PDAS COUNTRYMAN MEETS WITH MOD OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS END-USE ISSUES

Reference ID 09CAIRO1559
Created 2009-08-11 11:11
Released 2011-01-28
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Cairo



VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #1559/01 2231141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111141Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3389
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001559

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS ETTC PARM EG
SUBJECT: PDAS COUNTRYMAN MEETS WITH MOD OFFICIALS TO
DISCUSS END-USE ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 62775
¶B. CAIRO 1114
¶C. CAIRO 458
¶D. CAIRO 805

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. Key Points:

-- (C) On August 2, PM PDAS Tom Countryman led an interagency
visit to Cairo to discuss recent potential violations of the
Government of Egypt,s (GOE) end-use, retransfer, and
security obligations involving U.S.-provided defense articles
and defense services with the Ministry of Defense. He
stressed the importance of Egypt demonstrating that it is
taking concrete actions to prevent further violations.

-- (C) MOD agreed to continue an OMC-provided end-use
training course, create a new MOD-administered periodic
training course, name a high-level official to be a point of
contact on end-use issues, and add end-use issues to the
agenda for the annual Military Cooperation Committee
meetings. MOD declined to sign any written agreement
outlining these steps.

-- (C) Assistant Minister of Defense Mohammed al-Assar
emphasized that Egypt took its end-use obligations "very
seriously" and was taking "all measures" to prevent further
incidents. He added that recent violations involved "junior
officers making mistakes" without any high-level involvement.

--------------------------------
End-Use Monitoring Working Group
--------------------------------

¶2. (C) On August 2, PM PDAS Tom Countryman led an
interagency visit to Cairo to discuss recent potential
violations of the Government of Egypt,s (GOE) end-use,
retransfer, and security obligations involving U.S.-provided
defense articles and defense services (ref A) involving U.S.-
origin equipment and technology with the Ministry of Defense.
The delegation included representatives from PM/RSAT,
NEA/ELA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff
and U.S. Central Command. Major General Mohammed al-Assar,
Assistant Minister of Defense for Policy, led the Egyptian
side, accompanied by Major General Fouad Abdel Halim,
Assistant Minister of Defense for Armament and Major General
Ahmed al-Moataz, Chief of the U.S. Relations branch.

¶3. (C) Al-Assar said he had "high hopes" for establishing a
"new dialogue" with the U.S. following President Obama's June
speech in Cairo. Egypt's relationship with the U.S.
is "tremendously important," he continued, viewing the
military-military relationship as the "backbone" of bilateral
cooperation. PDAS Countryman expressed appreciation for the
strategic relationship with Egypt and strong security
cooperation over the last 30 years.

¶4. (C) PDAS Countryman noted that overall, Egypt has a good
record of protecting its large inventory of U.S. equipment
and technology. Many countries, however, expend great energy
to illegally obtain U.S. technology. In order to provide our
partners with the best military equipment available, strict
protections must exist to prevent compromise, he added. PDAS
Countryman stressed the important role Congress plays in
monitoring end-use compliance. He explained that the
Department, through the PM Bureau, was required to notify
Congress of any potential end-use violations.

¶5. (C) PDAS Countryman emphasized the importance of a clear
and transparent picture of Egypt's end-use performance,
including the measures being taken to prevent further
violations. He noted that Egypt had more potential Section 3
violations than any other country in the world over the last
several years. Cases involving the Chinese, he continued,
were of particular concern (ref A). If Egypt cannot
demonstrate that it is taking the necessary steps to prevent
future violations, the necessary Congressional consent for
important Foreign Military Financing (FMF)-funded programs
could be delayed, such as M1A1 co-production and the proposed
purchase of F-16 aircraft.

¶6. (C) SDO/DATT Major General Williams offered his
assessment of the recent potential violations, saying that
the cases demonstrated a lack of awareness amongst MOD
officials on end-use rules. He explained that the Office of
Military Cooperation (OMC) had already begun a training
program for mid-level Egyptian officials to address the lack
of awareness, noting that OMC had received full cooperation

from MOD on delivering the course (ref B). General Williams
added that the MOD had agreed to include end-use issues in
the agenda for the annual Military Cooperation Committee
meeting. He also highlighted the increase in third-party
transfer requests from the MOD, indicating that the training
program had increased awareness of end-use regulations.

¶7. (C) Major General Abdel Halim, who is responsible for
the FMF program, stressed that Egypt follows all regulations,
including the end-use, retransfer and security obligations
included with every purchase of U.S. equipment made by the
GOE. He noted that until the last four years, Egypt had no
Section 3 violations, adding that the recent violations were
a "minor thing" that could be overcome. On the recent
violations, he said that MOD had been very transparent with
the Embassy on discussing each individual case. Al-Assar
stressed that Egypt takes its end-use obligations "very
seriously" and was taking "all measures" to prevent further
incidents. He said that recent violations involved "junior
officers making mistakes" without any high-level involvement.
In the case of the reverse engineering of a 155 mm gun tube
(ref C), the MOD quickly fired the engineer involved and said
the engineer "did not know it was a violation."

-----------
Way Forward
-----------

¶8. (C) PDAS Countryman acknowledged Egypt,s good faith
efforts to report and redress apparent violations. He
outlined several steps Egypt could take to demonstrate its
commitment to preventing further end-use violations.
Al-Assar replied that the MOD cooperated fully with OMC and
was already taking the appropriate measures to prevent a
reoccurrence, including naming a point of contact responsible
for end-use issues. Al-Assar said that the MOD considered
raising end-use awareness amongst its officials to be an
important goal, but stressed that training had to be
conducted "carefully" in order to prevent the appearance of
"U.S. interference." Major General Abdel Halim suggested
that the MOD could provide periodic training (every two
months) to the "consigned officers" responsible for
protecting U.S. equipment and technology under the auspices
of the Armament Authority. This training would then filter
down to the operators of U.S. equipment at the unit level.
Having MOD officials quietly deliver the training, instead of
Americans, would allow MOD to frame the training as
"self-protection" of Egyptian equipment and not as a new
restriction from the U.S.

¶9. (C) PDAS Countryman commented on the recent violations,
saying that in the case of the 155 gun tube, MOD did the
right thing by taking swift action against the engineer
responsible, adding that the case did not raise much concern.
The case involving the visit of a Chinese military official
to an F-16 base (ref D), however, did raise genuine concerns
about the transfer of US technology. He noted that U.S.
concerns over the visit had already delayed Egypt's request
to purchase F-16 aircraft. PDAS Countryman stressed the
importance of receiving a consistent story of what happened
during the Chinese official's visit (Note: We have received
conflicting reports from MOD officials on what the Chinese
official saw during his tour. End Note). PDAS Countryman
suggested that the MOD should conduct an internal analysis of
the eight potential Section 3 violations over the last four
years to identify the reason behind each violation, which
would help guide any solution. An analytical review would
also help determine if training is reaching the right
audience.
¶10. (C) Al-Assar did not respond directly, but said MOD was
open to any program that would increase awareness of its
end-use, retransfer and security obligations. PDAS
Countryman urged the MOD to take proactive, concrete steps to
demonstrate its determination to prevent future violations.
He suggested MOD agree in writing to the following actions:
1) Conduct an internal analysis of the eight potential
violations to be shared with the OMC, 2) Commit to an end-use
training plan, and 3) Identify one senior official as a point
of contact for end-use issues. PDAS Countryman understood
MOD's reluctance to sign a document during the meeting, but
promised to provide a text for the MOD's review. Al-Assar
agreed to review the text for accuracy, but did not commit to
signing any document.

¶11. (C) Subsequent to the meeting, al-Assar reviewed the
proposed text, but declined to sign the document. He
verbally concurred that the MOD would continue OMC-provided
end-use training, create a new MOD-administered periodic
training course, name a high-level official (MG Abdul Halim)

to be a point of contact on end-use issues, and add end-use
issues to the agenda for the annual Military Cooperation
Committee meetings. He declined to conduct an internal
analysis on the end-use violations.

-------------------
Mil-Mil Cooperation
-------------------

¶12. (C) At the conclusion of the end-use monitoring portion
of the meeting, al-Assar raised several issues related to
bilateral military cooperation. He urged the U.S. not to
allow a third-party (Israel) to delay the political release
of advanced weapons systems to Egypt. Al-Assar had "high
hopes" that the new U.S. Administration would be more
supportive of releasing weapons systems to Egypt. (Note:
Egypt has long requested the release of certain weapons
systems, like the TOW 2B, LONGBOW, and JAVELIN. Egypt is
prevented from acquiring some systems because of Minister of
Defense Tantawi's refusal to sign the necessary security
agreement (CISMOA). The GoE also believes that concerns over
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge have prevented weapons
systems from being released to Egypt. End Note).

¶13. (C) Al-Assar also emphasized the importance of
maintaining the 2:3 ratio for FMF provided to Egypt and
Israel established after the Camp David Peace accord, in
order to sustain the "regional balance." He noted that over
the last 10 years, Israel's FMF level has grown
substantially, while Egypt's annual FMF level has remained at
$1.3 billion. The modernization of the Egyptian military was
critical to Egypt's ability to defend its territory, he
continued, stressing that "we want to proceed with our
modernization plan with the United States." Any delay in the
political release of weapons systems and Congressional
conditioning of bilateral assistance was "not good" for the
modernization plan.

¶14. (C) PDAS Countryman repeated that the U.S. appreciates
the strategic importance of Egypt. While US political
constraints on weapons sales are a real factor, they had not,
he believed, prevented Egypt from building a military
adequate to its regional responsibilities. He noted that
Egypt could best help itself with the Administration and with
Congress by insuring the proper protection of U.S. technology
and equipment, and by continuing its efforts to interdict
Iranian shipment of weapons bound for Hamas and Hizballah.


¶15. (U) PDAS Countryman cleared this cable.



SCOBEY









Source: Wikileaks