt-to-GDP, and unfunded pension liability figures were all more favorable than those of the E.U.
3.(C) Al-Maraj said Kuwait's May 2007 revaluation of its currency, and further declines in the dollar's value against the euro had fueled speculation over GCC states, next moves. However, Al-Maraj reiterated that Bahrain would not de-peg or revalue its currency. He said pressure to do so was originating from elites who frequented European vacation destinations and bought "Mercedes" cars. "I'm not going to allow these people to set Bahrain's monetary policy. Bahrain has an open economy and consumers have a choice. There are other places to go on vacation and other brands of cars to buy."
¶4. (C) Nevertheless, Al-Maraj acknowledged that those pushing for Bahraini currency revaluation were a vocal group. These included economic and business columnists in the local press. "If you look, they are all expats. They want Bahrain to revalue the dinar and have even misquoted me in the past to try to make their case. The peg has served us well over the past 30 years. Despite problems with the U.S. economy, we will remain with the peg. There simply is no alternative." ----------------------------- U.S. INTEREST RATES A CONCERN -----------------------------
5.(C) Al-Maraj said the only real problem he saw concerned U.S. interest rates, particularly recent and expected U.S. interest rate cuts. "Our economy is very strong right now. I should be raising interest rates." He said he sought to dampen liquidity and curb access to credit, particularly to cool the real estate sector, which he saw as vulnerable to overheating. "But if we increase our interest rates now, we'll be vulnerable to arbitrage." Al-Maraj said he had already seen an increase in dollar-to-dinar trading. "All of my GCC colleagues have the same problem." ------------------------- HURDLES TO MONETARY UNION -------------------------
6.(C) D/S Kimmitt asked Al-Maraj for any insights on GCC discussions of monetary union. Al-Maraj replied that a 2001 GCC decree had called for any unified currency to be pegged to the dollar. Member states, including Bahrain, had all codified the decree the following year. "My expectation is that there will not be any change to this. This road has no U-turn."
7.(C) However, Al-Maraj pointed to what he saw as major impediments to GCC monetary union in the near-term. He noted that one bloc of GCC countries led by Qatar and the UAE enjoyed per capita GDPs of $30,000 and above (Bahrain's 2006 per capita GDP was $25,600), while another bloc, Saudi Arabia and Oman, had per capita GDPs of only $14,000. Some GCC countries were rich in oil and gas resources, while Bahrain and Oman were relatively poor in these resources. In addition, there were wide disparities in terms of openness of banking and commercial regulation. All of these factors MANAMA 00001089 002 OF 002 represented considerable obstacles to establishing monetary union.
8.(C) The E.U. had addressed these kinds of imbalances among its member states with substantial infusions of capital to southern and eastern Europe. The GCC would have to provide the same kind of assistance in order for monetary union to be viable. "There has to be a level playing field." ----------- FUTURE BANK -----------
9.(C) D/S Kimmitt said that Bahrain's increasingly positive commercial and economic environment, of which the U.S.-Bahrain FTA was a component, coupled with Bahrain's strong regime against terrorist financing had underpinned the USG decision to forego designating Future Bank up to this point. D/S Kimmitt noted that when the U.S. designated Banco Delta Asia in 2005, the Monetary Authority of Macau, as well as Hong Kong, where the holding company is headquartered, had moved quickly to assume direct control of the bank, a useful example of close bilateral cooperation. As events continued along the path toward U.S. action on Future Bank, the USG sought to identify a collaborative solution that would adequately address U.S. concerns and take Bahraini views into account. The U.S. call to action on Future Bank was more about Iran than it was about Bahrain.
10.(C) "It is Bahrain and not Iran that would bear the consequences of a designation," Al-Maraj replied. "Future Bank is locally incorporated and is under our jurisdiction. If there were a run on the bank, our depositors could stand to lose and the CBB would have to bail them out. If it were just a branch of an Iranian bank, we could not care less about it." (Note: Future Bank's capitalization currently stands at roughly $100 million. End Note.)
11.(C) Al-Maraj said the CBB had implemented measures to ensure that Future Bank does not violate U.S. or U.N. sanctions. "We have effectively ring-fenced the bank." He said the CBB has appointed two independent board members and assigned accountants to review the banks activities on a weekly basis.
12.(C) Al-Maraj said other options included trying to reduce Future Bank's Iranian ownership. However, given "the current atmosphere," he doubted that buyers would come forward to acquire any Future Bank shares. He thought that with more time, potential buyers might be found. "I can assure you we will work to reduce Iran's ownership." Al-Maraj agreed to work with D/S Kimmitt and other USG officials in coming days to take appropriate action on Future Bank. --------------------------------- RELATIONS WITH IRAN UNCOMFORTABLE ---------------------------------
13.(C) In answer to D/S Kimmitt's question regarding who might be interested in putting money in Future Bank, Al-Maraj noted that Bahrain hosted a significant population of Persian extraction. "Still, the situation between Iran and Bahrain is not too comfortable. Despite what you may hear, feelings in hearts and minds are different." ------------------------------------ TERRORIST FINANCE - A PERSONAL STAKE ------------------------------------
14.(C) On terrorist financing, Al-Maraj pledged to guard against "anything that would corrupt Bahrain's financial system." He added, "I have a personal stake in this. When I was working in Saudi Arabia I lost three of my people in an attack by Al-Qaeda on our facility." He said that from that time on, he had been dedicated to countering terrorist efforts. "In this position, or in any position I hold in the future, I will take appropriate action to stop them."
¶15. (U) DepSec Kimmitt reviewed this message.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-12-09 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO7244
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1089/01 3431438
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091438Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7478
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001089
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
COMMERCE FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/ONE/HOFFMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ECON IR BA
SUBJECT: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR UNDERSCORES COMMITMENT TO DOLLAR REMAINS FIRM ---------------------------------
1.(C) Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Governor Rasheed Al-Maraj told Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt and the Ambassador December 5 that despite controversy surrounding the decline of the dollar's value in relation to the euro, it remained unlikely that any additional GCC country beyond Kuwait would de-peg from the dollar. Certainly Bahrain would not. Al-Maraj said the euro was incapable of replacing the dollar as a world currency and that the recent squeeze in euro liquidity, even in government bonds, was evidence of this. "That would never happen with the dollar because of the breadth and depth of the U.S. currency's marketplace liquidity," Al-Maraj said.
2.(C) D/S Kimmitt responded that the fundamentals of the U.S. economy remained strong. Inflation and unemployment are low, and beyond present difficulties associated with the sub-prime mortgage issue, future prospects for the U.S. economy remained bright. Al-Maraj agreed, noting that U.S. unemployment, inflation, debt-to-GDP, and unfunded pension liability figures were all more favorable than those of the E.U.
3.(C) Al-Maraj said Kuwait's May 2007 revaluation of its currency, and further declines in the dollar's value against the euro had fueled speculation over GCC states, next moves. However, Al-Maraj reiterated that Bahrain would not de-peg or revalue its currency. He said pressure to do so was originating from elites who frequented European vacation destinations and bought "Mercedes" cars. "I'm not going to allow these people to set Bahrain's monetary policy. Bahrain has an open economy and consumers have a choice. There are other places to go on vacation and other brands of cars to buy."
¶4. (C) Nevertheless, Al-Maraj acknowledged that those pushing for Bahraini currency revaluation were a vocal group. These included economic and business columnists in the local press. "If you look, they are all expats. They want Bahrain to revalue the dinar and have even misquoted me in the past to try to make their case. The peg has served us well over the past 30 years. Despite problems with the U.S. economy, we will remain with the peg. There simply is no alternative." ----------------------------- U.S. INTEREST RATES A CONCERN -----------------------------
5.(C) Al-Maraj said the only real problem he saw concerned U.S. interest rates, particularly recent and expected U.S. interest rate cuts. "Our economy is very strong right now. I should be raising interest rates." He said he sought to dampen liquidity and curb access to credit, particularly to cool the real estate sector, which he saw as vulnerable to overheating. "But if we increase our interest rates now, we'll be vulnerable to arbitrage." Al-Maraj said he had already seen an increase in dollar-to-dinar trading. "All of my GCC colleagues have the same problem." ------------------------- HURDLES TO MONETARY UNION -------------------------
6.(C) D/S Kimmitt asked Al-Maraj for any insights on GCC discussions of monetary union. Al-Maraj replied that a 2001 GCC decree had called for any unified currency to be pegged to the dollar. Member states, including Bahrain, had all codified the decree the following year. "My expectation is that there will not be any change to this. This road has no U-turn."
7.(C) However, Al-Maraj pointed to what he saw as major impediments to GCC monetary union in the near-term. He noted that one bloc of GCC countries led by Qatar and the UAE enjoyed per capita GDPs of $30,000 and above (Bahrain's 2006 per capita GDP was $25,600), while another bloc, Saudi Arabia and Oman, had per capita GDPs of only $14,000. Some GCC countries were rich in oil and gas resources, while Bahrain and Oman were relatively poor in these resources. In addition, there were wide disparities in terms of openness of banking and commercial regulation. All of these factors MANAMA 00001089 002 OF 002 represented considerable obstacles to establishing monetary union.
8.(C) The E.U. had addressed these kinds of imbalances among its member states with substantial infusions of capital to southern and eastern Europe. The GCC would have to provide the same kind of assistance in order for monetary union to be viable. "There has to be a level playing field." ----------- FUTURE BANK -----------
9.(C) D/S Kimmitt said that Bahrain's increasingly positive commercial and economic environment, of which the U.S.-Bahrain FTA was a component, coupled with Bahrain's strong regime against terrorist financing had underpinned the USG decision to forego designating Future Bank up to this point. D/S Kimmitt noted that when the U.S. designated Banco Delta Asia in 2005, the Monetary Authority of Macau, as well as Hong Kong, where the holding company is headquartered, had moved quickly to assume direct control of the bank, a useful example of close bilateral cooperation. As events continued along the path toward U.S. action on Future Bank, the USG sought to identify a collaborative solution that would adequately address U.S. concerns and take Bahraini views into account. The U.S. call to action on Future Bank was more about Iran than it was about Bahrain.
10.(C) "It is Bahrain and not Iran that would bear the consequences of a designation," Al-Maraj replied. "Future Bank is locally incorporated and is under our jurisdiction. If there were a run on the bank, our depositors could stand to lose and the CBB would have to bail them out. If it were just a branch of an Iranian bank, we could not care less about it." (Note: Future Bank's capitalization currently stands at roughly $100 million. End Note.)
11.(C) Al-Maraj said the CBB had implemented measures to ensure that Future Bank does not violate U.S. or U.N. sanctions. "We have effectively ring-fenced the bank." He said the CBB has appointed two independent board members and assigned accountants to review the banks activities on a weekly basis.
12.(C) Al-Maraj said other options included trying to reduce Future Bank's Iranian ownership. However, given "the current atmosphere," he doubted that buyers would come forward to acquire any Future Bank shares. He thought that with more time, potential buyers might be found. "I can assure you we will work to reduce Iran's ownership." Al-Maraj agreed to work with D/S Kimmitt and other USG officials in coming days to take appropriate action on Future Bank. --------------------------------- RELATIONS WITH IRAN UNCOMFORTABLE ---------------------------------
13.(C) In answer to D/S Kimmitt's question regarding who might be interested in putting money in Future Bank, Al-Maraj noted that Bahrain hosted a significant population of Persian extraction. "Still, the situation between Iran and Bahrain is not too comfortable. Despite what you may hear, feelings in hearts and minds are different." ------------------------------------ TERRORIST FINANCE - A PERSONAL STAKE ------------------------------------
14.(C) On terrorist financing, Al-Maraj pledged to guard against "anything that would corrupt Bahrain's financial system." He added, "I have a personal stake in this. When I was working in Saudi Arabia I lost three of my people in an attack by Al-Qaeda on our facility." He said that from that time on, he had been dedicated to countering terrorist efforts. "In this position, or in any position I hold in the future, I will take appropriate action to stop them."
¶15. (U) DepSec Kimmitt reviewed this message.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
MOTTAKI VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Reference ID 07MANAMA1119
Created 2007-12-27 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO0308
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1119 3611350
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271350Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7508
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 001119
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP EPET IR BA
SUBJECT: MOTTAKI VISIT TO BAHRAIN
REF: A. MANAMA 1045
¶B. MANAMA 922
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(S) Summary: The Iranian Foreign Minister led a joint political and economic delegation to Bahrain, and met the Bahraini Crown Prince and Foreign Minister. He failed to obtain a relaxation of Bahrain's visa regime for Iranians. The Crown Prince and Foreign Minister told him that Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. The GOB remained suspicious of Iranian interest in expanding business and banking ties. End summary.
2.(S) Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Manama December 25 and 26 for a meeting of the two countries' binational commission. He also met with Crown Prince Salman and Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa.
3.(C) In a meeting with poloff December 27, MFA bilateral affairs director Dhafer Al-Umran said that this week's FM Mottaki visit was in many ways a replay of President Ahmedinejad's visit in November (ref A). He said that Mottaki pressed hard for Memoranda of Understanding in a number of areas. In the end, the two sides signed "minutes" of the joint committee meeting. According to Al-Umran, there was no forward movement toward a natural gas deal; Iran and the GOB reiterated their commitment to the natural gas MOU signed during Ahmedinejad's visit (ref A).
4.(S) FM Mottaki sought an end to visa requirements for Iranian businessmen and, according to Al-Umran, was unhappy that the GOB would not budge. Al-Umran said he believed Teheran was looking to shift its business ties within the Gulf because "the UAE is closing the valve." He said that the MFA agreed to meet again in six months to discuss a mechanism to facilitate visas for businessmen. (Note: Currently, Bahraini Immigration and the Bahraini and Iranian Chambers of Commerce are involved in the vetting of business travelers. End note.)
5.(S) Al-Umran believed that Iran's increasing interest in Bahrain's markets and banking sector was a direct result of international pressure forcing it to seek new places to do business. "They want to dump their problems on us," he said. He praised Central Bank Governor Rashid Al-Miraj's stewardship of the banking sector, saying, "If the Iranians can follow international requirements, they are welcome. We will not accept anything that will hurt Bahrain's reputation as a banking center."
6.(S) FM Mottaki echoed Ahmedinejad's earlier claims (reftel) that the NIE exonerated Iran, according to Al-Umran. Both the Crown Prince and Foreign Minister told Mottaki that, while Bahrain did not support war, Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program.
7.(C) Comment: Some local media are reporting, without much detail, that Mottaki made progress toward a natural gas deal. The GOB tells U.S. officials that its need for gas is pressing, but it has also made it clear that Iran is the least attractive of the potential suppliers (ref B).
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-12-27 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO0308
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1119 3611350
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271350Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7508
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 001119
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP EPET IR BA
SUBJECT: MOTTAKI VISIT TO BAHRAIN
REF: A. MANAMA 1045
¶B. MANAMA 922
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(S) Summary: The Iranian Foreign Minister led a joint political and economic delegation to Bahrain, and met the Bahraini Crown Prince and Foreign Minister. He failed to obtain a relaxation of Bahrain's visa regime for Iranians. The Crown Prince and Foreign Minister told him that Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. The GOB remained suspicious of Iranian interest in expanding business and banking ties. End summary.
2.(S) Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Manama December 25 and 26 for a meeting of the two countries' binational commission. He also met with Crown Prince Salman and Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa.
3.(C) In a meeting with poloff December 27, MFA bilateral affairs director Dhafer Al-Umran said that this week's FM Mottaki visit was in many ways a replay of President Ahmedinejad's visit in November (ref A). He said that Mottaki pressed hard for Memoranda of Understanding in a number of areas. In the end, the two sides signed "minutes" of the joint committee meeting. According to Al-Umran, there was no forward movement toward a natural gas deal; Iran and the GOB reiterated their commitment to the natural gas MOU signed during Ahmedinejad's visit (ref A).
4.(S) FM Mottaki sought an end to visa requirements for Iranian businessmen and, according to Al-Umran, was unhappy that the GOB would not budge. Al-Umran said he believed Teheran was looking to shift its business ties within the Gulf because "the UAE is closing the valve." He said that the MFA agreed to meet again in six months to discuss a mechanism to facilitate visas for businessmen. (Note: Currently, Bahraini Immigration and the Bahraini and Iranian Chambers of Commerce are involved in the vetting of business travelers. End note.)
5.(S) Al-Umran believed that Iran's increasing interest in Bahrain's markets and banking sector was a direct result of international pressure forcing it to seek new places to do business. "They want to dump their problems on us," he said. He praised Central Bank Governor Rashid Al-Miraj's stewardship of the banking sector, saying, "If the Iranians can follow international requirements, they are welcome. We will not accept anything that will hurt Bahrain's reputation as a banking center."
6.(S) FM Mottaki echoed Ahmedinejad's earlier claims (reftel) that the NIE exonerated Iran, according to Al-Umran. Both the Crown Prince and Foreign Minister told Mottaki that, while Bahrain did not support war, Iran must address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program.
7.(C) Comment: Some local media are reporting, without much detail, that Mottaki made progress toward a natural gas deal. The GOB tells U.S. officials that its need for gas is pressing, but it has also made it clear that Iran is the least attractive of the potential suppliers (ref B).
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
ASHURA IN BAHRAIN
Reference ID 08MANAMA49
Created 2008-01-27 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO2126
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0049/01 0271419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271419Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7559
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000049
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV KISL KIRF PHUM ASEC IR BA
SUBJECT: ASHURA IN BAHRAIN
REF: A. 07 MANAMA 1118
¶B. 07 MANAMA 1113
¶C. 07 MANAMA 1112
¶D. 07 MANAMA 1110
¶E. 07 MANAMA 1109
¶F. 07 MANAMA 1105
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
------- SUMMARY -------
1.(SBU) Summary: Commemoration of Ashura drew into Manama hundreds of thousands of Shi'a from Bahrain and other Gulf countries. Mainstream Shi'a leaders succeeded in keeping the streets free of provocative political symbols or protests over the man who died in last month's rioting. End summary. --------------------------------------------- -------- SHI'A MARK ASHURA PEACEFULLY; AVOID POLITICAL SYMBOLS --------------------------------------------- --------
2.(SBU) An estimated 200-250,000 people crowded into the narrow streets of central Manama January 18 for the eve of tenth Muharram - Ashura - and commemorations of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Karbala in 680 AD. Participants in Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Emirati dress were numerous. The processions were peaceful and emboffs observed a good-natured atmosphere in which ma'tams - societies of Shi'a laymen - passed out tea and sweets to the crowds. The police cordoned off the area to control automobile traffic, but remained outside the perimeter.
3.(SBU) Shi'a clerics, and leaders of the ma'tams who organized the processions, worked closely with government authorities and their own memberships to keep politics out. Both government authorities and Shi'a community leaders had been concerned that the Al-Haq movement, which most here view as connected to December's street violence, might use the occasion of Ashura to instigate a new round of unrest with protests over the death of Ali Jassim Mekki (reftels). In the event there was no trouble. Al-Haq did set up shop outside the Al-Khawaja mosque (a longtime epicenter of Shi'a political dissent) and at three other locations seeking signatures for a petition calling for the Prime Minister's resignation. While some people were stopping to sign, response seemed to be moderate at best.
4.(SBU) Organizers succeeded again this year in ensuring that zealots did not display posters lionizing Iranian or Hizballah politicians (up through 2006 portraits of the late Ayatollah Khomeini were common). In years past, Sunni media commentators pointed to such displays during the Ashura celebration and questioned the loyalty of Bahrain's Shi'a. While Shi'a leaders managed to keep most of these displays off the streets, emboffs saw large posters of Khomeini and Khamenei inside a number of ma'tams. --------------------- MOURNING IMAM HUSSEIN ---------------------
5.(SBU) Well-organized processions of hundreds of men moved through the streets, most lightly striking their chests in mourning. Many colorful traditional features of Ashura, such as camels and riderless white horses, were included. Sheikh Isa Qassim, the spiritual leader of Bahrain's Shi'a community, led a silent procession of imams, including Al-Wifaq parliamentary bloc leader Ali Salman, through the winding streets. Spectators along the route fell silent as they noticed Qassim at the head of the group. Poloff encountered a group of 300-400 "Ajimis," Persian-origin Bahrainis, dressed in black and carrying out symbolic self-mortification with lightweight flails. The group moved in rhythm to drumbeats and a sing-song Farsi chant. Another Persian group marched with a street band. ----------------- "HAIDAR! HAIDAR!" -----------------
6.(SBU) Probably the most notorious feature of Ashura processions is "tatbir," during which parades of bare-chested men flail themselves bloody with chains or swords. This practice is becoming less common as mainstream clerics denounce the practice each year and urge Shi'a to instead donate to blood drives. Thousands of Bahrainis responded this year and donated blood at local hospitals. However, a few ma'tams still practice "tatbir" with gusto, and appeared MANAMA 00000049 002 OF 002 to do so as much out of machismo as out of devotion to the Imam Hussain. Emboffs saw several groups of 20-30 young men whipping their backs with razor-tipped flails in time to chants led by drummers and specialist Iraqi clerics; larger groups of 50-60 followed, striking their foreheads with swords to exuberant chants of "Haidar! Haidar!" A government ambulance accompanied each such group to tend to any serious injuries, and in another nod to safety, attendants repeatedly sprayed disinfectant on participants' flails and swords. ------------------------------- A RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL OCCASION -------------------------------
7.(SBU) In addition to organizing indoor readings of the Shi'a passion followed by outdoor processions, ma'tams distributed hot food and tea on the streets, as well as groceries for the poor. An art exhibition featured Ashura-themed works promoting tolerance and unity. Volunteers sectioned off areas of the sidewalks with black cloth to create segregated viewing areas for women, but this did not deter the teens and twenty-somethings who viewed the gathering as an opportunity to see and be seen. According to FSNs, Shi'a youth use the Ashura celebration to mingle with the opposite sex. Poloff saw one teen boy toss a small, crumpled piece of paper (presumably with his mobile phone number) toward a group of four girls who giggled and moved on. ---------- CONCLUSION ----------
8.(C) Conclusion: This year's Ashura commemorations were a success due to the mainstream Shi'a leadership and the security services' low profile. Understanding that a reprise of December's unrest might jeopardize the government's liberal approach to Ashura, the Shi'a leadership worked diligently to get the message to their members that they should respect the occasion and set politics aside. At the same time, they worked closely with the government to ensure a safe and orderly event. In the end, there were no protests, no violence, and Al-Haq received only a lukewarm response to its harangues. Most attendees seemed content to enjoy the opportunity to express their Shi'a identity to the fullest.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-01-27 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO2126
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0049/01 0271419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271419Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7559
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000049
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV KISL KIRF PHUM ASEC IR BA
SUBJECT: ASHURA IN BAHRAIN
REF: A. 07 MANAMA 1118
¶B. 07 MANAMA 1113
¶C. 07 MANAMA 1112
¶D. 07 MANAMA 1110
¶E. 07 MANAMA 1109
¶F. 07 MANAMA 1105
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
------- SUMMARY -------
1.(SBU) Summary: Commemoration of Ashura drew into Manama hundreds of thousands of Shi'a from Bahrain and other Gulf countries. Mainstream Shi'a leaders succeeded in keeping the streets free of provocative political symbols or protests over the man who died in last month's rioting. End summary. --------------------------------------------- -------- SHI'A MARK ASHURA PEACEFULLY; AVOID POLITICAL SYMBOLS --------------------------------------------- --------
2.(SBU) An estimated 200-250,000 people crowded into the narrow streets of central Manama January 18 for the eve of tenth Muharram - Ashura - and commemorations of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Karbala in 680 AD. Participants in Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Emirati dress were numerous. The processions were peaceful and emboffs observed a good-natured atmosphere in which ma'tams - societies of Shi'a laymen - passed out tea and sweets to the crowds. The police cordoned off the area to control automobile traffic, but remained outside the perimeter.
3.(SBU) Shi'a clerics, and leaders of the ma'tams who organized the processions, worked closely with government authorities and their own memberships to keep politics out. Both government authorities and Shi'a community leaders had been concerned that the Al-Haq movement, which most here view as connected to December's street violence, might use the occasion of Ashura to instigate a new round of unrest with protests over the death of Ali Jassim Mekki (reftels). In the event there was no trouble. Al-Haq did set up shop outside the Al-Khawaja mosque (a longtime epicenter of Shi'a political dissent) and at three other locations seeking signatures for a petition calling for the Prime Minister's resignation. While some people were stopping to sign, response seemed to be moderate at best.
4.(SBU) Organizers succeeded again this year in ensuring that zealots did not display posters lionizing Iranian or Hizballah politicians (up through 2006 portraits of the late Ayatollah Khomeini were common). In years past, Sunni media commentators pointed to such displays during the Ashura celebration and questioned the loyalty of Bahrain's Shi'a. While Shi'a leaders managed to keep most of these displays off the streets, emboffs saw large posters of Khomeini and Khamenei inside a number of ma'tams. --------------------- MOURNING IMAM HUSSEIN ---------------------
5.(SBU) Well-organized processions of hundreds of men moved through the streets, most lightly striking their chests in mourning. Many colorful traditional features of Ashura, such as camels and riderless white horses, were included. Sheikh Isa Qassim, the spiritual leader of Bahrain's Shi'a community, led a silent procession of imams, including Al-Wifaq parliamentary bloc leader Ali Salman, through the winding streets. Spectators along the route fell silent as they noticed Qassim at the head of the group. Poloff encountered a group of 300-400 "Ajimis," Persian-origin Bahrainis, dressed in black and carrying out symbolic self-mortification with lightweight flails. The group moved in rhythm to drumbeats and a sing-song Farsi chant. Another Persian group marched with a street band. ----------------- "HAIDAR! HAIDAR!" -----------------
6.(SBU) Probably the most notorious feature of Ashura processions is "tatbir," during which parades of bare-chested men flail themselves bloody with chains or swords. This practice is becoming less common as mainstream clerics denounce the practice each year and urge Shi'a to instead donate to blood drives. Thousands of Bahrainis responded this year and donated blood at local hospitals. However, a few ma'tams still practice "tatbir" with gusto, and appeared MANAMA 00000049 002 OF 002 to do so as much out of machismo as out of devotion to the Imam Hussain. Emboffs saw several groups of 20-30 young men whipping their backs with razor-tipped flails in time to chants led by drummers and specialist Iraqi clerics; larger groups of 50-60 followed, striking their foreheads with swords to exuberant chants of "Haidar! Haidar!" A government ambulance accompanied each such group to tend to any serious injuries, and in another nod to safety, attendants repeatedly sprayed disinfectant on participants' flails and swords. ------------------------------- A RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL OCCASION -------------------------------
7.(SBU) In addition to organizing indoor readings of the Shi'a passion followed by outdoor processions, ma'tams distributed hot food and tea on the streets, as well as groceries for the poor. An art exhibition featured Ashura-themed works promoting tolerance and unity. Volunteers sectioned off areas of the sidewalks with black cloth to create segregated viewing areas for women, but this did not deter the teens and twenty-somethings who viewed the gathering as an opportunity to see and be seen. According to FSNs, Shi'a youth use the Ashura celebration to mingle with the opposite sex. Poloff saw one teen boy toss a small, crumpled piece of paper (presumably with his mobile phone number) toward a group of four girls who giggled and moved on. ---------- CONCLUSION ----------
8.(C) Conclusion: This year's Ashura commemorations were a success due to the mainstream Shi'a leadership and the security services' low profile. Understanding that a reprise of December's unrest might jeopardize the government's liberal approach to Ashura, the Shi'a leadership worked diligently to get the message to their members that they should respect the occasion and set politics aside. At the same time, they worked closely with the government to ensure a safe and orderly event. In the end, there were no protests, no violence, and Al-Haq received only a lukewarm response to its harangues. Most attendees seemed content to enjoy the opportunity to express their Shi'a identity to the fullest.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
U/S LEVEY ENGAGES GOB OFFICIALS ON TERRORISM, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FINANCE
Reference ID 08MANAMA127
Created 2008-03-03 12:12
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO1009
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #0127/01 0631250
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031250Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7634
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000127
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/RA, EEB
NSC FOR EABRAMS
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ECON IR BA
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY ENGAGES GOB OFFICIALS ON TERRORISM, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FINANCE REF: 07 MANAMA 1089 MANAMA 00000127 001.6 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ------- SUMMARY -------
1.(S) Central Bank governor Al-Maraj told U/S Levey he was unable to take further action against Future Bank, but understood the U.S. was likely to proceed. The Foreign Minister, however, wished to push one more time for Bahraini action against Future Bank, believing that UNSC action would give the Bahraini leadership cover to act; he urged the U.S. to wait two more weeks before designating the bank while he made the case again to his colleagues in the government. End Summary. ------------------------------------ FOREIGN MINISTER PLEDGES COOPERATION ------------------------------------
2.(S) In a meeting joined by the Ambassador with Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa February 26, Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey commended Bahrain on the terrorism trial of al-Qaida supporters that resulted in guilty verdicts for four Bahrainis and one Qatari.
3.(S) U/S Levey said the USG would move to designate two of these al-Qaida facilitators -- Abdulrahman Jaffar Ali and Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subayi -- as terrorists domestically under Executive Order 13224, and before the United Nations 1267 Sanctions Committee as al-Qaida associates. U/S Levey said the USG would like the GOB's support and co-sponsorship for this UN designation.
4.(S) Sheikh Khalid said he would be pleased to offer Bahraini cooperation with the USG on the UN designation. He also responded positively to U/S Levey's proposal that Bahrain host a regional workshop on the regulation and oversight of charity fundraising. The workshop would be organized with USG and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) participation. (Note. Bahrain hosts the MENA-FATF Executive Secretariat. End Note.) ----------------- FM ON FUTURE BANK -----------------
5.(S) U/S Levey told Shaikh Khalid that the USG would likely designate Future Bank under Executive Order 13382 as a supporter of a weapons of mass production proliferator in coming days. (Note: Future Bank, a Bahraini entity, is jointly owned by the Bahraini Ahli United Bank, and the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat. Melli and Saderat have each already been designated under E.O. 13882. End Note.)
6.(C) U/S Levey noted that the USG had thus far designated subsidiaries of Bank Melli everywhere else in the world, but had deferred designation of Future Bank in hopes that the GOB would take satisfactory steps against the bank on its own. However, Levey said, measures taken to date by Ahli United and the Central Bank of Bahrain had not been enough to ensure that Future Bank could not be corrupted by its Iranian partners.
7.(C) Shaikh Khalid told U/S Levey that the GOB would consider taking more vigorous action in a bid to forestall a USG designation of Future Bank. (Note: Options open to the GOB include taking Future Bank into receivership, or even revoking its license to operate. End note.) "Give us two weeks and we will see what can be done." The FM said that a new UNSC resolution would be an opportunity for him to convince Al-Maraj and others in the Bahraini leadership to take further action against Future Bank. U/S Levey said it was likely that announcement of a U.S. designation of Future Bank would be timed to complement an imminent third United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Iran. In the meantime, any decisive GOB action against Future Bank would be welcomed. --------------------------- FURTHER CBB VIGILANCE URGED MANAMA 00000127 002.2 OF 002
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-03-03 12:12
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO1009
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #0127/01 0631250
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031250Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7634
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000127
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/RA, EEB
NSC FOR EABRAMS
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ECON IR BA
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY ENGAGES GOB OFFICIALS ON TERRORISM, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FINANCE REF: 07 MANAMA 1089 MANAMA 00000127 001.6 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ------- SUMMARY -------
1.(S) Central Bank governor Al-Maraj told U/S Levey he was unable to take further action against Future Bank, but understood the U.S. was likely to proceed. The Foreign Minister, however, wished to push one more time for Bahraini action against Future Bank, believing that UNSC action would give the Bahraini leadership cover to act; he urged the U.S. to wait two more weeks before designating the bank while he made the case again to his colleagues in the government. End Summary. ------------------------------------ FOREIGN MINISTER PLEDGES COOPERATION ------------------------------------
2.(S) In a meeting joined by the Ambassador with Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa February 26, Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey commended Bahrain on the terrorism trial of al-Qaida supporters that resulted in guilty verdicts for four Bahrainis and one Qatari.
3.(S) U/S Levey said the USG would move to designate two of these al-Qaida facilitators -- Abdulrahman Jaffar Ali and Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subayi -- as terrorists domestically under Executive Order 13224, and before the United Nations 1267 Sanctions Committee as al-Qaida associates. U/S Levey said the USG would like the GOB's support and co-sponsorship for this UN designation.
4.(S) Sheikh Khalid said he would be pleased to offer Bahraini cooperation with the USG on the UN designation. He also responded positively to U/S Levey's proposal that Bahrain host a regional workshop on the regulation and oversight of charity fundraising. The workshop would be organized with USG and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) participation. (Note. Bahrain hosts the MENA-FATF Executive Secretariat. End Note.) ----------------- FM ON FUTURE BANK -----------------
5.(S) U/S Levey told Shaikh Khalid that the USG would likely designate Future Bank under Executive Order 13382 as a supporter of a weapons of mass production proliferator in coming days. (Note: Future Bank, a Bahraini entity, is jointly owned by the Bahraini Ahli United Bank, and the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat. Melli and Saderat have each already been designated under E.O. 13882. End Note.)
6.(C) U/S Levey noted that the USG had thus far designated subsidiaries of Bank Melli everywhere else in the world, but had deferred designation of Future Bank in hopes that the GOB would take satisfactory steps against the bank on its own. However, Levey said, measures taken to date by Ahli United and the Central Bank of Bahrain had not been enough to ensure that Future Bank could not be corrupted by its Iranian partners.
7.(C) Shaikh Khalid told U/S Levey that the GOB would consider taking more vigorous action in a bid to forestall a USG designation of Future Bank. (Note: Options open to the GOB include taking Future Bank into receivership, or even revoking its license to operate. End note.) "Give us two weeks and we will see what can be done." The FM said that a new UNSC resolution would be an opportunity for him to convince Al-Maraj and others in the Bahraini leadership to take further action against Future Bank. U/S Levey said it was likely that announcement of a U.S. designation of Future Bank would be timed to complement an imminent third United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Iran. In the meantime, any decisive GOB action against Future Bank would be welcomed. --------------------------- FURTHER CBB VIGILANCE URGED MANAMA 00000127 002.2 OF 002
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
REISSUE - U/S LEVEY ENGAGES GOB OFFICIALS ON TERRORISM, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FINANCE
Reference ID 08MANAMA138
Created 2008-03-06 16:04
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXYZ4704
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMK #0138/01 0661615
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061615Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7643
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 000138
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ECON IR BA
SUBJECT: REISSUE - U/S LEVEY ENGAGES GOB OFFICIALS ON
TERRORISM, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FINANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1.(U) The following is a reissuance of Manama 127 that includes Treasury U/S Levey's revision and clearance. ------- SUMMARY -------
¶2. (S) Central Bank governor Al-Maraj told U/S Levey he was unable to take further action against Future Bank, but understood that the USG would proceed with a domestic designation. The Foreign Minister, however, wished to push one more time for Bahraini action against Future Bank, believing that UNSC action would give the Bahraini leadership cover to act; he urged the USG to wait two more weeks before designating the bank while he made the case again to his colleagues in the government. End Summary. ------------------------ -------------- ------------------- FOREIGN MINISTER PLEDGES COOPERATION ON TERRORIST FINANCING ------------------------ -------------- -------------------
3.(S) In a meeting joined by the Ambassador with Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa February 26, Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey commended Bahrain on the terrorism trial of al-Qaida supporters that resulted in guilty verdicts for four Bahrainis and one Qatari. He stressed concern about the short sentences and encouraged the Government of Bahrain (GOB) to pursue joint UN designations of two of these al-Qaida facilitators -- Abdulrahman Jaffar Ali and Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy -- at the United Nations 1267 Sanctions Committee. U/S Levey said the USG would assist the GOB in preparing a designation package and that the USG would also be pursuing their domestic designations under EO 13224. Sheikh Khalid said he would be pleased to offer Bahraini cooperation with the USG on the UN designation.
4.(S) U/S Levey also raised the status of the Bahraini proposal to host a regional workshop on the regulation and oversight of charity fundraising. The workshop would be organized with USG and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) participation. (Note. Bahrain hosts the MENA-FATF Executive Secretariat. End Note.) Treasury prepared a concept paper highlighting charity workshop objectives, specifically raising awareness of the problem, reviewing best practices, and outlining specific training deliverables. Sheikh Khalid suggested discussing the issues among relevant government ministries in the spring and opening up the conversation to a larger group, including NGOs, in the fall 2008. He added that Bahrain would take responsibility for the initiative and "put it on the table". Sheikh Khaild will establish a point of contact on this and relay to Embassy. ----------------- FM ON FUTURE BANK -----------------
5.(S) U/S Levey told Shaikh Khalid that the USG would likely designate Future Bank in the coming few weeks (Note: Future Bank, a Bahraini entity, is jointly owned by the Bahraini Ahli United Bank, and the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat. Melli and Saderat have each already been designated under E.O. 13882. End Note.)
6.(C) U/S Levey noted that the USG had thus far designated Bank Melli and Bank Saderat and their subsidiaries everywhere else in the world, but deferred designation of Future Bank in hopes that the GOB would take satisfactory steps against the bank on its own. However, Levey said, measures taken to date by Ahli United and the Central Bank of Bahrain were not sufficient. He stated that the USG would be pursuing an imminent designation of Future Bank.
7.(C) Shaikh Khalid noted reputational concerns and a desire to keep the Bahraini financial system "clean" and asked U/S Levey to give him "two weeks to see what can be done". The FM said that a new UNSC resolution would be an opportunity for him to convince Al-Maraj and others in the Bahraini leadership to take further action against Future Bank. U/S Levey said that any decisive GOB action against Future Bank would be welcomed. ----------------------------------- FURTHER CBB VIGILANCE URGED ON IRAN -----------------------------------
8.(C) In a separate meeting, Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Governor Rasheed Al-Maraj defended the actions the CBB had taken to date on Future Bank. It had placed two directors on Future Bank's board and had seen no evidence of wrongdoing on Future Bank's part (reftel). Absent evidence of illicit Future Bank activity, it would be difficult to justify further CBB action. Al-Maraj said the GOB understood, however, that a USG designation of the bank now seemed inevitable. U/S Levey pledged to work through Ambassador Ereli to ensure the designation of Future Bank is framed in a way that makes clear that the designation is based solely on ownership and not a failure of oversight on behalf of Bahrain.
9.(C) U/S Levey also raised concerns about the Central Bank of Iran's activities going beyond those typically carried out by a central bank. Iran recognizes its financial institutions have become pariahs, thus the CBI is acting almost as a front for Iranian banks. U/S Levey conveyed that to the extent the CBI maintains accounts in Bahrain, they will require the kinds of scrutiny not normally anticipated when dealing with a central bank. He raised concern about information available to the USG indicating that financial institutions in Bahrain may be holding significant foreign exchange reserves for the CBI, and noted that given the CBI's conduct, this activity requires additional scrutiny. He also noted the December 2007 advisory issued by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) on a recent FATF statement on Iran, and urged Governor Al-Maraj to issue a similar statement.
10.(C) Governor Al-Maraj replied that, while CBB officials had verbally conveyed to all Bahraini financial institutions the need for caution in dealing with Iran, issuing a DFSA-style advisory would be politically difficult. He asked if U/S Levey had any specific concerns.
11.(S) U/S Levey said that the upcoming UNSCR on Iran would likely include language urging increased vigilance on all Iranian banks, specifically Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Under this scenario, the EU would probably follow with a designation of Bank Melli. U/S Levey noted that the CBI had been seen making very active attempts to evade sanctions in the run up to the UN designation of Bank Sepah, where the CBI funneled large influxes of cash from Sepah to its accounts in various countries in order to prevent these funds from being frozen. The CBB should anticipate and guard against any such attempts to evade sanctions on Melli. U/S Levey passed a nonpaper on the activities of Bank Melli.
12.(S) U/S Levey also raised specific concern with Arab Banking Corporation (ABC). According to information available to the USG, ABC continues to provide services to Iranian banks, including Bank Melli and the Central Bank of Iran is also trying to expand cooperation with ABC.
13.(C) On U.S. and UN sanctions, U/S Levey noted that the intent was not to punish Iran by crippling its banking system. Rather, these sanctions were in response to clear and specific instances of Iranian abuse of the international banking system to further its illicit aims. The USG sought Bahrain's assistance to prevent such attempts from succeeding.
14.(U) Post will report other U/S Levey meetings septel.
15.(U) Undersecretary Levey cleared this message.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-03-06 16:04
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXYZ4704
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMK #0138/01 0661615
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061615Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7643
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 000138
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ECON IR BA
SUBJECT: REISSUE - U/S LEVEY ENGAGES GOB OFFICIALS ON
TERRORISM, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FINANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1.(U) The following is a reissuance of Manama 127 that includes Treasury U/S Levey's revision and clearance. ------- SUMMARY -------
¶2. (S) Central Bank governor Al-Maraj told U/S Levey he was unable to take further action against Future Bank, but understood that the USG would proceed with a domestic designation. The Foreign Minister, however, wished to push one more time for Bahraini action against Future Bank, believing that UNSC action would give the Bahraini leadership cover to act; he urged the USG to wait two more weeks before designating the bank while he made the case again to his colleagues in the government. End Summary. ------------------------ -------------- ------------------- FOREIGN MINISTER PLEDGES COOPERATION ON TERRORIST FINANCING ------------------------ -------------- -------------------
3.(S) In a meeting joined by the Ambassador with Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa February 26, Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey commended Bahrain on the terrorism trial of al-Qaida supporters that resulted in guilty verdicts for four Bahrainis and one Qatari. He stressed concern about the short sentences and encouraged the Government of Bahrain (GOB) to pursue joint UN designations of two of these al-Qaida facilitators -- Abdulrahman Jaffar Ali and Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy -- at the United Nations 1267 Sanctions Committee. U/S Levey said the USG would assist the GOB in preparing a designation package and that the USG would also be pursuing their domestic designations under EO 13224. Sheikh Khalid said he would be pleased to offer Bahraini cooperation with the USG on the UN designation.
4.(S) U/S Levey also raised the status of the Bahraini proposal to host a regional workshop on the regulation and oversight of charity fundraising. The workshop would be organized with USG and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) participation. (Note. Bahrain hosts the MENA-FATF Executive Secretariat. End Note.) Treasury prepared a concept paper highlighting charity workshop objectives, specifically raising awareness of the problem, reviewing best practices, and outlining specific training deliverables. Sheikh Khalid suggested discussing the issues among relevant government ministries in the spring and opening up the conversation to a larger group, including NGOs, in the fall 2008. He added that Bahrain would take responsibility for the initiative and "put it on the table". Sheikh Khaild will establish a point of contact on this and relay to Embassy. ----------------- FM ON FUTURE BANK -----------------
5.(S) U/S Levey told Shaikh Khalid that the USG would likely designate Future Bank in the coming few weeks (Note: Future Bank, a Bahraini entity, is jointly owned by the Bahraini Ahli United Bank, and the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat. Melli and Saderat have each already been designated under E.O. 13882. End Note.)
6.(C) U/S Levey noted that the USG had thus far designated Bank Melli and Bank Saderat and their subsidiaries everywhere else in the world, but deferred designation of Future Bank in hopes that the GOB would take satisfactory steps against the bank on its own. However, Levey said, measures taken to date by Ahli United and the Central Bank of Bahrain were not sufficient. He stated that the USG would be pursuing an imminent designation of Future Bank.
7.(C) Shaikh Khalid noted reputational concerns and a desire to keep the Bahraini financial system "clean" and asked U/S Levey to give him "two weeks to see what can be done". The FM said that a new UNSC resolution would be an opportunity for him to convince Al-Maraj and others in the Bahraini leadership to take further action against Future Bank. U/S Levey said that any decisive GOB action against Future Bank would be welcomed. ----------------------------------- FURTHER CBB VIGILANCE URGED ON IRAN -----------------------------------
8.(C) In a separate meeting, Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Governor Rasheed Al-Maraj defended the actions the CBB had taken to date on Future Bank. It had placed two directors on Future Bank's board and had seen no evidence of wrongdoing on Future Bank's part (reftel). Absent evidence of illicit Future Bank activity, it would be difficult to justify further CBB action. Al-Maraj said the GOB understood, however, that a USG designation of the bank now seemed inevitable. U/S Levey pledged to work through Ambassador Ereli to ensure the designation of Future Bank is framed in a way that makes clear that the designation is based solely on ownership and not a failure of oversight on behalf of Bahrain.
9.(C) U/S Levey also raised concerns about the Central Bank of Iran's activities going beyond those typically carried out by a central bank. Iran recognizes its financial institutions have become pariahs, thus the CBI is acting almost as a front for Iranian banks. U/S Levey conveyed that to the extent the CBI maintains accounts in Bahrain, they will require the kinds of scrutiny not normally anticipated when dealing with a central bank. He raised concern about information available to the USG indicating that financial institutions in Bahrain may be holding significant foreign exchange reserves for the CBI, and noted that given the CBI's conduct, this activity requires additional scrutiny. He also noted the December 2007 advisory issued by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) on a recent FATF statement on Iran, and urged Governor Al-Maraj to issue a similar statement.
10.(C) Governor Al-Maraj replied that, while CBB officials had verbally conveyed to all Bahraini financial institutions the need for caution in dealing with Iran, issuing a DFSA-style advisory would be politically difficult. He asked if U/S Levey had any specific concerns.
11.(S) U/S Levey said that the upcoming UNSCR on Iran would likely include language urging increased vigilance on all Iranian banks, specifically Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Under this scenario, the EU would probably follow with a designation of Bank Melli. U/S Levey noted that the CBI had been seen making very active attempts to evade sanctions in the run up to the UN designation of Bank Sepah, where the CBI funneled large influxes of cash from Sepah to its accounts in various countries in order to prevent these funds from being frozen. The CBB should anticipate and guard against any such attempts to evade sanctions on Melli. U/S Levey passed a nonpaper on the activities of Bank Melli.
12.(S) U/S Levey also raised specific concern with Arab Banking Corporation (ABC). According to information available to the USG, ABC continues to provide services to Iranian banks, including Bank Melli and the Central Bank of Iran is also trying to expand cooperation with ABC.
13.(C) On U.S. and UN sanctions, U/S Levey noted that the intent was not to punish Iran by crippling its banking system. Rather, these sanctions were in response to clear and specific instances of Iranian abuse of the international banking system to further its illicit aims. The USG sought Bahrain's assistance to prevent such attempts from succeeding.
14.(U) Post will report other U/S Levey meetings septel.
15.(U) Undersecretary Levey cleared this message.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
U/S LEVEY PROMOTES CHARITIES CONFERENCE, WARNS BANKERS ON IRAN
Reference ID 08MANAMA195
Created 2008-03-24 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO2889
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #0195/01 0841437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241437Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7707
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000195
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE ALSO FOR DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN IR BA
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY PROMOTES CHARITIES CONFERENCE, WARNS BANKERS ON IRAN
REF: A. MANAMA 168 B. MANAMA 138 C. MANAMA 117 D. 07 MANAMA 803 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher Henzel, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Treasury U/S Levey reiterated to banks the risks of engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions. U/S Levey said he expected the imminent U.S. designation of Future Bank. He told the Minister of Social Development about the importance of fund-raising oversight, and supported Bahrain's efforts to host a regional conference on charities. End Summary. ----------------- BANKERS CAUTIONED -----------------
2.(C) In a meeting with Ahli United Bank's (AUB) CEO Adel El-Labban on February 26, Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey discussed how the international community's message on the risks of doing business with Iran were taking hold globally (Ref. D). El-Labban acknowledged that in the current climate, any savvy banker sought to minimize Iranian exposure. He pointed to himself as an example. "Since we last met, we (AUB) have implemented what we discussed (Ref. D)." He said that a large group of Iranian bonds held by AUB would mature "in two months". Other holdings were declining on track toward zero. "We tend to minimize our contact with the Iranians. Our strategy is to stay away."
3.(C) U/S Levey pointed to a recent speech by Iran's Central Bank Governor declaring that Iran was receiving assistance from Bahrain and the UAE in mitigating the effects of UN sanctions. El-Labban observed that the CBB had affirmed its adherence to UN sanctions. To his knowledge, the Iranians had not received any cooperation from Bahraini institutions. He said he would not be surprised to learn that some banks in the UAE were more accommodating. Even so, El-Labban speculated that the composition of Iranian assets in the Gulf was fairly small compared to what might be found in Russia, China, or even Serbia. U/S Levey countered that the financial environments of those countries lacked the broad Iranian relationships that exists in the Gulf. -------------------------------- FUTURE BANK DESIGNATION IMMINENT --------------------------------
4.(C) U/S Levey told El-Labban that Future Bank would be designated by the U.S. in the coming weeks. El-Labban acknowledged that the designation was imminent. He requested that AUB's name be kept out of any announcement and asked if there was any tangible evidence of wrongdoing on Ahli United Bank's part. "Our intention to act is not based on particular misconduct of Ahli United Bank," U/S Levey replied. (Note: Treasury announced March 12 the designation of Future Bank under Executive Order 13382.) ----------------------------------- ABC, GIB CLAIM TO SHUN IRANIAN RISK -----------------------------------
5.(C) In separate meetings, U/S Levey also reiterated to Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) President and CEO Ghazi Abdul Jawad and Gulf International Bank (GIB) CEO Dr. Khalid Al-Fayez the risks of engaging in financial transactions with Iranian banks. Abdul Jawad said ABC had not extended credit to Iranian institutions "for a year and a half" and that any new transactions were handled on a referral basis. "We have done spot foreign exchange, but no new credit." Abdul Jawad said ABC had previously held substantial amounts of Iranian risk, but this had "come down substantially." He elaborated that ABC no longer confirmed Iranian letters of credit, and only used outstanding accounts to extract monies owed to ABC.
6.(C) On the potential threat posed by Iranian banks, GIB's Al-Fayez noted that his bank had been jointly formed by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments. "The last thing we want to do is embarrass them." As a sign of his bank's commitment to anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance principles, he noted that in the last two years, GIB's compliance department had grown from one officer to six. MANAMA 00000195 002 OF 002 ---------------------------- FOCUS ON CHARITY FUNDRAISING ----------------------------
7.(C) Minister of Social Development Dr. Fatima Bint Mohammed Al-Belooshi told U/S Levey that her ministry remains committed to ensuring that charitable giving occur in a forthright manner and that funds are not diverted to illicit ends.
8.(C) Minister Al-Belooshi highlighted Bahrain's NGO law as a vital tool in that effort. (Note: Under Bahrain's NGO law, NGOs must submit financial accounts to the ministry. These accounts must detail any extra-territorial expenditures, e.g., the Gaza Strip. Contributions surpassing BD 10,000 (USD 26,500) must be independently verified by an external auditor. End Note.)
9.(C) However, Minister Al-Belooshi confided that her ministry's resources were stretched beyond their limits. "There are 500 NGOs operating in Bahrain. We don't have the capacity to deal with this number." She also acknowledged that it would be difficult to monitor individuals or groups determined to distribute donations outside the established legal framework. She noted that her Ministry relied on the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) for reports of suspicious charitable transactions.
10.(C) U/S Levey shared a concept document invoking Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidance and noting that the MENAFATF, headquartered in Bahrain, has been active in developing a regional best practices paper on charities. The document reflects Bahrain's proposal to host a high-level regional conference on charities (Ref. B). According to Treasury's paper, the suggested outcomes of the conference could be: a) furthering the understanding of the terrorist financing risk through charities; b) discussing current approaches and best practices; and c) securing commitments to undertake specific steps as a way forward.
11.(C) Minister Al-Belooshi welcomed the paper and commented that the conference would foster improved oversight of charity fundraising. However, she suspected that NGO's would be "among the first to oppose it." Adding, "Already they are complaining that we monitor their financial transactions too closely." She said that her answer to such objections was to point out the risk of being victimized and subsequently smeared by fraudulent transactions. "You don't want anyone to put an X, on you." (Comment: Activists, complaints about the GOB's oversight of NGOs are indeed numerous. See Ref. A for an example.) ------------------ OTHER GOB MEETINGS ------------------
12.(C) While in Bahrain February 26, U/S Levey also met with Central Bank Governor Rasheed Al-Maraj, Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa (Ref. B) and Minister of Justice Shaikh Khalid Bin Ali Bin Abdulla Al-Khalifa (Ref. C).
13.(U) Undersecretary Levey cleared this message.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-03-24 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO2889
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #0195/01 0841437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241437Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7707
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000195
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE ALSO FOR DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN IR BA
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY PROMOTES CHARITIES CONFERENCE, WARNS BANKERS ON IRAN
REF: A. MANAMA 168 B. MANAMA 138 C. MANAMA 117 D. 07 MANAMA 803 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher Henzel, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Treasury U/S Levey reiterated to banks the risks of engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions. U/S Levey said he expected the imminent U.S. designation of Future Bank. He told the Minister of Social Development about the importance of fund-raising oversight, and supported Bahrain's efforts to host a regional conference on charities. End Summary. ----------------- BANKERS CAUTIONED -----------------
2.(C) In a meeting with Ahli United Bank's (AUB) CEO Adel El-Labban on February 26, Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey discussed how the international community's message on the risks of doing business with Iran were taking hold globally (Ref. D). El-Labban acknowledged that in the current climate, any savvy banker sought to minimize Iranian exposure. He pointed to himself as an example. "Since we last met, we (AUB) have implemented what we discussed (Ref. D)." He said that a large group of Iranian bonds held by AUB would mature "in two months". Other holdings were declining on track toward zero. "We tend to minimize our contact with the Iranians. Our strategy is to stay away."
3.(C) U/S Levey pointed to a recent speech by Iran's Central Bank Governor declaring that Iran was receiving assistance from Bahrain and the UAE in mitigating the effects of UN sanctions. El-Labban observed that the CBB had affirmed its adherence to UN sanctions. To his knowledge, the Iranians had not received any cooperation from Bahraini institutions. He said he would not be surprised to learn that some banks in the UAE were more accommodating. Even so, El-Labban speculated that the composition of Iranian assets in the Gulf was fairly small compared to what might be found in Russia, China, or even Serbia. U/S Levey countered that the financial environments of those countries lacked the broad Iranian relationships that exists in the Gulf. -------------------------------- FUTURE BANK DESIGNATION IMMINENT --------------------------------
4.(C) U/S Levey told El-Labban that Future Bank would be designated by the U.S. in the coming weeks. El-Labban acknowledged that the designation was imminent. He requested that AUB's name be kept out of any announcement and asked if there was any tangible evidence of wrongdoing on Ahli United Bank's part. "Our intention to act is not based on particular misconduct of Ahli United Bank," U/S Levey replied. (Note: Treasury announced March 12 the designation of Future Bank under Executive Order 13382.) ----------------------------------- ABC, GIB CLAIM TO SHUN IRANIAN RISK -----------------------------------
5.(C) In separate meetings, U/S Levey also reiterated to Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) President and CEO Ghazi Abdul Jawad and Gulf International Bank (GIB) CEO Dr. Khalid Al-Fayez the risks of engaging in financial transactions with Iranian banks. Abdul Jawad said ABC had not extended credit to Iranian institutions "for a year and a half" and that any new transactions were handled on a referral basis. "We have done spot foreign exchange, but no new credit." Abdul Jawad said ABC had previously held substantial amounts of Iranian risk, but this had "come down substantially." He elaborated that ABC no longer confirmed Iranian letters of credit, and only used outstanding accounts to extract monies owed to ABC.
6.(C) On the potential threat posed by Iranian banks, GIB's Al-Fayez noted that his bank had been jointly formed by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments. "The last thing we want to do is embarrass them." As a sign of his bank's commitment to anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance principles, he noted that in the last two years, GIB's compliance department had grown from one officer to six. MANAMA 00000195 002 OF 002 ---------------------------- FOCUS ON CHARITY FUNDRAISING ----------------------------
7.(C) Minister of Social Development Dr. Fatima Bint Mohammed Al-Belooshi told U/S Levey that her ministry remains committed to ensuring that charitable giving occur in a forthright manner and that funds are not diverted to illicit ends.
8.(C) Minister Al-Belooshi highlighted Bahrain's NGO law as a vital tool in that effort. (Note: Under Bahrain's NGO law, NGOs must submit financial accounts to the ministry. These accounts must detail any extra-territorial expenditures, e.g., the Gaza Strip. Contributions surpassing BD 10,000 (USD 26,500) must be independently verified by an external auditor. End Note.)
9.(C) However, Minister Al-Belooshi confided that her ministry's resources were stretched beyond their limits. "There are 500 NGOs operating in Bahrain. We don't have the capacity to deal with this number." She also acknowledged that it would be difficult to monitor individuals or groups determined to distribute donations outside the established legal framework. She noted that her Ministry relied on the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) for reports of suspicious charitable transactions.
10.(C) U/S Levey shared a concept document invoking Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidance and noting that the MENAFATF, headquartered in Bahrain, has been active in developing a regional best practices paper on charities. The document reflects Bahrain's proposal to host a high-level regional conference on charities (Ref. B). According to Treasury's paper, the suggested outcomes of the conference could be: a) furthering the understanding of the terrorist financing risk through charities; b) discussing current approaches and best practices; and c) securing commitments to undertake specific steps as a way forward.
11.(C) Minister Al-Belooshi welcomed the paper and commented that the conference would foster improved oversight of charity fundraising. However, she suspected that NGO's would be "among the first to oppose it." Adding, "Already they are complaining that we monitor their financial transactions too closely." She said that her answer to such objections was to point out the risk of being victimized and subsequently smeared by fraudulent transactions. "You don't want anyone to put an X, on you." (Comment: Activists, complaints about the GOB's oversight of NGOs are indeed numerous. See Ref. A for an example.) ------------------ OTHER GOB MEETINGS ------------------
12.(C) While in Bahrain February 26, U/S Levey also met with Central Bank Governor Rasheed Al-Maraj, Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa (Ref. B) and Minister of Justice Shaikh Khalid Bin Ali Bin Abdulla Al-Khalifa (Ref. C).
13.(U) Undersecretary Levey cleared this message.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
SCENESETTER FOR CNO VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Reference ID 08MANAMA235
Created 2008-04-10 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO8786
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0235/01 1011354
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101354Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7764
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000235
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FROM AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS IR BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CNO VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------- Overview --------
1.(S) Admiral Roughhead, Embassy Manama is delighted to welcome you to Bahrain. This is as good a bilateral relationship as we have anywhere: Bahrain,s leaders share our strategic vision for the region and they identify their national interest as tied to ours.
2.(S) Your visit comes on the heels of a very successful visit by King Hamad to Washington. You will find the leadership focused on missile defense, coastal radar upgrades, and the return of Navy dependents. Multilateral air and maritime defense initiatives have been a subject of steady follow-up with the Bahrainis since Secretary Gates, meetings with regional Chiefs of Staff on the margins of the Manama Dialogue in December 2007.
3.(S) On the political side, the Bahraini leadership will be outspoken in its condemnation of Iranian actions and behavior and will probe you on our plans for dealing with this threat. On April 21, Bahrain will host a meeting of GCC plus 2 Foreign Ministers, which will include Secretary Rice. During the King,s visit, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Cooperation, the first of its kind in the Gulf. Internally, political conditions in Bahrain remain tense and unsettled. ---------------------------------------- Missile Defense and Regional Cooperation ----------------------------------------
4.(S) The top security priority for Bahrain,s leadership is missile defense. King Hamad told Secretary Gates on March 26 that Bahrain has assessed the need for three Patriot firing units to cover the island. He said that that he hoped the U.S. would provide one, while Bahrain would buy or lease the other two. A Patriot firing unit will temporarily deploy to Bahrain in May as part of the annual GCC military exercise, Eagle Resolve. OSD is examining a number of options for providing a longer-term solution, including re-deployment to the region of some of the Patriot units currently based in the United States as well as the periodic deployment of SM-2 and SM-3 equipped AEGIS cruisers.
5.(S) The most significant deliverable to come out of the SecDef,s December meetings in Manama with Chiefs of Staff from the GCC and Jordan is the recognition that effective regional air and maritime defense requires multilateral cooperation. On that basis, OSD has launched a number of initiatives to develop multilateral capabilities. In February, NAVCENT hosted a Maritime Infrastructure Symposium which was attended by representatives from the GCC and some NATO countries. On 22-23 June, Air Force Chief of Staff Mosley will bring together in Bahrain Air Chiefs from the GCC plus Jordan to develop a way-ahead for shared early warning and regional, mutual air defense. The Air Chiefs from the GCC Jordan and Egypt will be invited to participate. ------------------------------------- Coastal Defense and Maritime Security -------------------------------------
6.(S) The Government of Bahrain is very concerned about its vulnerability to maritime threats ranging from piracy, to drug trafficking, to terrorism. Enhancing coastal defense and maritime security is a priority second only to missile defense. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) has embarked on an ambitious program to enhance the counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities of its Coast Guard Special Units. We have seen considerable commitment and improvement.
7.(S) For this reason, the Embassy strongly supports a NAVCENT-initiated Section 1206 funded proposal to upgrade Bahrain,s Coastal Surveillance Radar. If approved, this proposal would significantly improve Bahrain,s maritime security capability and send a strong message of support to the government at a time of steep reductions in FMF and IMET funding. Under this proposal the Bahrain Navy will receive new equipment that will augment the system already owned by the Bahrain Coast Guard. The picture will be shared with the Bahrain Coast Guard, Bahrain Military Intelligence, and the U.S. Navy. The radar picture can potentially be shared with MANAMA 00000235 002 OF 003 other countries in the region. ------------------ Royal Bahrain Navy ------------------
8.(S) On March 4, Bahrain's navy took command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, the coalition maritime force that patrols the central and southern Arabian Gulf. It is the first time a Gulf state has commanded a coalition military operation. The Royal Bahrain Navy has been struggling to keep its frigate, Sabha (Jack Williams), sea worthy. Low budgets and a lack of a professional NCO Corps have allowed relatively minor problems to hamper readiness. NAVCENT has provided extensive support in order to maintain the Sabha,s operability, but it is overdue for DSRA. NAVSEA will conduct a ship check in June 2008 to determine what repairs are required.
9.(S) The RBN will receive 6 Boston Whaler Boats in July 2008. These boats were procured through section 1206 authority. Two Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats will be procured through section 1206 and will be delivered in 2009. -------------------- U.S. Navy Dependents --------------------
10.(S) Secretary Gates told the King during their meeting in Washington in March that Navy dependents would begin returning as soon as this month and that families could begin returning as early as this summer. The Crown Prince is a strong advocate for the people-to-people contacts fostered by having Navy families in Bahrain. He views this as important to maintaining domestic support for his strategy of alignment with the U.S. The Crown Prince is, himself, a graduate of the DoD Bahrain School, and his son will graduate from the school at the end of the academic year. -------------------------------------- Regional Security - GCC plus 2 and GSD --------------------------------------
11.(S) King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman are playing a leading role in strengthening security cooperation among GCC states and with the United States. Bahrain pushed to host the GCC plus 2 (Egypt, Jordan) Foreign Ministers. It is scheduled to take place in Manama on April 21, with Secretary Rice representing the United States. The goal of this gathering, in the words of Bahrain,s Foreign Minister, is to show the region, and Iran, that there is "an alliance that will not stand by and watch countries fall to Iran one by one."
12.(C) The Foreign Minister has also agreed to invite Iraqi FM Zebari in an effort to reach out to Al-Maliki,s government. In addition, the FM confirmed during the King,s Washington visit that Bahrain would soon return its ambassador to Baghdad.
13.(C) The Crown Prince chaired the November 2007 iteration of the Gulf Security Dialogue here in Manama. We anticipate that he will lead Bahrain,s delegation for the proposed GSD talks this coming June. He strongly supports GSD and has advocated taking a more strategic approach to the discussions. ------------------- Nuclear Cooperation -------------------
14.(S) In nuclear energy, as with regional security, Bahrain is leading by example and demonstrating to others in the Gulf how to be on the right side of an issue. On March 26, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, as well as a statement of support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Bahrain is also seeking an invitation to participate in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Bahrain,s example provided a marked counterpoint to Iran,s ilicit pursuit of nuclear technology. -------------- Internal Issues ---------------
15.C) Internally, conditions in Bahrain continue to smmer. Small but violent bands of Shi'a underclas youth, MANAMA 00000235 003 OF 003 frustrated with persistent discrimination and what they perceive as too gradual a pace of reform, clash with police nearly every week. The Sunni minority, which rules the country and controls all security forces, has generally acted with restraint, but as last December's riots showed, an accidental death or other mistake can lead to larger confrontations. The opposition Shi'a Wifaq party, the largest in parliament, has acted responsibly to quiet Shi'a hot-heads, but more radical elements continue to provoke violence in the hope of exploiting it for political gain. The most recent and disturbing escalation of violence occurred the evening of April 9, when a policeman was killed in the Shi,a village of Kazarkhan by youths who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, igniting his vehicle.
16.(S) There are also extremists among the Sunni minority. In January, a court sentenced three local Sunnis to time served (six months), after finding them guilty of conspiring with Al-Qaeda operatives outside Bahrain to commit acts of terror in the country. While the sentence was disappointing to us and to the leadership of Bahrain's security establishment, their conviction represented a first, successful test of the 2006 counterterorrism law. Bahraini security appears to be keeping a close watch on the convicts and their sympathizers.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-04-10 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO8786
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0235/01 1011354
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101354Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7764
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000235
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FROM AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS IR BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CNO VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------- Overview --------
1.(S) Admiral Roughhead, Embassy Manama is delighted to welcome you to Bahrain. This is as good a bilateral relationship as we have anywhere: Bahrain,s leaders share our strategic vision for the region and they identify their national interest as tied to ours.
2.(S) Your visit comes on the heels of a very successful visit by King Hamad to Washington. You will find the leadership focused on missile defense, coastal radar upgrades, and the return of Navy dependents. Multilateral air and maritime defense initiatives have been a subject of steady follow-up with the Bahrainis since Secretary Gates, meetings with regional Chiefs of Staff on the margins of the Manama Dialogue in December 2007.
3.(S) On the political side, the Bahraini leadership will be outspoken in its condemnation of Iranian actions and behavior and will probe you on our plans for dealing with this threat. On April 21, Bahrain will host a meeting of GCC plus 2 Foreign Ministers, which will include Secretary Rice. During the King,s visit, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Cooperation, the first of its kind in the Gulf. Internally, political conditions in Bahrain remain tense and unsettled. ---------------------------------------- Missile Defense and Regional Cooperation ----------------------------------------
4.(S) The top security priority for Bahrain,s leadership is missile defense. King Hamad told Secretary Gates on March 26 that Bahrain has assessed the need for three Patriot firing units to cover the island. He said that that he hoped the U.S. would provide one, while Bahrain would buy or lease the other two. A Patriot firing unit will temporarily deploy to Bahrain in May as part of the annual GCC military exercise, Eagle Resolve. OSD is examining a number of options for providing a longer-term solution, including re-deployment to the region of some of the Patriot units currently based in the United States as well as the periodic deployment of SM-2 and SM-3 equipped AEGIS cruisers.
5.(S) The most significant deliverable to come out of the SecDef,s December meetings in Manama with Chiefs of Staff from the GCC and Jordan is the recognition that effective regional air and maritime defense requires multilateral cooperation. On that basis, OSD has launched a number of initiatives to develop multilateral capabilities. In February, NAVCENT hosted a Maritime Infrastructure Symposium which was attended by representatives from the GCC and some NATO countries. On 22-23 June, Air Force Chief of Staff Mosley will bring together in Bahrain Air Chiefs from the GCC plus Jordan to develop a way-ahead for shared early warning and regional, mutual air defense. The Air Chiefs from the GCC Jordan and Egypt will be invited to participate. ------------------------------------- Coastal Defense and Maritime Security -------------------------------------
6.(S) The Government of Bahrain is very concerned about its vulnerability to maritime threats ranging from piracy, to drug trafficking, to terrorism. Enhancing coastal defense and maritime security is a priority second only to missile defense. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) has embarked on an ambitious program to enhance the counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities of its Coast Guard Special Units. We have seen considerable commitment and improvement.
7.(S) For this reason, the Embassy strongly supports a NAVCENT-initiated Section 1206 funded proposal to upgrade Bahrain,s Coastal Surveillance Radar. If approved, this proposal would significantly improve Bahrain,s maritime security capability and send a strong message of support to the government at a time of steep reductions in FMF and IMET funding. Under this proposal the Bahrain Navy will receive new equipment that will augment the system already owned by the Bahrain Coast Guard. The picture will be shared with the Bahrain Coast Guard, Bahrain Military Intelligence, and the U.S. Navy. The radar picture can potentially be shared with MANAMA 00000235 002 OF 003 other countries in the region. ------------------ Royal Bahrain Navy ------------------
8.(S) On March 4, Bahrain's navy took command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, the coalition maritime force that patrols the central and southern Arabian Gulf. It is the first time a Gulf state has commanded a coalition military operation. The Royal Bahrain Navy has been struggling to keep its frigate, Sabha (Jack Williams), sea worthy. Low budgets and a lack of a professional NCO Corps have allowed relatively minor problems to hamper readiness. NAVCENT has provided extensive support in order to maintain the Sabha,s operability, but it is overdue for DSRA. NAVSEA will conduct a ship check in June 2008 to determine what repairs are required.
9.(S) The RBN will receive 6 Boston Whaler Boats in July 2008. These boats were procured through section 1206 authority. Two Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats will be procured through section 1206 and will be delivered in 2009. -------------------- U.S. Navy Dependents --------------------
10.(S) Secretary Gates told the King during their meeting in Washington in March that Navy dependents would begin returning as soon as this month and that families could begin returning as early as this summer. The Crown Prince is a strong advocate for the people-to-people contacts fostered by having Navy families in Bahrain. He views this as important to maintaining domestic support for his strategy of alignment with the U.S. The Crown Prince is, himself, a graduate of the DoD Bahrain School, and his son will graduate from the school at the end of the academic year. -------------------------------------- Regional Security - GCC plus 2 and GSD --------------------------------------
11.(S) King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman are playing a leading role in strengthening security cooperation among GCC states and with the United States. Bahrain pushed to host the GCC plus 2 (Egypt, Jordan) Foreign Ministers. It is scheduled to take place in Manama on April 21, with Secretary Rice representing the United States. The goal of this gathering, in the words of Bahrain,s Foreign Minister, is to show the region, and Iran, that there is "an alliance that will not stand by and watch countries fall to Iran one by one."
12.(C) The Foreign Minister has also agreed to invite Iraqi FM Zebari in an effort to reach out to Al-Maliki,s government. In addition, the FM confirmed during the King,s Washington visit that Bahrain would soon return its ambassador to Baghdad.
13.(C) The Crown Prince chaired the November 2007 iteration of the Gulf Security Dialogue here in Manama. We anticipate that he will lead Bahrain,s delegation for the proposed GSD talks this coming June. He strongly supports GSD and has advocated taking a more strategic approach to the discussions. ------------------- Nuclear Cooperation -------------------
14.(S) In nuclear energy, as with regional security, Bahrain is leading by example and demonstrating to others in the Gulf how to be on the right side of an issue. On March 26, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, as well as a statement of support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Bahrain is also seeking an invitation to participate in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Bahrain,s example provided a marked counterpoint to Iran,s ilicit pursuit of nuclear technology. -------------- Internal Issues ---------------
15.C) Internally, conditions in Bahrain continue to smmer. Small but violent bands of Shi'a underclas youth, MANAMA 00000235 003 OF 003 frustrated with persistent discrimination and what they perceive as too gradual a pace of reform, clash with police nearly every week. The Sunni minority, which rules the country and controls all security forces, has generally acted with restraint, but as last December's riots showed, an accidental death or other mistake can lead to larger confrontations. The opposition Shi'a Wifaq party, the largest in parliament, has acted responsibly to quiet Shi'a hot-heads, but more radical elements continue to provoke violence in the hope of exploiting it for political gain. The most recent and disturbing escalation of violence occurred the evening of April 9, when a policeman was killed in the Shi,a village of Kazarkhan by youths who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, igniting his vehicle.
16.(S) There are also extremists among the Sunni minority. In January, a court sentenced three local Sunnis to time served (six months), after finding them guilty of conspiring with Al-Qaeda operatives outside Bahrain to commit acts of terror in the country. While the sentence was disappointing to us and to the leadership of Bahrain's security establishment, their conviction represented a first, successful test of the 2006 counterterorrism law. Bahraini security appears to be keeping a close watch on the convicts and their sympathizers.
ERELI
Source: Wikileaks
OIL MINISTER ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NATURAL GAS
Reference ID 08MANAMA306
Created 2008-05-15 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO5248
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0306 1361420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151420Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7853
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000306
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
TAGS: ENRG EPET PREL IR BA
SUBJECT: OIL MINISTER ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NATURAL GAS
REF: A. MANAMA 298
¶B. MANAMA 237
¶C. MANAMA 156
D.07 MANAMA 1070 E. 07 MANAMA 1045 F. 07 MANAMA 982 Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1.(C) Summary. Bahrain is in the early stages of mapping out a nuclear energy strategy for the longer term, according to a key minister. Bahrain's energy problem is more immediate, and while the GOB claims Iran will be its natural gas supplier of last resort, talks with Iran continue. The oil minister reiterated GOB appeals for the USG to nudge Riyadh to be more sympathetic to Bahraini approaches over the Abu Safa field. End Summary.
2.(C) Minister of Oil and Gas Affairs Dr. Abdul Hussein Ali Mirza told CDA May 7 that the Bahraini government is selecting the membership of an inter-ministerial committee that will convene this summer to deliberate over the GOB's nuclear energy policy. Building or buying a reactor for Bahrain was one of the "long term" options the committee will research for the country's leadership. Mirza will be on the committee. He is also chairman of the GOB's tender board, which would play an important role in any decision to purchase civil nuclear capabilities.
3.(C) Mirza said that while Bahraini officials wished to explore the feasibility of developing nuclear energy, there had so far been "no decision on the part of the Government to build a nuclear reactor in Bahrain." As Bahrain's oil reserves dwindled, he said, Bahrain faced an urgent need for new sources of cheap energy, and was seeking them from regional natural gas suppliers (refs B, C and D.) By contrast, he said, nuclear power was an option for ten to fifteen years out, and might be developed in concert with GCC neighbors or unilaterally. -------------------------------- GAS PROSPECTS YET TO MATERIALIZE --------------------------------
4.(C) Mirza said Bahrain continues its efforts to obtain cheap natural gas from Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Iran. Iran remained the most forthcoming of the three, but even those negotiations were progressing slowly. There was still no agreement on whether gas would be transported by tanker or pipeline, how new infrastructure would be financed, or even which Iranian field it might be drawn from. Nevertheless, he said that during Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's November 17, 2007 visit to Bahrain, Ahmedinejad had asserted to senior GOB officials that Iran was eager to provide natural gas (ref E). Mirza added that Iranian Energy Minister Parviz Fattah told him at the April 20-22 International Energy Forum in Rome that Iran hoped to conclude an agreement with Bahrain by the end of 2008.
5.(C) CDA reminded Mirza that the U.S. objected strongly to any such deal. Mirza reiterated that Iranian gas was Bahrain's least favored option (ref D), but argued that stability in Bahrain "can only be assured if we have energy." CDA pointed out that relying on Iran for natural gas would put Bahrain in much the position Ukraine is to Russia and was hardly a reliable foundation for development or stability. Mirza acknowledged that this was a serious concern and was a drawback to the Iranian option. He lamented the lack of progress in gas talks with Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and reiterated other Bahraini leaders, appeals (ref C) for the USG to ask the Saudis to respond positively to Bahraini requests for more transparency on the joint Bahraini-Saudi Abu Safa field.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-05-15 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO5248
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0306 1361420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151420Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7853
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000306
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
TAGS: ENRG EPET PREL IR BA
SUBJECT: OIL MINISTER ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NATURAL GAS
REF: A. MANAMA 298
¶B. MANAMA 237
¶C. MANAMA 156
D.07 MANAMA 1070 E. 07 MANAMA 1045 F. 07 MANAMA 982 Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1.(C) Summary. Bahrain is in the early stages of mapping out a nuclear energy strategy for the longer term, according to a key minister. Bahrain's energy problem is more immediate, and while the GOB claims Iran will be its natural gas supplier of last resort, talks with Iran continue. The oil minister reiterated GOB appeals for the USG to nudge Riyadh to be more sympathetic to Bahraini approaches over the Abu Safa field. End Summary.
2.(C) Minister of Oil and Gas Affairs Dr. Abdul Hussein Ali Mirza told CDA May 7 that the Bahraini government is selecting the membership of an inter-ministerial committee that will convene this summer to deliberate over the GOB's nuclear energy policy. Building or buying a reactor for Bahrain was one of the "long term" options the committee will research for the country's leadership. Mirza will be on the committee. He is also chairman of the GOB's tender board, which would play an important role in any decision to purchase civil nuclear capabilities.
3.(C) Mirza said that while Bahraini officials wished to explore the feasibility of developing nuclear energy, there had so far been "no decision on the part of the Government to build a nuclear reactor in Bahrain." As Bahrain's oil reserves dwindled, he said, Bahrain faced an urgent need for new sources of cheap energy, and was seeking them from regional natural gas suppliers (refs B, C and D.) By contrast, he said, nuclear power was an option for ten to fifteen years out, and might be developed in concert with GCC neighbors or unilaterally. -------------------------------- GAS PROSPECTS YET TO MATERIALIZE --------------------------------
4.(C) Mirza said Bahrain continues its efforts to obtain cheap natural gas from Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Iran. Iran remained the most forthcoming of the three, but even those negotiations were progressing slowly. There was still no agreement on whether gas would be transported by tanker or pipeline, how new infrastructure would be financed, or even which Iranian field it might be drawn from. Nevertheless, he said that during Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's November 17, 2007 visit to Bahrain, Ahmedinejad had asserted to senior GOB officials that Iran was eager to provide natural gas (ref E). Mirza added that Iranian Energy Minister Parviz Fattah told him at the April 20-22 International Energy Forum in Rome that Iran hoped to conclude an agreement with Bahrain by the end of 2008.
5.(C) CDA reminded Mirza that the U.S. objected strongly to any such deal. Mirza reiterated that Iranian gas was Bahrain's least favored option (ref D), but argued that stability in Bahrain "can only be assured if we have energy." CDA pointed out that relying on Iran for natural gas would put Bahrain in much the position Ukraine is to Russia and was hardly a reliable foundation for development or stability. Mirza acknowledged that this was a serious concern and was a drawback to the Iranian option. He lamented the lack of progress in gas talks with Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and reiterated other Bahraini leaders, appeals (ref C) for the USG to ask the Saudis to respond positively to Bahraini requests for more transparency on the joint Bahraini-Saudi Abu Safa field.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
BAHRAIN'S KING PRAISES U.S. NAVY'S ROLE IN REGION
Reference ID 08MANAMA458
Created 2008-07-10 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO3801
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0458 1921321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101321Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7984
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0239
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000458
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR IR BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN'S KING PRAISES U.S. NAVY'S ROLE IN REGION
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1.(U) NAVCENT/U.S. Fifth Fleet/Combined Maritime Forces Commander Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff paid a farewell call on Bahrain's King Hamad July 3, accompanied by his successor, Vice Admiral William Gortney, and by Ambassador.
¶2. (C) During the half hour audience, the King praised the U.S. Navy for its decades of support not only for Bahrain's security, but for the whole region's. The King said he always stressed to fellow GCC leaders the "geo-strategic" benefit of the U.S. naval presence.
¶3. (C) The King noted with satisfaction that while Bahrain was at one time the only regional state with a significant U.S. military presence, several GCC neighbors now also hosted large U.S. military facilities.
¶4. (C) Admiral Cosgriff thanked the King for Bahrain's support for the Navy, and commended the service of Bahraini Brigadier Abdullah Mansoori as Commander of Coalition Task Force 152 from March through June of this year. (CTF 152 patrols the central Gulf.) Mansoori was the first GCC officer to command a Coalition naval task force, and Cosgriff noted that his appointment had had a positive effect on the other GCC navies; several were now expressing interest in greater cooperation/participation with the Coalition.
¶5. (SBU) The King also welcomed Ambassador's return from Iraq to Bahrain for Embassy's Independence Day reception July 3 and the NAVCENT change of command ceremony July 5. The King urged the Ambassador to make regular visits to Bahrain as frequently as possible.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-07-10 13:01
Released 2011-02-18
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO3801
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0458 1921321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101321Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7984
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0239
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000458
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR IR BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN'S KING PRAISES U.S. NAVY'S ROLE IN REGION
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1.(U) NAVCENT/U.S. Fifth Fleet/Combined Maritime Forces Commander Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff paid a farewell call on Bahrain's King Hamad July 3, accompanied by his successor, Vice Admiral William Gortney, and by Ambassador.
¶2. (C) During the half hour audience, the King praised the U.S. Navy for its decades of support not only for Bahrain's security, but for the whole region's. The King said he always stressed to fellow GCC leaders the "geo-strategic" benefit of the U.S. naval presence.
¶3. (C) The King noted with satisfaction that while Bahrain was at one time the only regional state with a significant U.S. military presence, several GCC neighbors now also hosted large U.S. military facilities.
¶4. (C) Admiral Cosgriff thanked the King for Bahrain's support for the Navy, and commended the service of Bahraini Brigadier Abdullah Mansoori as Commander of Coalition Task Force 152 from March through June of this year. (CTF 152 patrols the central Gulf.) Mansoori was the first GCC officer to command a Coalition naval task force, and Cosgriff noted that his appointment had had a positive effect on the other GCC navies; several were now expressing interest in greater cooperation/participation with the Coalition.
¶5. (SBU) The King also welcomed Ambassador's return from Iraq to Bahrain for Embassy's Independence Day reception July 3 and the NAVCENT change of command ceremony July 5. The King urged the Ambassador to make regular visits to Bahrain as frequently as possible.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
BAHRAIN'S CROWN PRINCE ON IRAN AND GULF SECURITY
Reference ID 08MANAMA470
Created 2008-07-14 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO6410
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0470 1961409
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141409Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7989
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0241
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 000470
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR IR BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN'S CROWN PRINCE ON IRAN AND GULF SECURITY
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(S) Summary: Bahrain's Crown Prince called on the U.S. and Bahraini militaries to update their plans for communication and cooperation in view of heightened Iranian rhetoric. End summary.
2.(C) NAVCENT commander Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, accompanied by Charge, paid an introductory call July 10 on Bahrain's Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa. After warmly welcoming Gortney and praising the Navy's close relationship with Bahrain, the CP sought Gortney's assessment of Iran's ongoing military exercises. The CP commented that the Iranians were reported to be plotting attacks on Gulf rulers. "They are trying to scare us, but it's not working." He described the struggle against violent extremists, whether of the Al-Qaeda variety or the Iranian, as a "generational struggle" that the Gulf states need to wage in partnership with the U.S. Update Plans ------------
3.(S) The CP referred to current heightened public rhetoric about military action and response options, particularly Iranian threats to strike U.S. bases in the Gulf, which he said would presumably include U.S. Navy facilities in Bahrain. The CP stressed the importance of maintaining close lines of communication and cooperation between the U.S. and Bahrain. Admiral Gortney noted the Navy would continue to work closely with the Bahrain Defense Force, furthering the strong relationship that we already enjoy. Charge added that CENTAF Commander General North's June conference of GCC Air Chiefs in Bahrain had gone well, and will be followed by further, more technical talks. The recent BMD exercise involving U.S. Fifth Fleet AEGIS ships and Patriot batteries in Bahrain and the UAE sent a useful message to Iran, and additional USG decisions related to missile defense should come soon. Charge also noted that Embassy Manama's Office of Military Cooperation, in coordination with CENTCOM, is reviving the U.S.-Bahrain Military Planning Committee, and that it will meet this fall for the first time in five years. The CP welcomed these developments, indicated the importance of coordination at the working level, and commented that he will probably be in Washington in early September and will seek meetings at DoD.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-07-14 14:02
Released 2011-02-18
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO6410
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0470 1961409
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141409Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7989
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0241
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAMA 000470
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR IR BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN'S CROWN PRINCE ON IRAN AND GULF SECURITY
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(S) Summary: Bahrain's Crown Prince called on the U.S. and Bahraini militaries to update their plans for communication and cooperation in view of heightened Iranian rhetoric. End summary.
2.(C) NAVCENT commander Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, accompanied by Charge, paid an introductory call July 10 on Bahrain's Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa. After warmly welcoming Gortney and praising the Navy's close relationship with Bahrain, the CP sought Gortney's assessment of Iran's ongoing military exercises. The CP commented that the Iranians were reported to be plotting attacks on Gulf rulers. "They are trying to scare us, but it's not working." He described the struggle against violent extremists, whether of the Al-Qaeda variety or the Iranian, as a "generational struggle" that the Gulf states need to wage in partnership with the U.S. Update Plans ------------
3.(S) The CP referred to current heightened public rhetoric about military action and response options, particularly Iranian threats to strike U.S. bases in the Gulf, which he said would presumably include U.S. Navy facilities in Bahrain. The CP stressed the importance of maintaining close lines of communication and cooperation between the U.S. and Bahrain. Admiral Gortney noted the Navy would continue to work closely with the Bahrain Defense Force, furthering the strong relationship that we already enjoy. Charge added that CENTAF Commander General North's June conference of GCC Air Chiefs in Bahrain had gone well, and will be followed by further, more technical talks. The recent BMD exercise involving U.S. Fifth Fleet AEGIS ships and Patriot batteries in Bahrain and the UAE sent a useful message to Iran, and additional USG decisions related to missile defense should come soon. Charge also noted that Embassy Manama's Office of Military Cooperation, in coordination with CENTCOM, is reviving the U.S.-Bahrain Military Planning Committee, and that it will meet this fall for the first time in five years. The CP welcomed these developments, indicated the importance of coordination at the working level, and commented that he will probably be in Washington in early September and will seek meetings at DoD.
HENZEL
Source: Wikileaks
2/21 STAFFDEL TALWAR VISIT: IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA/LEBANON, NATO/DARFUR, HAMAS, REGIONAL REFORM, COUNTERTERRORISM
Reference ID 06PARIS1236
Created 2006-02-28 11:11
Released 2011-02-25
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO1423
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1236/01 0591143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281143Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4616
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001236
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/28/2016
TAGS: PREL IR PARM IZ SY LE KPAL IS KDEM PTER SU
FR
SUBJECT: 2/21 STAFFDEL TALWAR VISIT: IRAN, IRAQ,
SYRIA/LEBANON, NATO/DARFUR, HAMAS, REGIONAL REFORM,
COUNTERTERRORISM
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Professional Staff Members Puneet Talwar and Tomicah Tilleman
met a series of senior French officials February 21, in
discussions that addressed Iran, Iraq, Syria/Lebanon,
NATO/Darfur, Hamas, regional reform, and counterterrorism.
On Iran, Chirac's Middle East advisor assessed that
international sanctions would pose real hardships for the
Iranian regime, and suggested that sanctions should be
gradual, consensus-driven, and target the regime. MFA policy
planning staff confirmed that Iran sanctions options under
GoF consideration included bans on travel, investment, and
students. On Iraq, Chirac's Middle East advisor called for a
"perspective" for a departure of foreign troops to help split
terrorists from Sunni resistance. On Syria, Elysee officials
emphasized French support for behavior change (vice regime
change), and criticized former VP Khaddam. MFA officials
suggested willingness to consider a NATO contribution in
Darfur, while strongly emphasizing resource concerns and the
need for the U.S. to offer a commitment. On Hamas, French
officials reaffirmed the GoF's no-contact policy, while
stressing the downsides of a cut-off in international
assistance to Palestinians. MFA officials voiced familiar
views on protecting EU equities in the BMENA efforts. A
senior Ministry of Interior advisor revealed details of a
new, values-based and pro-American foreign policy platform
for presidential hopeful/Interior Minister Sarkozy, while
praising U.S.-French cooperation on counterterrorism. End
summary.
ELYSEE ON IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA/LEBANON
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) On Iran, Elysee Middle East advisor Dominique Boche
assessed that the Ahmadinejad regime was going through an
initial phase of "militancy" built on unrealistic
assumptions. In this initial phase, Iran would pose problems
on several fronts, through its obstinacy on the nuclear
issue; efforts to exercise influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
and the Palestinian territories; and a broader attempt to
gain sympathy in the Islamic world via statements denying the
Holocaust or calling for Israel's destruction. The latter
Iranian strategy, Boche observed, was intended to appeal to
Muslims' widespread resentment of a perceived
"double-standard" vis-a-vis Israel, and thereby put moderate
Arab governments in great difficulty.
¶3. (C) Boche voiced optimism on middle term prospects for
Iran, concluding that Iran would come to realize that it
needed external support and would face international
sanctions with difficulty. In the case of petroleum
sanctions, Boche observed that Iran remained vulnerable due
its low refinery capacity, which forced it to import oil from
India. On possible civair sanctions, Boche noted that some 2
million Iranian travelers could be affected by such a ban.
Once the Iranian population saw the isolation provoked by the
regime's policies, Boche concluded, moderates would have a
window to assert a voice. Asked for further detail of
French thinking on sanctions, Boche observed that no
decisions had been made and that the GoF had found economic
sanctions, in past experience, to be "rarely effective."
For sanctions to be successful they would have to proceed
gradually, reflect consensus and P-5 unity, and target the
Iranian regime, not the population at large. Boche added
that diplomatic overtures to Tehran would continue in the
weeks leading up to the next BOG meeting, as seen in meetings
underway 2/21 in Moscow. He voiced confidence in Russian
negotiating efforts, noting Russia would not accept a nuclear
Iran on its southern border. Boche voiced skepticism on IAEA
DG al Baradei's proposal for Iran to retain a small research
capacity under international supervision, and concluded that
the only objective guarantee that Iran's nuclear program
remained peaceful would be suspension of enrichment.
¶4. (C) Asked by Talwar to assess U.S. policy towards Iran,
Boche noted that the U.S. had done what the EU-3 had asked in
supporting EU-3 proposals which were later dismissed out of
hand by Tehran. On the U.S. offer to provide 75 million USD
for reformers in Iran, Boche opined that the GoF was not
averse to efforts to encourage political openness in Iran,
though it did not support the U.S. goal of regime change in
Iran. The GoF preferred an Iran approach similar to that
pursued by the West with respect the USSR -- accept the
existence of the other side, while not refraining from
actions which encourage political evolution, as seen in the
PARIS 00001236 002 OF 004
Helsinki process.
¶5. (C) In brief comments on Iraq, Boche called for maximum
international efforts to avoid Iraq's territorial breakup and
Iranian dominance of the country. Though positive trends had
emerged in Iraq, with the mobilization of the population in
elections, a number of negative trends remained, including
increased sectarian divisions, foreign interference, and a
high level of terrorist activity. In order for Iraq to
achieve true national reconciliation, Boche called for
revising the constitution, to give more power to the central
government, as well as a "perspective for a departure" of
Coalition forces, in order to show that Iraq was truly
sovereign. Boche clarified that the GoF was not asking for
an immediate departure of U.S. troops, which would be
catastrophic. However, more definitive U.S. statements,
making clear that the Coalition troop presence was not
permanent, could help divide terrorists from Iraqi
resistance. Asked about French assistance to Iraq, Boche
described the GoF offer to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police
outside Iraq as "still on the table" after 18 months, with
the impasse due to lack of follow-up from the Iraqi side.
¶6. (C) On Syria/Lebanon, Boche assessed that though a great
deal had been accomplished over the past year, the dynamic
had slowed down more recently, with the pace of the UN
investigation into the Hariri assassination not meeting
political expectations. Boche observed that the
international community had greater control in pushing for
compliance with UNSCR 1559, though accelerated efforts to
push for Hizballah disarmament would put the Lebanese
government in difficulty. Meanwhile, Boche viewed Syria as
still seeking to reassert dominance in Lebanon and using its
overtures to Iran to push Egypt and Saudi Arabia towards
seeking a return to the status quo ante. Boche asserted that
while Syrian behavior must change, the GoF did not advocate
Syrian regime change, which would provoke alarm among Arab
moderates. Boche added that if the Syrian regime fell, it
would come from the inside. Boche described the situation of
former VP Khaddam in Paris as "unfortunate," admitting that
the GoF had asked Khaddam to stop making public remarks from
France after Khaddam called publicly for regime change in
Damascus. Boche dismissed Khaddam as responsible, "more than
anyone," for the Syrian regime's crimes of the past 30 years.
He added that, while uniting the Syrian opposition was a
good thing, Khaddam was not the one to unite them. Boche
voiced greater confidence in unnamed former Syrian MPs
(likely a reference to Riad Seif), but conceded that choices
were limited. He concluded that the best option might be to
keep Bashar al-Asad under international pressure, remaining
in control in Syria but constrained from causing problems
externally.
POLICY PLANNING STAFF ON IRAN, NATO/DARFUR
------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Talwar and Tillemann's discussion with Philippe
Errera, Deputy Director-equivalent for the MFA,s Policy
Planning bureau, focused largely on Iran and to a lesser
degree on NATO/Darfur. Errera said he personally believed
that the EU-3,s diplomatic initiative on Iran had not been a
failure, given that the international community has now come
to a basic consensus on Iran, and furthermore, intelligence
agencies and the IAEA have increased information about
Iran,s nuclear program. He believed there was still
potential for diplomatic efforts to bear fruit, although he
acknowledged that the GOF had been brainstorming about
potential sanctions regimes, including targeted sanctions,
travel bans, investment bans, and student bans. He
speculated that Western economies could weather a cutoff of
oil exports from Iran, with a potential per barrel rise in
price of approximately $30. In a separate comment on
NATO/Darfur, Errera said there was a feeling among some in
the EU that some of the people advocating a NATO mission in
Darfur were more interested in building up NATO than in
helping the Darfur situation.
MFA STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DAS ON NATO/DARFUR
----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Staffdel Talwar's discussion with MFA DAS-equivalent
for strategic affairs Nicolas Niemtchinow focused on
NATO/Darfur in greater detail. Niemtchinow said that he
understood that the U.S. wanted to foster the process as the
AU mandate ends and the UN mandate begins and that NATO was
an option. He said that the French thinking remained
preliminary and that many questions, particularly ones
related to resources, needed to be answered. He affirmed
PARIS 00001236 003 OF 004
that France would not be averse to NATO involvement if the
U.S. would provide "military means." He added that the
French would like to know what the U.S. is prepared to
provide. Niemtchinow said that France did not envision
Western forces on the ground, not even a small presence
force; instead, he said, the GoF viewed NATO's role more in
the training of officers and providing strategic lift. He
said that the EU had about 15 people already on the ground in
Sudan but that expanding to a force large enough to serve as
a deterrent would be difficult, given the difficulties in
force generation. Furthermore, he added, using the NRF would
not sit well with several allies who are adamant that the NRF
should be used as an emergency force and not as a reserve.
Also, he said, the lack of a peace agreement to enforce would
make it more difficult to argue for the presence of troops on
the ground.
¶9. (C) Niemtchinow concluded that, ultimately, the question
of a NATO role in Darfur was one of resources. France wanted
to stop the slaughter of innocents in Sudan but European
countries, including France, were stretched thin overseeing
elections in the DRC and providing forces in Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Cote d'Ivoire and elsewhere. For the GoF, the root
of the issue was determining to what extent the U.S. would
provide and/or participate if NATO was to get involved in
Darfur. European governments did not have the resources to
address all of the world's problems and had begun to speak in
terms of an "acceptable level of disorder." He said, though,
that there was room for NATO and the EU to work together to
facilitate the transition of mandates; for example, if NATO
provided training, the EU could provide planning officers.
Niemtchinow insisted that the French argument was "not
theological" but instead about resources. For NATO to take
on the challenge of "intervening everywhere" would be
difficult; for example, NATO involvement in Pakistan, while
good from a moral and political view, taught Europeans that
NATO should not be doing everything. Other organizations, he
concluded, ones designed for developing civilian
capabilities, would have been more cost effective and hence
better suited for missions like the one in Pakistan.
MFA NEA PDAS ON HAMAS, REGIONAL REFORM
--------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Talwar and Tillemann's discussion with MFA
PDAS-equivalent for Middle East/North Africa Gilles Bonnaud
focused on Hamas and Middle East reform efforts. Bonnaud
emphasized the GoF's no-contact policy with Hamas (though
conceding some "technical contacts" with Hamas municipal
officials had taken place in the past) and GoF insistence
that Hamas must renounce violence, recognize Israel, and
accept past accords with Israel. At the same time, he
cautioned against the repercussions of a total aid cut-off to
Palestinians in the event that Hamas failed to meet the
Quartet conditions. Bonnaud suggested that the international
community should not signal the "door is closed" entirely to
Hamas, and look for ways to continue aid to the Palestinians
after the formation of the new PA government. Bonnaud
observed that PA President Abbas had shown firmness in his
opening speech to the PLC, and that the international
community should seek to help him as well. On BMENA efforts,
Bonnaud repeated familiar GoF concerns on use of EU funding
for the Foundation for the Future, and emphasized a
preference for the U.S. and Europe pursuing distinct, but
complementary reform efforts.
INTERIOR MINISTRY ON SARKOZY FOREIGN POLICY, COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶11. (C) In contrast to other GoF meetings, the staffdel's
discussion with Boris Boillon, Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, focused on internal
politics, specifically Sarkozy's candidacy for the 2007
French presidential elections. Boillon briefed the staffdel
on ongoing efforts to craft a comprehensive foreign policy
strategy for Sarkozy, which the Sarkozy camp aims to publish
in six months. While emphasizing that the formulation of
this strategy remained in preliminary stages only, Boillon
described three main guiding principles: 1) promotion of
values, such as democracy and freedom, in a "total departure"
from past French foreign policy; 2) defending French
security, through responding to terrorism, proliferation, and
other threats, including greater willingness to resort to use
of force; and 3) promotion of French interests. Boillon
noted that Sarkozy wanted to dramatically improve French
relations with the U.S., in addition to focusing on Africa
and the Mediterranean. Asked about traditional French
PARIS 00001236 004 OF 004
preference for multilateralism, Boillon quipped that Sarkozy
did not want to pursue multilateralism for multilateralism's
sake alone. In the past, he observed, the GoF had promoted
multilateralism because it remained a "weapon of the weak."
Boillon added that the policy strategy would, of course,
focus on Europe, though Europe remained "a joke,"
internationally. Sarkozy would seek to strengthen Europe as
a real power, and would seek key partners like Spain, the UK,
and Italy. In Sarkozy's view, the EU had served mainly as a
tool for dialogue and negotiation, but now was the time for
action. Boillon summed up that Sarkozy viewed France as
having fallen behind internationally, perhaps 20 years or so,
and that dramatic, effective action was needed for France to
catch up with the rest of the world.
¶12. (C) In closing, Boillon commended GoF-USG
counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the context of
combating Islamic extremism. Boillon stressed the GoF's
close ties with the Arab world and its large Muslim
community, which he described as closely monitored by GoF
authorities. He described a December 2005 anti-terrorism law
which gave the GoF important new tools to combat terrorism,
including increased surveillance powers, reinforced efforts
to freeze terrorist assets and financing networks, and
extended detention periods for suspected terrorists. Boillon
described the GoF as in a never-ending fight against Islamic
radicals, and noted that the GoF had expelled 21 extremist
imams in 2005.
¶13. (U) This message was cleared by Staffdel Talwar.
Stapleton
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-02-28 11:11
Released 2011-02-25
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO1423
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1236/01 0591143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281143Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4616
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001236
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/28/2016
TAGS: PREL IR PARM IZ SY LE KPAL IS KDEM PTER SU
FR
SUBJECT: 2/21 STAFFDEL TALWAR VISIT: IRAN, IRAQ,
SYRIA/LEBANON, NATO/DARFUR, HAMAS, REGIONAL REFORM,
COUNTERTERRORISM
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Professional Staff Members Puneet Talwar and Tomicah Tilleman
met a series of senior French officials February 21, in
discussions that addressed Iran, Iraq, Syria/Lebanon,
NATO/Darfur, Hamas, regional reform, and counterterrorism.
On Iran, Chirac's Middle East advisor assessed that
international sanctions would pose real hardships for the
Iranian regime, and suggested that sanctions should be
gradual, consensus-driven, and target the regime. MFA policy
planning staff confirmed that Iran sanctions options under
GoF consideration included bans on travel, investment, and
students. On Iraq, Chirac's Middle East advisor called for a
"perspective" for a departure of foreign troops to help split
terrorists from Sunni resistance. On Syria, Elysee officials
emphasized French support for behavior change (vice regime
change), and criticized former VP Khaddam. MFA officials
suggested willingness to consider a NATO contribution in
Darfur, while strongly emphasizing resource concerns and the
need for the U.S. to offer a commitment. On Hamas, French
officials reaffirmed the GoF's no-contact policy, while
stressing the downsides of a cut-off in international
assistance to Palestinians. MFA officials voiced familiar
views on protecting EU equities in the BMENA efforts. A
senior Ministry of Interior advisor revealed details of a
new, values-based and pro-American foreign policy platform
for presidential hopeful/Interior Minister Sarkozy, while
praising U.S.-French cooperation on counterterrorism. End
summary.
ELYSEE ON IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA/LEBANON
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) On Iran, Elysee Middle East advisor Dominique Boche
assessed that the Ahmadinejad regime was going through an
initial phase of "militancy" built on unrealistic
assumptions. In this initial phase, Iran would pose problems
on several fronts, through its obstinacy on the nuclear
issue; efforts to exercise influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
and the Palestinian territories; and a broader attempt to
gain sympathy in the Islamic world via statements denying the
Holocaust or calling for Israel's destruction. The latter
Iranian strategy, Boche observed, was intended to appeal to
Muslims' widespread resentment of a perceived
"double-standard" vis-a-vis Israel, and thereby put moderate
Arab governments in great difficulty.
¶3. (C) Boche voiced optimism on middle term prospects for
Iran, concluding that Iran would come to realize that it
needed external support and would face international
sanctions with difficulty. In the case of petroleum
sanctions, Boche observed that Iran remained vulnerable due
its low refinery capacity, which forced it to import oil from
India. On possible civair sanctions, Boche noted that some 2
million Iranian travelers could be affected by such a ban.
Once the Iranian population saw the isolation provoked by the
regime's policies, Boche concluded, moderates would have a
window to assert a voice. Asked for further detail of
French thinking on sanctions, Boche observed that no
decisions had been made and that the GoF had found economic
sanctions, in past experience, to be "rarely effective."
For sanctions to be successful they would have to proceed
gradually, reflect consensus and P-5 unity, and target the
Iranian regime, not the population at large. Boche added
that diplomatic overtures to Tehran would continue in the
weeks leading up to the next BOG meeting, as seen in meetings
underway 2/21 in Moscow. He voiced confidence in Russian
negotiating efforts, noting Russia would not accept a nuclear
Iran on its southern border. Boche voiced skepticism on IAEA
DG al Baradei's proposal for Iran to retain a small research
capacity under international supervision, and concluded that
the only objective guarantee that Iran's nuclear program
remained peaceful would be suspension of enrichment.
¶4. (C) Asked by Talwar to assess U.S. policy towards Iran,
Boche noted that the U.S. had done what the EU-3 had asked in
supporting EU-3 proposals which were later dismissed out of
hand by Tehran. On the U.S. offer to provide 75 million USD
for reformers in Iran, Boche opined that the GoF was not
averse to efforts to encourage political openness in Iran,
though it did not support the U.S. goal of regime change in
Iran. The GoF preferred an Iran approach similar to that
pursued by the West with respect the USSR -- accept the
existence of the other side, while not refraining from
actions which encourage political evolution, as seen in the
PARIS 00001236 002 OF 004
Helsinki process.
¶5. (C) In brief comments on Iraq, Boche called for maximum
international efforts to avoid Iraq's territorial breakup and
Iranian dominance of the country. Though positive trends had
emerged in Iraq, with the mobilization of the population in
elections, a number of negative trends remained, including
increased sectarian divisions, foreign interference, and a
high level of terrorist activity. In order for Iraq to
achieve true national reconciliation, Boche called for
revising the constitution, to give more power to the central
government, as well as a "perspective for a departure" of
Coalition forces, in order to show that Iraq was truly
sovereign. Boche clarified that the GoF was not asking for
an immediate departure of U.S. troops, which would be
catastrophic. However, more definitive U.S. statements,
making clear that the Coalition troop presence was not
permanent, could help divide terrorists from Iraqi
resistance. Asked about French assistance to Iraq, Boche
described the GoF offer to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police
outside Iraq as "still on the table" after 18 months, with
the impasse due to lack of follow-up from the Iraqi side.
¶6. (C) On Syria/Lebanon, Boche assessed that though a great
deal had been accomplished over the past year, the dynamic
had slowed down more recently, with the pace of the UN
investigation into the Hariri assassination not meeting
political expectations. Boche observed that the
international community had greater control in pushing for
compliance with UNSCR 1559, though accelerated efforts to
push for Hizballah disarmament would put the Lebanese
government in difficulty. Meanwhile, Boche viewed Syria as
still seeking to reassert dominance in Lebanon and using its
overtures to Iran to push Egypt and Saudi Arabia towards
seeking a return to the status quo ante. Boche asserted that
while Syrian behavior must change, the GoF did not advocate
Syrian regime change, which would provoke alarm among Arab
moderates. Boche added that if the Syrian regime fell, it
would come from the inside. Boche described the situation of
former VP Khaddam in Paris as "unfortunate," admitting that
the GoF had asked Khaddam to stop making public remarks from
France after Khaddam called publicly for regime change in
Damascus. Boche dismissed Khaddam as responsible, "more than
anyone," for the Syrian regime's crimes of the past 30 years.
He added that, while uniting the Syrian opposition was a
good thing, Khaddam was not the one to unite them. Boche
voiced greater confidence in unnamed former Syrian MPs
(likely a reference to Riad Seif), but conceded that choices
were limited. He concluded that the best option might be to
keep Bashar al-Asad under international pressure, remaining
in control in Syria but constrained from causing problems
externally.
POLICY PLANNING STAFF ON IRAN, NATO/DARFUR
------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Talwar and Tillemann's discussion with Philippe
Errera, Deputy Director-equivalent for the MFA,s Policy
Planning bureau, focused largely on Iran and to a lesser
degree on NATO/Darfur. Errera said he personally believed
that the EU-3,s diplomatic initiative on Iran had not been a
failure, given that the international community has now come
to a basic consensus on Iran, and furthermore, intelligence
agencies and the IAEA have increased information about
Iran,s nuclear program. He believed there was still
potential for diplomatic efforts to bear fruit, although he
acknowledged that the GOF had been brainstorming about
potential sanctions regimes, including targeted sanctions,
travel bans, investment bans, and student bans. He
speculated that Western economies could weather a cutoff of
oil exports from Iran, with a potential per barrel rise in
price of approximately $30. In a separate comment on
NATO/Darfur, Errera said there was a feeling among some in
the EU that some of the people advocating a NATO mission in
Darfur were more interested in building up NATO than in
helping the Darfur situation.
MFA STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DAS ON NATO/DARFUR
----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Staffdel Talwar's discussion with MFA DAS-equivalent
for strategic affairs Nicolas Niemtchinow focused on
NATO/Darfur in greater detail. Niemtchinow said that he
understood that the U.S. wanted to foster the process as the
AU mandate ends and the UN mandate begins and that NATO was
an option. He said that the French thinking remained
preliminary and that many questions, particularly ones
related to resources, needed to be answered. He affirmed
PARIS 00001236 003 OF 004
that France would not be averse to NATO involvement if the
U.S. would provide "military means." He added that the
French would like to know what the U.S. is prepared to
provide. Niemtchinow said that France did not envision
Western forces on the ground, not even a small presence
force; instead, he said, the GoF viewed NATO's role more in
the training of officers and providing strategic lift. He
said that the EU had about 15 people already on the ground in
Sudan but that expanding to a force large enough to serve as
a deterrent would be difficult, given the difficulties in
force generation. Furthermore, he added, using the NRF would
not sit well with several allies who are adamant that the NRF
should be used as an emergency force and not as a reserve.
Also, he said, the lack of a peace agreement to enforce would
make it more difficult to argue for the presence of troops on
the ground.
¶9. (C) Niemtchinow concluded that, ultimately, the question
of a NATO role in Darfur was one of resources. France wanted
to stop the slaughter of innocents in Sudan but European
countries, including France, were stretched thin overseeing
elections in the DRC and providing forces in Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Cote d'Ivoire and elsewhere. For the GoF, the root
of the issue was determining to what extent the U.S. would
provide and/or participate if NATO was to get involved in
Darfur. European governments did not have the resources to
address all of the world's problems and had begun to speak in
terms of an "acceptable level of disorder." He said, though,
that there was room for NATO and the EU to work together to
facilitate the transition of mandates; for example, if NATO
provided training, the EU could provide planning officers.
Niemtchinow insisted that the French argument was "not
theological" but instead about resources. For NATO to take
on the challenge of "intervening everywhere" would be
difficult; for example, NATO involvement in Pakistan, while
good from a moral and political view, taught Europeans that
NATO should not be doing everything. Other organizations, he
concluded, ones designed for developing civilian
capabilities, would have been more cost effective and hence
better suited for missions like the one in Pakistan.
MFA NEA PDAS ON HAMAS, REGIONAL REFORM
--------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Talwar and Tillemann's discussion with MFA
PDAS-equivalent for Middle East/North Africa Gilles Bonnaud
focused on Hamas and Middle East reform efforts. Bonnaud
emphasized the GoF's no-contact policy with Hamas (though
conceding some "technical contacts" with Hamas municipal
officials had taken place in the past) and GoF insistence
that Hamas must renounce violence, recognize Israel, and
accept past accords with Israel. At the same time, he
cautioned against the repercussions of a total aid cut-off to
Palestinians in the event that Hamas failed to meet the
Quartet conditions. Bonnaud suggested that the international
community should not signal the "door is closed" entirely to
Hamas, and look for ways to continue aid to the Palestinians
after the formation of the new PA government. Bonnaud
observed that PA President Abbas had shown firmness in his
opening speech to the PLC, and that the international
community should seek to help him as well. On BMENA efforts,
Bonnaud repeated familiar GoF concerns on use of EU funding
for the Foundation for the Future, and emphasized a
preference for the U.S. and Europe pursuing distinct, but
complementary reform efforts.
INTERIOR MINISTRY ON SARKOZY FOREIGN POLICY, COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶11. (C) In contrast to other GoF meetings, the staffdel's
discussion with Boris Boillon, Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, focused on internal
politics, specifically Sarkozy's candidacy for the 2007
French presidential elections. Boillon briefed the staffdel
on ongoing efforts to craft a comprehensive foreign policy
strategy for Sarkozy, which the Sarkozy camp aims to publish
in six months. While emphasizing that the formulation of
this strategy remained in preliminary stages only, Boillon
described three main guiding principles: 1) promotion of
values, such as democracy and freedom, in a "total departure"
from past French foreign policy; 2) defending French
security, through responding to terrorism, proliferation, and
other threats, including greater willingness to resort to use
of force; and 3) promotion of French interests. Boillon
noted that Sarkozy wanted to dramatically improve French
relations with the U.S., in addition to focusing on Africa
and the Mediterranean. Asked about traditional French
PARIS 00001236 004 OF 004
preference for multilateralism, Boillon quipped that Sarkozy
did not want to pursue multilateralism for multilateralism's
sake alone. In the past, he observed, the GoF had promoted
multilateralism because it remained a "weapon of the weak."
Boillon added that the policy strategy would, of course,
focus on Europe, though Europe remained "a joke,"
internationally. Sarkozy would seek to strengthen Europe as
a real power, and would seek key partners like Spain, the UK,
and Italy. In Sarkozy's view, the EU had served mainly as a
tool for dialogue and negotiation, but now was the time for
action. Boillon summed up that Sarkozy viewed France as
having fallen behind internationally, perhaps 20 years or so,
and that dramatic, effective action was needed for France to
catch up with the rest of the world.
¶12. (C) In closing, Boillon commended GoF-USG
counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the context of
combating Islamic extremism. Boillon stressed the GoF's
close ties with the Arab world and its large Muslim
community, which he described as closely monitored by GoF
authorities. He described a December 2005 anti-terrorism law
which gave the GoF important new tools to combat terrorism,
including increased surveillance powers, reinforced efforts
to freeze terrorist assets and financing networks, and
extended detention periods for suspected terrorists. Boillon
described the GoF as in a never-ending fight against Islamic
radicals, and noted that the GoF had expelled 21 extremist
imams in 2005.
¶13. (U) This message was cleared by Staffdel Talwar.
Stapleton
Source: Wikileaks
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