SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO PRESIDENT BUSH

Reference ID 90BAGHDAD4237
Created 1990-07-25 12:12
Released 2011-01-01 21:09
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Baghdad



O 251246Z JUL 90
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4627
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS PREL US KU IZ
SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO PRESIDENT BUSH

¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

¶2. SUMMARY: SADDAM TOLD THE AMBASSADOR JULY 25
THAT MUBARAK HAS ARRANGED FOR KUWAITI AND IRAQI
DELEGATIONS TO MEET IN RIYADH, AND THEN ON
JULY 28, 29 OR 30, THE KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE WILL
COME TO BAGHDAD FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. "NOTHING
WILL HAPPEN" BEFORE THEN, SADDAM HAD PROMISED
MUBARAK.

--SADDAM WISHED TO CONVEY AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT BUSH: IRAQ WANTS FRIENDSHIP, BUT DOES
THE USG? IRAQ SUFFERED 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES
AND IS NOW SO POOR THAT WAR ORPHAN PENSIONS WILL
SOON BE CUT; YET RICH KUWAIT WILL NOT EVEN ACCEPT
OPEC DISCIPLINE. IRAQ IS SICK OF WAR, BUT KUWAIT
HAS IGNORED DIPLOMACY. USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE
WILL ENCOURAGE THE UAE AND KUWAIT TO IGNORE
CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMACY. IF IRAQ IS PUBLICLY
HUMILIATED BY THE USG, IT WILL HAVE NO CHOICE
BUT TO "RESPOND," HOWEVER ILLOGICAL AND SELF
DESTRUCTIVE THAT WOULD PROVE.

--ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE EXPLICIT, SADDAM'S MESSAGE
TO US SEEMED TO BE THAT HE WILL MAKE A MAJOR PUSH
TO COOPERATE WITH MUBARAK'S DIPLOMACY, BUT WE MUST
TRY TO UNDERSTAND KUWAITI/UAE "SELFISHNESS" IS
UNBEARABLE. AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT WE CAN
NEVER EXCUSE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY OTHER THAN
PEACEFUL MEANS. END SUMMARY.

¶3. AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT
SADDAM HUSAYN AT NOON JULY 25. ALSO PRESENT
WERE FONMIN AZIZ, THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
DIRECTOR, TWO NOTETAKERS, AND THE IRAQI
INTERPRETER.

¶4. SADDAM, WHOSE MANNER WAS CORDIAL,
REASONABLE AND EVEN WARM THROUGHOUT THE ENSUING
TWO HOURS, SAID HE WISHED THE AMBASSADOR TO
CONVEY A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH. SADDAM
THEN RECALLED IN DETAIL THE HISTORY OF IRAQ'S
DECISION TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
AND ITS POSTPONING IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT
DECISION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, RATHER THAN BE
THOUGHT WEAK AND NEEDY. HE THEN SPOKE ABOUT THE
MANY "BLOWS" OUR RELATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO
SINCE 1984, CHIEF AMONG THEM IRANGATE. IT WAS
AFTER THE FAW VICTORY, SADDAM SAID, THAT IRAQI
MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT USG PURPOSES BEGAN TO
SURFACE AGAIN, I.E., SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS
NOT HAPPY TO SEE THE WAR END.

¶5. PICKING HIS WORDS WITH CARE, SADDAM SAID
THAT THERE ARE "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG,
INCLUDING IN CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
BUT EMPHATICALLY EXCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY BAKER, WHO ARE NOT FRIENDLY TOWARD
IRAQ-U.S. RELATIONS. HE THEN LISTED WHAT HE
SEEMED TO REGARD AS FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS
CONCLUSION: "SOME CIRCLES ARE GATHERING
INFORMATION ON WHO MIGHT BE SADDAM HUSAYN'S
SUCCESSOR;" THEY KEPT UP CONTACTS IN THE GULF
WARNING AGAINST IRAQ; THEY WORKED TO ENSURE
NO HELP WOULD GO TO IRAQ (READ EXIM AND CCC).

¶6. IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, IS IN SERIOUS
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, WITH 40 BILLION USD DEBTS.
IRAQ, WHOSE VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST IRAN
MADE AN HISTORIC DIFFERENCE TO THE ARAB WORLD
AND THE WEST, NEEDS A MARSHALL PLAN. BUT "YOU
WANT THE OIL PRICE DOWN," SADDAM CHARGED.

¶7. RESUMING HIS LIST OF GRIEVANCES WHICH HE
BELIEVED WERE ALL INSPIRED BY
"SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG, HE RECALLED THE
"USIA CAMPAIGN" AGAINST HIMSELF, AND THE
GENERAL MEDIA ASSAULT ON IRAQ AND ITS PRESIDENT.

¶8. DESPITE ALL THESE BLOWS, SADDAM SAID, AND
ALTHOUGH "WE WERE SOMEWHAT ANNOYED," WE STILL
HOPED THAT WE COULD DEVELOP A GOOD RELATIONSHIP.
BUT THOSE WHO FORCE OIL PRICES DOWN ARE ENGAGING
IN ECONOMIC WARFARE AND IRAQ CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH
A TRESPASS ON ITS DIGNITY AND PROSPERITY.

¶9. THE SPEARHEADS (FOR THE USG) HAVE BEEN KUWAIT
AND THE UAE, SADDAM SAID. SADDAM SAID CAREFULLY
THAT JUST AS IRAQ WILL NOT THREATEN OTHERS, IT
WILL ACCEPT NO THREAT AGAINST ITSELF. "WE HOPE
THE USG WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND:" IRAQ ACCEPTS,
AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, THAT ANY
COUNTRY MAY CHOOSE ITS FRIENDS. BUT THE USG KNOWS
THAT IT WAS IRAQ, NOT THE USG, WHICH DECISIVELY
PROTECTED THOSE USG FRIENDS DURING THE WAR--AND THAT
IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE USG,
TO SAY NOTHING OF GEOGRAPHY, WOULD HAVE MADE IT
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT 10,000 DEAD
IN A SINGLE BATTLE, AS IRAQ DID.

¶10. SADDAM ASKED WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE USG
TO ANNOUNCE IT IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF
ITS FRIENDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY.
ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION, HE SAID THAT TO IRAQ
IT MEANS FLAGRANT BIAS AGAINST THE GOI.

¶11. COMING TO ONE OF HIS MAIN POINTS, SADDAM
ARGUED THAT USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE AND KUWAIT (SIC)
ENCOURAGED THEM IN THEIR UNGENEROUS POLICIES. THE
IRAQI RIGHTS, SADDAM EMPHASIZED, WILL BE RESTORED
ONE BY ONE, THOUGH IT MAY TAKE A MONTH OR MUCH
MORE THAN A YEAR. IRAQ HOPES THE USG WILL BE
IN HARMONY WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THIS DISPUTE.

¶12. SADDAM SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE USG IS
DETERMINED TO KEEP THE OIL FLOWING AND TO
MAINTAIN ITS FRIENDSHIPS IN THE GULF. WHAT HE
CANNOT UNDERSTAND IS WHY WE ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO
ARE DAMAGING IRAQ, WHICH IS WHAT OUR GULF MANEUVERS
WILL DO.

¶13. SADDAM SAID HE FULLY BELIEVES THE USG WANTS
PEACE, AND THAT IS GOOD. BUT DO NOT, HE ASKED,
USE METHODS WHICH YOU SAY YOU DO NOT LIKE,
METHODS LIKE ARM-TWISTING-

¶14. AT THIS POINT SADDAM SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT
PRIDE OF IRAQIS, WHO BELIEVE IN "LIBERTY OR DEATH."
IRAQ WILL HAVE TO RESPOND IF THE U.S. USES THESE
METHODS. IRAQ KNOWS THE USG CAN SEND PLANES AND
ROCKETS AND HURT IRAQ DEEPLY. SADDAM ASKS THAT
THE USG NOT FORCE IRAQ TO THE POINT OF HUMILIATION
AT WHICH LOGIC MUST BE DISREGARDED. IRAQ DOES NOT
CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ENEMY AND HAS TRIED TO BE
FRIENDS.

¶15. AS FOR THE INTRA-ARAB DISPUTES, SADDAM SAID
HE IS NOT ASKING THE USG TO TAKE UP ANY PARTICULAR
ROLE SINCE THE SOLUTIONS MUST COME THROUGH ARAB
AND BILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

¶16. RETURNING TO HIS THEME THAT IRAQ WANTS
DIGNITY AND FREEDOM AS WELL AS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE
U.S., HE CHARGED THAT IN THE LAST YEAR THERE WERE
MANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WHICH MADE IT SEEM THAT
THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO RECIPROCATE. HOW, FOR
EXAMPLE, SADDAM ASKED,CAN WE INTERPRET THE
INVITATION FOR ARENS TO VISIT AT A TIME OF CRISIS
IN THE GULF? WHY DID THE U.S- DEFENSE MINISTER
MAKE "INFLAMMATORY" STATEMENTS?

¶17. SADDAM SAID THAT THE IRAQIS KNOW WHAT
WAR IS, WANT NO MORE OF IT--"DO NOT PUSH US TO IT;
DO NOT MAKE IT THE ONLY OPTION LEFT WITH WHICH WE
CAN PROTECT OUR DIGNITY."

¶18. PRESIDENT BUSH, SADDAM SAID, HAS MADE NO MISTAKE
IN HIS PRESIDENCY VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS. THE DECISION
ON THE PLO DIALOGUE WAS "MISTAKEN," BUT IT WAS
TAKEN UNDER "ZIONIST PRESSURE" AND, SADDAM SAID, IS
PERHAPS A CLEVER TACTIC TO ABSORB THAT PRESSURE.

¶19. AFTER A SHORT DIVERSION ON THE NEED FOR THE
U.S. TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 200,000
ARABS WITH THE SAME VIGOR AND INTEREST AS THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF THE ISRAELIS, SADDAM CONCLUDED BY
RESTATING THAT IRAQ WANTS AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP
"ALTHOUGH WE WILL NOT PANT FOR IT, WE WILL DO OUR
PART AS FRIENDS."

¶20. SADDAM THEN OFFERED AN ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE
HIS POINT. HE HAD TOLD THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER
IN 1974 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE UP HALF OF
THE SHATT AL-ARAB TO IRAN TO OBTAIN ALL OF A
PROSPEROUS IRAQ. THE KURD HAD BET THAT SADDAM WOULD
NOT GIVE HALF THE SHATT--THE KURD WAS WRONG. EVEN
NOW, THE ONLY REAL ISSUE WITH IRAN IS THE SHATT, AND
IF GIVING AWAY HALF OF THE WATERWAY IS THE ONLY
THING STANDING BETWEEN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND
IRAQI PROSPERITY, SADDAM SAID HE WOULD BE GUIDED
BY WHAT HE DID IN 1974.

¶21. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED SADDAM FOR THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH HIM SOME OF
HIS AND OUR CONCERNS. PRESIDENT BUSH, TOO, WANTS
FRIENDSHIP, AS HE HAD WRITTEN AT THE 'ID AND ON
THE OCCASION OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL DAY. SADDAM
INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE HAD BEEN TOUCHED BY THOSE

¶22. AMBASSADOR RESUMED HER THEME, RECALLING THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HER TO BROADEN AND
DEEPEN OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. SADDAM HAD REFERRED
TO "SOME CIRCLES" ANTIPATHETIC TO THAT AIM. SUCH
CIRCLES CERTAINLY EXISTED, BUT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
IS INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND,
THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONTROL THE AMERICAN PRESS;
IF HE DID, CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT
EXIST. SADDAM AGAIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE UNDERSTOOD
THAT. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE HAD SEEN THE DIANE
SAWYER SHOW AND THOUGHT THAT IT WAS CHEP AND UNFAIR.
BUT THE AMERICAN PRESS TREATS ALL POLITICIANS
WITHOUT KID GLOVES--THAT IS OUR WAY.

¶23. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
VERY RECENTLY REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE FOR A BETTER
RELATIONSHIP AND HAS PROVEN THAT BY, FOR EXAMPLE,
OPPOSING SANCTIONS BILLS. HERE SADDAM INTERRUPTED
AGAIN. LAUGHING, HE SAID THERE IS NOTHING LEFT
FOR IRAQ TO BUY IN THE U.S. EVERYTHING IS
PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR WHEAT, AND NO DOUBT THAT WILL
SOON BE DECLARED A DUAL-USE ITEM- SADDAM SAID, HOWEVER,
HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE, BUT RATHER
CONCENTRATE ON THE FAR MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES AT HAND.

¶24. AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WERE MANY ISSUES HE
HAD RAISED SHE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON, BUT
SHE WISHED TO USE HER LIMITED TIME WITH THE
PRESIDENT TO STRESS FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESIRE
FOR FRIENDSHIP AND, SECOND, HIS STRONG DESIRE, SHARED
WE ASSUME BY IRAQ, FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MID
EAST. IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO BE CONCERNED
WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH
SAY PUBLICLY THAT KUWAITI ACTIONS ARE THE
EQUIVALENT OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, AND THEN WE
LEARN THAT MANY UNITS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD
HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE BORDER? IS IT NOT REASONABLE
FOR US TO ASK, IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, NOT
CONFRONTATION, THE SIMPLE QUESTION: WHAT ARE YOUR
INTENTIONS?

¶25. SADDAM SAID THAT WAS INDEED A REASONABLE
QUESTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE SHOULD BE
CONCERNED FOR REGIONAL PEACE, IN FACT IT IS OUR
DUTY AS A SUPERPOWER. "BUT HOW CAN WE MAKE THEM
(KUWAIT AND UAE) UNDERSTAND HOW DEEPLY WE ARE
SUFFERING." THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT
THE PENSIONS FOR WIDOWS AND ORPHANS WILL HAVE
TO BE CUT. AT THIS POINT, THE INTERPRETER AND
ONE OF THE NOTETAKERS BROKE DOWN AND WEPT.

¶26. AFTER A PAUSE FOR RECUPERATION, SADDAM SAID,
IN EFFECT, BELIEVE ME I HAVE TRIED EVERYTHING: WE
SENT ENVOYS, WROTE MESSAGES, ASKED FAHD TO
ARRANGE QUADRAPARTITE SUMMIT (IRAQ, SAG, UE,
KUWAIT). FAHD SUGGESTFD OIL MINISTERS INSTEAD AND
WE AGREED TO THE JEDDAH AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH IT WAS
WELL BELOW OUR HOPES. THEN, SADDAM CONTINUED,
TWO DAYS LATER THE KUWAITI OIL MINISTER ANNOUNCED
HE WOULD WANT TO ANNUL THAT AGREEMENT WITHIN TWO
MONTHS. AS FOR THE UAE, SADDAM SAID, I BEGGED
SHAYKH ZAYID TO UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS (WHEN
SADDAM ENTERTAINED HIM IN MOSUL AFTER THE BAGHDAD
SUMMIT), AND ZAYID SAID JUST WAIT UNTIL I GET
BACK TO ABU DHABI. BUT THEN HIS MINISTER OF OIL
MADE "BAD STATEMENTS."

¶27. AT THIS POINT, SADDAM LEFT THE ROOM TO TAKE
AN URGENT CALL FROM MUBARAK. AFTER HIS RETURN,
THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF HE COULD TELL HER IF
THERE HAS ANY PROGRESS IN FINDING A PEACEFUL WAY
TO DEFUSE THE DISPUTE. THIS WAS SOMETHING PRESIDENT
BUSH WOULD BE KEENLY INTERESTED TO KNOW. SADDAM
SAID THAT HE HAD JUST LEARNED FROM MUBARAK THE
KUWAITIS HAVE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE. THE KUWAITI
CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER WOULD MEET IN RIYADH
WITH SADDAM'S NUMBER TWO, IZZAT IBRAHIM, AND THEN
THE KUWAITI WOULD COME TO BAGHDAD ON SATURDAY,
SUNDAY OR, AT THE LATEST, MONDAY, JULY 30.

¶28. "I TOLD MUBARAK," SADDAM SAID, THAT "NOTHING
WILL HAPPEN UNTIL THE MEETING," AND NOTHING WILL
HAPPEN DURING OR AFTER THE MEETING IF THE KUWAITIS
WILL AT LAST "GIVE US SOME HOPE."

¶29. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR
THIS GOOD NEWS. SADDAM THEN ASKED HER TO CONVEY
HIS WARM GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND TO
CONVEY HIS MESSAGE TO HIM.

¶30. NOTE: ON THE BORDER QUESTION, SADDAM REFERRED
TO THE 1961 AGREEMENT AND A "LINE OF PATROL" IT
HAD ESTABLISHED. THE KUWAITIS, HE SAID, HAD TOLD
MUBARAK IRAQ WAS 20 KILOMETERS "IN FRONT" OF THIS
LINE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SHE HAD SERVED IN
KUWAIT 20 YEARS BEFORE; THEN, AS NOW, WE TOOK NO
POSITION ON THESE ARAB AFFAIRS.

¶31. COMMENT: IN THE MEMORY QF THE CURRENT
DIPLOMATIC CORPS, SADDAM HAS NEVER SUMMONED AN
AMBASSADOR. HE IS WORRIED.

ACCORDING TO HIS OWN POLITICAL THEORIZING
(U.S. THE SOLE MAJOR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST),
HE NEEDS AT A MINIMUM A CORRECT RELATIONSHIP
WITH US FOR OBVIOUS GEOPOLITICAL REASONS,
ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS HE PERCEIVES MORTAL
THREATS FROM ISRAEL AND IRAN. AMBASSADOR
BELIEVES SADDAM SUSPECTS OUR DECISION SUDDENLY
TO UNDERTAKE MANEUVERS WITH ABU DHABI IS A
HARBINGER OF A USG DECISION TO TAKE SIDES.
FURTHER, SADDAM, HIMSELF BEGINNING TO HAVE AN
INKLING OF HOW MUCH HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ABOUT
THE U.S., IS APPREHENSIVE THAT WE DO NOT
UNDERSTAND CERTAIN POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH
INHIBIT HIM, SUCH AS:

--HE CANNOT ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PERCEIVED AS
CAVING IN TO SUPERPOWER BULLYING (AS U/S HAMDUN
FRANKLY WARNED US IN LATE 1988);

--IRAQ, WHICH LOST 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES, IS
SUFFERING AND KUWAIT IS "MISERLY" AND "SELFISH."

¶32. IT WAS PROGRESS TO HAVE SADDAM ADMIT
THAT THE USG HAS A "RESPONSIBILITY" IN THE
REGION, AND HAS EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT AN
ANSWER WHEN WE ASK IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. HIS
RESPONSE IN EFFECT THAT HE TRIED VARIOUS
DIPLOMATIC/CHANNELS BEFORE RESORTING TO
UNADULTERATED INTIMIDATION HAS AT LEAST THE
VIRTUE OF FRANKNESS. HIS EMPHASIS THAT HE
WANTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS SURELY SINCERE
(IRAQIS ARE SICK OF WAR), BUT THE TERMS SOUND
DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. SADDAM SEEMS TO WANT
PLEDGES NOW ON OIL PRICES AND PRODUCTION TO
COVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.


GLASPIE




Source: Wikileaks