Reference ID 10AMMAN91
Created 2010-01-07 13:01
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXRO2566
RR RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #0091/01 0071356
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071356Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0419
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6641
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0219
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0074
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000091
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL ASEC JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN: REGIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT - AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (U) This cable is part 1 of 5 in a series on Jordan's
regional security contributions and military support.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Jordan has been exceptionally responsive
to USG requests for military contributions in support of
regional and international security priorities. In
Afghanistan, Jordan has responded with significant ground and
Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces are now
engaged in combat and security operations alongside Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) units. Deployments of this magnitude
are a first for Jordan. While the financial requirements of
sustaining large numbers of forces abroad could hamper
Jordan's ability to maintain its contributions, Jordan is
otherwise prepared to continue its deployments and seek new
ways to support the planned surge of U.S. forces. END
SUMMARY.
Force Deployments in Afghanistan
--------------------------------
¶3. (C) In July 2009, Jordan deployed a 720 person infantry
battalion to Logar Province, Afghanistan, for an expected six
month deployment. The battalion, named Task Force 222
(TF222), conducted security operations with U.S. Task Force
Spartan (3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division). Originally
deployed to support elections in the province, the battalion
now conducts routine security operations. Jordan's Chief of
Defense has approved a second rotation (TF222-Bravo) which is
scheduled to deploy on January 9, 2010. TF 222-Bravo will be
partnered with the 173d Airborne Brigade at Forward Operating
Base Shank.
¶4. (C) Jordan included two rotary-wing aviators from the
Prince Hashim Royal Brigade with their TF222 deployment to
observe U.S. rotary-wing aviation missions. The goal of this
deployment is to build Jordan's capacity for air support of
forces with an emphasis on enhancing interoperability with
U.S. forces. In September 2009, Jordan deployed a second
round of rotary-wing aviators, with the intent to establish
routine rotations.
¶5. (C) Jordanian Special Operations Forces deployed Task
Force 111 (TF111), a 111-person unit, in May 2009 to conduct
combat operations with the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group,
near Qalat, Afghanistan. TF111 redeployed in late August. A
second iteration of the SOF unit, TF111-Bravo, deployed to
Afghanistan on October 1, 2009, for an expected deployment of
6 months, establishing consistent Jordanian SOF presence in
Afghanistan. Coordination is underway for the deployment of
its replacement, TF111-Charlie, which will deploy to
Afghanistan on February 11, 2010.
Other Contributions for Afghanistan
-----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Other contributions to security goals in Afghanistan
include:
-- Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) operates a military field
hospital in Qalat, Afghanistan. Since 2003 the hospital has
treated over 750,000 patients.
-- In 2003, Jordan was one of the first countries to send
demining teams to Afghanistan.
-- Jordan trained a 50-man cadre of the Afghanistan
National Army Counter Terrorism force.
Pay Entitlements Break the Bank
-------------------------------
¶7. (C) Although Jordan has been an eager partner in
Afghanistan, limited resources are a significant constraint.
TF111 and TF222 deployments have been made possible only
through U.S. support, such as pre-deployment training,
airlift, equipment, and billeting.
¶8. (C) A central issue is the requirement under Jordanian
law that forces deployed abroad are paid a combat premium of
approximately 1600 USD per month. (Note: These so-called
pay entitlements have been consistently paid during Jordan's
AMMAN 00000091 002 OF 002
19-year history in UN Peacekeeping operations (PKO). Pay
entitlements for PKOs were funded through the UN system.
However, there is no similar mechanism when Jordan deploys
independently or with coalition partners, forcing Jordan to
make these payments on its own to its forces deployed in
Afghanistan. End Note.)
¶9. (C) Pay entitlements are a significant element in the
JAF's growing budget deficit, now estimated to be
approximately 150 million USD. The pay entitlements issue
nearly derailed the original deployment of TF222 and could
limit the sustainability of future rotations of TF111 and
TF222.
¶10. (C) Jordan has repeatedly requested assistance from the
U.S. to fund its pay entitlements, a request the USG cannot
fulfill. Jordan has also requested assistance from the
United Arab Emirates, but so far funds have not been
forthcoming.
Jordan Wants to Do More
-----------------------
¶11. (C) In meetings Jordanian officials have indicated
their interest in doing more to support the mission in
Afghanistan and the planned surge of U.S. forces there. In
particular, both the Chairman of Defense and King Abdullah II
have said that Jordan stands ready to contribute additional
forces, especially if the pay entitlements issue can be
solved. In addition, the King has offered to contribute two
Blackhawk helicopters for special operations, an offer which
is currently under review by CENTCOM.
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) Jordan's Afghanistan deployments are a significant
expression of support from a key Arab ally for the mission in
Afghanistan. In addition, Jordan's forces are showing
results. Feedback from the field indicates that the
Jordanian military presence is yielding valuable engagement
with key leaders in rural areas in Afghanistan, giving these
leaders a promising alternative to Taliban affiliation. In
addition, the deployments are helping Jordan acquire
experience and skills in a combat situation -- a critical
need for a national military that has not deployed in combat
in over a generation -- and improving interoperability with
U.S. forces. It is clear that Jordan could do more.
However, with its pay entitlements problem and military
budget shortfall, financing remains a barrier.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
Monday, January 31, 2011
JORDAN: PREVIEW OF AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT OFFER IN UPCOMING WASHINGTON MEETINGS
Reference ID 10AMMAN219
Created 2010-01-22 13:01
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXRO5344
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #0219/01 0221343
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221343Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0427
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6736
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 6357
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0221
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5762
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0077
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000219
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PINS MASS KISL JO AF
SUBJECT: JORDAN: PREVIEW OF AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT OFFER IN
UPCOMING WASHINGTON MEETINGS
REF: A. AMMAN 0200
¶B. AMMAN 0091
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Jordan's top military advisor and
brother of the King, Lieutenant General (LTG) Prince Faisal
bin Al Hussein, and Minister of Planning Jafar Hassan will
travel to Washington during the week of January 25. Their
itineraries include meetings with senior U.S. officials in
the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Department of
StaQrQQ^,ON2}g5Congress. In the meetings, the
Jordanians are expected to offer significant increases to
Jordan's security support in Afghanistan in exchange for
additional economic assistance through an anticipated
Afghanistan supplemental appropriation. Contributions that
support U.S. goals can likely be obtained for reimbursement
at cost if we want to hold the line and not include Jordan in
the supplemental. END SUMMARY.
Afghanistan Issues
------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Jordan has already made a significant
contribution of forces in Afghanistan (ref B), currently
numbered at 850 troops, which includes an infantry battalion,
a special operations company, and a field hospital. Prince
Faisal and Minister Hasan will likely make a number of offers
for increased participation in Afghanistan. Specifically, we
expect them to offer:
¶3. (S/NF) Training for Afghan Clerics -- Minister Hasan has
indicated an interest in offering a one-year training program
for Afghan clerics and religious leaders in moderate Islam to
counter extremist ideologies. The program would be hosted at
Al Albayt University in Mafraq, Jordan, and has been approved
by Prince Ghazi bin Muhammed, the King's special advisor on
religious affairs. (Note: Prince Ghazi is also the author
of the Amman Message on moderate Islam and the Common Word on
outreach to Christians. End Note.)
¶4. (S/NF) Police Training -- Prince Faisal and Minister
Hasan will offer to train Afghan National Police (ANP) at
training facilities in Jordan or by sending Mobile Training
Teams (MTT) to Afghanistan.
-- Background: Jordan has established a record of effective
training of regional police and para-military forces at the
Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). In
2005-2007, the Jordanian Public Security Directorate (PSD)
trained over 53,000 Iraqi National Police. Since 2008,
Jordan has trained over 3,500 members of the Palestinian
Authority's gendarmerie-like National Security Forces (NSF)
and Presidential Guard, resulting in partial withdrawal of
Israeli security from four key West Bank cities.
¶5. (S/NF) Additional Field Hospital -- Prince Faisal and
Minister Hasan will offer to send an additional military
field hospital to Afghanistan. Jordan already operates one
hospital in Qalat, Afghanistan which has treated over 750,000
patients since 2003. Jordan also maintains field hospitals
in Fallujah, Iraq and in Gaza, and will soon open one in
Haiti (ref A).
¶6. (S/NF) Additional Ground Forces -- Senior Jordanian
military officials have in the past mentioned their interest
in making sizeable increases in their contribution of ground
forces in Afghanistan, and recently reaffirmed their interest
to the U.K. and NATO officials. Prince Faisal may make such
an offer in Washington.
-- Background: Feedback from the field indicates that
Jordanian forces already deployed have been highly effective
at key leader engagement in Afghan villages, forging valuable
relationships that give these leaders a promising alternative
to Taliban affiliation. At the same time, a Jordanian legal
requirement that soldiers deployed overseas must receive
approximately 1600 USD per month in combat pay has been
pushing the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) deeper into deficit.
The GOJ has repeatedly requested assistance from us to meet
AMMAN 00000219 002 OF 002
this obligation, a request the USG cannot fulfill. CENTCOM
has had preliminary discussions with the U.A.E. to explore it
as a potential source of donor funding, but so far funds have
not been forthcoming.
¶7. (S/NF) Special Operations Training -- Prince Faisal may
offer to train Afghan counter-terrorism (CT) or special
operations forces (SOF).
-- Background: Jordan has developed strong SOF and CT skills
within its security forces and currently has a SOF unit
deployed in Afghanistan (TF111). In May 2009 Jordan opened
the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC)
as an intended center of excellence for SOF training.
Although KASOTC has hosted regional joint exercises, it has
yet to host a full-length regional training course.
¶8. (S/NF) Fighter Jets and Helicopters -- In previous
meetings, Prince Faisal has offered to send F-16 fighter jets
and UH-60 helicopters with pilots to conduct combat missions.
-- Background: Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) Commander
LTG Hostage met Prince Faisal in Amman on January 19 and
indicated to him that such a contribution would not be
helpful at this time. He assessed that Jordanian F-16 and
UH-60 pilots do not have sufficient combat flight experience.
In addition, the fleet would require point-to-point support
from the U.S. for maintenance, repair, and in missions.
Iraq Issues
-----------
¶9. (S/NF) Prince Faisal may also raise the following issues
related to Iraq:
¶10. (S/NF) Sale of Fighter Jets -- Prince Faisal has
previously indicated his interest in selling Jordan's Peace
Falcon I (PF-I) F-16 Fighter Jets to Iraq. The sale is
intended to make way for an acquisition of fourteen new F-16
jets from European partners with increased avionics
capabilities. A recent assessment by the Air Force
International Affairs Division indicated that the
acquisition, and an accompanying mid-life upgrade to the
remainder of its F-16 fleet, would cost Jordan well over $1
billion, including training and maintenance support.
¶11. (S/NF) Training Iraqi Pilots -- As Iraq establishes its
Air Force capabilities, Jordan has indicated interest in
training Iraqi pilots. In his January 19 meeting LTG Hostage
indicated that the U.S. was exploring conduct that training
itself.
¶12. (S/NF) Fighter Weapons School -- Jordan plans to
establish a center of excellence for fighter pilot training
and may seek U.S. assistance with the project. However, the
USG already supports such a facility in the region, the Gulf
Air War Center in the U.A.E.
Comment
-------
¶13. (S/NF) Through their deployments in Afghanistan and
their assistance to other countries in the region, Jordan has
shown itself to be a willing and capable partner in support
of U.S. security goals. Despite the recent suicide bombing
in Khost, Afghanistan, the resulting press reporting
regarding Jordan's role in Afghanistan, and domestic public
pressures on Jordan to end its security cooperation with the
U.S., the Jordanians will make significant offers to increase
their assistance during the Washington visit. Forefront in
their minds, however, is an equally significant reward in the
form of economic assistance through an Afghanistan or other
supplemental appropriation. Although they would be
disappointed not to receive supplemental assistance, the
Jordanians would likely accept reimbursement at cost for any
additional contributions we do want, especially if we can
identify a third-country donor to assist with Jordan's combat
pay problem.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2010-01-22 13:01
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXRO5344
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #0219/01 0221343
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221343Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0427
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6736
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 6357
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0221
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5762
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0077
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000219
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PINS MASS KISL JO AF
SUBJECT: JORDAN: PREVIEW OF AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT OFFER IN
UPCOMING WASHINGTON MEETINGS
REF: A. AMMAN 0200
¶B. AMMAN 0091
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Jordan's top military advisor and
brother of the King, Lieutenant General (LTG) Prince Faisal
bin Al Hussein, and Minister of Planning Jafar Hassan will
travel to Washington during the week of January 25. Their
itineraries include meetings with senior U.S. officials in
the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Department of
StaQrQQ^,ON2}g5Congress. In the meetings, the
Jordanians are expected to offer significant increases to
Jordan's security support in Afghanistan in exchange for
additional economic assistance through an anticipated
Afghanistan supplemental appropriation. Contributions that
support U.S. goals can likely be obtained for reimbursement
at cost if we want to hold the line and not include Jordan in
the supplemental. END SUMMARY.
Afghanistan Issues
------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Jordan has already made a significant
contribution of forces in Afghanistan (ref B), currently
numbered at 850 troops, which includes an infantry battalion,
a special operations company, and a field hospital. Prince
Faisal and Minister Hasan will likely make a number of offers
for increased participation in Afghanistan. Specifically, we
expect them to offer:
¶3. (S/NF) Training for Afghan Clerics -- Minister Hasan has
indicated an interest in offering a one-year training program
for Afghan clerics and religious leaders in moderate Islam to
counter extremist ideologies. The program would be hosted at
Al Albayt University in Mafraq, Jordan, and has been approved
by Prince Ghazi bin Muhammed, the King's special advisor on
religious affairs. (Note: Prince Ghazi is also the author
of the Amman Message on moderate Islam and the Common Word on
outreach to Christians. End Note.)
¶4. (S/NF) Police Training -- Prince Faisal and Minister
Hasan will offer to train Afghan National Police (ANP) at
training facilities in Jordan or by sending Mobile Training
Teams (MTT) to Afghanistan.
-- Background: Jordan has established a record of effective
training of regional police and para-military forces at the
Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). In
2005-2007, the Jordanian Public Security Directorate (PSD)
trained over 53,000 Iraqi National Police. Since 2008,
Jordan has trained over 3,500 members of the Palestinian
Authority's gendarmerie-like National Security Forces (NSF)
and Presidential Guard, resulting in partial withdrawal of
Israeli security from four key West Bank cities.
¶5. (S/NF) Additional Field Hospital -- Prince Faisal and
Minister Hasan will offer to send an additional military
field hospital to Afghanistan. Jordan already operates one
hospital in Qalat, Afghanistan which has treated over 750,000
patients since 2003. Jordan also maintains field hospitals
in Fallujah, Iraq and in Gaza, and will soon open one in
Haiti (ref A).
¶6. (S/NF) Additional Ground Forces -- Senior Jordanian
military officials have in the past mentioned their interest
in making sizeable increases in their contribution of ground
forces in Afghanistan, and recently reaffirmed their interest
to the U.K. and NATO officials. Prince Faisal may make such
an offer in Washington.
-- Background: Feedback from the field indicates that
Jordanian forces already deployed have been highly effective
at key leader engagement in Afghan villages, forging valuable
relationships that give these leaders a promising alternative
to Taliban affiliation. At the same time, a Jordanian legal
requirement that soldiers deployed overseas must receive
approximately 1600 USD per month in combat pay has been
pushing the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) deeper into deficit.
The GOJ has repeatedly requested assistance from us to meet
AMMAN 00000219 002 OF 002
this obligation, a request the USG cannot fulfill. CENTCOM
has had preliminary discussions with the U.A.E. to explore it
as a potential source of donor funding, but so far funds have
not been forthcoming.
¶7. (S/NF) Special Operations Training -- Prince Faisal may
offer to train Afghan counter-terrorism (CT) or special
operations forces (SOF).
-- Background: Jordan has developed strong SOF and CT skills
within its security forces and currently has a SOF unit
deployed in Afghanistan (TF111). In May 2009 Jordan opened
the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC)
as an intended center of excellence for SOF training.
Although KASOTC has hosted regional joint exercises, it has
yet to host a full-length regional training course.
¶8. (S/NF) Fighter Jets and Helicopters -- In previous
meetings, Prince Faisal has offered to send F-16 fighter jets
and UH-60 helicopters with pilots to conduct combat missions.
-- Background: Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) Commander
LTG Hostage met Prince Faisal in Amman on January 19 and
indicated to him that such a contribution would not be
helpful at this time. He assessed that Jordanian F-16 and
UH-60 pilots do not have sufficient combat flight experience.
In addition, the fleet would require point-to-point support
from the U.S. for maintenance, repair, and in missions.
Iraq Issues
-----------
¶9. (S/NF) Prince Faisal may also raise the following issues
related to Iraq:
¶10. (S/NF) Sale of Fighter Jets -- Prince Faisal has
previously indicated his interest in selling Jordan's Peace
Falcon I (PF-I) F-16 Fighter Jets to Iraq. The sale is
intended to make way for an acquisition of fourteen new F-16
jets from European partners with increased avionics
capabilities. A recent assessment by the Air Force
International Affairs Division indicated that the
acquisition, and an accompanying mid-life upgrade to the
remainder of its F-16 fleet, would cost Jordan well over $1
billion, including training and maintenance support.
¶11. (S/NF) Training Iraqi Pilots -- As Iraq establishes its
Air Force capabilities, Jordan has indicated interest in
training Iraqi pilots. In his January 19 meeting LTG Hostage
indicated that the U.S. was exploring conduct that training
itself.
¶12. (S/NF) Fighter Weapons School -- Jordan plans to
establish a center of excellence for fighter pilot training
and may seek U.S. assistance with the project. However, the
USG already supports such a facility in the region, the Gulf
Air War Center in the U.A.E.
Comment
-------
¶13. (S/NF) Through their deployments in Afghanistan and
their assistance to other countries in the region, Jordan has
shown itself to be a willing and capable partner in support
of U.S. security goals. Despite the recent suicide bombing
in Khost, Afghanistan, the resulting press reporting
regarding Jordan's role in Afghanistan, and domestic public
pressures on Jordan to end its security cooperation with the
U.S., the Jordanians will make significant offers to increase
their assistance during the Washington visit. Forefront in
their minds, however, is an equally significant reward in the
form of economic assistance through an Afghanistan or other
supplemental appropriation. Although they would be
disappointed not to receive supplemental assistance, the
Jordanians would likely accept reimbursement at cost for any
additional contributions we do want, especially if we can
identify a third-country donor to assist with Jordan's combat
pay problem.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
JORDAN SCENESETTER FOR JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN ADM MIKE MULLEN
Reference ID 10AMMAN329
Created 2010-02-08 06:06
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXRO8648
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #0329/01 0390643
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 080643Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6860
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2033
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0227
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 6380
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5787
RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHAM/MAP AMMAN JO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0436
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0081
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 000329
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS OVIP JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN SCENESETTER FOR JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN ADM
MIKE MULLEN
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: The Chairman's visit comes at a time
when Jordan has made significant contributions both in
Afghanistan and to broader regional security: encouraging
Syria to seek a moderate Arab alternative to Iranian
influence, maintaining its focus on a two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and redoubling its
efforts to strengthen ties with Baghdad. At the same time,
Amman perceives U.S. military financial support as not
keeping pace with the level of Jordanian regional
contributions. Despite the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding
on foreign assistance agreeing on an annual commitment of
$300 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) through
2014, Jordan continues to seek additional assistance in the
form of supplemental appropriations. In 2009 Jordan was
successful in obtaining $150 million in forward-financed
assistance in this manner, directly reducing our FMF
commitment for 2010. Jordan has so far been disappointed
with our lack of commitment to leave behind or store military
equipment redeploying through Jordan from Iraq. End Summary.
Middle East Peace
-----------------
¶2. (S//NF) Jordan continues to play a central role in
fostering Middle East peace and a two-state solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Both the King and his Foreign
Minister Naser Joudeh have maintained steady pressure on
other Arab states to offer modest deliverables to Israel.
The King's efforts, which have met with some success, seek
tangible steps such as overflight permission for Israeli air
traffic, linking telecommunications networks with Israel, and
reducing restrictions on travelers who have transited Israel.
Recently however, the King has adopted a new approach,
pressing PM Netanyahu and President Abbas to initiate
immediate negotiations aimed at producing even limited
Israeli concessions. Positive progress at the negotiating
table, however meager, could provide crucial political cover
for Abu Mazen, affording him a measure of maneuverability.
¶3. (S//NF) Given his public backing of U.S. attempts to
restart Middle East Peace negotiations, the King views the
lack of progress as damaging to his credibility. This damage
could limit his ability to play a constructive role in the
future. At the same time, Jordanian officials consistently
express concern that Jordan will be asked to assume a degree
of guardianship over the West Bank, a move which many believe
would alter Jordan's demographic makeup in ways that directly
threaten its Hashemite rule, and consequently, the interests
of the East Bank elites.
Iraq
----
¶4. (C) Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq,
using engagement to promote bilateral trade and encouraging
Iraq to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with
Iran. As evidence of the proactive Jordanian position the
King became the first Arab Head of State to visit Baghdad, in
July 2008, and has named an Ambassador to Iraq. The King
supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but
moving in the right direction. Senior Jordanian leaders have
become concerned that increasing tensions between the central
government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent
conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability
as U.S. forces withdraw.
¶5. (S) In response to a request by General Odierno to
provide capacity-building assistance to the Iraqi Ministries
of Defense and Interior, Jordan has hosted visits of Iraqi
officers to learn about border security operations on the
Syrian border and observe military cooperation through joint
AMMAN 00000329 002 OF 005
exercises with CENTCOM. Jordan hosted Iraqis at two 2009
seminars aimed at building the Iraqi capacity to manage their
own Foreign Military Sales workload. Jordan has also said it
will send a Defense Attach to Baghdad, but has not yet made
plans to do so.
¶6. (S) Jordan signed a Technical Agreement with CENTCOM in
July, laying the groundwork for redeployment of U.S. forces
and equipment from Iraq through Jordan. In November, the
first set of U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equipment
redeployed through Jordan, signaling an appreciable increase
in throughput with additional BCT sets redeploying in
December and January. Over the course of the next six
months, seven additional BCT sets of equipment are scheduled
to transit Jordan en route to the port of Aqaba and
ultimately to the U.S. Redeployment represents a significant
boon to the Jordanian economy: $15.1M in 2009. The military
and political leadership of Jordan has been frustrated that
the U.S. has not committed to leave equipment behind in
Jordan to be donated, refurbished, or stored. Two further
disappointments include the termination of jet fuel shipments
through Jordan into Western Iraq, and the U.S. decision not
to train Iraqi F-16 pilots in Jordanian flight schools.
Iran
----
¶7. (S//NF) Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in
the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect
of an Iranian nuclear program, support for Hizballah and
Hamas, support for the Huthi and other armed groups in Yemen,
and Iran's role in Iraq and links with Syria. The King
believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran
exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the
Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's
leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting
their freedom and resources to act internationally.
Especially with the recent buildup of U.S. military assets in
the Persian Gulf, fear remains that Iran will try to counter
these perceptions with a dramatic act. Jordan will support
new UNSC sanctions against Iran, but will be loath to enforce
those sanctions in the absence of progress in the Middle East
Peace Process. Without a material improvement in the Peace
Process, any confrontation with Iran risks backlash from
Palestinian groups
who cast Tehran as their protector.
¶8. (S//NF) Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link
between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and
progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and
Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to
Iran. Arab governments are restricted in their ability to
deal with Iran, they say, so long as Iran is seen as
supporting the Palestinians against Israel. Realization of
the two-state solution would consolidate the regional
consensus against Iran, Jordan believes.
Syria
-----
¶9. (S/NF) Jordan increased its engagement with Syria in the
last half of 2009 attempting to draw Damascus toward an
alignment with moderate Arab states and away from Iranian
influence. The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met
at least four times in 2009, which resulted in agreements on
a number of initiatives, including border demarcation,
customs procedures, and commercial transport. Although
Jordanian officials continue to be skeptical of Syrian
intentions to follow through, Jordan is supported in its
dialogue with Syria by Turkey, which is interested in
increasing its ground transit of commercial goods through
Syria to Gulf countries.
AMMAN 00000329 003 OF 005
Domestic Politics
-----------------
¶10. (C) King Abdullah dissolved the unpopular Parliament
and announced a new Cabinet in December 2009, ending months
of infighting and legislative stalemate. The King has
mandated that new elections take place before the end of 2010
with a new election law currently being drafted. It is
unclear whether the new law will correct the disproportionate
districting that systematically under represents urban
Palestinian-Jordanians in Parliament. The current electoral
system favors rural, traditionally East-Bank districts, over
the cities. It is too soon to tell by how much the numbers
might shift or how tribal or traditional East Bank interests
would be affected.
¶11. (S/NF) We have been urging the Jordanians to
re-invigorate social and political reforms, expanding
political space for civil society, pressing electoral changes
aimed at a more representative, inclusive system, and further
loosening of state control over the economy. The King's
economic and political changes face domestic opposition from
tribal leaders and an array of entrenched East Bank
interests. The latter include many in the military, security
services, and bureaucracy, who enjoy a disproportionate share
of the current system.
¶12. (S//NF) Jordan has made progress on the economic front:
buying back debt, eliminating subsidies, and promoting a
trade-based, market-oriented economy. The positive effects
of those measures are starting to wane, in part, a
ramification of the global financial crisis, but also due to
poor budget management and poor management of its limited
water and energy resources. Jordan is one of the world's
most water-poor nations and is moving aggressively on
independent and regional initiatives to address its water
needs. GAMA, a Turkish company partially owned by General
Electric was awarded an $800 million contract to pump water
from Southern Jordan's Disi aquifer to Amman. While a World
Bank-led study continues on conveying water from the Red Sea
to the Dead Sea to rehabilitate the Dead Sea, generate
hydropower, and provide desalinated water to Jordan, Israel,
and the Palestinian Authority, Jordan announced in May 2009,
similar plans for the unilateral $10 billion Jordan Red Sea
Development Project to bene
fit Jordan only. Jordan has yet to secure the requisite
funding to begin the single-country project.
¶13. (S//NF) Jordan's economy is also affected by its energy
needs. Jordan is a net importer of energy and thus subject
to market fluctuations for oil prices. It imports some of
its fuel needs from Iraq, but poor infrastructure limits
import quantities, which must travel overland by tanker
truck. Consequently, the discount offered barely offsets
transportation costs. Since 2003, Jordan has paid market
rate for other imported fuel. Jordan sees nuclear energy as
its future and the King has placed a priority on developing a
civilian nuclear energy program. The GOJ is anxious to sign a
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with the United States,
required for U.S. companies to provide nuclear reactors, fuel
or materials. NCA negotiations are currently stalled however,
with the Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission
objecting to assurances sought by the U.S. that Jordan will
not refine or enrich uranium in Jordan. Meanwhile, the GOJ
continues to advance its nuclear energy program and has
signed either MOUs or NCAs with the United States, Canada,
China, France, South Korea, the UK, and a number of other
countries.
Military Assistance and Cooperation
-----------------------------------
¶14. (C) The U.S.-Jordan mil-to-mil relationship is among
the most extensive in the region. In September 2008, an MOU
on Foreign Assistance was signed with Jordan that included a
AMMAN 00000329 004 OF 005
commitment to $300 million annually in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) through 2014. In 2009 Congress allocated
$150 million (of the $300 million) in forward-financed FMF to
Jordan through the Supplemental Appropriation (which will
reduce the FMF commitment for 2010 by an equal amount.) In
January, Jordan's top military advisor, Prince Faisal, and
Minister of Planning met Defense and State Department
officials and Members of Congress in Washington aimed at
securing a pledge of funds through an anticipated Afghanistan
supplemental appropriation. Although these assistance levels
are substantial, Jordan is sensitive to decreases in FMF from
the height of the war in Iraq when Jordan received large
supplemental appropriations. For example, combined FMF was
$497 million in 2008, $307 million in 2007, and $305 million
in 2006.
¶15. (U) In addition to FMF, Jordan is one of the largest
recipients of Individual Military Education and Training
(IMET) funding, which will be $3.8M in 2010 and $3.7M in
¶2011. The program pays immense dividends, developing strong
professional bonds between U.S. and JAF officer corps.
¶16. (C) Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S.
regional security priorities. In July 2009, Jordan deployed
a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Logar Province in
Afghanistan to provide election security (TF 222). The JAF
deployed the second battalion rotation in support of OEF in
January 2010, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to
their soldiers' safety. JAF leaders have intimated that they
would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade), if
the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome. In fact,
during the Joint Military Commission in November 2009, MG
Mash'al Al Zaben, Chief of Staff for Strategy, stated that
Jordan would stay in Afghanistan until the last U.S. soldier
came home. In October, Jordan deployed the second rotation
of a Special Operations company (TF 111) that conducts combat
operations alongside U.S. Special Forces. The third
rotational company deploys in February 2010.
¶17. (S/NF) Following the December 30 suicide bombing by a
Jordanian national in Khost, Afghanistan, Jordan has
experienced increased calls by opposition groups and
non-governmental figures to explain its Afghanistan
assistance and end its security cooperation with the United
States. So far, such calls and commentary in the press have
received no traction with the government, which vigorously
and publically defends its efforts to combat terrorism.
Jordanian government officials have privately reiterated the
commitment to maintaining their relationship with us,
highlighting their deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
¶18. (C) In May, Jordan completed a donation of 10 M60 tanks
to Lebanon, funded by UAE. Jordan delivered to Yemen 25 M113
Armored Personnel Carriers in response to a request from
State Department, funded by UAE. Jordan has offered to
assist with other deployments, counter-piracy missions, and
to host training courses and exercises for Iraqi, Lebanese,
and other forces, but remains dependent on external financial
support to fund its contributions. Jordan continues to
supply forces to U.N. sponsored Peace-Keeping Operations
around the world.
¶19. (S). Jordan is anxious to provide additional
contributions to the fight in Afghanistan, and made this
clear during HRH Prince Feisal's recent trip to Washington.
OSD, Joint Staff and CENTCOM are reviewing their proposals.
¶20. (S) Despite the high levels of FMF and other security
assistance, Jordan continues to request additional financial
resources from external sources to make each contribution to
regional security possible. For example, the Lebanon and
Yemen donations were financed with funds from the UAE.
Training programs for regional forces are financed through
U.S. Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) funds or the U.S.
Security Coordinator (USSC). In addition, Jordanian law
stipulates that its soldiers deployed overseas are entitled
AMMAN 00000329 005 OF 005
to approximately $1,700 monthly in combat pay, which has been
financed through the United Nations for peacekeeping
operations. Jordan has not yet identified a source of combat
pay funding for its Afghanistan deployments but is hopeful
NATO will contribute.
¶21. (S) Jordan has used its FMF to improve its border
security and defensive capabilities remaining cognizant of
interoperability with U.S. forces. We are concerned that
Jordan has focused too heavily on acquiring expensive new
technology and needs to place more emphasis on the training
and maintenance needs of existing programs.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2010-02-08 06:06
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXRO8648
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #0329/01 0390643
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 080643Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6860
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2033
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0227
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 6380
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5787
RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHAM/MAP AMMAN JO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0436
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0081
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 000329
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS OVIP JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN SCENESETTER FOR JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN ADM
MIKE MULLEN
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: The Chairman's visit comes at a time
when Jordan has made significant contributions both in
Afghanistan and to broader regional security: encouraging
Syria to seek a moderate Arab alternative to Iranian
influence, maintaining its focus on a two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and redoubling its
efforts to strengthen ties with Baghdad. At the same time,
Amman perceives U.S. military financial support as not
keeping pace with the level of Jordanian regional
contributions. Despite the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding
on foreign assistance agreeing on an annual commitment of
$300 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) through
2014, Jordan continues to seek additional assistance in the
form of supplemental appropriations. In 2009 Jordan was
successful in obtaining $150 million in forward-financed
assistance in this manner, directly reducing our FMF
commitment for 2010. Jordan has so far been disappointed
with our lack of commitment to leave behind or store military
equipment redeploying through Jordan from Iraq. End Summary.
Middle East Peace
-----------------
¶2. (S//NF) Jordan continues to play a central role in
fostering Middle East peace and a two-state solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Both the King and his Foreign
Minister Naser Joudeh have maintained steady pressure on
other Arab states to offer modest deliverables to Israel.
The King's efforts, which have met with some success, seek
tangible steps such as overflight permission for Israeli air
traffic, linking telecommunications networks with Israel, and
reducing restrictions on travelers who have transited Israel.
Recently however, the King has adopted a new approach,
pressing PM Netanyahu and President Abbas to initiate
immediate negotiations aimed at producing even limited
Israeli concessions. Positive progress at the negotiating
table, however meager, could provide crucial political cover
for Abu Mazen, affording him a measure of maneuverability.
¶3. (S//NF) Given his public backing of U.S. attempts to
restart Middle East Peace negotiations, the King views the
lack of progress as damaging to his credibility. This damage
could limit his ability to play a constructive role in the
future. At the same time, Jordanian officials consistently
express concern that Jordan will be asked to assume a degree
of guardianship over the West Bank, a move which many believe
would alter Jordan's demographic makeup in ways that directly
threaten its Hashemite rule, and consequently, the interests
of the East Bank elites.
Iraq
----
¶4. (C) Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq,
using engagement to promote bilateral trade and encouraging
Iraq to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with
Iran. As evidence of the proactive Jordanian position the
King became the first Arab Head of State to visit Baghdad, in
July 2008, and has named an Ambassador to Iraq. The King
supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but
moving in the right direction. Senior Jordanian leaders have
become concerned that increasing tensions between the central
government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent
conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability
as U.S. forces withdraw.
¶5. (S) In response to a request by General Odierno to
provide capacity-building assistance to the Iraqi Ministries
of Defense and Interior, Jordan has hosted visits of Iraqi
officers to learn about border security operations on the
Syrian border and observe military cooperation through joint
AMMAN 00000329 002 OF 005
exercises with CENTCOM. Jordan hosted Iraqis at two 2009
seminars aimed at building the Iraqi capacity to manage their
own Foreign Military Sales workload. Jordan has also said it
will send a Defense Attach to Baghdad, but has not yet made
plans to do so.
¶6. (S) Jordan signed a Technical Agreement with CENTCOM in
July, laying the groundwork for redeployment of U.S. forces
and equipment from Iraq through Jordan. In November, the
first set of U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equipment
redeployed through Jordan, signaling an appreciable increase
in throughput with additional BCT sets redeploying in
December and January. Over the course of the next six
months, seven additional BCT sets of equipment are scheduled
to transit Jordan en route to the port of Aqaba and
ultimately to the U.S. Redeployment represents a significant
boon to the Jordanian economy: $15.1M in 2009. The military
and political leadership of Jordan has been frustrated that
the U.S. has not committed to leave equipment behind in
Jordan to be donated, refurbished, or stored. Two further
disappointments include the termination of jet fuel shipments
through Jordan into Western Iraq, and the U.S. decision not
to train Iraqi F-16 pilots in Jordanian flight schools.
Iran
----
¶7. (S//NF) Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in
the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect
of an Iranian nuclear program, support for Hizballah and
Hamas, support for the Huthi and other armed groups in Yemen,
and Iran's role in Iraq and links with Syria. The King
believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran
exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the
Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's
leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting
their freedom and resources to act internationally.
Especially with the recent buildup of U.S. military assets in
the Persian Gulf, fear remains that Iran will try to counter
these perceptions with a dramatic act. Jordan will support
new UNSC sanctions against Iran, but will be loath to enforce
those sanctions in the absence of progress in the Middle East
Peace Process. Without a material improvement in the Peace
Process, any confrontation with Iran risks backlash from
Palestinian groups
who cast Tehran as their protector.
¶8. (S//NF) Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link
between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and
progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and
Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to
Iran. Arab governments are restricted in their ability to
deal with Iran, they say, so long as Iran is seen as
supporting the Palestinians against Israel. Realization of
the two-state solution would consolidate the regional
consensus against Iran, Jordan believes.
Syria
-----
¶9. (S/NF) Jordan increased its engagement with Syria in the
last half of 2009 attempting to draw Damascus toward an
alignment with moderate Arab states and away from Iranian
influence. The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met
at least four times in 2009, which resulted in agreements on
a number of initiatives, including border demarcation,
customs procedures, and commercial transport. Although
Jordanian officials continue to be skeptical of Syrian
intentions to follow through, Jordan is supported in its
dialogue with Syria by Turkey, which is interested in
increasing its ground transit of commercial goods through
Syria to Gulf countries.
AMMAN 00000329 003 OF 005
Domestic Politics
-----------------
¶10. (C) King Abdullah dissolved the unpopular Parliament
and announced a new Cabinet in December 2009, ending months
of infighting and legislative stalemate. The King has
mandated that new elections take place before the end of 2010
with a new election law currently being drafted. It is
unclear whether the new law will correct the disproportionate
districting that systematically under represents urban
Palestinian-Jordanians in Parliament. The current electoral
system favors rural, traditionally East-Bank districts, over
the cities. It is too soon to tell by how much the numbers
might shift or how tribal or traditional East Bank interests
would be affected.
¶11. (S/NF) We have been urging the Jordanians to
re-invigorate social and political reforms, expanding
political space for civil society, pressing electoral changes
aimed at a more representative, inclusive system, and further
loosening of state control over the economy. The King's
economic and political changes face domestic opposition from
tribal leaders and an array of entrenched East Bank
interests. The latter include many in the military, security
services, and bureaucracy, who enjoy a disproportionate share
of the current system.
¶12. (S//NF) Jordan has made progress on the economic front:
buying back debt, eliminating subsidies, and promoting a
trade-based, market-oriented economy. The positive effects
of those measures are starting to wane, in part, a
ramification of the global financial crisis, but also due to
poor budget management and poor management of its limited
water and energy resources. Jordan is one of the world's
most water-poor nations and is moving aggressively on
independent and regional initiatives to address its water
needs. GAMA, a Turkish company partially owned by General
Electric was awarded an $800 million contract to pump water
from Southern Jordan's Disi aquifer to Amman. While a World
Bank-led study continues on conveying water from the Red Sea
to the Dead Sea to rehabilitate the Dead Sea, generate
hydropower, and provide desalinated water to Jordan, Israel,
and the Palestinian Authority, Jordan announced in May 2009,
similar plans for the unilateral $10 billion Jordan Red Sea
Development Project to bene
fit Jordan only. Jordan has yet to secure the requisite
funding to begin the single-country project.
¶13. (S//NF) Jordan's economy is also affected by its energy
needs. Jordan is a net importer of energy and thus subject
to market fluctuations for oil prices. It imports some of
its fuel needs from Iraq, but poor infrastructure limits
import quantities, which must travel overland by tanker
truck. Consequently, the discount offered barely offsets
transportation costs. Since 2003, Jordan has paid market
rate for other imported fuel. Jordan sees nuclear energy as
its future and the King has placed a priority on developing a
civilian nuclear energy program. The GOJ is anxious to sign a
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with the United States,
required for U.S. companies to provide nuclear reactors, fuel
or materials. NCA negotiations are currently stalled however,
with the Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission
objecting to assurances sought by the U.S. that Jordan will
not refine or enrich uranium in Jordan. Meanwhile, the GOJ
continues to advance its nuclear energy program and has
signed either MOUs or NCAs with the United States, Canada,
China, France, South Korea, the UK, and a number of other
countries.
Military Assistance and Cooperation
-----------------------------------
¶14. (C) The U.S.-Jordan mil-to-mil relationship is among
the most extensive in the region. In September 2008, an MOU
on Foreign Assistance was signed with Jordan that included a
AMMAN 00000329 004 OF 005
commitment to $300 million annually in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) through 2014. In 2009 Congress allocated
$150 million (of the $300 million) in forward-financed FMF to
Jordan through the Supplemental Appropriation (which will
reduce the FMF commitment for 2010 by an equal amount.) In
January, Jordan's top military advisor, Prince Faisal, and
Minister of Planning met Defense and State Department
officials and Members of Congress in Washington aimed at
securing a pledge of funds through an anticipated Afghanistan
supplemental appropriation. Although these assistance levels
are substantial, Jordan is sensitive to decreases in FMF from
the height of the war in Iraq when Jordan received large
supplemental appropriations. For example, combined FMF was
$497 million in 2008, $307 million in 2007, and $305 million
in 2006.
¶15. (U) In addition to FMF, Jordan is one of the largest
recipients of Individual Military Education and Training
(IMET) funding, which will be $3.8M in 2010 and $3.7M in
¶2011. The program pays immense dividends, developing strong
professional bonds between U.S. and JAF officer corps.
¶16. (C) Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S.
regional security priorities. In July 2009, Jordan deployed
a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Logar Province in
Afghanistan to provide election security (TF 222). The JAF
deployed the second battalion rotation in support of OEF in
January 2010, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to
their soldiers' safety. JAF leaders have intimated that they
would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade), if
the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome. In fact,
during the Joint Military Commission in November 2009, MG
Mash'al Al Zaben, Chief of Staff for Strategy, stated that
Jordan would stay in Afghanistan until the last U.S. soldier
came home. In October, Jordan deployed the second rotation
of a Special Operations company (TF 111) that conducts combat
operations alongside U.S. Special Forces. The third
rotational company deploys in February 2010.
¶17. (S/NF) Following the December 30 suicide bombing by a
Jordanian national in Khost, Afghanistan, Jordan has
experienced increased calls by opposition groups and
non-governmental figures to explain its Afghanistan
assistance and end its security cooperation with the United
States. So far, such calls and commentary in the press have
received no traction with the government, which vigorously
and publically defends its efforts to combat terrorism.
Jordanian government officials have privately reiterated the
commitment to maintaining their relationship with us,
highlighting their deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
¶18. (C) In May, Jordan completed a donation of 10 M60 tanks
to Lebanon, funded by UAE. Jordan delivered to Yemen 25 M113
Armored Personnel Carriers in response to a request from
State Department, funded by UAE. Jordan has offered to
assist with other deployments, counter-piracy missions, and
to host training courses and exercises for Iraqi, Lebanese,
and other forces, but remains dependent on external financial
support to fund its contributions. Jordan continues to
supply forces to U.N. sponsored Peace-Keeping Operations
around the world.
¶19. (S). Jordan is anxious to provide additional
contributions to the fight in Afghanistan, and made this
clear during HRH Prince Feisal's recent trip to Washington.
OSD, Joint Staff and CENTCOM are reviewing their proposals.
¶20. (S) Despite the high levels of FMF and other security
assistance, Jordan continues to request additional financial
resources from external sources to make each contribution to
regional security possible. For example, the Lebanon and
Yemen donations were financed with funds from the UAE.
Training programs for regional forces are financed through
U.S. Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) funds or the U.S.
Security Coordinator (USSC). In addition, Jordanian law
stipulates that its soldiers deployed overseas are entitled
AMMAN 00000329 005 OF 005
to approximately $1,700 monthly in combat pay, which has been
financed through the United Nations for peacekeeping
operations. Jordan has not yet identified a source of combat
pay funding for its Afghanistan deployments but is hopeful
NATO will contribute.
¶21. (S) Jordan has used its FMF to improve its border
security and defensive capabilities remaining cognizant of
interoperability with U.S. forces. We are concerned that
Jordan has focused too heavily on acquiring expensive new
technology and needs to place more emphasis on the training
and maintenance needs of existing programs.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
JORDAN: SCENESETTER FOR VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN
Reference ID 10AMMAN459
Created 2010-02-25 14:02
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAM #0459/01 0561441
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251441Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0068
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2078
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5807
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0441
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6975
S E C R E T AMMAN 000459
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS: OVIP EAID PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN: SCENESETTER FOR VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
¶1. (S//NF) Summary: Mr. Vice President, Embassy Amman warmly
welcomes you to Jordan. As you arrive, Jordan continues to
face some of the most troubling challenges of King Abdullah's
10-year reign. Jordan has been hit hard by the global
economic slowdown and is heavily aid-dependent. The
pared-down 2010 national budget, which still includes a USD
1.43 billion deficit before grants, has imposed painful cuts
across the board, including a 20 percent cut in capital
expenditures. Jordan's domestic political scene remains
unsettled, and the government is constitutionally ruling by
decree following the King's late November 2009 dissolution of
parliament, a body considered by many Jordanians to have been
selected through government-manipulated elections. Samir
Rifai, the new Prime Minister, is currently overseeing an
inter-ministerial committee drafting amendments to the
electoral law and has promised to unveil the amended law in
May, with elections currently scheduled to take place during
the last quarter of 2010.
¶2. (S//NF) Regional tensions also continue to capture the
attention of the Jordanian leadership. Amman is particularly
focused on the perceived stalled peace negotiations between
the Palestinians and Israelis and Iran's evolving nuclear
program and growing regional influence, which Jordanian
officials view as distinct issues. The solution to both is
seen as linked by Jordanian interlocutors. At the same time,
Jordan has made significant contributions in Afghanistan and
has worked to improve regional security by encouraging Syria
to seek a moderate Arab alternative to Iranian influence and
strengthening ties to Baghdad. End Summary.
Budget Challenges and Impact on USG
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) Your visit comes as Jordan faces a difficult budget
environment. The 2010 budget includes USD 6.74 billion in
projected revenues and USD 7.71 billion in expenditures (83
percent of which is accounted for by Jordan's bloated civil
service and military patronage system) and has a USD 1.4
billion deficit before grants, which is 5.8 percent of
Jordan's GDP (estimated at USD 24.7 billion for 2010). The
2010 budget features 20 percent cuts to capital expenditures
and 1.4 percent cuts to current expenditures and will impact
GOJ agencies by curtailing their ability to hire new
employees and forcing additional cuts in overtime, official
travel, and purchases of vehicles and furniture. Existing
reform and development projects requiring new staff and/or
construction will also face financial constraints. Weak
growth in 2009 will translate to lower income and sales tax
revenues this year (taxes on 2009 income will be paid in
2010). This along with a downward trend for the collection
of land sale and other fees by the GOJ in 2010 portends an
even more precarious budget situation during the second half
of 2010. This budget environment has already resulted in
requests from the GOJ for additional USG financial and
technical assistance.
Assistance MOU
--------------
¶4. (C) On September 22, 2008, Jordan and the U.S. signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to development,
economic, and military assistance. The agreement laid out a
five-year non-binding annual commitment of economic support
funds (ESF) USD 360 million) and foreign military funds (FMF)
USD 300 million). (Note: The FY 2011 OMB budget submission
includes $360 million in ESF and USD 300 million in FMF for
Jordan. End note.) In turn, a side letter spelled out the
joint intent to expand cooperation in the political and
economic arenas. The side letter draws on the 2006 Jordanian
"National Agenda" reform plan and identifies areas of mutual
cooperation to be discussed in separate economic and
political bilateral dialogues. A bilateral political
dialogue meeting focused on equality for women under the law,
media freedom, religious tolerance and freedom, prison
conditions and inmate treatment, good governance, and a
strong civil society was held in Amman in January 2010 with
senior State Department officials. GOJ officials have
proposed that the bilateral economic dialogue take place in
April in Washington.
Political Changes
-----------------
¶5. (S//NF) The King constitutionally dissolved the Parliament
in late November 2009. The public supported the King's
decision because parliament was widely perceived to have been
elected in manipulated elections and was seen as corrupt and
ineffective. Cooperation between the then-cabinet and
parliament had deteriorated to such an extent by late summer
2009 that only a minimal amount of legislation was offered
for parliamentary consideration, most of which was stymied
or, if approved, mangled in the process, according to
parliamentary observers.
¶6. (SBU) Following the King's dissolution of the parliament,
he exercised a constitutional clause which allowed him to
extend the normal constitutionally required four-month window
for new elections. Palace statements indicate that this was
done to reform the election law, which strongly favors rural,
East Bank communities over urban communities with large
Palestinian-origin populations. The King has established a
ministerial-level committee, overseen by Prime Minister
Rifai, to draft electoral law reforms and announced that
parliamentary elections will be held in the last quarter of
¶2010. However, there have been no meaningful consultations
with electoral reform advocates to date and few believe that
the new law will produce any significant changes.
¶7. (SBU) In early December, the King requested the
resignation of then-Prime Minister Nader Dahabi and appointed
to replace him Samir Rifai, who is a former official and
advisor to the King in the Royal Court, Foreign Minister
Nasser Judeh's cousin, and the son of former Prime Minister
and Upper House Speaker Zayd Rifai. In his designation
letter to Rifai, the King emphasized, among various reform
efforts, the need to fight corruption.
¶8. (SBU) Along with the new Prime Minister, a new 29-member
cabinet was named and officially sworn in on December 14.
Local commentators note a lack of new faces in the cabinet,
with 13 returning ministers and seven who served in previous
governments. Analysts believe that the government, as a
whole, will ultimately turn out to be conservative rather
than reform-oriented in its decision-making. In the absence
of a sitting parliament, the new government has begun to pass
so-called "temporary laws" or legislation enacted without
parliamentary approval, which will theoretically be subject
to parliamentary re-evaluation once new members are elected
and seated. Some commentators see this as a way for the
government to pass legislation which otherwise would not have
made it through a sitting parliament. For example, much
needed tax reform laws, which the previous parliament
opposed, were recently enacted as well as a law on renewable
energy.
Middle East Peace
------------------
¶9. (S//NF) During your visit, you will hear from GOJ
interlocutors their concern on the lack of progress in Middle
East Peace negotiations. The King remains a resolute
advocate of a two-state solution and has responded positively
to his engagements with SEMEP Mitchell. Jordanian officials
consistently express concern that Jordan will be asked to
assume some form of responsibility for the West Bank, a
proposition that King Abdullah consistently resists, as does
an overwhelming percentage of the Jordanian public.
¶10. (S//NF) King Abdullah has said publicly that the lack of
progress is the greatest threat to stability in the region
and hurts U.S. credibility in the region. King Abdullah
further asserts that the lack of meaningful progress hurts
the ability of the United States to advance its interests on
multiple issues in the region, including on Iran. Jordan
considers settlement activities, home demolitions, and
evictions in Jerusalem to be particularly destabilizing and
unhelpful in restarting negotiations. The King also has a
keen interest in preserving Jordan's role in administering
the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount complex in Jerusalem and in
overseeing other Islamic and Christian holy sites in
Jerusalem.
¶11. (S//NF) Recently, the King has adopted a new approach,
pressing PM Netanyahu and President Abbas to initiate
immediate proximity talks as a means to work towards direct
negotiations. Positive progress at the negotiating table,
however meager, could provide crucial political cover for
President Abbas, affording him a measure of maneuverability.
Given his public backing of U.S. efforts, the King also views
the lack of progress as damaging to his own credibility and
limiting his ability to play a constructive role in the
future.
Iran
----
¶12. (S//NF) Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in
the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect
of an Iranian nuclear program, support for Hizballah and
Hamas, support for the Huthi and other armed groups in Yemen,
and Iran's role in Iraq and links with Syria. The King
believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran
exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the
Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's
leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting
their freedom and resources to act internationally.
Especially with the recent buildup of U.S. military assets in
the Persian Gulf, GOJ contacts fear that Iran will try to
counter these perceptions with a dramatic act.
¶13. (S//NF) Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link
between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and
progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and
Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to
Iran. Jordan will quietly support new UNSC sanctions against
Iran, but will be loath to enforce those sanctions in the
absence of progress in the Middle East peace negotiations.
Without a material improvement in the negotiations, any
confrontation with Iran risks backlash from regional publics
and Palestinian groups who cast Tehran as their protector.
Realization of the two-state solution would consolidate the
regional consensus against Iran, Jordan believes.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶14. (C) Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S.
regional security priorities. In July 2009, Jordan deployed
a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Afghanistan to provide
election security. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) has
deployed two battalions in rotation in support of OEF as of
January 2010, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to
their soldiers' safety. JAF leaders have intimated that they
would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade), if
the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome. In fact,
during the Joint Military Commission in November 2009, MG
Mash'al Al Zaben, Chief of Staff for Strategy, stated that
Jordan would stay in Afghanistan until the last U.S. soldier
came home.
¶15. (S/NF) Following the December 30 suicide bombing by a
Jordanian national in Khost, Afghanistan, Jordan has
experienced increased calls by opposition groups and
non-governmental figures to explain its Afghanistan
assistance and end its security cooperation with the United
States. So far, such calls and commentary in the press have
received no traction with the government, which has
vigorously and publicly defended its efforts to combat
terrorism. Jordanian government officials have privately
reiterated a commitment to maintaining their relationship
with us, highlighting their deployments in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
Syria
-----
¶16. (S/NF) Jordan increased its engagement with Syria in the
last half of 2009, attempting to draw Damascus toward an
alignment with moderate Arab states and away from Iranian
influence. The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met
at least four times in 2009, which resulted in agreements on
a number of initiatives, including border demarcation,
customs procedures, and commercial transport. Despite recent
agreements, Jordanian officials continue to be skeptical of
Syrian intentions to follow through.
Iraq
--------------
¶17. (C) Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq,
reaching out to promote bilateral trade and encouraging Iraq
to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with
Iran. The King became the first Arab Head of State to visit
Baghdad, in July 2008, subsequently named an Ambassador to
Iraq, and has promised to name a Defense Attach. The King
supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but
moving in the right direction. Senior Jordanian leaders have
become concerned that increasing tensions between the central
government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent
conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability
as U.S. forces withdraw.
¶18. (SBU) Jordan hosts numerous Iraqi "guests" who have fled
the conflict and its after-effects and has provided them with
access to some social services. The GOJ does not formally
classify the Iraqis as refugees, because of concerns that a
new permanent refugee populace in Jordan, in addition to the
already sizable Palestinian refugee population, would further
erode the demographic position of East Bankers. The GOJ
emphasizes that hosting the Iraqis has been a burden on the
budget, and Jordan has received significant amounts of
international aid to ease their already tight fiscal
situation. Jordanian officials have previously placed the
number of Iraqi refugees between 450,000 and 500,000, but
have now backed away from specific numbers of late in the
face of estimates from most international organizations and
NGOs that are significantly lower, perhaps in the 100,000 to
200,000 range. The real numbers are uncertain in the absence
of a needs assessment study on Iraqis in Jordan, which the
U.S. and others have been urging. Displaced Iraqis in Jordan
are integrated and live within Jordanian communities, not in
refugee camps.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2010-02-25 14:02
Released 2011-01-31
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Amman
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAM #0459/01 0561441
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0068
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2078
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5807
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0441
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6975
S E C R E T AMMAN 000459
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS: OVIP EAID PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN: SCENESETTER FOR VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
¶1. (S//NF) Summary: Mr. Vice President, Embassy Amman warmly
welcomes you to Jordan. As you arrive, Jordan continues to
face some of the most troubling challenges of King Abdullah's
10-year reign. Jordan has been hit hard by the global
economic slowdown and is heavily aid-dependent. The
pared-down 2010 national budget, which still includes a USD
1.43 billion deficit before grants, has imposed painful cuts
across the board, including a 20 percent cut in capital
expenditures. Jordan's domestic political scene remains
unsettled, and the government is constitutionally ruling by
decree following the King's late November 2009 dissolution of
parliament, a body considered by many Jordanians to have been
selected through government-manipulated elections. Samir
Rifai, the new Prime Minister, is currently overseeing an
inter-ministerial committee drafting amendments to the
electoral law and has promised to unveil the amended law in
May, with elections currently scheduled to take place during
the last quarter of 2010.
¶2. (S//NF) Regional tensions also continue to capture the
attention of the Jordanian leadership. Amman is particularly
focused on the perceived stalled peace negotiations between
the Palestinians and Israelis and Iran's evolving nuclear
program and growing regional influence, which Jordanian
officials view as distinct issues. The solution to both is
seen as linked by Jordanian interlocutors. At the same time,
Jordan has made significant contributions in Afghanistan and
has worked to improve regional security by encouraging Syria
to seek a moderate Arab alternative to Iranian influence and
strengthening ties to Baghdad. End Summary.
Budget Challenges and Impact on USG
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) Your visit comes as Jordan faces a difficult budget
environment. The 2010 budget includes USD 6.74 billion in
projected revenues and USD 7.71 billion in expenditures (83
percent of which is accounted for by Jordan's bloated civil
service and military patronage system) and has a USD 1.4
billion deficit before grants, which is 5.8 percent of
Jordan's GDP (estimated at USD 24.7 billion for 2010). The
2010 budget features 20 percent cuts to capital expenditures
and 1.4 percent cuts to current expenditures and will impact
GOJ agencies by curtailing their ability to hire new
employees and forcing additional cuts in overtime, official
travel, and purchases of vehicles and furniture. Existing
reform and development projects requiring new staff and/or
construction will also face financial constraints. Weak
growth in 2009 will translate to lower income and sales tax
revenues this year (taxes on 2009 income will be paid in
2010). This along with a downward trend for the collection
of land sale and other fees by the GOJ in 2010 portends an
even more precarious budget situation during the second half
of 2010. This budget environment has already resulted in
requests from the GOJ for additional USG financial and
technical assistance.
Assistance MOU
--------------
¶4. (C) On September 22, 2008, Jordan and the U.S. signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to development,
economic, and military assistance. The agreement laid out a
five-year non-binding annual commitment of economic support
funds (ESF) USD 360 million) and foreign military funds (FMF)
USD 300 million). (Note: The FY 2011 OMB budget submission
includes $360 million in ESF and USD 300 million in FMF for
Jordan. End note.) In turn, a side letter spelled out the
joint intent to expand cooperation in the political and
economic arenas. The side letter draws on the 2006 Jordanian
"National Agenda" reform plan and identifies areas of mutual
cooperation to be discussed in separate economic and
political bilateral dialogues. A bilateral political
dialogue meeting focused on equality for women under the law,
media freedom, religious tolerance and freedom, prison
conditions and inmate treatment, good governance, and a
strong civil society was held in Amman in January 2010 with
senior State Department officials. GOJ officials have
proposed that the bilateral economic dialogue take place in
April in Washington.
Political Changes
-----------------
¶5. (S//NF) The King constitutionally dissolved the Parliament
in late November 2009. The public supported the King's
decision because parliament was widely perceived to have been
elected in manipulated elections and was seen as corrupt and
ineffective. Cooperation between the then-cabinet and
parliament had deteriorated to such an extent by late summer
2009 that only a minimal amount of legislation was offered
for parliamentary consideration, most of which was stymied
or, if approved, mangled in the process, according to
parliamentary observers.
¶6. (SBU) Following the King's dissolution of the parliament,
he exercised a constitutional clause which allowed him to
extend the normal constitutionally required four-month window
for new elections. Palace statements indicate that this was
done to reform the election law, which strongly favors rural,
East Bank communities over urban communities with large
Palestinian-origin populations. The King has established a
ministerial-level committee, overseen by Prime Minister
Rifai, to draft electoral law reforms and announced that
parliamentary elections will be held in the last quarter of
¶2010. However, there have been no meaningful consultations
with electoral reform advocates to date and few believe that
the new law will produce any significant changes.
¶7. (SBU) In early December, the King requested the
resignation of then-Prime Minister Nader Dahabi and appointed
to replace him Samir Rifai, who is a former official and
advisor to the King in the Royal Court, Foreign Minister
Nasser Judeh's cousin, and the son of former Prime Minister
and Upper House Speaker Zayd Rifai. In his designation
letter to Rifai, the King emphasized, among various reform
efforts, the need to fight corruption.
¶8. (SBU) Along with the new Prime Minister, a new 29-member
cabinet was named and officially sworn in on December 14.
Local commentators note a lack of new faces in the cabinet,
with 13 returning ministers and seven who served in previous
governments. Analysts believe that the government, as a
whole, will ultimately turn out to be conservative rather
than reform-oriented in its decision-making. In the absence
of a sitting parliament, the new government has begun to pass
so-called "temporary laws" or legislation enacted without
parliamentary approval, which will theoretically be subject
to parliamentary re-evaluation once new members are elected
and seated. Some commentators see this as a way for the
government to pass legislation which otherwise would not have
made it through a sitting parliament. For example, much
needed tax reform laws, which the previous parliament
opposed, were recently enacted as well as a law on renewable
energy.
Middle East Peace
------------------
¶9. (S//NF) During your visit, you will hear from GOJ
interlocutors their concern on the lack of progress in Middle
East Peace negotiations. The King remains a resolute
advocate of a two-state solution and has responded positively
to his engagements with SEMEP Mitchell. Jordanian officials
consistently express concern that Jordan will be asked to
assume some form of responsibility for the West Bank, a
proposition that King Abdullah consistently resists, as does
an overwhelming percentage of the Jordanian public.
¶10. (S//NF) King Abdullah has said publicly that the lack of
progress is the greatest threat to stability in the region
and hurts U.S. credibility in the region. King Abdullah
further asserts that the lack of meaningful progress hurts
the ability of the United States to advance its interests on
multiple issues in the region, including on Iran. Jordan
considers settlement activities, home demolitions, and
evictions in Jerusalem to be particularly destabilizing and
unhelpful in restarting negotiations. The King also has a
keen interest in preserving Jordan's role in administering
the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount complex in Jerusalem and in
overseeing other Islamic and Christian holy sites in
Jerusalem.
¶11. (S//NF) Recently, the King has adopted a new approach,
pressing PM Netanyahu and President Abbas to initiate
immediate proximity talks as a means to work towards direct
negotiations. Positive progress at the negotiating table,
however meager, could provide crucial political cover for
President Abbas, affording him a measure of maneuverability.
Given his public backing of U.S. efforts, the King also views
the lack of progress as damaging to his own credibility and
limiting his ability to play a constructive role in the
future.
Iran
----
¶12. (S//NF) Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in
the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect
of an Iranian nuclear program, support for Hizballah and
Hamas, support for the Huthi and other armed groups in Yemen,
and Iran's role in Iraq and links with Syria. The King
believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran
exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the
Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's
leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting
their freedom and resources to act internationally.
Especially with the recent buildup of U.S. military assets in
the Persian Gulf, GOJ contacts fear that Iran will try to
counter these perceptions with a dramatic act.
¶13. (S//NF) Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link
between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and
progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and
Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to
Iran. Jordan will quietly support new UNSC sanctions against
Iran, but will be loath to enforce those sanctions in the
absence of progress in the Middle East peace negotiations.
Without a material improvement in the negotiations, any
confrontation with Iran risks backlash from regional publics
and Palestinian groups who cast Tehran as their protector.
Realization of the two-state solution would consolidate the
regional consensus against Iran, Jordan believes.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶14. (C) Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S.
regional security priorities. In July 2009, Jordan deployed
a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Afghanistan to provide
election security. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) has
deployed two battalions in rotation in support of OEF as of
January 2010, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to
their soldiers' safety. JAF leaders have intimated that they
would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade), if
the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome. In fact,
during the Joint Military Commission in November 2009, MG
Mash'al Al Zaben, Chief of Staff for Strategy, stated that
Jordan would stay in Afghanistan until the last U.S. soldier
came home.
¶15. (S/NF) Following the December 30 suicide bombing by a
Jordanian national in Khost, Afghanistan, Jordan has
experienced increased calls by opposition groups and
non-governmental figures to explain its Afghanistan
assistance and end its security cooperation with the United
States. So far, such calls and commentary in the press have
received no traction with the government, which has
vigorously and publicly defended its efforts to combat
terrorism. Jordanian government officials have privately
reiterated a commitment to maintaining their relationship
with us, highlighting their deployments in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
Syria
-----
¶16. (S/NF) Jordan increased its engagement with Syria in the
last half of 2009, attempting to draw Damascus toward an
alignment with moderate Arab states and away from Iranian
influence. The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met
at least four times in 2009, which resulted in agreements on
a number of initiatives, including border demarcation,
customs procedures, and commercial transport. Despite recent
agreements, Jordanian officials continue to be skeptical of
Syrian intentions to follow through.
Iraq
--------------
¶17. (C) Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq,
reaching out to promote bilateral trade and encouraging Iraq
to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with
Iran. The King became the first Arab Head of State to visit
Baghdad, in July 2008, subsequently named an Ambassador to
Iraq, and has promised to name a Defense Attach. The King
supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but
moving in the right direction. Senior Jordanian leaders have
become concerned that increasing tensions between the central
government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent
conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability
as U.S. forces withdraw.
¶18. (SBU) Jordan hosts numerous Iraqi "guests" who have fled
the conflict and its after-effects and has provided them with
access to some social services. The GOJ does not formally
classify the Iraqis as refugees, because of concerns that a
new permanent refugee populace in Jordan, in addition to the
already sizable Palestinian refugee population, would further
erode the demographic position of East Bankers. The GOJ
emphasizes that hosting the Iraqis has been a burden on the
budget, and Jordan has received significant amounts of
international aid to ease their already tight fiscal
situation. Jordanian officials have previously placed the
number of Iraqi refugees between 450,000 and 500,000, but
have now backed away from specific numbers of late in the
face of estimates from most international organizations and
NGOs that are significantly lower, perhaps in the 100,000 to
200,000 range. The real numbers are uncertain in the absence
of a needs assessment study on Iraqis in Jordan, which the
U.S. and others have been urging. Displaced Iraqis in Jordan
are integrated and live within Jordanian communities, not in
refugee camps.
Beecroft
Source: Wikileaks
Saturday, January 29, 2011
(NO SUBJECT, but related to Torture and police brutality in Egypt)
Reference ID 09CAIRO79
Created 2009-01-15 15:03
Released 2011-01-28
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHEG #0079/01 0151524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151524Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1372
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A LCAIRO 000079 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/NESCA, INL AND INR/NESA NSC FOR PASCUAL AND KUTCHA-HELBLINGE.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2029TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM EG
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Police brutality in Egypt against common criminals is routine and pervasive. Contacts describe the police using force to extract confessions from criminals as a daily event, resulting from poor training and understaffing. Brutality against Islamist detainees has reportedly decreased overall, but security forces still resort to torturing Muslim Brotherhood activists who are deemed to pose a political threat. Over the past five years, the government has stopped denying that torture exists, and since late 2007 courts have sentenced approximately 15 police officers to prison terms for torture and killings.
Independent NGOs have criticized GOE-led efforts to provide human rights training for the police as ineffective and lacking political will. The GOE has not yet made a serious effort to transform the police from an instrument of regime power into a public service institution. We want to continue a USG-funded police training program (ref F), and to look for other ways to help the GOE address police brutality. End summary and comment.
-------------------
A Pervasive Problem
------------------- ¶
¶2. (C) Torture and police brutality in Egypt are endemic and widespread. The police use brutal methods mostly against common criminals to extract confessions, but also against demonstrators, certain political prisoners and unfortunate bystanders. One human rights lawyer told us there is evidence of torture in Egypt dating back to the times of the Pharaohs. NGO contacts estimate there are literally hundreds of torture incidents every day in Cairo police stations alone. Egyptians are bombarded with consistent news reports of police brutality, ranging from high profile incidents such as accidental but lethal police shootings in Salamut and Aswan this past fall (refs B and C) that sparked riots, to reports of police officers shooting civilians following disputes over traffic tickets. In November 2008 alone, there were two incidents of off-duty police officers shooting and killing civilians over petty disputes. The cases against both officers are currently making their way through the judicial system.
¶3. (C) NGO and academic contacts from across the political spectrum report witnessing police brutality as part of their daily lives. One academic at XXXXXXXXXXXX told us XXXXXXXXXXXX the police proceeded to beat a female suspect into confessing about others involved in the theft and the whereabouts of the stolen valuables. A contact from an international NGO described witnessing police beat the doorman of an upscale Cairo apartment building into disclosing the apartment number of a suspect. Another contact at a human rights NGO told us that her friends do not report thefts from their apartments because they do not want to subject “all the doormen” in the vicinity to police beatings. She told us that the police’s use of force has pervaded Egyptian culture to the extent that one popular television soap opera recently featured a police detective hero who beats up suspects to collect evidence.
¶4. (C) Contacts attribute police brutality to poor training, understaffing and official sanction. Human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX speculated that officers routinely resort to brutality because of pressure from their superiors to solve crimes. He asserted that most officers think solving crimes justifies brutal interrogation methods, and that some policemen believe that Islamic law sanctions torture. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that a culture of judicial impunity for police officers enables continued brutality. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, “Police officers feel they are above the law and protected by the public prosecutor.” Human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX attributed police brutality against common criminals, including the use of electric shocks, to the problem of demoralized officers facing long hours and their own economic problems. He asserted that the police will even beat lawyers who enter police stations to defend their clients.
-----------------------
Criminals and Islamists
-----------------------
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that since the GOE opened a dialogue with formerly violent Islamists, such as the Islamic Group, following the 1997 Luxor terrorist attacks, torture of Islamists has decreased. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the GOE now treats Islamists better than common criminals. Some Islamist detainees are “spoiled,” he asserted, with regular access to visits from friends and family, decent food and education. Before the Luxor attacks, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented, the government would torture Islamist detainees on a daily basis.
¶6. (C) Attorney XXXXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the GOE is more reluctant to torture Islamists, including Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members, because of their persistence in making public political statements, and their contacts with international NGOs that could embarrass the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that the exception to this rule is when MB members mobilize people against the government in a way the regime deems threatening, such as the April 6 Facebook strike (ref D). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the MB-affiliated blogger and “April 6 Movement” member XXXXXXXXXXXX whom police arrested XXXXXXXXXXXX (ref A) falls into this category, and the GOE is probably torturing him to scare other “April 6” members into abandoning their political activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assessment tracks with “April 6” member XXXXXXXXXXXX’s accounts of his own torture and the alleged police sexual molestation of a female “April 6” activist this past November (ref A). Bloggers close to XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that following his arrest he was tortured severely with electric shocks and needed to be hospitalized, but that security forces stopped the torture when he began cooperating.
----------------------------
GOE Awareness of the Problem
----------------------------
¶7. (C) Contacts agree that in the past five years, the government has stopped denying that torture exists and has taken some steps to address the problem. However, contacts believe that the Interior Ministry lacks the political will to take substantive action to change the culture of police brutality. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that following alleged standing orders from the Interior Ministry between 2000 and 2006 for the police to shoot, beat and humiliate judges in order to undermine judicial independence, the GOE made a political decision in 2007 to allow the courts to sentence police officers to short prison terms. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the 2007 Imad El-Kebir case as a turning point in influencing the government to permit the sentencing of police officers.
(Note: Per ref E, a court sentenced two police officers to three years in prison in November 2007 for assaulting and sodomizing bus driver Imad El-Kebir. The case gained notoriety after a cell phone video recording of the torture was posted on YouTube. End note.)
¶8. (C) An estimated 13 cases of officers accused of brutality are currently working their way through the courts, and judges have handed down moderate sentences, usually the minimum three-year prison term, against policemen over the past few months, often for heinous crimes. For example, in October 2008, a court sentenced a policeman to three years in prison for beating and drowning a fisherman. In November 2008, a court sentenced two policemen to three years in prison for hooking a man to their car and dragging him to his death. XXXXXXXXXXXXX characterized the sentences as “light,” in proportion to the crimes, but commented that any prison sentences are an important development toward holding the police responsible for crimes. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the prison sentences demonstrate that the GOE is providing political space for judges to operate somewhat independently, in response to criticism from foreign governments and international NGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXXX described the sentences as important in drawing public attention to brutal police crimes, and strengthening the hand of advocates who call for reforming systemic problems within the police force.
-----------
GOE Efforts
-----------
¶9. (C) Ambassador Ahmed Haggag, who is detailed from the MFA as the coordinator for the UNDP Human Rights Capacity Building Project, described for us the organization’s efforts to train the Interior and Justice Ministries and the Public Prosecutor on human rights issues through lectures and workshops. Acknowledging that torture is a “problem, but not a daily occurrence,” Haggag said the UNDP trains police officers on international human rights conventions, and is trying to convince police officers to solve cases using “legal and ethical means,” instead of torture. Haggag told us he “doubts there is still torture against political prisoners.” Staffers from the quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights described the council’s workshops for police officers where professors give lectures on human rights law and prisoner psychology. NGO contacts have privately criticized the UNDP project as ineffective, complaining that it has banned credible human lawyers from giving lectures to the police because of their political opposition to the NDP, and instead invites MOI officials complicit in torture to give human rights presentations.
¶10. (C) In late December 2008, the MOI announced it had suspended 280 police officers for human rights violations and fired 1,164 lower-ranking policemen for misconduct. Our NGO contacts doubted that the disciplinary actions were human rights related, and speculated that the officers were probably involved in taking bribes and other illegal activity. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that this announcement does not amount to a serious MOI human rights policy. XXXXXXXXXXXXX expressed skepticism over whether these disciplinary actions will result in long-term positive changes XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶11. (C) Former senior Interior Ministry official Ihab Youssef, Director of the NGO “The Police and the People for Egypt” told us in late 2008 that his NGO did not receive many proposals from the public in response to its solicitation for ideas on developing projects to build trust between the police and citizens. Youssef said that the NGO’s Facebook site, which provides a forum for the public to complain about the police, has generated more interest. In September 2008, Youssef publicly announced the formation of his NGO, which counts establishment figures such as former FM Ahmed Maher among its board members (ref C). Youssef does not receive GOE funding for the NGO, and has turned to private Egyptian businesses to raise money. XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) The GOE has not begun serious work on trying to transform the police and security services from instruments of power that serve and protect the regime into institutions operating in the public interest, despite official slogans to the contrary. It seems that the government would have the strongest interest in preventing future accidental shootings of innocents, such as the Salamut and Aswan incidents that resulted in riots. We imagine that halting the torture of common criminals, who are usually poor and voiceless, is lower on the GOE’s agenda. We want to continue USG-funded police training, and we will look for ways to help XXXXXXXXXXXX’s NGO launch productive work.
SCOBEY
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-01-15 15:03
Released 2011-01-28
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHEG #0079/01 0151524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151524Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1372
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A LCAIRO 000079 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/NESCA, INL AND INR/NESA NSC FOR PASCUAL AND KUTCHA-HELBLINGE.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2029TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM EG
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Police brutality in Egypt against common criminals is routine and pervasive. Contacts describe the police using force to extract confessions from criminals as a daily event, resulting from poor training and understaffing. Brutality against Islamist detainees has reportedly decreased overall, but security forces still resort to torturing Muslim Brotherhood activists who are deemed to pose a political threat. Over the past five years, the government has stopped denying that torture exists, and since late 2007 courts have sentenced approximately 15 police officers to prison terms for torture and killings.
Independent NGOs have criticized GOE-led efforts to provide human rights training for the police as ineffective and lacking political will. The GOE has not yet made a serious effort to transform the police from an instrument of regime power into a public service institution. We want to continue a USG-funded police training program (ref F), and to look for other ways to help the GOE address police brutality. End summary and comment.
-------------------
A Pervasive Problem
------------------- ¶
¶2. (C) Torture and police brutality in Egypt are endemic and widespread. The police use brutal methods mostly against common criminals to extract confessions, but also against demonstrators, certain political prisoners and unfortunate bystanders. One human rights lawyer told us there is evidence of torture in Egypt dating back to the times of the Pharaohs. NGO contacts estimate there are literally hundreds of torture incidents every day in Cairo police stations alone. Egyptians are bombarded with consistent news reports of police brutality, ranging from high profile incidents such as accidental but lethal police shootings in Salamut and Aswan this past fall (refs B and C) that sparked riots, to reports of police officers shooting civilians following disputes over traffic tickets. In November 2008 alone, there were two incidents of off-duty police officers shooting and killing civilians over petty disputes. The cases against both officers are currently making their way through the judicial system.
¶3. (C) NGO and academic contacts from across the political spectrum report witnessing police brutality as part of their daily lives. One academic at XXXXXXXXXXXX told us XXXXXXXXXXXX the police proceeded to beat a female suspect into confessing about others involved in the theft and the whereabouts of the stolen valuables. A contact from an international NGO described witnessing police beat the doorman of an upscale Cairo apartment building into disclosing the apartment number of a suspect. Another contact at a human rights NGO told us that her friends do not report thefts from their apartments because they do not want to subject “all the doormen” in the vicinity to police beatings. She told us that the police’s use of force has pervaded Egyptian culture to the extent that one popular television soap opera recently featured a police detective hero who beats up suspects to collect evidence.
¶4. (C) Contacts attribute police brutality to poor training, understaffing and official sanction. Human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX speculated that officers routinely resort to brutality because of pressure from their superiors to solve crimes. He asserted that most officers think solving crimes justifies brutal interrogation methods, and that some policemen believe that Islamic law sanctions torture. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that a culture of judicial impunity for police officers enables continued brutality. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, “Police officers feel they are above the law and protected by the public prosecutor.” Human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX attributed police brutality against common criminals, including the use of electric shocks, to the problem of demoralized officers facing long hours and their own economic problems. He asserted that the police will even beat lawyers who enter police stations to defend their clients.
-----------------------
Criminals and Islamists
-----------------------
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that since the GOE opened a dialogue with formerly violent Islamists, such as the Islamic Group, following the 1997 Luxor terrorist attacks, torture of Islamists has decreased. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the GOE now treats Islamists better than common criminals. Some Islamist detainees are “spoiled,” he asserted, with regular access to visits from friends and family, decent food and education. Before the Luxor attacks, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented, the government would torture Islamist detainees on a daily basis.
¶6. (C) Attorney XXXXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the GOE is more reluctant to torture Islamists, including Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members, because of their persistence in making public political statements, and their contacts with international NGOs that could embarrass the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that the exception to this rule is when MB members mobilize people against the government in a way the regime deems threatening, such as the April 6 Facebook strike (ref D). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the MB-affiliated blogger and “April 6 Movement” member XXXXXXXXXXXX whom police arrested XXXXXXXXXXXX (ref A) falls into this category, and the GOE is probably torturing him to scare other “April 6” members into abandoning their political activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assessment tracks with “April 6” member XXXXXXXXXXXX’s accounts of his own torture and the alleged police sexual molestation of a female “April 6” activist this past November (ref A). Bloggers close to XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that following his arrest he was tortured severely with electric shocks and needed to be hospitalized, but that security forces stopped the torture when he began cooperating.
----------------------------
GOE Awareness of the Problem
----------------------------
¶7. (C) Contacts agree that in the past five years, the government has stopped denying that torture exists and has taken some steps to address the problem. However, contacts believe that the Interior Ministry lacks the political will to take substantive action to change the culture of police brutality. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that following alleged standing orders from the Interior Ministry between 2000 and 2006 for the police to shoot, beat and humiliate judges in order to undermine judicial independence, the GOE made a political decision in 2007 to allow the courts to sentence police officers to short prison terms. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the 2007 Imad El-Kebir case as a turning point in influencing the government to permit the sentencing of police officers.
(Note: Per ref E, a court sentenced two police officers to three years in prison in November 2007 for assaulting and sodomizing bus driver Imad El-Kebir. The case gained notoriety after a cell phone video recording of the torture was posted on YouTube. End note.)
¶8. (C) An estimated 13 cases of officers accused of brutality are currently working their way through the courts, and judges have handed down moderate sentences, usually the minimum three-year prison term, against policemen over the past few months, often for heinous crimes. For example, in October 2008, a court sentenced a policeman to three years in prison for beating and drowning a fisherman. In November 2008, a court sentenced two policemen to three years in prison for hooking a man to their car and dragging him to his death. XXXXXXXXXXXXX characterized the sentences as “light,” in proportion to the crimes, but commented that any prison sentences are an important development toward holding the police responsible for crimes. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the prison sentences demonstrate that the GOE is providing political space for judges to operate somewhat independently, in response to criticism from foreign governments and international NGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXXX described the sentences as important in drawing public attention to brutal police crimes, and strengthening the hand of advocates who call for reforming systemic problems within the police force.
-----------
GOE Efforts
-----------
¶9. (C) Ambassador Ahmed Haggag, who is detailed from the MFA as the coordinator for the UNDP Human Rights Capacity Building Project, described for us the organization’s efforts to train the Interior and Justice Ministries and the Public Prosecutor on human rights issues through lectures and workshops. Acknowledging that torture is a “problem, but not a daily occurrence,” Haggag said the UNDP trains police officers on international human rights conventions, and is trying to convince police officers to solve cases using “legal and ethical means,” instead of torture. Haggag told us he “doubts there is still torture against political prisoners.” Staffers from the quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights described the council’s workshops for police officers where professors give lectures on human rights law and prisoner psychology. NGO contacts have privately criticized the UNDP project as ineffective, complaining that it has banned credible human lawyers from giving lectures to the police because of their political opposition to the NDP, and instead invites MOI officials complicit in torture to give human rights presentations.
¶10. (C) In late December 2008, the MOI announced it had suspended 280 police officers for human rights violations and fired 1,164 lower-ranking policemen for misconduct. Our NGO contacts doubted that the disciplinary actions were human rights related, and speculated that the officers were probably involved in taking bribes and other illegal activity. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that this announcement does not amount to a serious MOI human rights policy. XXXXXXXXXXXXX expressed skepticism over whether these disciplinary actions will result in long-term positive changes XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶11. (C) Former senior Interior Ministry official Ihab Youssef, Director of the NGO “The Police and the People for Egypt” told us in late 2008 that his NGO did not receive many proposals from the public in response to its solicitation for ideas on developing projects to build trust between the police and citizens. Youssef said that the NGO’s Facebook site, which provides a forum for the public to complain about the police, has generated more interest. In September 2008, Youssef publicly announced the formation of his NGO, which counts establishment figures such as former FM Ahmed Maher among its board members (ref C). Youssef does not receive GOE funding for the NGO, and has turned to private Egyptian businesses to raise money. XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) The GOE has not begun serious work on trying to transform the police and security services from instruments of power that serve and protect the regime into institutions operating in the public interest, despite official slogans to the contrary. It seems that the government would have the strongest interest in preventing future accidental shootings of innocents, such as the Salamut and Aswan incidents that resulted in riots. We imagine that halting the torture of common criminals, who are usually poor and voiceless, is lower on the GOE’s agenda. We want to continue USG-funded police training, and we will look for ways to help XXXXXXXXXXXX’s NGO launch productive work.
SCOBEY
Source: Wikileaks
SENATOR LIEBERMAN’S FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH GAMAL MUBARAK
Reference ID 09CAIRO326
Created 2009-02-23 13:01
Released 2011-01-28
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Cairo
ACTION NEA-00
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00 DODE-00
DOTE-00 PERC-00 PDI-00 DS-00 EAP-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
LAB-01 MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
OMB-00 NIMA-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
DRL-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 (H-00 L-00
PM-00 ) /001W
------------------337677 231445Z /38
O 231307Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1705
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Cable dated:2009-02-23T13:07:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 000326FOR NEA AND HE.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL ECON IR SY IZ EG IS QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR LIEBERMAN’S FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH GAMAL MUBARAK
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During an hour-long meeting on February 17, Gamal Mubarak discussed with Senator Joseph Lieberman the problems with Gaza and Palestinian reconciliation, as well as the broader political split within the Arab world. Senator Lieberman sought Gamal’s advice on ways for the U.S. to engage Iran; Gamal offered that the best way to defeat Iranian ambitions in the region is to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Unfortunately, Qatar is playing “spoiler” in order to get “a seat at the table.” Gamal, a former international banker, opined that the U.S. needed to “shock” its financial system back to health, and said that Egypt -- which had so far escaped much of the pain of the global economic crisis -- was preparing to face tough economic times ahead. The Ambassador, Senator Lieberman’s foreign policy adviser, and the ECPO MinCouns as note taker were also present. End summary.
----
Gaza
----
¶2. (C) After welcoming Senator Lieberman, Gamal began by criticizing the Israeli government’s “last minute” decision not to move forward on the Gaza ceasefire without the release of Corporal Shalit. This complicates several aspects of the Israel Palestinian conflict, Gamal explained, not simply the situation in Gaza. The various Palestinian factions are due to begin reconciliation talks in Cairo “in about 10 days” and this development will make those discussions more difficult. It makes Egypt look bad, and strengthens Hamas.
--------------------------------------
Iranian Exploitation of Arab Divisions
--------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Another complicating factor, Gamal explained, is the current split within Arab ranks between “moderates” (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and “radicals” (Syria and Qatar). This polarization, he opined, has “paralyzed the peace process.” Iran has skillfully exploited -- using Hamas -- the lack of movement towards peace. As long as there was a viable peace process, Gamal averred, “there was no place for Iran.” The best way to thwart Iranian ambitions in the region, according to Gamal, is to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. What is also needed, he continued, is a unified Palestinian government. “The Palestinians need elections, both presidential and parliamentary.”
-------------------------------
U.S. Re-engagement with Tehran?
-------------------------------
¶4. (C) Senator Lieberman asked Gamal if he thought the United States should re-engage with Iran. “As long as Ahmedinejad is there, I am skeptical,” Gamal responded. Senator Lieberman said he shared that skepticism, but explained that the new administration believes the U.S. should try to engage the Iranians, but no clear strategy has yet emerged in Washington; Dennis Ross has been tasked with “reviewing” the situation. The one thing that is clear, Gamal stressed, is that by removing Saddam, the U.S. opened the door for Iran to flex its muscles and spread its influence throughout the region. “Like it or not, Saddam was a stumbling block to Iranian aspirations. His fall led directly to an increase in Iranian influence on the region.” Now, it is all the more important not to send a message of weakness to the Iranians, Gamal said, “neither from the U.S., nor from the moderates in the region.” We cannot “concede to their policy of aggression.”
¶5. (C) There are many in the region, Gamal explained, who believe that the U.S. was weakened by its actions in Iraq, and that Iran was strengthened. Furthermore, there is a perception that the U.S. has been hurt by the economic crisis and that it will be more inward looking for the next few years. Therefore, the Americans, it is said, will deal with problems in the region in a “less confrontational” fashion, and “may be willing to compromise. Iran is working hard to convince others that this is the case.” This creates a very dangerous situation for moderate states like Egypt, Gamal stressed. Noting that there was some truth in this analysis, particularly concerning the economic straits the U.S. is in, Senator Lieberman said that the U.S. will nonetheless engage in an even more aggressive Middle East foreign policy than previously, as evidenced by President Obama’s choice of
Secretary Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell. Gamal welcomed this reassurance, noting that the GCC states in particular are “terrified” of Iran. Just the previous week, he said, an Iranian general had said publicly that Bahrain “has always been part of Iran,” as well as the Tunb Islands.
-----
Qatar
-----
¶6. (C) Senator Lieberman then asked Gamal for his assessment of Qatari behavior. They are coordinating closely with Syria and Iran, Gamal said, “in an orchestrated attack on Egypt and other moderate Arab states.” Qatar has enabled Hamas to hamper every effort we have made to cement a ceasefire in Gaza. For some reason, Qatar seems to want to play the role of spoiler, Gamal surmised. “Even regarding the March 2nd Gaza conference we are hosting, they have called for another Arab only meeting in Doha just two days before.” In response to Senator Lieberman’s question as to Qatari motives, Gamal responded, “They just want a place at the table, no matter what.”
---------------
Egypt’s Economy
---------------
¶7. (C) Turning to the impact of the global financial crisis on Egypt, Gamal -- a former international banker -- said that while Egypt has so far escaped the worst effects of the crisis, “we are bound to feel the brunt of it eventually.” Because Egypt’s banking sector was thoroughly overhauled about five years ago, he explained, it is in much better shape than it night have been. Nonetheless, Egypt expects to see significantly lower GDP figures in 2009; “the most recent quarterly numbers are already way down.” The one ray of good news, Gamal said, is that inflation also is down; “nonetheless, we know we are in for a rough ride.” Egypt will be watching the United States very closely, Gamal said. Senator Lieberman asked for his advice as an experienced international financier. “Your banking system needs a shock,” Gamal offered. “You need a dramatic fix. Unless you get the banking sector revived, nothing else will come around.” However, Gamal continued, a piecemeal approach to the problem will not be enough; you need to inject even more money into the system than you have, and you need to get as much of the bad debt as possible out of it; “you must remove the toxic assets from the books” and restore the confidence of investors and consumers. Senator Lieberman agreed on the need for bold measures to restore confidence.
¶8. (U) This cable was cleared by Senator Lieberman.
SCOBEY
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-02-23 13:01
Released 2011-01-28
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Cairo
ACTION NEA-00
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 INL-00 DODE-00
DOTE-00 PERC-00 PDI-00 DS-00 EAP-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
LAB-01 MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
OMB-00 NIMA-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 T-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
DRL-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 (H-00 L-00
PM-00 ) /001W
------------------337677 231445Z /38
O 231307Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1705
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Cable dated:2009-02-23T13:07:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 000326FOR NEA AND HE.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL ECON IR SY IZ EG IS QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR LIEBERMAN’S FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH GAMAL MUBARAK
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During an hour-long meeting on February 17, Gamal Mubarak discussed with Senator Joseph Lieberman the problems with Gaza and Palestinian reconciliation, as well as the broader political split within the Arab world. Senator Lieberman sought Gamal’s advice on ways for the U.S. to engage Iran; Gamal offered that the best way to defeat Iranian ambitions in the region is to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Unfortunately, Qatar is playing “spoiler” in order to get “a seat at the table.” Gamal, a former international banker, opined that the U.S. needed to “shock” its financial system back to health, and said that Egypt -- which had so far escaped much of the pain of the global economic crisis -- was preparing to face tough economic times ahead. The Ambassador, Senator Lieberman’s foreign policy adviser, and the ECPO MinCouns as note taker were also present. End summary.
----
Gaza
----
¶2. (C) After welcoming Senator Lieberman, Gamal began by criticizing the Israeli government’s “last minute” decision not to move forward on the Gaza ceasefire without the release of Corporal Shalit. This complicates several aspects of the Israel Palestinian conflict, Gamal explained, not simply the situation in Gaza. The various Palestinian factions are due to begin reconciliation talks in Cairo “in about 10 days” and this development will make those discussions more difficult. It makes Egypt look bad, and strengthens Hamas.
--------------------------------------
Iranian Exploitation of Arab Divisions
--------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Another complicating factor, Gamal explained, is the current split within Arab ranks between “moderates” (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and “radicals” (Syria and Qatar). This polarization, he opined, has “paralyzed the peace process.” Iran has skillfully exploited -- using Hamas -- the lack of movement towards peace. As long as there was a viable peace process, Gamal averred, “there was no place for Iran.” The best way to thwart Iranian ambitions in the region, according to Gamal, is to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. What is also needed, he continued, is a unified Palestinian government. “The Palestinians need elections, both presidential and parliamentary.”
-------------------------------
U.S. Re-engagement with Tehran?
-------------------------------
¶4. (C) Senator Lieberman asked Gamal if he thought the United States should re-engage with Iran. “As long as Ahmedinejad is there, I am skeptical,” Gamal responded. Senator Lieberman said he shared that skepticism, but explained that the new administration believes the U.S. should try to engage the Iranians, but no clear strategy has yet emerged in Washington; Dennis Ross has been tasked with “reviewing” the situation. The one thing that is clear, Gamal stressed, is that by removing Saddam, the U.S. opened the door for Iran to flex its muscles and spread its influence throughout the region. “Like it or not, Saddam was a stumbling block to Iranian aspirations. His fall led directly to an increase in Iranian influence on the region.” Now, it is all the more important not to send a message of weakness to the Iranians, Gamal said, “neither from the U.S., nor from the moderates in the region.” We cannot “concede to their policy of aggression.”
¶5. (C) There are many in the region, Gamal explained, who believe that the U.S. was weakened by its actions in Iraq, and that Iran was strengthened. Furthermore, there is a perception that the U.S. has been hurt by the economic crisis and that it will be more inward looking for the next few years. Therefore, the Americans, it is said, will deal with problems in the region in a “less confrontational” fashion, and “may be willing to compromise. Iran is working hard to convince others that this is the case.” This creates a very dangerous situation for moderate states like Egypt, Gamal stressed. Noting that there was some truth in this analysis, particularly concerning the economic straits the U.S. is in, Senator Lieberman said that the U.S. will nonetheless engage in an even more aggressive Middle East foreign policy than previously, as evidenced by President Obama’s choice of
Secretary Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell. Gamal welcomed this reassurance, noting that the GCC states in particular are “terrified” of Iran. Just the previous week, he said, an Iranian general had said publicly that Bahrain “has always been part of Iran,” as well as the Tunb Islands.
-----
Qatar
-----
¶6. (C) Senator Lieberman then asked Gamal for his assessment of Qatari behavior. They are coordinating closely with Syria and Iran, Gamal said, “in an orchestrated attack on Egypt and other moderate Arab states.” Qatar has enabled Hamas to hamper every effort we have made to cement a ceasefire in Gaza. For some reason, Qatar seems to want to play the role of spoiler, Gamal surmised. “Even regarding the March 2nd Gaza conference we are hosting, they have called for another Arab only meeting in Doha just two days before.” In response to Senator Lieberman’s question as to Qatari motives, Gamal responded, “They just want a place at the table, no matter what.”
---------------
Egypt’s Economy
---------------
¶7. (C) Turning to the impact of the global financial crisis on Egypt, Gamal -- a former international banker -- said that while Egypt has so far escaped the worst effects of the crisis, “we are bound to feel the brunt of it eventually.” Because Egypt’s banking sector was thoroughly overhauled about five years ago, he explained, it is in much better shape than it night have been. Nonetheless, Egypt expects to see significantly lower GDP figures in 2009; “the most recent quarterly numbers are already way down.” The one ray of good news, Gamal said, is that inflation also is down; “nonetheless, we know we are in for a rough ride.” Egypt will be watching the United States very closely, Gamal said. Senator Lieberman asked for his advice as an experienced international financier. “Your banking system needs a shock,” Gamal offered. “You need a dramatic fix. Unless you get the banking sector revived, nothing else will come around.” However, Gamal continued, a piecemeal approach to the problem will not be enough; you need to inject even more money into the system than you have, and you need to get as much of the bad debt as possible out of it; “you must remove the toxic assets from the books” and restore the confidence of investors and consumers. Senator Lieberman agreed on the need for bold measures to restore confidence.
¶8. (U) This cable was cleared by Senator Lieberman.
SCOBEY
Source: Wikileaks
SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL SCHWARTZ (Visit to Egypt)
Reference ID 09CAIRO549
Created 2009-03-31 14:02
Released 2011-01-28
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Cairo
O 311444Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2058
INFO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Cable dated:2009-03-31T14:44:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 000549E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM MOPS KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL SCHWARTZ
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points
-- (SBU) U.S.- Egypt military relationship is strong, but should change to reflect new regional and transnational threats.
-- (SBU) More focus is needed on combating emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping.
-- (S/NF) Egypt continues to improve efforts to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, but a decision by Field Marshal Tantawi to delay a counter tunneling project threatens progress.
¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: General Schwartz, welcome to Egypt. Since our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program began almost 30 years ago, our strong military relationship has supported peace between Egypt and Israel and ensured critical Suez Canal and overflight access for U.S. military operations. The relationship, however, should now change to reflect new regional and transnational security threats. In FY2009, Congress removed conditions on U.S. assistance to Egypt. We and the GOE will be able to make the best case for continuing a robust FMF program by targeting funding for shared priorities like peacekeeping and border security, and must take more action on emerging regional security threats such as piracy.
¶3. (SBU) Summary continued. Your visit comes as Egypt continues its efforts to mediate a permanent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, to facilitate intra-Palestinian negotiations to form a new, interim government, and to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza. Many Egyptians see the new U.S. administration as a cause for cautious optimism in both the bilateral relationship and in U.S. engagement with the region. Special Envoy for the Middle East Senator George Mitchell has visited Egypt and the region twice and will likely return to Cairo in April. Your visit will fall on the anniversary of the April 6, 2008 nation-wide strike protesting political and economic conditions. At least one opposition group has called for another April 6 strike this year. We have requested meetings for you with Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sami Anan and Air Marshal Reda. End summary.
-----------------------------------------
Mil-Mil Cooperation: Ready for Next Level
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as “untouchable compensation” for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S. military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. We believe, however, that our relationship can accomplish much more. Over the last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared strategic objectives to address current and emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited success.
¶5. (S/NF) Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore one of the chief impediments to transforming our security relationship. During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has degraded. But he retains President Mubarak’s support, and so he and the top brass will most likely stay in position until Mubarak leaves the scene. COS Anan will welcome the lack of conditions on Egyptian assistance in FY 2009 funding and will seek support in convincing Congress of Egypt’s strategic importance. Anan should be reassured that Egypt remains a key U.S. ally, but stress that given the current economic downturn, Egypt should do more to justify continuing value by demonstrating through action its support for our shared regional security goals
¶6. (S/NF) One way to demonstrate Egypt’s continued strategic importance is through shifting more FMF funding to address asymmetric threats like terrorism and improving border security along its long and porous borders. We should also stress that our mil-mil relationship is much greater than the yearly flow of military assistance. Egypt could play a more active and influential role in regional security issues, including supporting and training the Iraqi military, deploying more peacekeeping troops to Sudan, joining neighbors in combating piracy, and stemming the flow of illegal migration. Another concrete display of a forward-looking security strategy would be to support CENTCOM’s efforts to re-invent Bright Star. Anan may lament the loss of large-scale Bright Stars. We should stress that Bright Star continues to be an important strategic statement for the U.S. and its regional allies, and solicit his input for ways to make Bright Star more relevant.
¶7. (S/NF) Both Anan and Reda will express concern over releasability issues and frustration with Egypt’s inability to procure restricted weapons systems. Some systems are not releasable because of Egyptian refusal to sign the necessary agreement (CISMOA) providing end-use assurances and ensuring proper protection of certain U.S. origin technology. Releasability is of special concern to the EAF as they prepare to purchase 24 F-16 aircraft that will require a costly retrofit with less-advanced weapons systems. Since 2006, the Department of State has notified Congress of six potential end-use violations by the Egyptian military. We are currently investigating two additional cases, one involving the visit of a Chinese military official to an F-16 facility on an Egyptian Air Force base. Other systems are either not releasable to any country or denied for political reasons, mainly due to concerns regarding Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). We should stress that decisions to release advanced weapons system are made on a country-by-country basis, but signing a CISMOA and expanding cooperation on current regional threats would be welcomed steps to our dialogue on releasability.
-----------------------------------
Israel-Palestine, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) The election of President Obama generated much optimism in Egypt and hopes that the new administration would quickly focus on problems in the Middle East. In particular, the Egyptian leadership wants the U.S. to urgently address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Senator Mitchell has assured them that the Administration will press hard for progress. The Egyptians have traditionally served as an intermediary between us, the Israelis, and the Palestinians. Since the January 2008 Hamas breach of the Egypt-Gaza border, the Egyptian role has shifted to focus on intra-Palestinian reconciliation and the establishment of a lasting Hamas-Israel cease-fire. EGIS Chief Soliman has worked to cement a Israeli-Hamas cease-fire but believes he was badly undercut by the Israeli introduction of the release of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit as a new pre-condition for the cease-fire. For the moment, rocket strikes from Gaza are relatively low in frequency.
¶9. (S/NF) Egyptian security forces continue to improve counter-smuggling efforts along the Gaza border and further afield, through increasing their security presence in northern Sinai and giving greater focus to preventing weapons from entering the Sinai. Egyptian officials claim to have identified and sealed over 100 tunnels since the beginning of the year, with new discoveries occurring daily. The Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) requested U.S. assistance to purchase 16 X-ray screening systems to monitor vehicular traffic into the Sinai for weapons and explosives, and we are currently exploring ways to provide the requested assistance. A recent decision by Tantawi to delay a FMF-funded counter smuggling project, however, threatens progress. In February, Tantawi insisted that the Army Corps of Engineers sever the satellite link necessary to calibrate seismic-acoustic sensors being installed along the Egypt-Gaza border to detect tunneling activity. He also insisted that the ACE disable GPS technology needed to accurately pinpoint tunneling activity. This decision will result in a four to five month delay to develop and implement a technical alternative. USG efforts to encourage Tantawi to reconsider, including from CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, have been unsuccessful.
---------------
Regional Issues
---------------
¶10. (SBU) Egypt has shown increasing confidence that Iraq has turned the corner, although concerns remain that the Shi’a-led government is prone to Iranian influence. On Iran, Egypt is concerned by rising Iranian influence in the region, has supported UN sanctions, and is increasingly active on countering Iran, e.g. in Gaza and to some extent in Lebanon, working with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty. Egypt has deployed peacekeeping troops to the UN Mission in Darfur, just agreed to send troops to the UN Mission in Congo and is taking a greater role within the African Union on regional security and political issues.
-------------------------------
Internal Politics and Economics
-------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt’s 454-seat parliament. Economic reform is ongoing although Egypt still suffers from widespread poverty affecting 35-40% of the population. Egyptian-U.S. trade has more than doubled in the last four years, reaching almost $9 billion in 2008. The U.S. exports to Egypt about twice as much as it imports. Egyptian banks operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in risky financial products, but the effects of the global economic crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global credit crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and remittances -- its largest sources of revenue -- are all down and likely to continue to fall.
SCOBEY
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-03-31 14:02
Released 2011-01-28
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Cairo
O 311444Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2058
INFO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Cable dated:2009-03-31T14:44:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 000549E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM MOPS KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL SCHWARTZ
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points
-- (SBU) U.S.- Egypt military relationship is strong, but should change to reflect new regional and transnational threats.
-- (SBU) More focus is needed on combating emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping.
-- (S/NF) Egypt continues to improve efforts to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, but a decision by Field Marshal Tantawi to delay a counter tunneling project threatens progress.
¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: General Schwartz, welcome to Egypt. Since our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program began almost 30 years ago, our strong military relationship has supported peace between Egypt and Israel and ensured critical Suez Canal and overflight access for U.S. military operations. The relationship, however, should now change to reflect new regional and transnational security threats. In FY2009, Congress removed conditions on U.S. assistance to Egypt. We and the GOE will be able to make the best case for continuing a robust FMF program by targeting funding for shared priorities like peacekeeping and border security, and must take more action on emerging regional security threats such as piracy.
¶3. (SBU) Summary continued. Your visit comes as Egypt continues its efforts to mediate a permanent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, to facilitate intra-Palestinian negotiations to form a new, interim government, and to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza. Many Egyptians see the new U.S. administration as a cause for cautious optimism in both the bilateral relationship and in U.S. engagement with the region. Special Envoy for the Middle East Senator George Mitchell has visited Egypt and the region twice and will likely return to Cairo in April. Your visit will fall on the anniversary of the April 6, 2008 nation-wide strike protesting political and economic conditions. At least one opposition group has called for another April 6 strike this year. We have requested meetings for you with Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sami Anan and Air Marshal Reda. End summary.
-----------------------------------------
Mil-Mil Cooperation: Ready for Next Level
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as “untouchable compensation” for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S. military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. We believe, however, that our relationship can accomplish much more. Over the last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared strategic objectives to address current and emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited success.
¶5. (S/NF) Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore one of the chief impediments to transforming our security relationship. During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has degraded. But he retains President Mubarak’s support, and so he and the top brass will most likely stay in position until Mubarak leaves the scene. COS Anan will welcome the lack of conditions on Egyptian assistance in FY 2009 funding and will seek support in convincing Congress of Egypt’s strategic importance. Anan should be reassured that Egypt remains a key U.S. ally, but stress that given the current economic downturn, Egypt should do more to justify continuing value by demonstrating through action its support for our shared regional security goals
¶6. (S/NF) One way to demonstrate Egypt’s continued strategic importance is through shifting more FMF funding to address asymmetric threats like terrorism and improving border security along its long and porous borders. We should also stress that our mil-mil relationship is much greater than the yearly flow of military assistance. Egypt could play a more active and influential role in regional security issues, including supporting and training the Iraqi military, deploying more peacekeeping troops to Sudan, joining neighbors in combating piracy, and stemming the flow of illegal migration. Another concrete display of a forward-looking security strategy would be to support CENTCOM’s efforts to re-invent Bright Star. Anan may lament the loss of large-scale Bright Stars. We should stress that Bright Star continues to be an important strategic statement for the U.S. and its regional allies, and solicit his input for ways to make Bright Star more relevant.
¶7. (S/NF) Both Anan and Reda will express concern over releasability issues and frustration with Egypt’s inability to procure restricted weapons systems. Some systems are not releasable because of Egyptian refusal to sign the necessary agreement (CISMOA) providing end-use assurances and ensuring proper protection of certain U.S. origin technology. Releasability is of special concern to the EAF as they prepare to purchase 24 F-16 aircraft that will require a costly retrofit with less-advanced weapons systems. Since 2006, the Department of State has notified Congress of six potential end-use violations by the Egyptian military. We are currently investigating two additional cases, one involving the visit of a Chinese military official to an F-16 facility on an Egyptian Air Force base. Other systems are either not releasable to any country or denied for political reasons, mainly due to concerns regarding Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). We should stress that decisions to release advanced weapons system are made on a country-by-country basis, but signing a CISMOA and expanding cooperation on current regional threats would be welcomed steps to our dialogue on releasability.
-----------------------------------
Israel-Palestine, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) The election of President Obama generated much optimism in Egypt and hopes that the new administration would quickly focus on problems in the Middle East. In particular, the Egyptian leadership wants the U.S. to urgently address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Senator Mitchell has assured them that the Administration will press hard for progress. The Egyptians have traditionally served as an intermediary between us, the Israelis, and the Palestinians. Since the January 2008 Hamas breach of the Egypt-Gaza border, the Egyptian role has shifted to focus on intra-Palestinian reconciliation and the establishment of a lasting Hamas-Israel cease-fire. EGIS Chief Soliman has worked to cement a Israeli-Hamas cease-fire but believes he was badly undercut by the Israeli introduction of the release of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit as a new pre-condition for the cease-fire. For the moment, rocket strikes from Gaza are relatively low in frequency.
¶9. (S/NF) Egyptian security forces continue to improve counter-smuggling efforts along the Gaza border and further afield, through increasing their security presence in northern Sinai and giving greater focus to preventing weapons from entering the Sinai. Egyptian officials claim to have identified and sealed over 100 tunnels since the beginning of the year, with new discoveries occurring daily. The Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) requested U.S. assistance to purchase 16 X-ray screening systems to monitor vehicular traffic into the Sinai for weapons and explosives, and we are currently exploring ways to provide the requested assistance. A recent decision by Tantawi to delay a FMF-funded counter smuggling project, however, threatens progress. In February, Tantawi insisted that the Army Corps of Engineers sever the satellite link necessary to calibrate seismic-acoustic sensors being installed along the Egypt-Gaza border to detect tunneling activity. He also insisted that the ACE disable GPS technology needed to accurately pinpoint tunneling activity. This decision will result in a four to five month delay to develop and implement a technical alternative. USG efforts to encourage Tantawi to reconsider, including from CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, have been unsuccessful.
---------------
Regional Issues
---------------
¶10. (SBU) Egypt has shown increasing confidence that Iraq has turned the corner, although concerns remain that the Shi’a-led government is prone to Iranian influence. On Iran, Egypt is concerned by rising Iranian influence in the region, has supported UN sanctions, and is increasingly active on countering Iran, e.g. in Gaza and to some extent in Lebanon, working with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty. Egypt has deployed peacekeeping troops to the UN Mission in Darfur, just agreed to send troops to the UN Mission in Congo and is taking a greater role within the African Union on regional security and political issues.
-------------------------------
Internal Politics and Economics
-------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt’s 454-seat parliament. Economic reform is ongoing although Egypt still suffers from widespread poverty affecting 35-40% of the population. Egyptian-U.S. trade has more than doubled in the last four years, reaching almost $9 billion in 2008. The U.S. exports to Egypt about twice as much as it imports. Egyptian banks operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in risky financial products, but the effects of the global economic crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global credit crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and remittances -- its largest sources of revenue -- are all down and likely to continue to fall.
SCOBEY
Source: Wikileaks
Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to Brazil: Sao Paulo's Muslims
Reference ID 09SAOPAULO653
Created 2009-11-20 12:12
Released 2011-01-28
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Consulate Sao Paulo
R 201218Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
CONFIDENTIAL SAO PAULO 000653
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SR FARAH PANDITH, KAREN CHANDLER AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20
TAGS: PGOV OEXC OIIP PHUM PINR PINS PROP SCUL PTER BR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to Brazil: Sao Paulo's Muslims
REF: SAO PAULO 433 SAO PAULO 421 BRASILIA 709 2008 SAO PAULO 542
Classified By: David C. Brooks, State POL; Reason: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (U) Post is delighted to host Special Representative (SR) Farah Pandith’s first visit to Latin America, November 22-23. Brazil offers a unique context for engaging the local Muslim communities. The country hosts a significant (400-500 thousand) Muslim minority that lives within a larger society that has historically taken great pride in both its diversity and tradition of cultural and religious tolerance. Sao Paulo hosts Brazil’s largest Muslim community, a combination of both older and more recent Arab immigrants (mostly from Lebanon) as well as some Africans and Brazilian converts. Engaging this group in the midst of Brazil’s famous “melting pot” context can generate opportunities for making connections not available elsewhere and will likely echo favorably with non-Muslim
Brazilians. Brazil’s Muslims By the Numbers (Such as They Are)
¶2. (U) Statistics on Brazil’s Muslim population vary widely. A year 2000 census lists only 27,000 Muslims in the country. Spokesmen for the country’s Muslim community have sometimes put this figure as high as 1-2 million. Most knowledgeable observers calculate that there are 400-500 thousand Muslims in Brazil. (Muslim community members universally lament the lack of hard data on their own numbers, due, in part, they say to flaws in the Brazilian census methodology.) The majority are Sunnis of Lebanese descent. Many of these immigrants’ families arrived decades ago and have set strong roots in Brazil. A more recent group of immigrants has complemented these earlier flows. The new immigrants are frequently also from Lebanon, but they are poorer and far more Shiite. Their politics is more radical and they frequently look to Hezbollah for leadership. The Consulate does not have contact with this latter group, which tends to keep its distance from us.
Consulate Engagement: A Work in Progress
¶3. (C) For several years, the Consulate has sought greater engagement with Sao Paulo’s various Muslim groups (Refs A-E). Working closely with the Lebanese Consul General, Joseph Sayah, we have developed an increasing network of friends among Sheiks and community leaders in the Sunni community, including an ability to dialogue with some Sunni Fundamentalists who hold highly critical views of the United States. We continue to try to make inroads into women and youth groups, but this is difficult in an essentially conservative, hierarchical community where even friendly Sheiks tend to guard their flocks closely, youth often enter family businesses and, as yet, women do not play overt leadership roles. Your visit offers us an opportunity to increase this engagement by highlighting both Washington-based programs and giving a Washington push to ideas we have developed locally.
¶4. (U) What follows is a description of broad trends in Brazil’s Muslim communities built around data points developed from our own experiences. This account includes data from only two trips outside Sao Paulo, a gap we intend to close in the coming year as we promote Muslim engagement as part of our normal political travel in our district.
The Lebanese Connection
¶5. (C) Heavy Lebanese immigration to Brazil, most of which was Maronite Christian, has shaped Brazil’s Muslim community in important ways. Most of the Lebanese who are here are descended from earlier generation immigrants who extol the virtues of a tolerant Lebanon where Christians, Jews and Muslims mixed with ease. This is a cornerstone of this community and has only been reinforced by Brazil’s own broad traditions of cultural tolerance. Many Lebanese Brazilians would like to see this spirit brought back to the country of their ancestors/their country of origin. A key figure in this effort is Lebanon’s Sao Paulo-based Consul General, Joseph Sayah. A Maronite Christian with fluent Arabic and an intimate understanding of Islam, he actively maintains contacts with a wide range of actors in the Brazil’s Islamic communities, promoting moderation. The social events he sponsors put this tolerance on remarkable display. In his hands, Lebanese National Day becomes a virtual celebration of religious comity, with Lebanese Jews, Christians and Muslims all hugging and conversing in fluent Arabic. Sayah is a close friend of the Consulate and a key interlocutor in reaching out to disaffected Muslims who would rather keep their distance from us.
America at Arms-Length: the Sunnis of San Bernardo
¶6. (C) The San Bernardo suburb of Sao Paulo is home to a Sunni mosque that is run by Jihad Hammadeh, a Lebanese Sheik who speaks excellent Portuguese. For this reason, he frequently appears in local media speaking out on Islamic or Middle Eastern issues (often criticizing what he sees as unfair stereotyping of Muslims in global media). Hammadeh also works for two organizations that are dedicated to the spread of Islam in Latin America: the Center for the Propagation of Islam in Latin America (CDIAL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The latter was originally financed by the Saudi Monarchy, but sources indicate that that funding has dried up in recent years. The San Bernardo Mosque gives classes in both Islam and Arabic language to those interested and makes strong efforts to convert Brazilians to Islam.
¶7. (C) Hammadeh meets with us, but never attends our events and keeps us at arm’s-length. When we have suggested visiting his Arabic language classes, he has demurred. When during a recent visit SP’s Jared Cohen talked about creating cyber-linkages between Brazilian Muslims and U.S. Muslims, Hammadeh said that this should take place through individual Sheiks (Ref B). Hammadeh is generally moderate in his public pronouncements, but various sources indicate that the Islamic line he promotes among followers is strongly fundamentalist. Modern Islam: Sheik Houssam Al-Boustani
¶8. (U) Sheik Al-Boustani teaches a class for young Brazilians interested in learning Arabic and learning about Islam under the auspices of the Lebanese Future Movement. Boustani studied Islam in India and has lived in Brazil for nine years. He is an extremely enthusiastic and energetic teacher who peppers his lessons on the Koran and on Arabic language with self-deprecating humor. His students, which he says number seventy-five at any one time, are generally young Brazilian professionals who are attracted to what Boustani calls his version of “modern” Islam. Boustani is most welcoming to us and has had Poloff as a guest in his classes. He has also worked on a number of inter-faith initiatives, including the Abraham Path Project, consulting for a Brazilian TV movie (a fictional romance) about a Jewish Holocaust survivor and an Arab woman who marry in Brazil after World War II, and co-teaching a course on religion with a Rabbi and a Catholic Priest. Finally, he has recently published a book about Mohammed in Portuguese and is working on a book on Islam in Brazil.
¶9. (C) Boustani’s openness is sincere, but did not necessarily come naturally to him. According to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, it is the product of a long process. Boustani has a tough-hewn past. He is a former amateur boxer, and he fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. When he arrived here nine years ago, according to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, he was quite extreme in his views. Over time, he has moderated considerably. His teaching style, as witnessed by Conoff, is expertly pitched for young Brazilians attracted to Islam but who also dress stylishly and require/respond to a highly entertaining presentation of religious ideas. Boustani himself has said that Islamic outreach in Brazil has to engage other religious traditions. He also admires some aspects of Brazil’s Evangelical Christian communities, which he says have become experts at reaching humble folk with a mass message. (Note: Boustani is presently in Lebanon, but we are attempting to arrange a meeting with his students. End Note.)
Anti-American Attitudes
¶10. (SBU) While Brazil’s Islamic community is peaceful and has many friendly elements, it also contains reservoirs of strong suspicion of the U.S. In an August meeting, Sheik Yamani of the Mosque in Londrina (an interior city in Parana State) told Poloff that Bin Laden’s involvement in the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers had never been proven. (When Poloff pointed out that Bin Laden had bragged about the same on television, Sheik Yamani replied, “Such things can be doctored.”) The Sheik, a 31 year old of Portuguese descent, proved otherwise quite friendly, inviting Poloff to attend Friday services at his Londrina Mosque. He appeared to represent a conservative strain of Euro-Islam, evidenced by his and his wife’s highly conservative dress. Poloff has also taken pains to correct other myths that abound among some Muslim contacts, such as the story that former President Bush is the grandson of a U.S.-based Pastor Bush, who wrote a book condemning Islam in the 19th century.
The Radicals
¶11. (C) While the majority of Brazil’s Muslims are moderate in orientation and the overwhelming majority is moderate in deed and action, genuine radical elements do exist here, some in the Tri-Border area of Foz de Iguacu and others among Sao Paulo’s estimated 20,000-strong, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population. Muslims at the moderate, Sunni-oriented Future Institute charge that Shia immigrants sometimes come to Brazil with Hezbollah support (allegedly USD 50,000 is a typical sum) to found businesses to support Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Reasons to Engage
¶12. (C) The Brazilian-Lebanese context provides an excellent double background of tolerance that already promotes a high degree of mixing between Brazil’s Muslims and the rest of the society. Engaging moderate Muslims puts radicals on the defensive and opens conduits of communication that could lead to greater information about more distant elements of the community given over to greater radicalism. Work with friendly moderates should not be seen as separate from monitoring more threatening elements. While Brazil’s tiny, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population is a legitimate concern, Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah also told Poloff to “not lose sight of the Sunnis.” (Note. Sunnis outnumber Shiites in Brazil by about ten to one. End Note.) Sayah described how some young Brazilians, either of Arab background or not, have become attracted to fundamentalist versions of Islam. While beliefs do not translate directly into action, such conversions can create a climate for the growth of fanaticism. Al-Boustani’s version of “modern Islam” is tailored to counter that. "By expressing a willingness to engage all groups, we make it more difficult for extremists to try to create the kind of closed atmosphere that enables their recruiting".
¶13. (C) Toward this end, Post has suggested several possible programs, including a campaign to provide consular information to Muslim contacts, a series of outreach presentations on President Obama, and, most important, our desire to bring down a visiting U.S. Sheik who can explain how Islam is now a vital part of American society and build ties with local religious leaders. Given its size, diversity and traditions of cultural tolerance, Brazil could be an excellent testing ground for programs that might be useful to other WHA posts with similar Muslim minority populations.
White
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-11-20 12:12
Released 2011-01-28
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Consulate Sao Paulo
R 201218Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
CONFIDENTIAL SAO PAULO 000653
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SR FARAH PANDITH, KAREN CHANDLER AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20
TAGS: PGOV OEXC OIIP PHUM PINR PINS PROP SCUL PTER BR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to Brazil: Sao Paulo's Muslims
REF: SAO PAULO 433 SAO PAULO 421 BRASILIA 709 2008 SAO PAULO 542
Classified By: David C. Brooks, State POL; Reason: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (U) Post is delighted to host Special Representative (SR) Farah Pandith’s first visit to Latin America, November 22-23. Brazil offers a unique context for engaging the local Muslim communities. The country hosts a significant (400-500 thousand) Muslim minority that lives within a larger society that has historically taken great pride in both its diversity and tradition of cultural and religious tolerance. Sao Paulo hosts Brazil’s largest Muslim community, a combination of both older and more recent Arab immigrants (mostly from Lebanon) as well as some Africans and Brazilian converts. Engaging this group in the midst of Brazil’s famous “melting pot” context can generate opportunities for making connections not available elsewhere and will likely echo favorably with non-Muslim
Brazilians. Brazil’s Muslims By the Numbers (Such as They Are)
¶2. (U) Statistics on Brazil’s Muslim population vary widely. A year 2000 census lists only 27,000 Muslims in the country. Spokesmen for the country’s Muslim community have sometimes put this figure as high as 1-2 million. Most knowledgeable observers calculate that there are 400-500 thousand Muslims in Brazil. (Muslim community members universally lament the lack of hard data on their own numbers, due, in part, they say to flaws in the Brazilian census methodology.) The majority are Sunnis of Lebanese descent. Many of these immigrants’ families arrived decades ago and have set strong roots in Brazil. A more recent group of immigrants has complemented these earlier flows. The new immigrants are frequently also from Lebanon, but they are poorer and far more Shiite. Their politics is more radical and they frequently look to Hezbollah for leadership. The Consulate does not have contact with this latter group, which tends to keep its distance from us.
Consulate Engagement: A Work in Progress
¶3. (C) For several years, the Consulate has sought greater engagement with Sao Paulo’s various Muslim groups (Refs A-E). Working closely with the Lebanese Consul General, Joseph Sayah, we have developed an increasing network of friends among Sheiks and community leaders in the Sunni community, including an ability to dialogue with some Sunni Fundamentalists who hold highly critical views of the United States. We continue to try to make inroads into women and youth groups, but this is difficult in an essentially conservative, hierarchical community where even friendly Sheiks tend to guard their flocks closely, youth often enter family businesses and, as yet, women do not play overt leadership roles. Your visit offers us an opportunity to increase this engagement by highlighting both Washington-based programs and giving a Washington push to ideas we have developed locally.
¶4. (U) What follows is a description of broad trends in Brazil’s Muslim communities built around data points developed from our own experiences. This account includes data from only two trips outside Sao Paulo, a gap we intend to close in the coming year as we promote Muslim engagement as part of our normal political travel in our district.
The Lebanese Connection
¶5. (C) Heavy Lebanese immigration to Brazil, most of which was Maronite Christian, has shaped Brazil’s Muslim community in important ways. Most of the Lebanese who are here are descended from earlier generation immigrants who extol the virtues of a tolerant Lebanon where Christians, Jews and Muslims mixed with ease. This is a cornerstone of this community and has only been reinforced by Brazil’s own broad traditions of cultural tolerance. Many Lebanese Brazilians would like to see this spirit brought back to the country of their ancestors/their country of origin. A key figure in this effort is Lebanon’s Sao Paulo-based Consul General, Joseph Sayah. A Maronite Christian with fluent Arabic and an intimate understanding of Islam, he actively maintains contacts with a wide range of actors in the Brazil’s Islamic communities, promoting moderation. The social events he sponsors put this tolerance on remarkable display. In his hands, Lebanese National Day becomes a virtual celebration of religious comity, with Lebanese Jews, Christians and Muslims all hugging and conversing in fluent Arabic. Sayah is a close friend of the Consulate and a key interlocutor in reaching out to disaffected Muslims who would rather keep their distance from us.
America at Arms-Length: the Sunnis of San Bernardo
¶6. (C) The San Bernardo suburb of Sao Paulo is home to a Sunni mosque that is run by Jihad Hammadeh, a Lebanese Sheik who speaks excellent Portuguese. For this reason, he frequently appears in local media speaking out on Islamic or Middle Eastern issues (often criticizing what he sees as unfair stereotyping of Muslims in global media). Hammadeh also works for two organizations that are dedicated to the spread of Islam in Latin America: the Center for the Propagation of Islam in Latin America (CDIAL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The latter was originally financed by the Saudi Monarchy, but sources indicate that that funding has dried up in recent years. The San Bernardo Mosque gives classes in both Islam and Arabic language to those interested and makes strong efforts to convert Brazilians to Islam.
¶7. (C) Hammadeh meets with us, but never attends our events and keeps us at arm’s-length. When we have suggested visiting his Arabic language classes, he has demurred. When during a recent visit SP’s Jared Cohen talked about creating cyber-linkages between Brazilian Muslims and U.S. Muslims, Hammadeh said that this should take place through individual Sheiks (Ref B). Hammadeh is generally moderate in his public pronouncements, but various sources indicate that the Islamic line he promotes among followers is strongly fundamentalist. Modern Islam: Sheik Houssam Al-Boustani
¶8. (U) Sheik Al-Boustani teaches a class for young Brazilians interested in learning Arabic and learning about Islam under the auspices of the Lebanese Future Movement. Boustani studied Islam in India and has lived in Brazil for nine years. He is an extremely enthusiastic and energetic teacher who peppers his lessons on the Koran and on Arabic language with self-deprecating humor. His students, which he says number seventy-five at any one time, are generally young Brazilian professionals who are attracted to what Boustani calls his version of “modern” Islam. Boustani is most welcoming to us and has had Poloff as a guest in his classes. He has also worked on a number of inter-faith initiatives, including the Abraham Path Project, consulting for a Brazilian TV movie (a fictional romance) about a Jewish Holocaust survivor and an Arab woman who marry in Brazil after World War II, and co-teaching a course on religion with a Rabbi and a Catholic Priest. Finally, he has recently published a book about Mohammed in Portuguese and is working on a book on Islam in Brazil.
¶9. (C) Boustani’s openness is sincere, but did not necessarily come naturally to him. According to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, it is the product of a long process. Boustani has a tough-hewn past. He is a former amateur boxer, and he fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. When he arrived here nine years ago, according to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, he was quite extreme in his views. Over time, he has moderated considerably. His teaching style, as witnessed by Conoff, is expertly pitched for young Brazilians attracted to Islam but who also dress stylishly and require/respond to a highly entertaining presentation of religious ideas. Boustani himself has said that Islamic outreach in Brazil has to engage other religious traditions. He also admires some aspects of Brazil’s Evangelical Christian communities, which he says have become experts at reaching humble folk with a mass message. (Note: Boustani is presently in Lebanon, but we are attempting to arrange a meeting with his students. End Note.)
Anti-American Attitudes
¶10. (SBU) While Brazil’s Islamic community is peaceful and has many friendly elements, it also contains reservoirs of strong suspicion of the U.S. In an August meeting, Sheik Yamani of the Mosque in Londrina (an interior city in Parana State) told Poloff that Bin Laden’s involvement in the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers had never been proven. (When Poloff pointed out that Bin Laden had bragged about the same on television, Sheik Yamani replied, “Such things can be doctored.”) The Sheik, a 31 year old of Portuguese descent, proved otherwise quite friendly, inviting Poloff to attend Friday services at his Londrina Mosque. He appeared to represent a conservative strain of Euro-Islam, evidenced by his and his wife’s highly conservative dress. Poloff has also taken pains to correct other myths that abound among some Muslim contacts, such as the story that former President Bush is the grandson of a U.S.-based Pastor Bush, who wrote a book condemning Islam in the 19th century.
The Radicals
¶11. (C) While the majority of Brazil’s Muslims are moderate in orientation and the overwhelming majority is moderate in deed and action, genuine radical elements do exist here, some in the Tri-Border area of Foz de Iguacu and others among Sao Paulo’s estimated 20,000-strong, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population. Muslims at the moderate, Sunni-oriented Future Institute charge that Shia immigrants sometimes come to Brazil with Hezbollah support (allegedly USD 50,000 is a typical sum) to found businesses to support Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Reasons to Engage
¶12. (C) The Brazilian-Lebanese context provides an excellent double background of tolerance that already promotes a high degree of mixing between Brazil’s Muslims and the rest of the society. Engaging moderate Muslims puts radicals on the defensive and opens conduits of communication that could lead to greater information about more distant elements of the community given over to greater radicalism. Work with friendly moderates should not be seen as separate from monitoring more threatening elements. While Brazil’s tiny, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population is a legitimate concern, Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah also told Poloff to “not lose sight of the Sunnis.” (Note. Sunnis outnumber Shiites in Brazil by about ten to one. End Note.) Sayah described how some young Brazilians, either of Arab background or not, have become attracted to fundamentalist versions of Islam. While beliefs do not translate directly into action, such conversions can create a climate for the growth of fanaticism. Al-Boustani’s version of “modern Islam” is tailored to counter that. "By expressing a willingness to engage all groups, we make it more difficult for extremists to try to create the kind of closed atmosphere that enables their recruiting".
¶13. (C) Toward this end, Post has suggested several possible programs, including a campaign to provide consular information to Muslim contacts, a series of outreach presentations on President Obama, and, most important, our desire to bring down a visiting U.S. Sheik who can explain how Islam is now a vital part of American society and build ties with local religious leaders. Given its size, diversity and traditions of cultural tolerance, Brazil could be an excellent testing ground for programs that might be useful to other WHA posts with similar Muslim minority populations.
White
Source: Wikileaks
XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
Reference ID 07CAIRO974
Created 2007-04-04 17:05
Released 2011-01-28
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO4822
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0974/01 0941717
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041717Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4450
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2047
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 4612
¶B. 2006 CAIRO 6600
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs,
William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with poloff, XXXXXXXXXXXX
parliamentarian XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed presidential son Gamal Mubarak's
possible succession of his father, and opined that Gamal
increasingly views Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi and EGIS head Omar Suleiman as a threat to his
presidential ambitions. XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that Tantawi recently
told him, in confidence, of his deepening frustration with
Gamal. End summary.
---------------------------------------------
GAMAL ANGLING TO "GET RID" OF HIS COMPETITION
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (S) On March 29, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to poloff his assessment that
the recently approved constitutional amendments package is
largely aimed at ensuring Gamal Mubarak's succession of his
father, and "a more controllable, stable political scene when
he does take the reins." Opining that "Gamal and his clique"
are becoming more confident in the inevitability of Gamal's
succession, and are now angling to remove potential
"stumbling blocks," XXXXXXXXXXXX said that speculation among Cairo's
elite is that there could be a cabinet reshuffle as soon as
May or June, in which Minister of Defense Tantawi and/or EGIS
head Omar Suleiman would be replaced. "Those two are
increasingly viewed as a threat by Gamal and those around
him," and thus Gamal is reportedly pushing Mubarak to get
them out of the way, so they "could not pose any problems" in
the event of a succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that "hitches"
to a Gamal succession could occur if Mubarak died before
installing his son: "Gamal knows this, and so wants to stack
the deck in his favor as much as possible now, while Mubarak
is firmly in control, just in case his father drops dead
sooner rather than later."
¶3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX had commented to him in a recent
private meeting that, "he has had it 'up to here' with Gamal
and his cronies, and the tremendous corruption they are
facilitating." "XXXXXXXXXXXX told me he is having trouble sleeping
at night," he continued, "and that he cannot stand what has
happened to the country, and what may yet happen to the
country." Disappointed by the recent constitutional
amendments, and skeptical about the will of either Mubarak or
Gamal to push forward meaningful political reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said he viewed a post-Mubarak military coup as "the best
possible way out for Egypt ... we are in a terrible spot, and
that is the best of all the bad options available." (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no further details about a possible coup
scenario, and appeared to simply be theorizing about the
future. To date, we have not heard other interlocutors
speculate about a possible coup option. End note).
----------------------------
CURRENT GOSSIP IN PARLIAMENT
----------------------------
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that parliamentarians are abuzz over rumors
that, under newly amended constitutional Article 136 (which
now gives the president the ability to dissolve the People's
Assembly by executive decree alone, without a national
referendum), the People,s Assembly will be dissolved in
roughly a year, so as to rid it of the "troublesome" 88
Muslim Brotherhood MP's. New elections would then be held,
but "as under the new constitutional amendments, there will
be no direct judicial supervision of elections to help to
guard against fraud, the government can be expected to
engineer the results" so that there are far fewer MB MP,s in
the new parliament. "The government is happy to deal with
fairly tame and non-threatening oppositionists such as
XXXXXXXXXXXX, Wafd, and Taggamu. But they do not want such a
powerful bloc of MB MP,s to remain, particularly when they
would make the most noise in the event of a Gamal succession."
¶5. (C) In terms of his personal political aspirations, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told poloff he has XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXX, founded by XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that hisXXXXXXXXXXXX (per ref B, a
XXXXXXXXXXXX), is XXXXXXXXXXXX at the XXXXXXXXXXXX, due to what XXXXXXXXXXXX termed the continuing XXXXXXXXXXXX. According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, MinDef Tantawi called him XXXXXXXXXXXX to
ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX was satisfied as to how XXXXXXXXXXXX was being
XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he engaged XXXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX, asking him to help get XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he has already XXXXXXXXXXXX and
"XXXXXXXXXXXX" XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly checked with XXXXXXXXXXXX,
then replied that XXXXXXXXXXXX cannot be XXXXXXXXXXXX before he XXXXXXXXXXXX, as, "we are under terrible foreign pressure to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, so cannot XXXXXXXXXXXX, as they will
then criticize us for not XXXXXXXXXXXX too." XXXXXXXXXXXX
subsequent suggestion to XXXXXXXXXXXX both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX went
unheeded. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he had
instructed XXXXXXXXXXXX to not
undertake any procedures to divest XXXXXXXXXXXX of his
XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX
therefore believes XXXXXXXXXXXX will be able to re-assume XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶7. (S) Comment: While XXXXXXXXXXXX is a useful interlocutor and a
well-placed parliamentarian, we stress that he is the only
Embassy contact to date who has raised with us the spectre of
a post-Mubarak military coup. While discussion of
presidential succession is a favorite parlor game in Cairo
salons, hypothesizing about the acutely sensitive topic of a
coup is certainly not regularly undertaken in Egyptian
circles.
RICCIARDONE
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2007-04-04 17:05
Released 2011-01-28
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO4822
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0974/01 0941717
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041717Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4450
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2047
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 4612
¶B. 2006 CAIRO 6600
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs,
William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with poloff, XXXXXXXXXXXX
parliamentarian XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed presidential son Gamal Mubarak's
possible succession of his father, and opined that Gamal
increasingly views Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi and EGIS head Omar Suleiman as a threat to his
presidential ambitions. XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that Tantawi recently
told him, in confidence, of his deepening frustration with
Gamal. End summary.
---------------------------------------------
GAMAL ANGLING TO "GET RID" OF HIS COMPETITION
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (S) On March 29, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to poloff his assessment that
the recently approved constitutional amendments package is
largely aimed at ensuring Gamal Mubarak's succession of his
father, and "a more controllable, stable political scene when
he does take the reins." Opining that "Gamal and his clique"
are becoming more confident in the inevitability of Gamal's
succession, and are now angling to remove potential
"stumbling blocks," XXXXXXXXXXXX said that speculation among Cairo's
elite is that there could be a cabinet reshuffle as soon as
May or June, in which Minister of Defense Tantawi and/or EGIS
head Omar Suleiman would be replaced. "Those two are
increasingly viewed as a threat by Gamal and those around
him," and thus Gamal is reportedly pushing Mubarak to get
them out of the way, so they "could not pose any problems" in
the event of a succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that "hitches"
to a Gamal succession could occur if Mubarak died before
installing his son: "Gamal knows this, and so wants to stack
the deck in his favor as much as possible now, while Mubarak
is firmly in control, just in case his father drops dead
sooner rather than later."
¶3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX had commented to him in a recent
private meeting that, "he has had it 'up to here' with Gamal
and his cronies, and the tremendous corruption they are
facilitating." "XXXXXXXXXXXX told me he is having trouble sleeping
at night," he continued, "and that he cannot stand what has
happened to the country, and what may yet happen to the
country." Disappointed by the recent constitutional
amendments, and skeptical about the will of either Mubarak or
Gamal to push forward meaningful political reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said he viewed a post-Mubarak military coup as "the best
possible way out for Egypt ... we are in a terrible spot, and
that is the best of all the bad options available." (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no further details about a possible coup
scenario, and appeared to simply be theorizing about the
future. To date, we have not heard other interlocutors
speculate about a possible coup option. End note).
----------------------------
CURRENT GOSSIP IN PARLIAMENT
----------------------------
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that parliamentarians are abuzz over rumors
that, under newly amended constitutional Article 136 (which
now gives the president the ability to dissolve the People's
Assembly by executive decree alone, without a national
referendum), the People,s Assembly will be dissolved in
roughly a year, so as to rid it of the "troublesome" 88
Muslim Brotherhood MP's. New elections would then be held,
but "as under the new constitutional amendments, there will
be no direct judicial supervision of elections to help to
guard against fraud, the government can be expected to
engineer the results" so that there are far fewer MB MP,s in
the new parliament. "The government is happy to deal with
fairly tame and non-threatening oppositionists such as
XXXXXXXXXXXX, Wafd, and Taggamu. But they do not want such a
powerful bloc of MB MP,s to remain, particularly when they
would make the most noise in the event of a Gamal succession."
¶5. (C) In terms of his personal political aspirations, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told poloff he has XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXX, founded by XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that hisXXXXXXXXXXXX (per ref B, a
XXXXXXXXXXXX), is XXXXXXXXXXXX at the XXXXXXXXXXXX, due to what XXXXXXXXXXXX termed the continuing XXXXXXXXXXXX. According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, MinDef Tantawi called him XXXXXXXXXXXX to
ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX was satisfied as to how XXXXXXXXXXXX was being
XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he engaged XXXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX, asking him to help get XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he has already XXXXXXXXXXXX and
"XXXXXXXXXXXX" XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly checked with XXXXXXXXXXXX,
then replied that XXXXXXXXXXXX cannot be XXXXXXXXXXXX before he XXXXXXXXXXXX, as, "we are under terrible foreign pressure to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, so cannot XXXXXXXXXXXX, as they will
then criticize us for not XXXXXXXXXXXX too." XXXXXXXXXXXX
subsequent suggestion to XXXXXXXXXXXX both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX went
unheeded. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he had
instructed XXXXXXXXXXXX to not
undertake any procedures to divest XXXXXXXXXXXX of his
XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX
therefore believes XXXXXXXXXXXX will be able to re-assume XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶7. (S) Comment: While XXXXXXXXXXXX is a useful interlocutor and a
well-placed parliamentarian, we stress that he is the only
Embassy contact to date who has raised with us the spectre of
a post-Mubarak military coup. While discussion of
presidential succession is a favorite parlor game in Cairo
salons, hypothesizing about the acutely sensitive topic of a
coup is certainly not regularly undertaken in Egyptian
circles.
RICCIARDONE
Source: Wikileaks
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