Reference ID 09TRIPOLI198
Created 2009-03-03 14:02
Released 2011-02-22
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Tripoli
From: CBPC, EACTAPP
Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2009 4:33 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000198 P CO 03-MAR-09 BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD? SAADI
AL-QADHAFI’S EXPORT FREE ZONE IN WESTERN LIBYA [8590535]
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO8024
PP RUEHDE RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0198/01 0621442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 031442Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4566
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0710
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1024
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0497
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1422
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0781
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0909
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0847
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0029
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0032
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5092
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000198
SIPDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; STATE FOR NEA/MAG; PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/2/2019
TAGS: PGOV ECON EIND EINV ETRD EAIR LY
SUBJECT: BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD? SAADI AL-QADHAFI'S EXPORT FREE ZONE IN WESTERN LIBYA
REF: 08 TRIPOLI 530
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Saadi al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, has recently turned his attention to transforming an area near the western Libyan town of Zuwara into an Export Free Trade Zone. The project would include an airport, immigration and customs operations, a high tech industrial park, banks, medical centers and educational facilities. During a rare visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Zuwara late last year, he promised to help bring the project to reality; work began a few days after the visit. As with most business ventures in Libya, there are considerable political dimensions to any economic enterprise. A desire to provide tangible deliverables to a leading city of the Berbers, with whom his regime has had a historically contentious relationship, may have helped prompt al-Qadhafi's support.
Saadi's status as a son of the first family may mean that his project stands a better chance of surviving as government budgets are tightened in light of flat oil prices. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, XXXXXXXXXXXX Regardless, the Berber-dominated town of Zuwara will benefit from the creation of new employment, both in the construction phase and later in the running of the zone.
End summary.
SAADI SETTLES IN
¶2. (C) Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, has recently spent considerable time in the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara, located in western Libya near the border with Tunisia. Saadi was married off several years ago to the daughter of prominent regime figure al-Khweildi al-Hmeidi XXXXXXXXXXXX According to residents, XXXXXXXXXXXX Saadi does his own shopping and walks the streets of Zuwara's small downtown area, usually with a small security detail. A former professional footballer (he enjoyed a single season with Perugia in Italy's Serie A league, owns a significant share of al-Ahli - one of the two biggest soccer teams in Libya - and has run Libya's Football Federation) and engineer by training, Saadi's focus has drifted from soccer to the military (he was briefly an officer in a special forces unit and reportedly did well, but was bored by military life) to movies (he owns the film production company World Navigator Entertainment). He now appears to be focused on developing Zuwara into an Export Free Zone.
ZUWARA PROJECT SIZEABLE IN SCOPE
¶3. (SBU) The Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone project was initiated in 2006 XXXXXXXXXXXX to develop the area located between the city of Zuwara and the fishing village of Ras-Ajdar. The latter is located on the Libya-Tunisia border.
The zone is intended to encourage foreign investment and prompt industrial and commercial development and tourism that will contribute to long-term economic growth. In a press release, Saadi highlighted the project as a means by which to diversify Libya's economy, reduce dependence on oil revenues, create jobs and strengthen foreign investment. The design of the project was assigned to a number of multinational companies, which have developed a phased plan for the project. In late 2008, Emirati Emaar Properties and the Government of Libya (GOL) created a joint venture company to be the main developer of Phase 1, which included developing residential, commercial, industrial, educational, healthcare, leisure and entertainment components designed to attract foreign investment and generate employment.
¶4. (SBU) If implemented, the Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone would be the first of its kind in Libya. It would have unique
TRIPOLI 00000198 002 OF 003
features such as its own harbor and airport, and immigration and customs offices to facilitate vistors' entry into Libya, and would be a fully-functioning hub for business investors. In a nod to cultural sensitivity, there would be multi-religious worship facilities in the zone and the area would deliberately cultivate "western style" business laws with which European and American companies would be familiar. Locally-engaged Embassy staff resident in Zuwara have heard credible reports that Saadi has secured agreement to sell alcohol in the zone as part of an effort to make it attractive to potential expatriate investors and business interests. (Note: Libya is technically dry, although there is a thriving black market for alcohol and discreet drinking is tacitly accepted. A number of new hotels in Tripoli due to open soon have requested liquor licenses and believe they may get them, although there is credible reporting suggesting that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally opposes the consumption of alcohol and will not allow it so long as he remains in power. End note.)
LEADER'S VISIT SPARKS MOVEMENT ON CONSTRUCTION
¶5. (C) During a rare visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Zuwara in September 2008, he promised to help bring the project to fruition. His visit and interest in the project may have been partly prompted by a desire to provide tangible deliverables to the Berber community, with which his regime has had a historically contentious relationship. In 2007, the GOL showed some evidence of reversing its longstanding denial that any Berber communities exist in Libya and granted permission to the Amazigh (Berber) World Congress to host a large gathering in Tripoli in August 2007. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and the Prime Minister made high-profile visits in August and September 2007 to predominantly Berber communities and announced major infrastructure investments; however, in March 2008 the GOL hotly criticized a request for Emboffs to visit Berber leaders in Zuwara and in May 2008 Muammar al-Qadhafi denied the existence of an ethno-linguistically distinct Berber minority in a visit to Berber tribes near Jadu (reftel).
¶6. (C) Within a few days of his al-Qadhafi's visit to Zuwara, significant work on the free trade zone project began. On a site visit to Zwara in October 2008, Econoff noticed several old buildings being torn down along the beachfront to make way for new buildings. Roads have been re-surfaced in record time and the city's main entrance from the coastal road leading to Tripoli has been spruced up with palm trees and landscaping.
Local residents have remarked that their town, which had been a bit dusty and shabby, now looks like "an international city". A project to build another water desalination plant has just been awarded to a Turkish contractor and work has begun, which will directly contribute to the overall standard of living for Zuwara's residents. There is talk in the town of Zwara that the best building in town, previously owned by the National Livestock Company, will host the new joint venture company that will manage construction of the free zone.
¶7. (C) Comment: Saadi's status as a son of the first family likely means that the Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone stands a better chance of surviving as budgets are trimmed in light of flat oil prices. As reported previously, the GOL had initially pegged its 2009 national budget (now being debated at the session of the General People's Congress currently underway) to a price per barrel of USD 65; however, it recently re-calibrated the budget and significantly reduced outlays on some development projects to reflect sagging oil prices. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, Muammar al-Qadhafi likely views it as a relatively small price to pay if it helps occupy the notoriously ill-behaved Saadi and lend a patina of useful engagement to his otherwise less than sterling reputation. Saadi has a troubled past, including scuffles with police in Europe (especially Italy), abuse of drugs and alcohol, excessive partying, travel abroad in contravention of his father's wishes XXXXXXXXXXXX Creating the appearance of useful employment for al-Qadhafi's offspring has been an important objective for the regime. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the oldest of al-Qadhafi's children, but by his first wife)
TRIPOLI 00000198 003 OF 003
dominates the telecommunciations sector, Saif al-Islam is the presumed heir-apparent and is focused on civil society and political-economic reform, Muatassim is National Security Adviser, Hannibal (another miscreant whose recent misbehavior in Geneva is the cause of the current rupture in Swiss-Libyan
relations) has maritime shipping, Khamis is commanding officer of Libya's premier military unit and Aisha runs a quasi-governmental organization and helps mediate family disputes. The mystery candidate is Saif al-Arab, who reportedly spends most of his time in Munich, where he is involved in ill-defined business pursuits and spends much of his time partying. Regardless of any desire to appease the Berber community and/or paternalistic motives behind the GOL's support for the free trade zone, the town of Zuwara and its predominantly Berber residents stand to benefit in the end from the project. End comment.
CRETZ
Source: Wikileaks
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE
Reference ID 09TRIPOLI208
Created 2009-03-09 16:04
Released 2011-02-22
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO4734
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0208/01 0681608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 091608Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5108
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000208
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR ECON MARR MASS PHUM PINR LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE
REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 564, B) 08 TRIPOLI 592, C) TRIPOLI 198, D) 08 TRIPOLI 870 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 679, F) 08 TRIPOLI 494, G) TRIPOLI 196, H) TRIPOLI 134, I) 0 8 TRIPOLI 227
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: A series of events since last summer suggest that tension between various children of Muammar al-Qadhafi has increased, XXXXXXXXXXXX. Much of the tension appears to stem from resentment of Saif al-Islam's high-profile as the public face of the regime; however, deeper tension about contradictions between Saif al-Islam's proposed political-economic reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX also play an important role. The arrest and intimidation of a number of Saif al-Islam allies since last summer, on the one hand, and moves to circumscribe Muatassim's role in military equipment procurement, on the other, suggest that the current level of discord among al-Qadhafi's children is acute. While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension comes during a particularly momentous period. Amid turmoil related to the 40th anniversary of the revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as African Union chairman, proposed political-economic reforms and persistent rumors about al-Qadhafi's health and the absence of a viable mechanism to orchestrate a succession, the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the family is able to hold on to power after the author of the revolution exits the political scene. End summary.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in Geneva in mid-July (ref B subsequent) and a visit to Rome by Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, against his father's express wishes in early August. Hannibal and Saadi both have checkered histories of unseemly behavior and public scuffles with authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Although Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly fed a carefully vetted version of the events attendant to Hannibal's arrest to help minimize the perception that Hannibal was to blame, the elder al-Qadhafi was reportedly vexed that Libya, for reasons of protecting the first family's pride, had to engage in a bilateral spat with Switzerland at a time when it was trying to move ahead with negotiations for a framework agreement with the European Union. XXXXXXXXXXXX
... PROMPT AN AL-QADHAFI FAMILY MEETING
¶4. (C) The upshot of Muatassim's solicitation of funds, Hannibal's arrest and Saadi's jaunt was an al-Qadhafi family meeting in mid-August. Al-Qadhafi reportedly decided to reduce Sanussi's role as a minder for the most troublesome children (he is still a key adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi) and to
TRIPOLI 00000208 002 OF 005
instead assign his daughter, Aisha al-Qadhafi, the task of monitoring the activities of ne'er-do-wells Saadi, Hannibal and Saif al-Arab. (Note: The latter is the least publicly know of al-Qadhafi's children; he lives in Munich, where he pursues ill-defined business interests and spends much time partying. At the meeting, Saadi reportedly criticized his father for having ignored him, and specifically cited the fact that his (Saadi's) efforts to establish an Export Free Trade Zone near the western Libyan town of Zuwara had not enjoyed the kind of support that Muatassim's activities as National Security Adviser or Saif al-Islam's high-profile efforts under the Qadhafi Development Foundation and Libya Youth Forum. As reported ref C, Muammar al-Qadhafi subsequently made an unusual visit to Zuwara last September and significant work on the development project began within a few days of his visit. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶5. XXXXXXXXXXXX have told us that Aisha played a strong role in urging a hardline Libyan position with respect to the Swiss-Libyan contretemps over Hannibal's arrest. Separately, the Swiss Ambassador told us that Aisha's less than accurate rendering to her father of the events surrounding Hannibal's arrest and treatment by Swiss authorities helped stoke Muammar al-Qadhafi's anger, limiting the extent to which Libyan and Swiss officials could maneuver to find an acceptable compromise. The Swiss have told us that in the most recent effort between the two sides to resolve the issue in Davos, Saif had approved an agreement that had the Swiss literally bending over backwards to assuage Libyan demands. After making a phone call (to either Aisha or the leader), Saif returned somewhat chastened after several minutes to rescind the aproval. The Swiss crisis, together with other points of intra-family tension, has reportedly brought Aisha, who enjoys closer relations with Hannibal than with her other brothers, together with Hannibal, Saadi and, to a lesser extent, Saif al-Arab. Muatassim reportedly agreed with the hardline approach vis a vis the Swiss and has been closer to Aisha's end of the spectrum than to that of Saif al-Islam, who urged a more moderate approach. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the eldest son, but by al-Qadhafis' first wife) and Khamis al-Qadhafi (fifth son by al-Qadhafi's second wife and the well-respected commander of a special forces unit that effectively serves as a regime protection unit) have remained neutral. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed frustration XXXXXXXXXXXX that Saif al-Islam had persisted in his hard-partying, womanizing ways, a source of concern in a socially conservative country like Libya.
INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SAIF AL-ISLAM AND MUATASSIM
¶6. (C) Against that backdrop of tension, competition between Saif al-Islam, whom most still regard as the heir-apparent, and Muatassim, whose viability as a potential alternative successor has risen since his appointment as National Security Adviser, has increased since last fall. XXXXXXXXXXXX Saif reportedly bridled at the fact that Muatassim accompanied Muammar al-Qadhafi on the latter's visit to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev last year (ref D), and played a key role in negotiating potential weapons contracts. Muatassim (who flew back early) and his older brother Muhammad greeted Muammar al-Qadhafi at the airport upon the latter's return to Tripoli; Saif, who was in town, was pointedly absent. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX It was further determined that Khamis al-Qadhafi would play a larger role in military procurement, since his Khamis Regiment (the 32nd Brigade) had demonstrated some success in procurement. Muatassim, whom the Serbian Ambassador described as "a bloody man" and "not terribly bright", XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶7. (C) Saif al-Islam's highly-publicized visit to the U.S. last November-December exacerbated tension with his siblings, particularly Muatassim, who viewed it as grandstanding. Saif al-Islam's high-profile role as the public face of the regime to the West has been a mixed blessing for him. While it has bolstered his image (he is probably the most publicly-recognized figure in Libya other than Muammar al-Qadhafi), many Libyans view him as self-aggrandizing and too eager to please foreigners at the expense of Libyans' interest. His role in the denouement of the Bulgarian nurses' case, in which he acknowledged in media interviews that the nurses had been tortured and the investigation into their alleged injection of the AIDS virus into Libyan children bungled, badly damaged his reputation. The fact that his recent visit to the U.S. came not long after his August 2008 Youth Forum address - in which he strongly criticized the existing Jamahiriya system of governance, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that most of his proposed reforms had already been achieved, and declared his intention to withdraw from political life to focus solely on civil society issues (ref E) - reportedly irritated his siblings. XXXXXXXXXXXX have suggested to us that Muatassim's desire to visit Washington this spring and his seemingly overweaning focus on having meetings with senior USG officials and signing a number of agreements are driven at least in part by a strong sense of competition with Saif al-Islam.
THE KNIVES COME OUT
¶8. (C) Recent events have fueled speculation that inter-sibling rivalries, and those of the more conservative regime elements they represent, have been increasing. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
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¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
1 XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶11. (C) Comment: While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension between Saif al-Islam and Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal and Saadi, comes during a particularly momentous period in the Jamahiriya's history. The 40th anniversary of the revolution on September 1, 2009, together with Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as Chairman of the AU (ref H), proposed political-economic reforms, consideration of a constitution, and rumored elections, have contributed to a sense that Libya is in the midst of a period of particular political turbulence. XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that a draft constitution had been finished and submitted to the General People's Committee (cabinet-equivalent) for approval, and that it could be submitted to the General People's Congress for ratification sometime this year. The UN Resident Representative recently told the Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had established a super-committee under the auspices of the Economic and Development Board to draw up plans to implement wealth distribution and privatization/government restructuring advocated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref I). XXXXXXXXXXXX Saif al-Islam's recent announcement of a regional organization that would publicly identify specific individuals who perpetrate human rights abuses and target them for sanctions has been interpreted by some local observers as a manifestation of his frustration with the slow pace of reforms
TRIPOLI 00000208 005 OF 005
and as a threat to conservative regime elements, many of whom personally played a part in the most serious transgressions of the late 1970's and 1980's.
¶12. (C) Comment (continued): Persistent rumors about Muammar al-Qadhafi's declining health have lent particular urgency to questions about succession scenarios, throwing into stark relief the fact that, absent a constitution, there is no legal mechanism by which to orchestrate such an endeavor and seemingly increasing the stakes for the sibling rivalry. XXXXXXXXXXXX As Libya lurches forward with the effort to balance badly needed economic reform with the appearance of some political re-structuring - all against the backdrop of looming succession issues - the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the al-Qadhafi family is able to hold on to power after Muammar al-Qadhafi exits (one way or another) the political scene. End comment.
CRETZ
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-03-09 16:04
Released 2011-02-22
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO4734
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0208/01 0681608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 091608Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5108
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000208
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR ECON MARR MASS PHUM PINR LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE
REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 564, B) 08 TRIPOLI 592, C) TRIPOLI 198, D) 08 TRIPOLI 870 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 679, F) 08 TRIPOLI 494, G) TRIPOLI 196, H) TRIPOLI 134, I) 0 8 TRIPOLI 227
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: A series of events since last summer suggest that tension between various children of Muammar al-Qadhafi has increased, XXXXXXXXXXXX. Much of the tension appears to stem from resentment of Saif al-Islam's high-profile as the public face of the regime; however, deeper tension about contradictions between Saif al-Islam's proposed political-economic reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX also play an important role. The arrest and intimidation of a number of Saif al-Islam allies since last summer, on the one hand, and moves to circumscribe Muatassim's role in military equipment procurement, on the other, suggest that the current level of discord among al-Qadhafi's children is acute. While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension comes during a particularly momentous period. Amid turmoil related to the 40th anniversary of the revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as African Union chairman, proposed political-economic reforms and persistent rumors about al-Qadhafi's health and the absence of a viable mechanism to orchestrate a succession, the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the family is able to hold on to power after the author of the revolution exits the political scene. End summary.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in Geneva in mid-July (ref B subsequent) and a visit to Rome by Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, against his father's express wishes in early August. Hannibal and Saadi both have checkered histories of unseemly behavior and public scuffles with authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Although Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly fed a carefully vetted version of the events attendant to Hannibal's arrest to help minimize the perception that Hannibal was to blame, the elder al-Qadhafi was reportedly vexed that Libya, for reasons of protecting the first family's pride, had to engage in a bilateral spat with Switzerland at a time when it was trying to move ahead with negotiations for a framework agreement with the European Union. XXXXXXXXXXXX
... PROMPT AN AL-QADHAFI FAMILY MEETING
¶4. (C) The upshot of Muatassim's solicitation of funds, Hannibal's arrest and Saadi's jaunt was an al-Qadhafi family meeting in mid-August. Al-Qadhafi reportedly decided to reduce Sanussi's role as a minder for the most troublesome children (he is still a key adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi) and to
TRIPOLI 00000208 002 OF 005
instead assign his daughter, Aisha al-Qadhafi, the task of monitoring the activities of ne'er-do-wells Saadi, Hannibal and Saif al-Arab. (Note: The latter is the least publicly know of al-Qadhafi's children; he lives in Munich, where he pursues ill-defined business interests and spends much time partying. At the meeting, Saadi reportedly criticized his father for having ignored him, and specifically cited the fact that his (Saadi's) efforts to establish an Export Free Trade Zone near the western Libyan town of Zuwara had not enjoyed the kind of support that Muatassim's activities as National Security Adviser or Saif al-Islam's high-profile efforts under the Qadhafi Development Foundation and Libya Youth Forum. As reported ref C, Muammar al-Qadhafi subsequently made an unusual visit to Zuwara last September and significant work on the development project began within a few days of his visit. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶5. XXXXXXXXXXXX have told us that Aisha played a strong role in urging a hardline Libyan position with respect to the Swiss-Libyan contretemps over Hannibal's arrest. Separately, the Swiss Ambassador told us that Aisha's less than accurate rendering to her father of the events surrounding Hannibal's arrest and treatment by Swiss authorities helped stoke Muammar al-Qadhafi's anger, limiting the extent to which Libyan and Swiss officials could maneuver to find an acceptable compromise. The Swiss have told us that in the most recent effort between the two sides to resolve the issue in Davos, Saif had approved an agreement that had the Swiss literally bending over backwards to assuage Libyan demands. After making a phone call (to either Aisha or the leader), Saif returned somewhat chastened after several minutes to rescind the aproval. The Swiss crisis, together with other points of intra-family tension, has reportedly brought Aisha, who enjoys closer relations with Hannibal than with her other brothers, together with Hannibal, Saadi and, to a lesser extent, Saif al-Arab. Muatassim reportedly agreed with the hardline approach vis a vis the Swiss and has been closer to Aisha's end of the spectrum than to that of Saif al-Islam, who urged a more moderate approach. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the eldest son, but by al-Qadhafis' first wife) and Khamis al-Qadhafi (fifth son by al-Qadhafi's second wife and the well-respected commander of a special forces unit that effectively serves as a regime protection unit) have remained neutral. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed frustration XXXXXXXXXXXX that Saif al-Islam had persisted in his hard-partying, womanizing ways, a source of concern in a socially conservative country like Libya.
INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SAIF AL-ISLAM AND MUATASSIM
¶6. (C) Against that backdrop of tension, competition between Saif al-Islam, whom most still regard as the heir-apparent, and Muatassim, whose viability as a potential alternative successor has risen since his appointment as National Security Adviser, has increased since last fall. XXXXXXXXXXXX Saif reportedly bridled at the fact that Muatassim accompanied Muammar al-Qadhafi on the latter's visit to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev last year (ref D), and played a key role in negotiating potential weapons contracts. Muatassim (who flew back early) and his older brother Muhammad greeted Muammar al-Qadhafi at the airport upon the latter's return to Tripoli; Saif, who was in town, was pointedly absent. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX It was further determined that Khamis al-Qadhafi would play a larger role in military procurement, since his Khamis Regiment (the 32nd Brigade) had demonstrated some success in procurement. Muatassim, whom the Serbian Ambassador described as "a bloody man" and "not terribly bright", XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶7. (C) Saif al-Islam's highly-publicized visit to the U.S. last November-December exacerbated tension with his siblings, particularly Muatassim, who viewed it as grandstanding. Saif al-Islam's high-profile role as the public face of the regime to the West has been a mixed blessing for him. While it has bolstered his image (he is probably the most publicly-recognized figure in Libya other than Muammar al-Qadhafi), many Libyans view him as self-aggrandizing and too eager to please foreigners at the expense of Libyans' interest. His role in the denouement of the Bulgarian nurses' case, in which he acknowledged in media interviews that the nurses had been tortured and the investigation into their alleged injection of the AIDS virus into Libyan children bungled, badly damaged his reputation. The fact that his recent visit to the U.S. came not long after his August 2008 Youth Forum address - in which he strongly criticized the existing Jamahiriya system of governance, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that most of his proposed reforms had already been achieved, and declared his intention to withdraw from political life to focus solely on civil society issues (ref E) - reportedly irritated his siblings. XXXXXXXXXXXX have suggested to us that Muatassim's desire to visit Washington this spring and his seemingly overweaning focus on having meetings with senior USG officials and signing a number of agreements are driven at least in part by a strong sense of competition with Saif al-Islam.
THE KNIVES COME OUT
¶8. (C) Recent events have fueled speculation that inter-sibling rivalries, and those of the more conservative regime elements they represent, have been increasing. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
TRIPOLI 00000208 004 OF 005
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
1 XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶11. (C) Comment: While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension between Saif al-Islam and Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal and Saadi, comes during a particularly momentous period in the Jamahiriya's history. The 40th anniversary of the revolution on September 1, 2009, together with Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as Chairman of the AU (ref H), proposed political-economic reforms, consideration of a constitution, and rumored elections, have contributed to a sense that Libya is in the midst of a period of particular political turbulence. XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that a draft constitution had been finished and submitted to the General People's Committee (cabinet-equivalent) for approval, and that it could be submitted to the General People's Congress for ratification sometime this year. The UN Resident Representative recently told the Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had established a super-committee under the auspices of the Economic and Development Board to draw up plans to implement wealth distribution and privatization/government restructuring advocated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref I). XXXXXXXXXXXX Saif al-Islam's recent announcement of a regional organization that would publicly identify specific individuals who perpetrate human rights abuses and target them for sanctions has been interpreted by some local observers as a manifestation of his frustration with the slow pace of reforms
TRIPOLI 00000208 005 OF 005
and as a threat to conservative regime elements, many of whom personally played a part in the most serious transgressions of the late 1970's and 1980's.
¶12. (C) Comment (continued): Persistent rumors about Muammar al-Qadhafi's declining health have lent particular urgency to questions about succession scenarios, throwing into stark relief the fact that, absent a constitution, there is no legal mechanism by which to orchestrate such an endeavor and seemingly increasing the stakes for the sibling rivalry. XXXXXXXXXXXX As Libya lurches forward with the effort to balance badly needed economic reform with the appearance of some political re-structuring - all against the backdrop of looming succession issues - the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the al-Qadhafi family is able to hold on to power after Muammar al-Qadhafi exits (one way or another) the political scene. End comment.
CRETZ
Source: Wikileaks
"I'M GOING TO WIN" PAN CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERON TELLS AMBASSADOR
Reference ID 06MEXICO255
Created 2006-01-18 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 182237Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8352
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000255
USAID FOR DAA/LAC MIKE MAGAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016
TAGS: MX PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: "I'M GOING TO WIN" PAN CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERON TELLS AMBASSADOR
Classified By: Classified by Amb. Antonio O. Garza, Jr., Reasons: 1.4 ( B/D)
¶1. (C) Summary: A confident Felipe Calderon and key campaign advisors Ernesto Cordero and Josefina Vasquez Mota told the Ambassador January 10 that recent polls showed Calderon slightly ahead of Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). The National Action Party candidate expressed concern about the perceived worsening of U.S.-Mexico relations, and warned that migration differences would inevitably enter into the election debate. Calderon and his team were interested in -- and apparently previously unaware of -- both USAID programs and law enforcement initiatives between the U.S. and Mexico. Calderon demonstrated once again that he shares our point of view on everything ranging from migration to competitiveness to border security. In contrast to his Institutional Revolution (PRI) counterpart Roberto Madrazo (septel), Calderon didn't bring any PAN party leaders with him, and was entirely focused on his own race. End Summary.
"I'm Going to Win"
¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by the political and public affairs ministers-counselor, the chief of USAID, the Legat, and poloff (notetaker), hosted Calderon and his team for breakfast January 10 in the first of three sessions with the leading presidential contenders. Calderon arrived slightly late after a meeting with President Fox, and moved right to business. Calderon noted that a recent door-to-door poll of 33,000 Mexicans (conducted by PAN pollster Rafael Jimenez of ARCOP) gave him a two point lead over AMLO, and a five point lead over Madrazo. Calderon said he had hoped to start the campaign season (which officially launches January 19) slightly below the other contenders. This was a great boost. "I'm going to win," Calderon said easily.
Migration as Politics
¶3. (C) Calderon noted that there was a deterioration in the U.S.-Mexico relationship, then agreed it could simply be a perception that relations were more difficult because of the controversy over migration, and specifically the Sensenbrenner bill coupled with a recent migrant shooting along the border near Tijuana. The negative spin on migration in the Mexican press clearly hurt the Fox administration and by extension, Calderon noted, his own campaign. He couldn't allow AMLO to take one vote on the migration issue, and would have to speak out against a "border wall" as well. The Ambassador clarified a few points about the bill, but noted that Calderon had already taken the right tack by stressing that Mexico needed to build opportunities here so citizens wouldn't have to look at migration as their source of hope. Certainly it was politic to reject the border fence, but that was not a solution. Solutions involved fixing the problems that spurred migration. Calderon agreed, and stressed again it was not his intent to inflame the debate, but to reframe it in constructive terms. Turning to specifics he was very interested in the possible timing of any migration reform that might be considered by the U.S. Congress. He was also perplexed that, after all the debate of a year ago over pepperguns, it appeared they weren't being used by the Border Patrol in the area north of Tijuana.
The Cooperative Relationship
¶4. (C) To demonstrate the range of excellent cooperation between Mexico and the U.S., the Ambassador asked the USAID director to brief on key programs. Both Calderon and Vasquez Mota seemed surprised and impressed by the range of USAID activities, taking special note of AID's programs on justice system reforms, competitiveness studies, and local government access to capital markets. Vasquez Mota said she would follow up with AID's office at a later point in time regarding those programs. Calderon said his number one agenda item is enforcing the rule of law and making Mexico a safer country. He listened intently to a presentation by the Legal Attache on U.S. programs to combat border violence and to track Special Interest Aliens (SIA) in Mexico, and followed-up with questions about drug-trafficking and improved methods for searching vehicles crossing the border.Q The Campaign Ahead
¶5. (C) Comment: Calderon met with the Ambassador just a day after adding former Secretary of Development Vasquez Mota to his campaign team, a move which caused certain dissension with Los Pinos over the designation of Vazquez Mota's successor. It was also the day before Calderon's formal registration as the PAN presidential candidate. Calderon and his team made clear they hoped to be in touch during the campaign, would provide continuity in all the key U.S. initiatives underway with Mexico, and would address our concerns regarding reform, border security, and competitiveness -- which is no surprise. Unlike PRI candidate Madrazo (septel), Calderon came without any party leaders in his wake, and was focused on his own campaign and platform rather than the entire PAN ticket for Congress, state governors, etc. Calderon was also clearly relieved that the "political truce" had apparently not cost him the popular momentum he was starting to build just before the Federal Electoral Institute called a halt to campaigning right before Christmas. Calderon's challenges will include consolidating the support of his party, reaching out to disaffected youth and other uncommitted voters, and keeping his momentum building during the long campaign ahead.
¶6. (U) Visit Mexico City's election blog at http://blogs.csp.sgov.gov/blojsom/blog/ mexicoelect06/
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-01-18 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 182237Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8352
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000255
USAID FOR DAA/LAC MIKE MAGAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016
TAGS: MX PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: "I'M GOING TO WIN" PAN CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERON TELLS AMBASSADOR
Classified By: Classified by Amb. Antonio O. Garza, Jr., Reasons: 1.4 ( B/D)
¶1. (C) Summary: A confident Felipe Calderon and key campaign advisors Ernesto Cordero and Josefina Vasquez Mota told the Ambassador January 10 that recent polls showed Calderon slightly ahead of Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). The National Action Party candidate expressed concern about the perceived worsening of U.S.-Mexico relations, and warned that migration differences would inevitably enter into the election debate. Calderon and his team were interested in -- and apparently previously unaware of -- both USAID programs and law enforcement initiatives between the U.S. and Mexico. Calderon demonstrated once again that he shares our point of view on everything ranging from migration to competitiveness to border security. In contrast to his Institutional Revolution (PRI) counterpart Roberto Madrazo (septel), Calderon didn't bring any PAN party leaders with him, and was entirely focused on his own race. End Summary.
"I'm Going to Win"
¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by the political and public affairs ministers-counselor, the chief of USAID, the Legat, and poloff (notetaker), hosted Calderon and his team for breakfast January 10 in the first of three sessions with the leading presidential contenders. Calderon arrived slightly late after a meeting with President Fox, and moved right to business. Calderon noted that a recent door-to-door poll of 33,000 Mexicans (conducted by PAN pollster Rafael Jimenez of ARCOP) gave him a two point lead over AMLO, and a five point lead over Madrazo. Calderon said he had hoped to start the campaign season (which officially launches January 19) slightly below the other contenders. This was a great boost. "I'm going to win," Calderon said easily.
Migration as Politics
¶3. (C) Calderon noted that there was a deterioration in the U.S.-Mexico relationship, then agreed it could simply be a perception that relations were more difficult because of the controversy over migration, and specifically the Sensenbrenner bill coupled with a recent migrant shooting along the border near Tijuana. The negative spin on migration in the Mexican press clearly hurt the Fox administration and by extension, Calderon noted, his own campaign. He couldn't allow AMLO to take one vote on the migration issue, and would have to speak out against a "border wall" as well. The Ambassador clarified a few points about the bill, but noted that Calderon had already taken the right tack by stressing that Mexico needed to build opportunities here so citizens wouldn't have to look at migration as their source of hope. Certainly it was politic to reject the border fence, but that was not a solution. Solutions involved fixing the problems that spurred migration. Calderon agreed, and stressed again it was not his intent to inflame the debate, but to reframe it in constructive terms. Turning to specifics he was very interested in the possible timing of any migration reform that might be considered by the U.S. Congress. He was also perplexed that, after all the debate of a year ago over pepperguns, it appeared they weren't being used by the Border Patrol in the area north of Tijuana.
The Cooperative Relationship
¶4. (C) To demonstrate the range of excellent cooperation between Mexico and the U.S., the Ambassador asked the USAID director to brief on key programs. Both Calderon and Vasquez Mota seemed surprised and impressed by the range of USAID activities, taking special note of AID's programs on justice system reforms, competitiveness studies, and local government access to capital markets. Vasquez Mota said she would follow up with AID's office at a later point in time regarding those programs. Calderon said his number one agenda item is enforcing the rule of law and making Mexico a safer country. He listened intently to a presentation by the Legal Attache on U.S. programs to combat border violence and to track Special Interest Aliens (SIA) in Mexico, and followed-up with questions about drug-trafficking and improved methods for searching vehicles crossing the border.Q The Campaign Ahead
¶5. (C) Comment: Calderon met with the Ambassador just a day after adding former Secretary of Development Vasquez Mota to his campaign team, a move which caused certain dissension with Los Pinos over the designation of Vazquez Mota's successor. It was also the day before Calderon's formal registration as the PAN presidential candidate. Calderon and his team made clear they hoped to be in touch during the campaign, would provide continuity in all the key U.S. initiatives underway with Mexico, and would address our concerns regarding reform, border security, and competitiveness -- which is no surprise. Unlike PRI candidate Madrazo (septel), Calderon came without any party leaders in his wake, and was focused on his own campaign and platform rather than the entire PAN ticket for Congress, state governors, etc. Calderon was also clearly relieved that the "political truce" had apparently not cost him the popular momentum he was starting to build just before the Federal Electoral Institute called a halt to campaigning right before Christmas. Calderon's challenges will include consolidating the support of his party, reaching out to disaffected youth and other uncommitted voters, and keeping his momentum building during the long campaign ahead.
¶6. (U) Visit Mexico City's election blog at http://blogs.csp.sgov.gov/blojsom/blog/ mexicoelect06/
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESUMED PRESIDENT ELECT CALDERON
Reference ID 06MEXICO4310
Created 2006-08-04 13:01
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 041338Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2510
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
73752
2006-08-04 13:38:00
06MEXICO4310
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
R 041338Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2510
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 004310
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESUMED PRESIDENT ELECT
CALDERON
Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza Jr for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Presumed President-elect Felipe Calderon
told the Ambassador 8/2 that he thought the Electoral
Tribunal could decide as early as this week to recount a
certain number of ballots, a gesture Calderon thought was
reasonable in light of the ongoing Democratic Revolution
Party (PRD) protests in Mexico City. A final certification
of the presidential election could take until late August, he
speculated. Calderon said his role was to be patient and
prepare himself for the presidency. He planned to attend
President Uribe's inauguration in Colombia, but also looked
forward to an early visit to the United States, perhaps
including some cities with large migrant populations.
Calderon is looking to engage on a broad agenda with the U.S.
and to avoid the trap of making migration the dominant
bilateral issue. Calderon's comments led us to believe his
transition planning is in the very early stages. He dropped
one comment that indicated he has not been in close contact
with President Fox since the election. End Summary.
The Waiting Game
¶2. (C) Presumed President-elect Felipe Calderon requested
the 8/2 meeting with the Ambassador, primarily to express
thanks for President Bush's early and friendly congratulatory
call. (Note: Calderon met 8/1 with the Spanish Ambassador,
and expected to meet with the ambassadors of other countries
offering congratulations in the course of the week).
Calderon expressed his regret about the ongoing PRD protests
(which have blocked key arteries leading to the Embassy's
neighborhood) and some frustration that PRD candidate Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) was refusing to acknowledge
defeat. While his situation was difficult, Calderon said,
every day he was more convinced a few weeks of patience was
better than just one day with AMLO in Los Pinos. Calderon's
tracking polls indicated that on a daily basis AMLO was
losing support and Calderon was gaining. The PRD's attacks
on election institutions had done some damage, but as AMLO
became increasingly inconsiderate and obstructive the
institutions regained credibility.
¶3. (C) Calderon reported there were some indications that
the Electoral Tribunal could make a preliminary ruling this
Friday that would allow for a recount of some ballot boxes in
areas where the results were extremely close, or where the
law permitted a recounting of the ballots. He estimated that
some 6,000-8,000 ballot boxes could be recounted under this
ruling (there are a maximum of 750 votes per ballot box).
The recount could begin immediately, with results available
within a matter of days. Calderon's expectation was that the
recount results would not vary dramatically from those
originally reported. This would be enough to satisfy some in
the PRD and broader public who were calling for a recount,
Calderon surmised, but probably not AMLO. The Tribunal could
make its final certification of the election results in late
August, but AMLO could continue protests (although not
necesarily his occupation of Paseo de la Reforma) through
President Fox's annual report to Congress (September 2) and
inauguration day (December 1) -- or beyond.
Transition
¶4. (C) Calderon stressed his willingness to work
collaboratively with the U.S. on a broad range of issues, and
did not want to get stuck in a single-issue debate on
migration. He expected to differentiate his Administration
from that of President Fox, but at this meeting didn't
provide many specifics. Calderon planned to attend Colombian
President Uribe's inauguration in Colombia next week, and was
considering a trip to U.S. cities with large migrant
populations, starting with Los Angeles. He acknowledged the
Ambassador's point that such travel should be scheduled with
careful attention to U.S. electoral calendar and the debate
on migration. Once Calderon's election was certified, he
hoped as well to meet President Bush and senior U.S.
officials. While the Ambassador pressed for details on
transition priorities and personalities, Calderon wasn't
particularly forthcoming, suggesting his transition planning
is still in its early stages. The Ambassador stressed that
we were looking forward to a close working relationship with
the Calderon team as soon as they were ready.
Region
¶5. (C) Calderon volunteered his concern over the role
Chavez was playing in the region, while noting that Castro's
sudden absence from the scene -- be it permanent or temporary
-- offered an opportunity to undermine Chavez' role.
Calderon said he understood Chavez was increasingly active in
Mexico. Calderon international affairs adviser Arturo
Sarrukhan stated that Castro had duodenal cancer and was
likely in the final stages. All agreed it was an
unprecedented situation leading to a probable transition.
The Ambassador pointed out that the region should not permit
a Castro-Castro succession scenario to be considered
legitimate.
¶6. (C) Sarrukhan separately stated that one reason Calderon
had agreed to go to Colombia was to consult with the GOC on
the increasing ties between Colombian and Mexican narcotics
traffickers. During his attendance at Garcia's inauguration
in Peru, Sarrukhan said, Peruvian leaders had also stressed
their concern that Mexican traffickers were playing a larger
role in the Andes generally. Calderon was extremely
concerned about the damage the cartels were doing to Mexico,
and wanted to take strong measures against them.
Comment
¶7. (C) Comment: Calderon was convinced he won legitimately
and resigned to waiting out the Electoral Tribunal's
ratification of his election -- an outcome he did not appear
to doubt. He appeared in a paid announcement on national
television the evening of August 2 to stress his conviction
that election institutions had acted appropriately and that
his victory should be recognized. Caldeorn let slip a
comment that it was hard for him to reach President Fox -- an
indication that the two are not working closely together
during this period of uncertainty.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-08-04 13:01
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 041338Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2510
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
73752
2006-08-04 13:38:00
06MEXICO4310
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
R 041338Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2510
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 004310
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESUMED PRESIDENT ELECT
CALDERON
Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza Jr for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Presumed President-elect Felipe Calderon
told the Ambassador 8/2 that he thought the Electoral
Tribunal could decide as early as this week to recount a
certain number of ballots, a gesture Calderon thought was
reasonable in light of the ongoing Democratic Revolution
Party (PRD) protests in Mexico City. A final certification
of the presidential election could take until late August, he
speculated. Calderon said his role was to be patient and
prepare himself for the presidency. He planned to attend
President Uribe's inauguration in Colombia, but also looked
forward to an early visit to the United States, perhaps
including some cities with large migrant populations.
Calderon is looking to engage on a broad agenda with the U.S.
and to avoid the trap of making migration the dominant
bilateral issue. Calderon's comments led us to believe his
transition planning is in the very early stages. He dropped
one comment that indicated he has not been in close contact
with President Fox since the election. End Summary.
The Waiting Game
¶2. (C) Presumed President-elect Felipe Calderon requested
the 8/2 meeting with the Ambassador, primarily to express
thanks for President Bush's early and friendly congratulatory
call. (Note: Calderon met 8/1 with the Spanish Ambassador,
and expected to meet with the ambassadors of other countries
offering congratulations in the course of the week).
Calderon expressed his regret about the ongoing PRD protests
(which have blocked key arteries leading to the Embassy's
neighborhood) and some frustration that PRD candidate Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) was refusing to acknowledge
defeat. While his situation was difficult, Calderon said,
every day he was more convinced a few weeks of patience was
better than just one day with AMLO in Los Pinos. Calderon's
tracking polls indicated that on a daily basis AMLO was
losing support and Calderon was gaining. The PRD's attacks
on election institutions had done some damage, but as AMLO
became increasingly inconsiderate and obstructive the
institutions regained credibility.
¶3. (C) Calderon reported there were some indications that
the Electoral Tribunal could make a preliminary ruling this
Friday that would allow for a recount of some ballot boxes in
areas where the results were extremely close, or where the
law permitted a recounting of the ballots. He estimated that
some 6,000-8,000 ballot boxes could be recounted under this
ruling (there are a maximum of 750 votes per ballot box).
The recount could begin immediately, with results available
within a matter of days. Calderon's expectation was that the
recount results would not vary dramatically from those
originally reported. This would be enough to satisfy some in
the PRD and broader public who were calling for a recount,
Calderon surmised, but probably not AMLO. The Tribunal could
make its final certification of the election results in late
August, but AMLO could continue protests (although not
necesarily his occupation of Paseo de la Reforma) through
President Fox's annual report to Congress (September 2) and
inauguration day (December 1) -- or beyond.
Transition
¶4. (C) Calderon stressed his willingness to work
collaboratively with the U.S. on a broad range of issues, and
did not want to get stuck in a single-issue debate on
migration. He expected to differentiate his Administration
from that of President Fox, but at this meeting didn't
provide many specifics. Calderon planned to attend Colombian
President Uribe's inauguration in Colombia next week, and was
considering a trip to U.S. cities with large migrant
populations, starting with Los Angeles. He acknowledged the
Ambassador's point that such travel should be scheduled with
careful attention to U.S. electoral calendar and the debate
on migration. Once Calderon's election was certified, he
hoped as well to meet President Bush and senior U.S.
officials. While the Ambassador pressed for details on
transition priorities and personalities, Calderon wasn't
particularly forthcoming, suggesting his transition planning
is still in its early stages. The Ambassador stressed that
we were looking forward to a close working relationship with
the Calderon team as soon as they were ready.
Region
¶5. (C) Calderon volunteered his concern over the role
Chavez was playing in the region, while noting that Castro's
sudden absence from the scene -- be it permanent or temporary
-- offered an opportunity to undermine Chavez' role.
Calderon said he understood Chavez was increasingly active in
Mexico. Calderon international affairs adviser Arturo
Sarrukhan stated that Castro had duodenal cancer and was
likely in the final stages. All agreed it was an
unprecedented situation leading to a probable transition.
The Ambassador pointed out that the region should not permit
a Castro-Castro succession scenario to be considered
legitimate.
¶6. (C) Sarrukhan separately stated that one reason Calderon
had agreed to go to Colombia was to consult with the GOC on
the increasing ties between Colombian and Mexican narcotics
traffickers. During his attendance at Garcia's inauguration
in Peru, Sarrukhan said, Peruvian leaders had also stressed
their concern that Mexican traffickers were playing a larger
role in the Andes generally. Calderon was extremely
concerned about the damage the cartels were doing to Mexico,
and wanted to take strong measures against them.
Comment
¶7. (C) Comment: Calderon was convinced he won legitimately
and resigned to waiting out the Electoral Tribunal's
ratification of his election -- an outcome he did not appear
to doubt. He appeared in a paid announcement on national
television the evening of August 2 to stress his conviction
that election institutions had acted appropriately and that
his victory should be recognized. Caldeorn let slip a
comment that it was hard for him to reach President Fox -- an
indication that the two are not working closely together
during this period of uncertainty.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
STRENGTHENING CALDERON'S WEAK HAND
Reference ID 06MEXICO4937
Created 2006-09-01 12:12
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 011201Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2974
NSC WASHDC
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
76950
2006-09-01 12:01:00
06MEXICO4937
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
R 011201Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2974
NSC WASHDC
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 004937
STATE - WHA A/S SHANNON AND NSC - FISK FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING CALDERON'S WEAK HAND
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA JR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: In the coming days the Electoral Tribunal
(TEPJF) is expected to confirm National Action Party (PAN)
candidate Felipe Calderon's presidential victory, but the
protests will continue. Thwarted Democratic Revolution (PRD)
candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) has already
promised to undermine Calderon at every turn, and will
determine his next steps during a September 16 "Democratic
Convention." Calderon has perforce been largely silent
throughout the TEPJF's deliberations, reflecting discipline
and patience, two qualities that will serve him well in the
difficult days ahead. Nevertheless, his razor-thin mandate
inevitably has been eroded by AMLO's harassment, by perceived
insults from his party's leadership, and by the cold shoulder
offered from President Fox. Calderon will have virtually no
"honeymoon," and will need strong support from the USG to
reinforce his agenda and leadership. I have already met with
him twice during the past several weeks to convey our
support, should his election be confirmed, as now appears
inevitable. I also have a private dinner scheduled with him
for September 19, at which time I will be able to reiterate
this support and address key transition issues. I recommend
that President Bush call Calderon with congratulations once
the election results are ratified, and that he invite
Calderon to visit with him at the earliest opportunity. I
will separately take Commerce Secretary Gutierrez up on his
offer to visit in late September/early October to offer a
hand of friendship to both departing President Fox and
President-elect Calderon. From the Embassy we will begin
vigorous transition planning across the board with the
Calderon team, starting with an early meeting with team
leaders Juan Camillo Mourino and Josefina Vasquez Mota. I
would like to strongly recommend that First Lady Laura Bush
lead a broad and representative U.S. delegation to Calderon's
inauguration as a key signal of the friendship and esteem we
hold for Mexico and President-elect Calderon. End Summary.
Bittersweet Victory
¶2. (C) The TEPJF is days away from an expected
ratification of Felipe Calderon as the President-elect of
Mexico -- but Calderon's victory is tarnished by the long --
and continuing -- electoral protests led by AMLO. The PRD
has already signaled it will make Fox's last "state of the
union" (informe) address a three-ring-circus of antagonism
September 1. AMLO will decide September 16 what his next
steps will be, but we can anticipate that from now through at
least inauguration day AMLO will spare no effort to embarrass
and insult Calderon. While AMLO's popular support may reduce
to a hard core of true believers, his constant barrage of
attacks against the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the
TEPJF, and against Calderon have taken their toll in the
public mindset. On July 2 Mexicans were sure of their
institutions, the credibility of the results, and the outcome
of 41 million ballots cast. Today the institutions and their
determinations are shadowed by doubt. Calderon has had to be
largely silent during the TEPJF's deliberations, leaving the
stage to AMLO's dramatic gesticulations.
¶3. (C) While Calderon's spokesmen have spoken out in his
favor, the PAN structure has done little to support the
putative President-elect. During the initial AMLO attacks
against Calderon, the PAN leadership literally went on
vacation. Most recently, party leaders handed Calderon a
very public series of defeats by putting his political
competitors in charge of the PAN factions in the Senate
(Santiago Creel) and the Chamber of Deputies (Hector Larios).
This means that Calderon will have to negotiate with his own
faction, in addition to the PRI's, to get reform initiatives
through the newly-constituted 60th legislature. President
Fox has made no secret of the fact that, while relieved AMLO
apparently didn't win, he has no love lost for Calderon.
Calderon, for his part, has reason to be irritated that Fox's
repeated failures to maintain what Mexicans consider an
appropriate distance from the election further clouded
Calderon's narrow victory.
Lost Honeymoon
¶4. (C) Given the turmoil surrounding the confirmation of
his election, the divisions within his party, and the legacy
Fox will leave, Calderon will come into office December 1 in
the weakest possible situation politically. We risk
stagnation on our highest-profile issues unless we can send a
strong signal of support, prompt the Calderon team into a
vigorous transition, and reinforce Calderon's agenda and
leadership. President Bush started us off well by
congratulating Calderon after the July 6 IFE declaration that
the PAN candidate had received the most votes. I recommend
that President Bush make a second call to Calderon once the
TEPJF results are released, offering formal congratulations
on his victory. At that point my mission team will engage
energetically with Calderon's transition team to invigorate
progress on our priority areas. I understand Commerce
Secretary Gutierrez is willing to make an early visit to
Mexico, and I will encourage him to do so in late September
or early October, as a first opportunity to signal our
respect for both outgoing President Fox and President-elect
Calderon. Finally, the December 1 inauguration will be the
moment Calderon supersedes the irritations AMLO has posed
these many months, and finally becomes President. I deeply
hope that First Lady Laura Bush will be able to lead a broad
and representative delegation of USG officials as a symbol of
our commitment to working closely with the Calderon team.
Her presence would unmistakably signal the President's
strong, personal support as the incipient Calderon
administration confronts an unusually challenging political
climate.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-09-01 12:12
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 011201Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2974
NSC WASHDC
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
76950
2006-09-01 12:01:00
06MEXICO4937
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
R 011201Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2974
NSC WASHDC
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 004937
STATE - WHA A/S SHANNON AND NSC - FISK FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING CALDERON'S WEAK HAND
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA JR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: In the coming days the Electoral Tribunal
(TEPJF) is expected to confirm National Action Party (PAN)
candidate Felipe Calderon's presidential victory, but the
protests will continue. Thwarted Democratic Revolution (PRD)
candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) has already
promised to undermine Calderon at every turn, and will
determine his next steps during a September 16 "Democratic
Convention." Calderon has perforce been largely silent
throughout the TEPJF's deliberations, reflecting discipline
and patience, two qualities that will serve him well in the
difficult days ahead. Nevertheless, his razor-thin mandate
inevitably has been eroded by AMLO's harassment, by perceived
insults from his party's leadership, and by the cold shoulder
offered from President Fox. Calderon will have virtually no
"honeymoon," and will need strong support from the USG to
reinforce his agenda and leadership. I have already met with
him twice during the past several weeks to convey our
support, should his election be confirmed, as now appears
inevitable. I also have a private dinner scheduled with him
for September 19, at which time I will be able to reiterate
this support and address key transition issues. I recommend
that President Bush call Calderon with congratulations once
the election results are ratified, and that he invite
Calderon to visit with him at the earliest opportunity. I
will separately take Commerce Secretary Gutierrez up on his
offer to visit in late September/early October to offer a
hand of friendship to both departing President Fox and
President-elect Calderon. From the Embassy we will begin
vigorous transition planning across the board with the
Calderon team, starting with an early meeting with team
leaders Juan Camillo Mourino and Josefina Vasquez Mota. I
would like to strongly recommend that First Lady Laura Bush
lead a broad and representative U.S. delegation to Calderon's
inauguration as a key signal of the friendship and esteem we
hold for Mexico and President-elect Calderon. End Summary.
Bittersweet Victory
¶2. (C) The TEPJF is days away from an expected
ratification of Felipe Calderon as the President-elect of
Mexico -- but Calderon's victory is tarnished by the long --
and continuing -- electoral protests led by AMLO. The PRD
has already signaled it will make Fox's last "state of the
union" (informe) address a three-ring-circus of antagonism
September 1. AMLO will decide September 16 what his next
steps will be, but we can anticipate that from now through at
least inauguration day AMLO will spare no effort to embarrass
and insult Calderon. While AMLO's popular support may reduce
to a hard core of true believers, his constant barrage of
attacks against the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the
TEPJF, and against Calderon have taken their toll in the
public mindset. On July 2 Mexicans were sure of their
institutions, the credibility of the results, and the outcome
of 41 million ballots cast. Today the institutions and their
determinations are shadowed by doubt. Calderon has had to be
largely silent during the TEPJF's deliberations, leaving the
stage to AMLO's dramatic gesticulations.
¶3. (C) While Calderon's spokesmen have spoken out in his
favor, the PAN structure has done little to support the
putative President-elect. During the initial AMLO attacks
against Calderon, the PAN leadership literally went on
vacation. Most recently, party leaders handed Calderon a
very public series of defeats by putting his political
competitors in charge of the PAN factions in the Senate
(Santiago Creel) and the Chamber of Deputies (Hector Larios).
This means that Calderon will have to negotiate with his own
faction, in addition to the PRI's, to get reform initiatives
through the newly-constituted 60th legislature. President
Fox has made no secret of the fact that, while relieved AMLO
apparently didn't win, he has no love lost for Calderon.
Calderon, for his part, has reason to be irritated that Fox's
repeated failures to maintain what Mexicans consider an
appropriate distance from the election further clouded
Calderon's narrow victory.
Lost Honeymoon
¶4. (C) Given the turmoil surrounding the confirmation of
his election, the divisions within his party, and the legacy
Fox will leave, Calderon will come into office December 1 in
the weakest possible situation politically. We risk
stagnation on our highest-profile issues unless we can send a
strong signal of support, prompt the Calderon team into a
vigorous transition, and reinforce Calderon's agenda and
leadership. President Bush started us off well by
congratulating Calderon after the July 6 IFE declaration that
the PAN candidate had received the most votes. I recommend
that President Bush make a second call to Calderon once the
TEPJF results are released, offering formal congratulations
on his victory. At that point my mission team will engage
energetically with Calderon's transition team to invigorate
progress on our priority areas. I understand Commerce
Secretary Gutierrez is willing to make an early visit to
Mexico, and I will encourage him to do so in late September
or early October, as a first opportunity to signal our
respect for both outgoing President Fox and President-elect
Calderon. Finally, the December 1 inauguration will be the
moment Calderon supersedes the irritations AMLO has posed
these many months, and finally becomes President. I deeply
hope that First Lady Laura Bush will be able to lead a broad
and representative delegation of USG officials as a symbol of
our commitment to working closely with the Calderon team.
Her presence would unmistakably signal the President's
strong, personal support as the incipient Calderon
administration confronts an unusually challenging political
climate.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT CALDERON
Reference ID 06MEXICO5607
Created 2006-09-29 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 292203Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3489
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
NSC WASHDC
80245
2006-09-29 22:03:00
06MEXICO5607
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
R 292203Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3489
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 005607
STATE FOR A/S SHANNON; NSC FOR FISK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT
CALDERON
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA JR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) During a private dinner with Ambassador and Mrs.
Garza, President-elect Felipe Calderon expressed his grave
concern over the security situation in Mexico. It was
heartrending to see Mexico living through such times, he told
the Ambassador, and improving security would be a key pillar
of his administration. The Ambassador agreed, noting that
Calderon did not want his to be the "narco-sexenio." Gains
on competitiveness, education and employment could be quickly
overshadowed by narcotics-related organized crime. To draw
the investment and energy needed to jump-start Mexico's
economy, foreigners and Mexicans alike had to be reassured
that the rule of law would prevail. The Ambassador impressed
upon the President-elect the need to have a strong security
team in place early. Calderon agreed completely and stressed
his strong desire to continue and improve cooperation with
the U.S. on security matters.
¶2. (C) Calderon confided that he was disappointed with U.S.
border security measures but would adhere to his commitment
not to make these the central issues of the bilateral
relationship. His administration would continue to offer
support to migrants in the U.S., but would not make U.S.
migration reform its defining element. Calderon reiterated
his strong desire to work with the U.S., but also signaled a
desire to re-establish better relations with Latin America.
To that end, he would travel the first week of October to
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile and Brazil. He
pressed again for a meeting with President Bush prior to his
December 1 inauguration, and after U.S. elections.
¶3. (C) Calderon volunteered his grave concern over
Venezuela President Chavez' antics and activities generally.
He segued into worrying about the growing Iran-Venezuela
nexus, offering that these ties could reverberate negatively
throughout the region and beyond. Neither leader could be
trusted, and their capacity for trouble was almost limitless.
¶4. (C) Comment: Calderon hosted the Ambassador in his
private residence, a fairly modest household in a compound of
other privately-owned homes that did not seem to offer
presidential-level security or privacy. Neither was it
staked out by the media, which covers his transition offices
fairly aggressively. His wife, Margarita Zavala, was also
present during the dinner and discussed her role, looking to
distance herself from the model set by Marta Sahagun. The
Ambassador was struck by Calderon's confidence, willingness
to dig right into substance, and readiness to speak frankly
about a range of challenges. Calderon confessed he was
unfamiliar with some key power centers, including business
leaders, something he will work to remedy. But he clearly
has a strategy in this transition period of airing issues,
defining near-term legislative and executive objectives, and
reaching out beyond his core support group to bring others on
board.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-09-29 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico
R 292203Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3489
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
NSC WASHDC
80245
2006-09-29 22:03:00
06MEXICO5607
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
R 292203Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3489
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 005607
STATE FOR A/S SHANNON; NSC FOR FISK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT
CALDERON
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA JR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) During a private dinner with Ambassador and Mrs.
Garza, President-elect Felipe Calderon expressed his grave
concern over the security situation in Mexico. It was
heartrending to see Mexico living through such times, he told
the Ambassador, and improving security would be a key pillar
of his administration. The Ambassador agreed, noting that
Calderon did not want his to be the "narco-sexenio." Gains
on competitiveness, education and employment could be quickly
overshadowed by narcotics-related organized crime. To draw
the investment and energy needed to jump-start Mexico's
economy, foreigners and Mexicans alike had to be reassured
that the rule of law would prevail. The Ambassador impressed
upon the President-elect the need to have a strong security
team in place early. Calderon agreed completely and stressed
his strong desire to continue and improve cooperation with
the U.S. on security matters.
¶2. (C) Calderon confided that he was disappointed with U.S.
border security measures but would adhere to his commitment
not to make these the central issues of the bilateral
relationship. His administration would continue to offer
support to migrants in the U.S., but would not make U.S.
migration reform its defining element. Calderon reiterated
his strong desire to work with the U.S., but also signaled a
desire to re-establish better relations with Latin America.
To that end, he would travel the first week of October to
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile and Brazil. He
pressed again for a meeting with President Bush prior to his
December 1 inauguration, and after U.S. elections.
¶3. (C) Calderon volunteered his grave concern over
Venezuela President Chavez' antics and activities generally.
He segued into worrying about the growing Iran-Venezuela
nexus, offering that these ties could reverberate negatively
throughout the region and beyond. Neither leader could be
trusted, and their capacity for trouble was almost limitless.
¶4. (C) Comment: Calderon hosted the Ambassador in his
private residence, a fairly modest household in a compound of
other privately-owned homes that did not seem to offer
presidential-level security or privacy. Neither was it
staked out by the media, which covers his transition offices
fairly aggressively. His wife, Margarita Zavala, was also
present during the dinner and discussed her role, looking to
distance herself from the model set by Marta Sahagun. The
Ambassador was struck by Calderon's confidence, willingness
to dig right into substance, and readiness to speak frankly
about a range of challenges. Calderon confessed he was
unfamiliar with some key power centers, including business
leaders, something he will work to remedy. But he clearly
has a strategy in this transition period of airing issues,
defining near-term legislative and executive objectives, and
reaching out beyond his core support group to bring others on
board.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
SRE'S GUTIERREZ TELLS SHANNON BORDER FENCE A BITTER PILL
Reference ID 06MEXICO5698
Created 2006-10-06 17:05
Released 2011-02-21
Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Origin Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO2723
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #5698/01 2791737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061737Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3557
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0926
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0106
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
81011
2006-10-06 17:37:00
06MEXICO5698
Embassy Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
VZCZCXRO2723
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #5698/01 2791737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061737Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3557
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0926
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0106
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 005698
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KSEP MX PGOV PHUM PREL UNGA WHO
SUBJECT: SRE'S GUTIERREZ TELLS SHANNON BORDER FENCE A
BITTER PILL
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A subdued Geronimo Gutierrez used his
October 2 meeting with A/S Shannon to voice Mexico's deep
frustration with last week's Senate vote to fund a border
fence, saying it was a "bitter pill" at a bad time that would
complicate bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Gutierrez was
hopeful that senior level contacts would continue and help
move the relationship forward. SRE's Undersecretary for
North America took the opportunity to thank A/S Shannon for
the scheduled November 9 meeting between president-elect
Calderon and President Bush, and briefly touched on pending
IO issues, such as the upcoming vote for the GRULAC UNSC
seat. End Summary
¶2. (SBU) Gutierrez began by thanking A/S Shannon for his
early a.m. Televisa interview, which was focused in part on
the Senate vote and Mexican reaction. He said that Shannon's
comments, which placed the vote in the context of a national
debate on immigration and emphasized president Bush's ongoing
commitment to a broader immigration reform, might help defuse
some of the anger felt in Mexico at the congressional
decision to go forward with construction. Nevertheless, he
said, last week's vote was a bitter pill for Mexican's to
swallow that complicated the relationship. His biggest
worry, he stated, was that during a critical period, the
fence would box in transition leaders and make it more
difficult for them to take decisions that would move Mexico
closer to the United States on a range of issues. Foreign
affairs decisions, he noted, always involved heavy
expenditures of political capital in Mexico. Calderon would
now be paying double. He hoped that A/S Shannon was correct
in that the fence was not the last chapter in the immigration
story.
¶3. (SBU) A/S Shannon assured Gutierrez that the
administration remained committed to broader immigration
reform. Given the debate in the U.S. about border security,
many in Congress felt the need to act on getting a fence in
place in the short-term. The president maintains a more
far-sighted regard for the need for broader reform, however.
¶4. (SBU) By way of offering local context in which the
Senate vote was taken, Gutierrez outlined the domestic
challenges both the current administration and
president-elect Calderon face. (Embassy comment: Gutierrez
painted a far more pessimistic picture than Calderon's own
advisors provided Shannon in a meeting just prior to his
visit to SRE, noted in SEPTEL End comment) He provide a
brief, and by-now familiar sketch of Mexico's post-electoral
scene and underscored the particular difficulties the current
Oaxaca-related unrest present the Fox administration. He
noted also that Calderon's transition team was taking great
pains to avoid moves that might radicalize government
opponents, but that the president-elect will face difficult
challenges early on in his administration.
¶5. (SBU) Elevating his gaze beyond the fence and the
difficulties it poses for Mexico, Gutierrez looked toward the
schedule of high-level meetings slated for this fall. He
thanked A/S Shannon in particular for the November 9 meeting
offered by the White House to president-elect Calderon.
This was an important opportunity that both sides needed to
take maximum advantage of; SRE will be coordinating closely
with Calderon's transition team and the USG in order to shape
it. Both sides agreed that such high-level encounters remain
key to the relationship. Shannon noted the recent North
American Forum in this regard and that said such encounters
should be backed up by good public diplomacy. Gutierrez said
they help educate elites and public about what closer
bilateral engagement can offer -- and that it does not
represent an erosion of Mexican sovereignty. Mexican elites
are broadening their vision of foreign policy and national
security engagement, but there needs to be more work done to
shore up public support.
¶6. (SBU) A/S Shannon raised the upcoming UNSC vote with
Gutierrez, noting that he had had a good meeting in New York
with SRE's Undersecretary for Latin American, Jorge Chen.
While Chen remains worried about Venezuela's prospects for
gaining a seat on the security council, Shannon noted that
the U.S. believed Chavez has not marshaled sufficient votes
for a first round win, and that his inflammatory UN speech
had probably cost him support. He urged Mexico to continue to
work hard on Guatemala's behalf. Gutierrez reaffirmed
Mexico's support for Guatemala's candidacy. Venezuela's
presence on the Security Council, he said, would undermine
MEXICO 00005698 002 OF 002
both the U.N. and the GRULAC.
¶7. (SBU) At the meeting's close, SRE officials reminded A/S
Shannon of the November election for the World Health
Organization's Director Generalship and repeated Mexico's
request for USG support for the candidacy of Public Health
Secretary Julio Frenk.
SIPDIS
¶8. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Shannon has cleared this
message.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-10-06 17:05
Released 2011-02-21
Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Origin Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO2723
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #5698/01 2791737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061737Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3557
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0926
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0106
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
81011
2006-10-06 17:37:00
06MEXICO5698
Embassy Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
VZCZCXRO2723
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #5698/01 2791737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061737Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3557
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0926
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0106
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 005698
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KSEP MX PGOV PHUM PREL UNGA WHO
SUBJECT: SRE'S GUTIERREZ TELLS SHANNON BORDER FENCE A
BITTER PILL
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A subdued Geronimo Gutierrez used his
October 2 meeting with A/S Shannon to voice Mexico's deep
frustration with last week's Senate vote to fund a border
fence, saying it was a "bitter pill" at a bad time that would
complicate bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Gutierrez was
hopeful that senior level contacts would continue and help
move the relationship forward. SRE's Undersecretary for
North America took the opportunity to thank A/S Shannon for
the scheduled November 9 meeting between president-elect
Calderon and President Bush, and briefly touched on pending
IO issues, such as the upcoming vote for the GRULAC UNSC
seat. End Summary
¶2. (SBU) Gutierrez began by thanking A/S Shannon for his
early a.m. Televisa interview, which was focused in part on
the Senate vote and Mexican reaction. He said that Shannon's
comments, which placed the vote in the context of a national
debate on immigration and emphasized president Bush's ongoing
commitment to a broader immigration reform, might help defuse
some of the anger felt in Mexico at the congressional
decision to go forward with construction. Nevertheless, he
said, last week's vote was a bitter pill for Mexican's to
swallow that complicated the relationship. His biggest
worry, he stated, was that during a critical period, the
fence would box in transition leaders and make it more
difficult for them to take decisions that would move Mexico
closer to the United States on a range of issues. Foreign
affairs decisions, he noted, always involved heavy
expenditures of political capital in Mexico. Calderon would
now be paying double. He hoped that A/S Shannon was correct
in that the fence was not the last chapter in the immigration
story.
¶3. (SBU) A/S Shannon assured Gutierrez that the
administration remained committed to broader immigration
reform. Given the debate in the U.S. about border security,
many in Congress felt the need to act on getting a fence in
place in the short-term. The president maintains a more
far-sighted regard for the need for broader reform, however.
¶4. (SBU) By way of offering local context in which the
Senate vote was taken, Gutierrez outlined the domestic
challenges both the current administration and
president-elect Calderon face. (Embassy comment: Gutierrez
painted a far more pessimistic picture than Calderon's own
advisors provided Shannon in a meeting just prior to his
visit to SRE, noted in SEPTEL End comment) He provide a
brief, and by-now familiar sketch of Mexico's post-electoral
scene and underscored the particular difficulties the current
Oaxaca-related unrest present the Fox administration. He
noted also that Calderon's transition team was taking great
pains to avoid moves that might radicalize government
opponents, but that the president-elect will face difficult
challenges early on in his administration.
¶5. (SBU) Elevating his gaze beyond the fence and the
difficulties it poses for Mexico, Gutierrez looked toward the
schedule of high-level meetings slated for this fall. He
thanked A/S Shannon in particular for the November 9 meeting
offered by the White House to president-elect Calderon.
This was an important opportunity that both sides needed to
take maximum advantage of; SRE will be coordinating closely
with Calderon's transition team and the USG in order to shape
it. Both sides agreed that such high-level encounters remain
key to the relationship. Shannon noted the recent North
American Forum in this regard and that said such encounters
should be backed up by good public diplomacy. Gutierrez said
they help educate elites and public about what closer
bilateral engagement can offer -- and that it does not
represent an erosion of Mexican sovereignty. Mexican elites
are broadening their vision of foreign policy and national
security engagement, but there needs to be more work done to
shore up public support.
¶6. (SBU) A/S Shannon raised the upcoming UNSC vote with
Gutierrez, noting that he had had a good meeting in New York
with SRE's Undersecretary for Latin American, Jorge Chen.
While Chen remains worried about Venezuela's prospects for
gaining a seat on the security council, Shannon noted that
the U.S. believed Chavez has not marshaled sufficient votes
for a first round win, and that his inflammatory UN speech
had probably cost him support. He urged Mexico to continue to
work hard on Guatemala's behalf. Gutierrez reaffirmed
Mexico's support for Guatemala's candidacy. Venezuela's
presence on the Security Council, he said, would undermine
MEXICO 00005698 002 OF 002
both the U.N. and the GRULAC.
¶7. (SBU) At the meeting's close, SRE officials reminded A/S
Shannon of the November election for the World Health
Organization's Director Generalship and repeated Mexico's
request for USG support for the candidacy of Public Health
Secretary Julio Frenk.
SIPDIS
¶8. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Shannon has cleared this
message.
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
MEXICAN ARMY MAJOR ARRESTED FOR ASSISTING DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS
Reference ID 09MEXICO133
Created 2009-01-20 15:03
Released 2011-02-21
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO0793
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0133/01 0201543
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201543Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
187945
2009-01-20 15:43:00
09MEXICO133
Embassy Mexico
SECRET
VZCZCXRO0793
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0133/01 0201543
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201543Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000133
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SNAR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN ARMY MAJOR ARRESTED FOR ASSISTING DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS
Classified By: Polcouns Charles Barclay. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A mid-level Mexican army major was arrested
in late December 2008 for assisting drug traffickers and
providing them with limited information about the activities
and travel plans of Mexican President Felipe Calderon.
According to an informant, the cartels were using the
information to avoid heightened security around the
president, not to target him personally. The arrest
represents the most serious security breach to date but is
not surprising given high-level civilian Government of Mexico
(GOM) corruption charges over the past six months. While the
case demonstrates that the Mexican Secretariat of Defense
(SEDENA) failed to properly investigate and oversee an
officer who was involved in providing security for the
president, it nevertheless indicates that the military is
serious about combating corruption. Although the major was
not part of the president's inner circle, it also shows that
the cartels succeeded in infiltrating a significant area of
the GOM's security apparatus. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) Mid-level Mexican Army Major Arturo Gonzalez
Rodriguez was arrested the week of December 21, 2008, for
allegedly assisting Mexican drug trafficking organizations
(DTO) for USD 100K a month. Gonzalez had been assigned to
the Estado Mayor (Presidential Protective Division), the unit
responsible for protecting Mexico's president, to secure the
periphery around the president's location. Based on
statements from a former cartel member turned witness
code-named "Jennifer," PGR has accused Gonzalez of passing
information related to the activities and travel plans of
Mexican President Felipe Calderon to the Arturo Beltran Leyva
organization (ABLO). Gonzalez also stands accused of leaking
military intelligence, training ABLO hit men through a
private security company and supplying military weapons to
various DTOs, including los Zetas.
¶3. (C) In light of high-level civilian Government of Mexico
(GOM) corruption charges over the past months, this case is
disturbing but certainly not shocking. GOM sources sought to
downplay the seriousness of the breach, but the revelation
that Gonzalez was providing intelligence and materials to
ABLO represented a double blow to the GOM. First, the fact
that a member of an army unit responsible for protecting the
president was passing information about presidential
movements to the cartels exposes a gap in Calderon's security
detail. While it is not known what specific information
Gonzalez had access to, or what exact details he was passing
to the cartels, this is a significant security breach. PGR
Senior Advisor Oscar Rocha told Poloff that, even though
Gonzalez was not/not one of the president's personal guards,
he had access to the president's movements to facilitate his
unit's forward deployments. However, given that not all
batallions are deployed at any given event, the major likely
only had partial information for a relatively short period of
time about the president's movements. According to PGR, the
informant Jennifer has said the cartels were tracking the
president's movements with the intent of avoiding the high
level of government security that surrounds the president,
but had no specific plan to target Calderon.
¶4. (SBU) The second unsettling aspect of the case is that
Gonzalez apparently had been on the cartel payroll since
2005, during which time he held different positions in the
government. As he changed assignments, he was kept on as a
cartel asset, and the nature of his involvement with the
cartels changed. It is entirely feasible that he fed
information on other departments of the army (not just the
Presidential Protective Division) over the course of his
three-year relationship with the cartels.
¶5. (S/NF) RSO shared threat information with the Presidential
Protective Division regarding threats against the life of
President Calderon from DTOs. One source advised that
Calderon's medical file was passed to a DTO by a corrupt
member of Calderon's inner circle. Regarding the arrest of
Major Gonzalez, General Cuevas, the second in command of the
Presidential Protective Division, was not overly concerned as
he stated that the major did not have close access to the
president. .
¶6. (C) COMMENT: One of the primary reasons the GOM relies on
the military to fight the cartels is the perception that the
military is considerably less corrupt than the state and
MEXICO 00000133 002 OF 002
local police forces. But this case -- along with other
military corruption arrests in 2008 -- reaffirms that members
of the Mexican military also are prone to corruption.
Security expert Raul Benitez told Poloff that this case
represents an intelligence failure on the part of the
Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA) as it had cleared this
individual for the assignment. On the upside, SEDENA
ultimately uncovered the criminal behavior and took action.
According to the Embassy's Defense Attache Office (DAO),
SEDENA recognizes the danger of corruption in the military in
its fight against narcotrafficking, particularly in the
garrisons out in the countryside. To counter that threat,
SEDENA administers a program of counter-intelligence
(excluding the Presidential Protective Division) and has
begun, under the Calderon administration, rotating units in
from the outside in joint operations with local units. Just
as with other institutions engaged in the drug war, DAO
believes that the cartels are reaching out to the military
with offers some cannot refuse. Although the army major was
not part of the president's inner circle, this case
demonstrates that the cartels were able to extend their
intelligence network to those charged with protecting his
personal security. END COMMENT.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-01-20 15:03
Released 2011-02-21
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO0793
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0133/01 0201543
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201543Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
187945
2009-01-20 15:43:00
09MEXICO133
Embassy Mexico
SECRET
VZCZCXRO0793
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0133/01 0201543
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201543Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000133
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SNAR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN ARMY MAJOR ARRESTED FOR ASSISTING DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS
Classified By: Polcouns Charles Barclay. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A mid-level Mexican army major was arrested
in late December 2008 for assisting drug traffickers and
providing them with limited information about the activities
and travel plans of Mexican President Felipe Calderon.
According to an informant, the cartels were using the
information to avoid heightened security around the
president, not to target him personally. The arrest
represents the most serious security breach to date but is
not surprising given high-level civilian Government of Mexico
(GOM) corruption charges over the past six months. While the
case demonstrates that the Mexican Secretariat of Defense
(SEDENA) failed to properly investigate and oversee an
officer who was involved in providing security for the
president, it nevertheless indicates that the military is
serious about combating corruption. Although the major was
not part of the president's inner circle, it also shows that
the cartels succeeded in infiltrating a significant area of
the GOM's security apparatus. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) Mid-level Mexican Army Major Arturo Gonzalez
Rodriguez was arrested the week of December 21, 2008, for
allegedly assisting Mexican drug trafficking organizations
(DTO) for USD 100K a month. Gonzalez had been assigned to
the Estado Mayor (Presidential Protective Division), the unit
responsible for protecting Mexico's president, to secure the
periphery around the president's location. Based on
statements from a former cartel member turned witness
code-named "Jennifer," PGR has accused Gonzalez of passing
information related to the activities and travel plans of
Mexican President Felipe Calderon to the Arturo Beltran Leyva
organization (ABLO). Gonzalez also stands accused of leaking
military intelligence, training ABLO hit men through a
private security company and supplying military weapons to
various DTOs, including los Zetas.
¶3. (C) In light of high-level civilian Government of Mexico
(GOM) corruption charges over the past months, this case is
disturbing but certainly not shocking. GOM sources sought to
downplay the seriousness of the breach, but the revelation
that Gonzalez was providing intelligence and materials to
ABLO represented a double blow to the GOM. First, the fact
that a member of an army unit responsible for protecting the
president was passing information about presidential
movements to the cartels exposes a gap in Calderon's security
detail. While it is not known what specific information
Gonzalez had access to, or what exact details he was passing
to the cartels, this is a significant security breach. PGR
Senior Advisor Oscar Rocha told Poloff that, even though
Gonzalez was not/not one of the president's personal guards,
he had access to the president's movements to facilitate his
unit's forward deployments. However, given that not all
batallions are deployed at any given event, the major likely
only had partial information for a relatively short period of
time about the president's movements. According to PGR, the
informant Jennifer has said the cartels were tracking the
president's movements with the intent of avoiding the high
level of government security that surrounds the president,
but had no specific plan to target Calderon.
¶4. (SBU) The second unsettling aspect of the case is that
Gonzalez apparently had been on the cartel payroll since
2005, during which time he held different positions in the
government. As he changed assignments, he was kept on as a
cartel asset, and the nature of his involvement with the
cartels changed. It is entirely feasible that he fed
information on other departments of the army (not just the
Presidential Protective Division) over the course of his
three-year relationship with the cartels.
¶5. (S/NF) RSO shared threat information with the Presidential
Protective Division regarding threats against the life of
President Calderon from DTOs. One source advised that
Calderon's medical file was passed to a DTO by a corrupt
member of Calderon's inner circle. Regarding the arrest of
Major Gonzalez, General Cuevas, the second in command of the
Presidential Protective Division, was not overly concerned as
he stated that the major did not have close access to the
president. .
¶6. (C) COMMENT: One of the primary reasons the GOM relies on
the military to fight the cartels is the perception that the
military is considerably less corrupt than the state and
MEXICO 00000133 002 OF 002
local police forces. But this case -- along with other
military corruption arrests in 2008 -- reaffirms that members
of the Mexican military also are prone to corruption.
Security expert Raul Benitez told Poloff that this case
represents an intelligence failure on the part of the
Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA) as it had cleared this
individual for the assignment. On the upside, SEDENA
ultimately uncovered the criminal behavior and took action.
According to the Embassy's Defense Attache Office (DAO),
SEDENA recognizes the danger of corruption in the military in
its fight against narcotrafficking, particularly in the
garrisons out in the countryside. To counter that threat,
SEDENA administers a program of counter-intelligence
(excluding the Presidential Protective Division) and has
begun, under the Calderon administration, rotating units in
from the outside in joint operations with local units. Just
as with other institutions engaged in the drug war, DAO
believes that the cartels are reaching out to the military
with offers some cannot refuse. Although the army major was
not part of the president's inner circle, this case
demonstrates that the cartels were able to extend their
intelligence network to those charged with protecting his
personal security. END COMMENT.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA
Source: Wikileaks
(U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation with Mexican President Felipe Calderon
Reference ID 09PARTO40301
Created 2009-04-03 17:05
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin US Delegation, Secretary
VZCZCXRO9333
OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031728Z APR 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
200714
2009-04-03 17:28:00
09PARTO40301
US Delegation, Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO9333
OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031728Z APR 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARTO 040301
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL SNAR MX
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation
with Mexican President Felipe Calderon
Ref: White House 0813 dated 03/21/09
¶1. (U) Classified by Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (d).
¶2. (U) 03/25/09, 1 p.m., Mexico City, Mexico
¶3. (U) Participants
U.S.
The Secretary
Charge Bassett
A/S Shannon
Laura Pena, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, National Security Council
Mexico
President Calderon
Foreign Secretary Espinosa
Amb. Sarukhan
U/S Rico
Presidential Advisor Fernandez de Castro
¶4. (C) Summary: During an extremely cordial
conversation with Secretary Clinton, President Calderon
emphasized his personal commitment to providing security
for Mexican citizens, pressed for greater U.S. actions
against arms trafficking, conveyed concerns about how the
issue of Cuba will be treated at the upcoming Summit of
the Americas, and discussed his ideas for global action
on environmental issues. Secretary Clinton praised
Calderon's commitment and leadership, acknowledged U.S.
co-responsibility for the drug war, and pledged U.S.
partnership against organized crime. President Calderon
encouraged the United States to re-assume its key role in
the region and expressed his personal admiration for
Secretary Clinton's leadership. He closed by expressing
appreciation for President Obama's decision to visit
Mexico. End Summary.
¶5. (C) President Calderon's aides tried several times
to interrupt his animated conversation with Secretary
Clinton, which lasted 1 hour 45 minutes and included a
15-minute one-on-one session, but he waved them off time
after time. He opened by expressing his admiration for
Secretary Clinton, confessing that he attended her 1998
appearance at Davos and submitted the written query,
"Would you consider running for President?" Secretary
Clinton said she was delighted to see him again, and
conveyed her appreciation for his commitment and courage.
The United States, she continued, recognized its co-
responsibility for the current situation, and would stand
shoulder to shoulder with Mexico until the battle was
won. Secretary Clinton added that it was a personal
priority for her to work on the broad relationship and
have positive outcomes.
--------
SECURITY
--------
¶6. (C) President Calderon acknowledged that our agenda
is broader than security, but turned to that topic as the
most urgent. His personal commitment was to leave his
successor a secure Mexico with credible institutions free
of the taint of corruption. To succeed he needed U.S.
support, and suggested renewing the assault weapons ban.
He said that there was a clear correlation between the
lifting of the ban in 2004 and Mexico's current
situation. During the six years of the Fox
administration, Mexican forces captured 3,000 assault
weapons. In the last two years, they confiscated 16,000,
with no end in sight. The availability of assault
weaponry had contributed to the cartels' new aggression
against government forces. A second factor was cartels'
expanding interests. While they still fought for access
to the U.S. market, they were increasingly seeking to
control the growing Mexican drug market, as well. The
combination of assault weapons and an increased
imperative for geographic control prompted the dramatic
increases in violence Mexico had recently witnessed. The
third factor was the Mexican government's increased
pressure on the cartels.
¶7. (C) Calderon cited the situation in Ciudad Juarez as
a case in point. Ciudad Juarez was important to the
cartels as a launching point into the United States, he
said, but it was also a growing metropolis with a
potentially lucrative drug market. The cartels' battle
for this territory had driven homicide rates up to record
levels. President Calderon said he had made the decision
to flood the city with federal forces and take over
security while pressing the city and state governments to
convert their local police into effective patrolling
units and to do more against common crime. In just a
month, violence in Ciudad Juarez had fallen by 73
percent, but this progress had to be sustained.
¶8. (C) Calderon said that a second priority should be
to cut U.S. drug consumption. Mexico was working to halt
the supply -- the United States needed to cut demand.
This led to the third priority -- cutting money flows to
the cartels. Calderon assessed that direct action to
interdict bulk cash coming from the United States to
Mexico would also strangle the cartels and their
operations. Mapping money flows and sharing that
information would help both countries interdict cash more
effectively and shut down the institutions facilitating
cash transactions. Mexico, he conceded, would have to do
more to check inbound travelers and vehicles, ideally
reaching a near 100 percent inspection rate through non-
invasive (NIIE) means. That might not be possible with
existing technology, he admitted, but deploying more NIIE
machines along more points of the border would be very
helpful.
¶9. (C) Calderon said he appreciated the change in the
tenor of USG officials' remarks in recent weeks, and
hoped that trend would continue. Suggestions by eminent
U.S. government officials that Mexico was unable to
govern its territory or risked becoming a failed state
did incalculable damage, not just to Mexico's image, but
to its efforts to confront organized crime. These
statements caused law enforcement officials to lose hope,
helped motivate local officials to surrender to
intimidation, and discouraged citizens from supporting
the government's efforts. On the other hand, he opined,
such statements led criminals to believe the government
would fail, and gave them renewed confidence to continue
to confront the forces of order. Calderon said he needed
the support of the Mexican people, and he needed them to
believe the rule of law would triumph.
¶10. (C) Secretary Clinton responded that her message
was one of co-responsibility and cooperation. She was
personally committed to making sure both countries
succeed. The United States would do its share. In the
coming weeks, AG Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano
would visit Mexico to further this important dialogue.
The Obama Administration had announced on March 20 a
series of new measures along the U.S. border to impede
smuggling or arms and cash into Mexico. The Secretary
said she could not be confident that an assault weapons
ban would be passed by Congress, but she was confident
the Administration would use every means to aggressively
enforce existing law. She offered to share ideas with
Mexico on demand reduction in both countries. She
affirmed the Administration's absolute confidence that
Calderon would succeed in his efforts, and that the
United States would be with him every step of the way.
¶11. (C) President Calderon thanked her, noting that he
appreciated the announcements made on the 20th, but
adding that moving the National Guard to the border would
pose a problem for Mexico. Turning back to Mexico's
situation, he commented that the cartels were more
aggressive in confronting Mexican institutions than ever
before. They were more openly intimidating elected
officials, and more brutally killing Mexican law
enforcement personnel. They had undertaken terrorist-
like acts, including throwing a grenade into a crowd of
civilians last September. Mexico had to face evidence
that corruption extended to all levels. The cartels had
a strong distribution network in the United States,
Calderon noted, and unchecked they could start to apply
the same tactics in the United States. Mexico had to
face the harsh truth about corruption in the Attorney
General's office; the United States should be concerned
that the massive volume of drugs, money, and weapons
flowing across the border could imply corruption problems
on the U.S. side, as well. Calderon said that both
countries needed to coordinate efforts closely to be
successful. The President expressed some frustration
with the pace of Merida deliveries, while noting his
appreciation for the partnership the Merida Initiative
represented.
----------
THE REGION
----------
¶12. (C) President Calderon observed that, while there
were many sensitivities in Mexico to working too closely
on security matters with the United States, the nations
of Central America did not face the same political
constraints. Mexico was concerned by the vulnerabilities
in Guatemala and other Central American nations where
security, judicial, and even democratic institutions were
weak and susceptible to corrupt influences. In
Guatemala, almost half the security forces had been
forcibly retired by the prior president, leaving its
security situation difficult at best. The United States
should focus regional Merida assistance on these most
vulnerable countries.
¶13. (C) President Calderon then went on to express his
hope that the United States would re-assert its
leadership role in the region, using the Summit of the
Americas as an important opportunity. The region was
eager to meet President Obama, and excited to hear his
vision of U.S. policy towards Latin America. Calderon
confessed that a recent meeting with Summit host Prime
Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago had left him
concerned that Manning would try to force the Cuba issue
at the Summit. Calderon said he had advised against
this, arguing the United States and Cuba needed to work
out their issues bilaterally first, before the region
engaged. Calderon did not think Manning was persuaded,
describing the leader as seduced by the idea of making
history with this issue.
---------
THE WORLD
---------
¶14. (C) Secretary Clinton noted U.S. appreciation for
Mexico's leadership role in the G-20, and especially its
early call for replenishing the international financial
institutions. Calderon pointed out that the Inter-
American Development Bank was one of those institutions
that needed replenishing, and should not be overlooked.
¶15. (C) Calderon continued that he and President Obama
had many things in common, and one was a "green" agenda.
Calderon noted this was another personal passion of his.
The global community set goals for the environment, but
didn't create mechanisms to make those goals attainable.
Calderon discussed his ideas for regional "clean energy"
markets, and for the creation of a "green fund" that
would provide incentives for nations who successfully
actualized plans to reduce emissions. Secretary Clinton
said that Mexico's vision on the range of issues
affecting the environment, renewable energy options, and
climate change was greatly valued, and for that reason
President Obama wished to invite him to a Major Economies
Forum on Energy and the Environment in Italy this July
(reftel). President Calderon noted that, as Secretary of
Energy and earlier, as President of the Development Bank
(Banobras), he had approved wind energy and biogas
programs across Mexico. Now those programs were models
of their kind. Secretary Clinton told him she was
pleased to be visiting Mexico's showcase biogas plant in
Monterrey, drawing a warm smile from the President.
----------
NEXT STEPS
----------
¶16. (C) Calderon summed up the discussion by noting
that our two countries need a broad strategy to focus on
security, competitiveness, and the range of bilateral
issues. He said that we should build strategic alliances
in areas like healthcare, where U.S. demand could be met
by Mexican supply. Calderon noted he had shared these
ideas with President Obama, and very much looked forward
to discussing them further in April. He reiterated again
how honored Mexico was to receive the U.S. President.
Secretary Clinton thanked Calderon for his time and
leadership, and again pledged her personal commitment to
concrete results in the relationship.
CLINTON
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-04-03 17:05
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin US Delegation, Secretary
VZCZCXRO9333
OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031728Z APR 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
200714
2009-04-03 17:28:00
09PARTO40301
US Delegation, Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO9333
OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031728Z APR 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARTO 040301
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL SNAR MX
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation
with Mexican President Felipe Calderon
Ref: White House 0813 dated 03/21/09
¶1. (U) Classified by Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (d).
¶2. (U) 03/25/09, 1 p.m., Mexico City, Mexico
¶3. (U) Participants
U.S.
The Secretary
Charge Bassett
A/S Shannon
Laura Pena, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, National Security Council
Mexico
President Calderon
Foreign Secretary Espinosa
Amb. Sarukhan
U/S Rico
Presidential Advisor Fernandez de Castro
¶4. (C) Summary: During an extremely cordial
conversation with Secretary Clinton, President Calderon
emphasized his personal commitment to providing security
for Mexican citizens, pressed for greater U.S. actions
against arms trafficking, conveyed concerns about how the
issue of Cuba will be treated at the upcoming Summit of
the Americas, and discussed his ideas for global action
on environmental issues. Secretary Clinton praised
Calderon's commitment and leadership, acknowledged U.S.
co-responsibility for the drug war, and pledged U.S.
partnership against organized crime. President Calderon
encouraged the United States to re-assume its key role in
the region and expressed his personal admiration for
Secretary Clinton's leadership. He closed by expressing
appreciation for President Obama's decision to visit
Mexico. End Summary.
¶5. (C) President Calderon's aides tried several times
to interrupt his animated conversation with Secretary
Clinton, which lasted 1 hour 45 minutes and included a
15-minute one-on-one session, but he waved them off time
after time. He opened by expressing his admiration for
Secretary Clinton, confessing that he attended her 1998
appearance at Davos and submitted the written query,
"Would you consider running for President?" Secretary
Clinton said she was delighted to see him again, and
conveyed her appreciation for his commitment and courage.
The United States, she continued, recognized its co-
responsibility for the current situation, and would stand
shoulder to shoulder with Mexico until the battle was
won. Secretary Clinton added that it was a personal
priority for her to work on the broad relationship and
have positive outcomes.
--------
SECURITY
--------
¶6. (C) President Calderon acknowledged that our agenda
is broader than security, but turned to that topic as the
most urgent. His personal commitment was to leave his
successor a secure Mexico with credible institutions free
of the taint of corruption. To succeed he needed U.S.
support, and suggested renewing the assault weapons ban.
He said that there was a clear correlation between the
lifting of the ban in 2004 and Mexico's current
situation. During the six years of the Fox
administration, Mexican forces captured 3,000 assault
weapons. In the last two years, they confiscated 16,000,
with no end in sight. The availability of assault
weaponry had contributed to the cartels' new aggression
against government forces. A second factor was cartels'
expanding interests. While they still fought for access
to the U.S. market, they were increasingly seeking to
control the growing Mexican drug market, as well. The
combination of assault weapons and an increased
imperative for geographic control prompted the dramatic
increases in violence Mexico had recently witnessed. The
third factor was the Mexican government's increased
pressure on the cartels.
¶7. (C) Calderon cited the situation in Ciudad Juarez as
a case in point. Ciudad Juarez was important to the
cartels as a launching point into the United States, he
said, but it was also a growing metropolis with a
potentially lucrative drug market. The cartels' battle
for this territory had driven homicide rates up to record
levels. President Calderon said he had made the decision
to flood the city with federal forces and take over
security while pressing the city and state governments to
convert their local police into effective patrolling
units and to do more against common crime. In just a
month, violence in Ciudad Juarez had fallen by 73
percent, but this progress had to be sustained.
¶8. (C) Calderon said that a second priority should be
to cut U.S. drug consumption. Mexico was working to halt
the supply -- the United States needed to cut demand.
This led to the third priority -- cutting money flows to
the cartels. Calderon assessed that direct action to
interdict bulk cash coming from the United States to
Mexico would also strangle the cartels and their
operations. Mapping money flows and sharing that
information would help both countries interdict cash more
effectively and shut down the institutions facilitating
cash transactions. Mexico, he conceded, would have to do
more to check inbound travelers and vehicles, ideally
reaching a near 100 percent inspection rate through non-
invasive (NIIE) means. That might not be possible with
existing technology, he admitted, but deploying more NIIE
machines along more points of the border would be very
helpful.
¶9. (C) Calderon said he appreciated the change in the
tenor of USG officials' remarks in recent weeks, and
hoped that trend would continue. Suggestions by eminent
U.S. government officials that Mexico was unable to
govern its territory or risked becoming a failed state
did incalculable damage, not just to Mexico's image, but
to its efforts to confront organized crime. These
statements caused law enforcement officials to lose hope,
helped motivate local officials to surrender to
intimidation, and discouraged citizens from supporting
the government's efforts. On the other hand, he opined,
such statements led criminals to believe the government
would fail, and gave them renewed confidence to continue
to confront the forces of order. Calderon said he needed
the support of the Mexican people, and he needed them to
believe the rule of law would triumph.
¶10. (C) Secretary Clinton responded that her message
was one of co-responsibility and cooperation. She was
personally committed to making sure both countries
succeed. The United States would do its share. In the
coming weeks, AG Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano
would visit Mexico to further this important dialogue.
The Obama Administration had announced on March 20 a
series of new measures along the U.S. border to impede
smuggling or arms and cash into Mexico. The Secretary
said she could not be confident that an assault weapons
ban would be passed by Congress, but she was confident
the Administration would use every means to aggressively
enforce existing law. She offered to share ideas with
Mexico on demand reduction in both countries. She
affirmed the Administration's absolute confidence that
Calderon would succeed in his efforts, and that the
United States would be with him every step of the way.
¶11. (C) President Calderon thanked her, noting that he
appreciated the announcements made on the 20th, but
adding that moving the National Guard to the border would
pose a problem for Mexico. Turning back to Mexico's
situation, he commented that the cartels were more
aggressive in confronting Mexican institutions than ever
before. They were more openly intimidating elected
officials, and more brutally killing Mexican law
enforcement personnel. They had undertaken terrorist-
like acts, including throwing a grenade into a crowd of
civilians last September. Mexico had to face evidence
that corruption extended to all levels. The cartels had
a strong distribution network in the United States,
Calderon noted, and unchecked they could start to apply
the same tactics in the United States. Mexico had to
face the harsh truth about corruption in the Attorney
General's office; the United States should be concerned
that the massive volume of drugs, money, and weapons
flowing across the border could imply corruption problems
on the U.S. side, as well. Calderon said that both
countries needed to coordinate efforts closely to be
successful. The President expressed some frustration
with the pace of Merida deliveries, while noting his
appreciation for the partnership the Merida Initiative
represented.
----------
THE REGION
----------
¶12. (C) President Calderon observed that, while there
were many sensitivities in Mexico to working too closely
on security matters with the United States, the nations
of Central America did not face the same political
constraints. Mexico was concerned by the vulnerabilities
in Guatemala and other Central American nations where
security, judicial, and even democratic institutions were
weak and susceptible to corrupt influences. In
Guatemala, almost half the security forces had been
forcibly retired by the prior president, leaving its
security situation difficult at best. The United States
should focus regional Merida assistance on these most
vulnerable countries.
¶13. (C) President Calderon then went on to express his
hope that the United States would re-assert its
leadership role in the region, using the Summit of the
Americas as an important opportunity. The region was
eager to meet President Obama, and excited to hear his
vision of U.S. policy towards Latin America. Calderon
confessed that a recent meeting with Summit host Prime
Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago had left him
concerned that Manning would try to force the Cuba issue
at the Summit. Calderon said he had advised against
this, arguing the United States and Cuba needed to work
out their issues bilaterally first, before the region
engaged. Calderon did not think Manning was persuaded,
describing the leader as seduced by the idea of making
history with this issue.
---------
THE WORLD
---------
¶14. (C) Secretary Clinton noted U.S. appreciation for
Mexico's leadership role in the G-20, and especially its
early call for replenishing the international financial
institutions. Calderon pointed out that the Inter-
American Development Bank was one of those institutions
that needed replenishing, and should not be overlooked.
¶15. (C) Calderon continued that he and President Obama
had many things in common, and one was a "green" agenda.
Calderon noted this was another personal passion of his.
The global community set goals for the environment, but
didn't create mechanisms to make those goals attainable.
Calderon discussed his ideas for regional "clean energy"
markets, and for the creation of a "green fund" that
would provide incentives for nations who successfully
actualized plans to reduce emissions. Secretary Clinton
said that Mexico's vision on the range of issues
affecting the environment, renewable energy options, and
climate change was greatly valued, and for that reason
President Obama wished to invite him to a Major Economies
Forum on Energy and the Environment in Italy this July
(reftel). President Calderon noted that, as Secretary of
Energy and earlier, as President of the Development Bank
(Banobras), he had approved wind energy and biogas
programs across Mexico. Now those programs were models
of their kind. Secretary Clinton told him she was
pleased to be visiting Mexico's showcase biogas plant in
Monterrey, drawing a warm smile from the President.
----------
NEXT STEPS
----------
¶16. (C) Calderon summed up the discussion by noting
that our two countries need a broad strategy to focus on
security, competitiveness, and the range of bilateral
issues. He said that we should build strategic alliances
in areas like healthcare, where U.S. demand could be met
by Mexican supply. Calderon noted he had shared these
ideas with President Obama, and very much looked forward
to discussing them further in April. He reiterated again
how honored Mexico was to receive the U.S. President.
Secretary Clinton thanked Calderon for his time and
leadership, and again pledged her personal commitment to
concrete results in the relationship.
CLINTON
Source: Wikileaks
(C/NF) GENERAL MEXICAN LEADERSHIP (C-AL9-02352)
Reference ID 09STATE124636
Created 2009-12-04 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #4636 3382208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042208Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO 6040
238295
2009-12-04 22:08:00
09STATE124636
Secretary of State
SECRET//NOFORN
09MEXICO2071|09MEXICO7033
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #4636 3382208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042208Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO 6040
S E C R E T STATE 124636
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2034
TAGS: PINR PGOV MX
SUBJECT: (C/NF) GENERAL MEXICAN LEADERSHIP (C-AL9-02352)
REF: A. 314/07696-07
¶B. 314/88816-06
¶C. 314/81745-07
¶D. MEXICO 002071
¶E. MEXICO 007033
¶F. 314/061600-09
¶G. 314/068064-09
¶H. 314/045987-09
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (C/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY
INTERESTED IN MEXICO'S LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS, AND WE HAVE
APPRECIATED POST'S COVERAGE OF THIS TOPIC, REFS A-E HAVE
SPECIFICALLY BEEN USEFUL TO GAUGE INSIGHT INTO THESE
DYNAMICS. WE ARE INTERESTED IN REVISITING OUR ASSESSMENT OF
MEXICAN PRESIDENT CALDERON TO BETTER INFORM US POLICYMAKERS
ON HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE. REFS F-H HAVE INDICATED THAT
CALDERON AND HIS ADMINISTRATION ARE CURRENTLY UNDER GREAT
STRESS FROM THE DRUG WAR, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE, AND HIS PARTY'S
MIDTERM ELECTION LOSSES. DESPITE RECENT REPORTING WE ARE
STILL INTERESTED IN HOW THESE CURRENT STRESSES ARE AFFECTING
HIS PERSONALITY AND MANAGEMENT STYLE AND HOW THAT STYLE IS
AFFECTING THE RUNNING OF THE GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT
OF RECENT CABINET CHANGES. IN THE COURSE OF POST'S REGULAR
MEETINGS, WE WOULD WELCOME ANY INSIGHT POST CAN PROVIDE ON
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
¶A. (U) PRESIDENT CALDERON
1) (C/NF) HOW DOES PRESIDENT CALDERON REACT TO VIEWPOINTS
THAT ARE DIFFERENT FROM HIS OWN? (DOES HE LIKE TO GET INTO
DEBATES WITH PEOPLE WHO DISAGREE WITH HIM? DOES HE PREFER TO
LISTEN TO THEIR VIEWPOINT, THINK ON IT FOR A WHILE, AND COME
BACK WITH A RESPONSE?) DOES HE SURROUND HIMSELF WITH PEOPLE
WHO HAVE A VARIETY OF VIEWPOINTS, OR DOES HE PREFER "YES MEN"?
2) (C/NF) HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE CALDERON'S MANAGEMENT
STYLE (MORE OF AN "IDEA MAN" OR MORE OF A "MICROMANAGER")?
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF HIS MANAGEMENT STYLE ON THOSE WHO
WORK FOR HIM?
3) (C/NF) HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE CALDERON'S PERSONALITY?
WHAT VALUES/BELIEFS/BEHAVIORS DOES CALDERON HOLD MOST DEARLY,
AND RESPECT MOST IN OTHERS (TRUTHFULNESS, LOYALTY, RESPECT,
ETC)?
4) (C/NF) WHAT ARE CALDERON'S PLANS' FOR THE REMAINDER OF
HIS TERM? (SECURITY, ECONOMY, PAN PARTY, DEALING WITH THE
PRI)?
¶B. (U) CABINET
1) (C/NF) WHAT ARE THE GOALS FOR PRESIDENT CALDERON'S
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS OF HIS CABINET DURING THEIR
REMAINING TIME IN OFFICE? HOW DO THEY PLAN ON ACHIEVING THOSE
GOALS?
2) (C/NF) HOW DO THEY INDIVIDUALLY VIEW THE UNITED STATES,
AND HOW STRONG IS THEIR WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH US
OFFICIALS?
3) (C/NF) WHAT IS THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP STATUS OF
PRESIDENT CALDERON'S CABINET? DO ALL MEMBERS GET ALONG? HAVE
RIVALRIES, FRIENDSHIPS BEEN FORMED? HAVE THESE RELATIONSHIPS
TRICKLED DOWN TO THE WORKING LEVEL STAFFS OF EACH CABINET
MEMBER,S OFFICE?
4) (C/NF) HAS JOB STRESS AFFECTED ANY OF THE SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC SECTIONS OF HIS CABINET MEMBERS, HEALTH? IF SO,
HOW? WHAT ARE SOME WAYS THESE MEMBERS ARE ADDRESSING THIS
STRESS?
¶2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-02352 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2009-12-04 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #4636 3382208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042208Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO 6040
238295
2009-12-04 22:08:00
09STATE124636
Secretary of State
SECRET//NOFORN
09MEXICO2071|09MEXICO7033
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #4636 3382208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042208Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO 6040
S E C R E T STATE 124636
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2034
TAGS: PINR PGOV MX
SUBJECT: (C/NF) GENERAL MEXICAN LEADERSHIP (C-AL9-02352)
REF: A. 314/07696-07
¶B. 314/88816-06
¶C. 314/81745-07
¶D. MEXICO 002071
¶E. MEXICO 007033
¶F. 314/061600-09
¶G. 314/068064-09
¶H. 314/045987-09
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (C/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY
INTERESTED IN MEXICO'S LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS, AND WE HAVE
APPRECIATED POST'S COVERAGE OF THIS TOPIC, REFS A-E HAVE
SPECIFICALLY BEEN USEFUL TO GAUGE INSIGHT INTO THESE
DYNAMICS. WE ARE INTERESTED IN REVISITING OUR ASSESSMENT OF
MEXICAN PRESIDENT CALDERON TO BETTER INFORM US POLICYMAKERS
ON HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE. REFS F-H HAVE INDICATED THAT
CALDERON AND HIS ADMINISTRATION ARE CURRENTLY UNDER GREAT
STRESS FROM THE DRUG WAR, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE, AND HIS PARTY'S
MIDTERM ELECTION LOSSES. DESPITE RECENT REPORTING WE ARE
STILL INTERESTED IN HOW THESE CURRENT STRESSES ARE AFFECTING
HIS PERSONALITY AND MANAGEMENT STYLE AND HOW THAT STYLE IS
AFFECTING THE RUNNING OF THE GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT
OF RECENT CABINET CHANGES. IN THE COURSE OF POST'S REGULAR
MEETINGS, WE WOULD WELCOME ANY INSIGHT POST CAN PROVIDE ON
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
¶A. (U) PRESIDENT CALDERON
1) (C/NF) HOW DOES PRESIDENT CALDERON REACT TO VIEWPOINTS
THAT ARE DIFFERENT FROM HIS OWN? (DOES HE LIKE TO GET INTO
DEBATES WITH PEOPLE WHO DISAGREE WITH HIM? DOES HE PREFER TO
LISTEN TO THEIR VIEWPOINT, THINK ON IT FOR A WHILE, AND COME
BACK WITH A RESPONSE?) DOES HE SURROUND HIMSELF WITH PEOPLE
WHO HAVE A VARIETY OF VIEWPOINTS, OR DOES HE PREFER "YES MEN"?
2) (C/NF) HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE CALDERON'S MANAGEMENT
STYLE (MORE OF AN "IDEA MAN" OR MORE OF A "MICROMANAGER")?
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF HIS MANAGEMENT STYLE ON THOSE WHO
WORK FOR HIM?
3) (C/NF) HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE CALDERON'S PERSONALITY?
WHAT VALUES/BELIEFS/BEHAVIORS DOES CALDERON HOLD MOST DEARLY,
AND RESPECT MOST IN OTHERS (TRUTHFULNESS, LOYALTY, RESPECT,
ETC)?
4) (C/NF) WHAT ARE CALDERON'S PLANS' FOR THE REMAINDER OF
HIS TERM? (SECURITY, ECONOMY, PAN PARTY, DEALING WITH THE
PRI)?
¶B. (U) CABINET
1) (C/NF) WHAT ARE THE GOALS FOR PRESIDENT CALDERON'S
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS OF HIS CABINET DURING THEIR
REMAINING TIME IN OFFICE? HOW DO THEY PLAN ON ACHIEVING THOSE
GOALS?
2) (C/NF) HOW DO THEY INDIVIDUALLY VIEW THE UNITED STATES,
AND HOW STRONG IS THEIR WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH US
OFFICIALS?
3) (C/NF) WHAT IS THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP STATUS OF
PRESIDENT CALDERON'S CABINET? DO ALL MEMBERS GET ALONG? HAVE
RIVALRIES, FRIENDSHIPS BEEN FORMED? HAVE THESE RELATIONSHIPS
TRICKLED DOWN TO THE WORKING LEVEL STAFFS OF EACH CABINET
MEMBER,S OFFICE?
4) (C/NF) HAS JOB STRESS AFFECTED ANY OF THE SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC SECTIONS OF HIS CABINET MEMBERS, HEALTH? IF SO,
HOW? WHAT ARE SOME WAYS THESE MEMBERS ARE ADDRESSING THIS
STRESS?
¶2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-02352 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
Source: Wikileaks
LEADING CENTER-RIGHT ARGENTINE OPPOSITION LEADER MAURICIO MACRI ON KIRCHNER AND THE 2007 ELECTIONS
Reference ID 06BUENOSAIRES2215
Created 2006-09-28 21:09
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXRO3958
PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBU #2215/01 2712113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 282113Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1734
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 002215SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE USCINCSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: LEADING CENTER-RIGHT ARGENTINE OPPOSITION LEADER MAURICIO MACRI ON KIRCHNER AND THE 2007 ELECTIONS REF: BUENOS AIRES 01901 Classified By: CDA, a.i., Michael Matera, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 26, Charge and Poloff met with leading center-right political leader Mauricio Macri and
longtime Macri associate and local businessman, Nicolas
Caputo. Macri voiced his criticisms of President Nestor
Kirchner's policies and spoke at length about next year's
national elections. Despite his strong criticisms of
Kirchner, Macri noted that the GOA's fiscal discipline was a
positive change compared to past governments, and he admitted
that the projected continued strength of the economy over the
next year meant that Kirchner would likely win reelection.
Although Macri felt it would be difficult to beat Kirchner in
2007, he was optimistic about the long-term prospects of his
Republican Proposal (PRO) political alliance. Macri said he
was still undecided on which office he would run for in the
2007 elections. Although he did not rule out an eventual
alliance with former Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna, he
felt that he and Lavagna had little in common. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On September 26, Charge and Poloff met with leading
center-right political leader Mauricio Macri and longtime
Macri associate and local businessman, Nicolas Caputo. Macri
spoke at length about his views of President Nestor Kirchner
and next year's national elections. Macri was critical of
Kirchner's policies, particularly in the foreign and economic
policy areas. "Argentina is not getting the investment it
needs, especially in the energy sector. Kirchner thinks he
can go to New York, ring the bell at the Stock Exchange, and
tell investors 'we didn't fulfill our promises before, but
now you can trust us.' It will take a lot harder work than
that to bring investors back to Argentina. Kirchner is
constantly creating conflicts abroad, with our regional
neighbors, at Mar del Plata, but the Argentine people do not
realize how damaging this is because the government is very
good at controlling the media." 3. (C) Despite his strong criticisms of Kirchner, Macri noted that the GOA's fiscal discipline was a positive change compared to past governments, and he admitted that the
projected continued strength of the economy over the next
year meant that Kirchner would likely win reelection.
"Kirchner understands that money equals political power, so
he has put an emphasis on maintaining a surplus. For the
first time in recent memory, Argentina doesn't have to worry
about being able to pay its bills." Macri noted that
although surprises were always possible, particularly with
the crime issue, he did not foresee Kirchner having
difficulty wining reelection in 2007. 4. (C) Although Macri felt it would be difficult to beat Kirchner in 2007, he was optimistic about the long-term prospects of his Republican Proposal (PRO) political
alliance. He predicted that the economy would start to
decline in 2008. Macri said PRO was working to prepare its
leaders to assume office in 2011. "We are the first truly
pro-market, pro-business political force in nearly 80 years
of Argentine history that is ready to assume power." Macri
said that his foundation, Fundacion Creer y Crecer (Belief
and Growth Foundation), is working with the German Konrad
Adenhauer Foundation and the U.S. International Republican
Institute in a leadership development program. Nicolas
Caputo said that many in the Foundation were getting
restless, noting that the short-term focus of Argentine
politics made it difficult to convince the Foundation staff
to work for the long-term when Macri's plans for 2007 were
still undefined. 5. (C) Macri said his plans for 2007 were still undecided, and although he did not rule out an eventual alliance with
former Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna, he felt that he and
Lavagna had little in common. Macri said he would not define
his electoral plans until at least the end of the year,
noting that Kirchner himself has not yet announced his BUENOS AIR 00002215 002 OF 002 candidacy. Macri said that his supporters are sharply divided between those who want him to compete again to be
Mayor of Buenos Aires and those who want him to run for
President. Macri said that both options presented risks.
Macri would face a difficult race in the city against
potential Kirchner candidates like Vice President Daniel
Scioli and current Mayor Jorge Telerman. Macri would almost
certainly lose a presidential race to Kirchner, but a good
second place showing, Macri argued, could provide a political
base for the future. Asked about an alliance with Lavagna,
Macri quoted his PRO ally Ricardo Lopez Murphy, "Lavagna is a
better mannered, more tolerant Kirchner. I do not see much
difference between him and Kirchner. Moreover, I do not
think we have much in common with those that are around
Lavagna, like (former Presidents) Alfonsin and Duhalde."
However, he said that he did not discard the possibility of
an eventual accord between him and Lavagna. Asked about
Lopez Murphy, Macri said his alliance with him was strong,
but noted that Lopez Murphy can sometimes be "rigid" in his
thinking, which made discussions on potential political
alliances difficult. 6. (C) COMMENT: Mauricio Macri is currently the leading center-right opposition leader in Argentina. He is one of
the only opposition leaders who can compete toe-to-toe with
Kirchner's potential candidates in a key electoral district,
or make a potentially strong second place showing in a
presidential contest with Kirchner himself. Macri is young
enough and has sufficient personal resources to enable him to
compete for the long term. As 2007 is likely to be a
difficult year for the opposition in Argentina, opposition
leaders will need to have this type of long-term vision to
build for the future. END COMMENT.
MATERA
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2006-09-28 21:09
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXRO3958
PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBU #2215/01 2712113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 282113Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1734
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 002215SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE USCINCSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: LEADING CENTER-RIGHT ARGENTINE OPPOSITION LEADER MAURICIO MACRI ON KIRCHNER AND THE 2007 ELECTIONS REF: BUENOS AIRES 01901 Classified By: CDA, a.i., Michael Matera, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 26, Charge and Poloff met with leading center-right political leader Mauricio Macri and
longtime Macri associate and local businessman, Nicolas
Caputo. Macri voiced his criticisms of President Nestor
Kirchner's policies and spoke at length about next year's
national elections. Despite his strong criticisms of
Kirchner, Macri noted that the GOA's fiscal discipline was a
positive change compared to past governments, and he admitted
that the projected continued strength of the economy over the
next year meant that Kirchner would likely win reelection.
Although Macri felt it would be difficult to beat Kirchner in
2007, he was optimistic about the long-term prospects of his
Republican Proposal (PRO) political alliance. Macri said he
was still undecided on which office he would run for in the
2007 elections. Although he did not rule out an eventual
alliance with former Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna, he
felt that he and Lavagna had little in common. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On September 26, Charge and Poloff met with leading
center-right political leader Mauricio Macri and longtime
Macri associate and local businessman, Nicolas Caputo. Macri
spoke at length about his views of President Nestor Kirchner
and next year's national elections. Macri was critical of
Kirchner's policies, particularly in the foreign and economic
policy areas. "Argentina is not getting the investment it
needs, especially in the energy sector. Kirchner thinks he
can go to New York, ring the bell at the Stock Exchange, and
tell investors 'we didn't fulfill our promises before, but
now you can trust us.' It will take a lot harder work than
that to bring investors back to Argentina. Kirchner is
constantly creating conflicts abroad, with our regional
neighbors, at Mar del Plata, but the Argentine people do not
realize how damaging this is because the government is very
good at controlling the media." 3. (C) Despite his strong criticisms of Kirchner, Macri noted that the GOA's fiscal discipline was a positive change compared to past governments, and he admitted that the
projected continued strength of the economy over the next
year meant that Kirchner would likely win reelection.
"Kirchner understands that money equals political power, so
he has put an emphasis on maintaining a surplus. For the
first time in recent memory, Argentina doesn't have to worry
about being able to pay its bills." Macri noted that
although surprises were always possible, particularly with
the crime issue, he did not foresee Kirchner having
difficulty wining reelection in 2007. 4. (C) Although Macri felt it would be difficult to beat Kirchner in 2007, he was optimistic about the long-term prospects of his Republican Proposal (PRO) political
alliance. He predicted that the economy would start to
decline in 2008. Macri said PRO was working to prepare its
leaders to assume office in 2011. "We are the first truly
pro-market, pro-business political force in nearly 80 years
of Argentine history that is ready to assume power." Macri
said that his foundation, Fundacion Creer y Crecer (Belief
and Growth Foundation), is working with the German Konrad
Adenhauer Foundation and the U.S. International Republican
Institute in a leadership development program. Nicolas
Caputo said that many in the Foundation were getting
restless, noting that the short-term focus of Argentine
politics made it difficult to convince the Foundation staff
to work for the long-term when Macri's plans for 2007 were
still undefined. 5. (C) Macri said his plans for 2007 were still undecided, and although he did not rule out an eventual alliance with
former Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna, he felt that he and
Lavagna had little in common. Macri said he would not define
his electoral plans until at least the end of the year,
noting that Kirchner himself has not yet announced his BUENOS AIR 00002215 002 OF 002 candidacy. Macri said that his supporters are sharply divided between those who want him to compete again to be
Mayor of Buenos Aires and those who want him to run for
President. Macri said that both options presented risks.
Macri would face a difficult race in the city against
potential Kirchner candidates like Vice President Daniel
Scioli and current Mayor Jorge Telerman. Macri would almost
certainly lose a presidential race to Kirchner, but a good
second place showing, Macri argued, could provide a political
base for the future. Asked about an alliance with Lavagna,
Macri quoted his PRO ally Ricardo Lopez Murphy, "Lavagna is a
better mannered, more tolerant Kirchner. I do not see much
difference between him and Kirchner. Moreover, I do not
think we have much in common with those that are around
Lavagna, like (former Presidents) Alfonsin and Duhalde."
However, he said that he did not discard the possibility of
an eventual accord between him and Lavagna. Asked about
Lopez Murphy, Macri said his alliance with him was strong,
but noted that Lopez Murphy can sometimes be "rigid" in his
thinking, which made discussions on potential political
alliances difficult. 6. (C) COMMENT: Mauricio Macri is currently the leading center-right opposition leader in Argentina. He is one of
the only opposition leaders who can compete toe-to-toe with
Kirchner's potential candidates in a key electoral district,
or make a potentially strong second place showing in a
presidential contest with Kirchner himself. Macri is young
enough and has sufficient personal resources to enable him to
compete for the long term. As 2007 is likely to be a
difficult year for the opposition in Argentina, opposition
leaders will need to have this type of long-term vision to
build for the future. END COMMENT.
MATERA
Source: Wikileaks
ARGENTINA: CANDID TALK FROM BUENOS AIRES MAYOR MAURICIO MACRI ON CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Reference ID 08BUENOSAIRES1150
Created 2008-08-14 20:08
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1150/01 2272042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 142042Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1789
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001150 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAGR ECON ETRD EFIN AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: CANDID TALK FROM BUENOS AIRES MAYOR MAURICIO MACRI ON CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 0893 B. BUENOS AIRES 1050 Classified By: by Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Senior Professional Staffer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Carl Meacham and the DCM, Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri criticized the Kirchners for pushing their policies to the limit and spoke directly about concerns that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) could fail to complete her mandate. Macri said that he thinks CFK will muddle through, if only because many fear the instability that could follow such a scenario. He attributed anti-Americanism in Argentina to a government that does not restrain its criticism of the United States, but noted that Argentina not only craves U.S. attention, but also needs better relations with the United States. Macri asserted that the Kirchners view his current success as a threat, and indicated his intention to run for the presidency. End Summary. 2. (C) On August 6, Senior Professional Staffer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Carl Meacham met with Mayor Mauricio Macri, a center-right leader of the Argentine
opposition, in his office. They discussed the effect of the recent agricultural crisis on Argentina's political future and stability and the prospects for U.S.-Argentine relations. Mayor Macri was accompanied by his party's international affairs advisor Diego Guelar (Argentine former ambassador to the United States). Staffdel Meacham was accompanied by DCM, WHA/BSC Deputy Director Bruce Friedman, and Polintern. ----------------- The Kirchner Irony
------------------ 3. (C) Macri spoke frankly about the current Kirchner
administration. He said that Argentines would be "happy" for the Kirchners to fall (raising his glass of water, he said "if this glass of water was the Kirchners, everybody would fight to push it over") except for one factor -- they fear that the government's collapse would risk the country's return to the chaos of 2001-02. This lingering fear is, in
his view, the Kirchners' biggest advantage in the current political crisis. Macri went on to criticize the Kirchners for pushing their policies to the limit, further noting the surreal nature of the Argentine political environment and casting it as something akin to a television drama. 4. (C) Macri's advisors were less sanguine about the government's prospects. The PRO party's international affairs advisor Diego Guelar, Argentine former ambassador to the United States, said on the way out that he gives the government "60 days" before it falls. (COMMENT: Some perspective on Guelar's political handicapping track record: he predicted six months before last year's presidential }election that Nestor Kirchner, not CFK, would be the official presidential candidate. END COMMENT.) Macri on the Causes of Anti-Americanism 5. (C) Referring to Argentina's rampant anti-Americanism, Macri said it is encouraged by a presidency that has not constrained its criticisms of the United States. This is
compounded, he claimed, by the fact that the overall U.S. involvement in Argentina has been too "passive" and unwilling to directlychallenge the Kirchners' provocations, ultimately resulting in the perception that the United States is "never around," he noted. Argentines, in general, enjoy playing the "anti-American," he said, but in reality are very sensitive to U.S. criticism or lack of attention. He acknowledged that President Bush's focus on so many places around the world does not allow for active engagement with the Kirchners, who he said are consistently disrespecting and demonizing world leaders anyway. Nevertheless, Argentina needs better relations with the United States, Macri asserted. He urged the United States to recognize Argentina
independently of its neighbors, instead of grouping it with other countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.------------------------
Macri's Political Future ------------------------ 6. (C) Macri said the Kirchners view his current success as a threat to them. When asked about his future political prospects, Macri noted his positive ratings (currently above 40% in Buenos Aires polling) which are significantly better than CFK's positive ratings (slightly above 20% in national
polls), and noted the improvements already achieved in the first eight months of his tenure, mostly in the realm of infrastructure projects throughout the city. However, transferring control of the Federal Police in the capital from the national government to the municipality -- a central plank of his election campaign -- has stalled, he said.-------
Comment ------- 7. (C) Macri's demeanor, as usual, was serious, smiling only in disbelief at the melodrama of Argentine politics. Though expressing great disdain for the Kirchners, he appeared more concerned with the lack of continuity in Argentine politics.
He therefore views the completion of CFK's term through 2011 as imperative for Argentina's stability and credibility. Furthermore, the years ahead will give him an opportunity to prove his management capabilities while circumstances and the current administration's blunders builds support for someone who can define himself as the
diametric opposite of the Kirchners. However, Macri faces a
tremendous challenge in pulling together a divided and divisive opposition. Macri's comments about U.S. policy and Argentine anti-Americanism are similar to those he made recently to A/S Tom Shannon. He would clearly like the U.S. to take a tougher public line with the Kirchners. End Comment. 8. (U) This cable was cleared by Staffdel Meacham and WHA/BSC Deputy Director Friedman.
WAYNE
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2008-08-14 20:08
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1150/01 2272042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 142042Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1789
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001150 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAGR ECON ETRD EFIN AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: CANDID TALK FROM BUENOS AIRES MAYOR MAURICIO MACRI ON CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 0893 B. BUENOS AIRES 1050 Classified By: by Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Senior Professional Staffer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Carl Meacham and the DCM, Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri criticized the Kirchners for pushing their policies to the limit and spoke directly about concerns that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) could fail to complete her mandate. Macri said that he thinks CFK will muddle through, if only because many fear the instability that could follow such a scenario. He attributed anti-Americanism in Argentina to a government that does not restrain its criticism of the United States, but noted that Argentina not only craves U.S. attention, but also needs better relations with the United States. Macri asserted that the Kirchners view his current success as a threat, and indicated his intention to run for the presidency. End Summary. 2. (C) On August 6, Senior Professional Staffer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Carl Meacham met with Mayor Mauricio Macri, a center-right leader of the Argentine
opposition, in his office. They discussed the effect of the recent agricultural crisis on Argentina's political future and stability and the prospects for U.S.-Argentine relations. Mayor Macri was accompanied by his party's international affairs advisor Diego Guelar (Argentine former ambassador to the United States). Staffdel Meacham was accompanied by DCM, WHA/BSC Deputy Director Bruce Friedman, and Polintern. ----------------- The Kirchner Irony
------------------ 3. (C) Macri spoke frankly about the current Kirchner
administration. He said that Argentines would be "happy" for the Kirchners to fall (raising his glass of water, he said "if this glass of water was the Kirchners, everybody would fight to push it over") except for one factor -- they fear that the government's collapse would risk the country's return to the chaos of 2001-02. This lingering fear is, in
his view, the Kirchners' biggest advantage in the current political crisis. Macri went on to criticize the Kirchners for pushing their policies to the limit, further noting the surreal nature of the Argentine political environment and casting it as something akin to a television drama. 4. (C) Macri's advisors were less sanguine about the government's prospects. The PRO party's international affairs advisor Diego Guelar, Argentine former ambassador to the United States, said on the way out that he gives the government "60 days" before it falls. (COMMENT: Some perspective on Guelar's political handicapping track record: he predicted six months before last year's presidential }election that Nestor Kirchner, not CFK, would be the official presidential candidate. END COMMENT.) Macri on the Causes of Anti-Americanism 5. (C) Referring to Argentina's rampant anti-Americanism, Macri said it is encouraged by a presidency that has not constrained its criticisms of the United States. This is
compounded, he claimed, by the fact that the overall U.S. involvement in Argentina has been too "passive" and unwilling to directlychallenge the Kirchners' provocations, ultimately resulting in the perception that the United States is "never around," he noted. Argentines, in general, enjoy playing the "anti-American," he said, but in reality are very sensitive to U.S. criticism or lack of attention. He acknowledged that President Bush's focus on so many places around the world does not allow for active engagement with the Kirchners, who he said are consistently disrespecting and demonizing world leaders anyway. Nevertheless, Argentina needs better relations with the United States, Macri asserted. He urged the United States to recognize Argentina
independently of its neighbors, instead of grouping it with other countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.------------------------
Macri's Political Future ------------------------ 6. (C) Macri said the Kirchners view his current success as a threat to them. When asked about his future political prospects, Macri noted his positive ratings (currently above 40% in Buenos Aires polling) which are significantly better than CFK's positive ratings (slightly above 20% in national
polls), and noted the improvements already achieved in the first eight months of his tenure, mostly in the realm of infrastructure projects throughout the city. However, transferring control of the Federal Police in the capital from the national government to the municipality -- a central plank of his election campaign -- has stalled, he said.-------
Comment ------- 7. (C) Macri's demeanor, as usual, was serious, smiling only in disbelief at the melodrama of Argentine politics. Though expressing great disdain for the Kirchners, he appeared more concerned with the lack of continuity in Argentine politics.
He therefore views the completion of CFK's term through 2011 as imperative for Argentina's stability and credibility. Furthermore, the years ahead will give him an opportunity to prove his management capabilities while circumstances and the current administration's blunders builds support for someone who can define himself as the
diametric opposite of the Kirchners. However, Macri faces a
tremendous challenge in pulling together a divided and divisive opposition. Macri's comments about U.S. policy and Argentine anti-Americanism are similar to those he made recently to A/S Tom Shannon. He would clearly like the U.S. to take a tougher public line with the Kirchners. End Comment. 8. (U) This cable was cleared by Staffdel Meacham and WHA/BSC Deputy Director Friedman.
WAYNE
Source: Wikileaks
Argentina: Buenos Aires Mayor Macri on Political Plans and Current Situation
Reference ID 10BUENOSAIRES81
Created 2010-02-05 18:06
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #0081/01 0361845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051845Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0473
INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000081 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/05 TAGS: PGOV EFIN ECON PREL SCUL AR
SUBJECT: Argentina: Buenos Aires Mayor Macri on Political Plans and Current Situation REF: BUENOS AIRES 25; 09 BUENOS AIRES 1222; 09 BUENOS AIRES 55 CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador hosted prominent opposition leader and Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri, along with four of his cabinet members, to lunch January 28. Macri spoke openly of his planned run for president in 2011. He considered President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and her husband and former President Nestor Kirchner to be politically weak, but warned that they could do significant damage to Argentina's governance institutions unless the opposition united effectively to thwart them. Macri reiterated a request for our help in standing-up the new Buenos Aires Municipal police force, and he encouraged the U.S. Government to send a suitably "emblematic" representative to Argentina's bicentennial celebrations in May. In a separate conversation, a friend and ally of Macri's told the DCM that he thinks that Macri will eventually pull out of the presidential race. End Summary. 2. (U) Ambassador on January 28 hosted Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri to lunch at her residence. Macri was accompanied by four members of his city government team: Chief of Cabinet Dr. Horacio Larreta, Minister for Security Dr. Guillermo Montenegro, new Police Chief Dr. Eugenio Burzaco, and Director for
International Relations Fulvio Pompeo. Deputy Chief of Mission,
Legal Attache, Regional Security Officer and Acting Political
Counselor joined for the Embassy. Macri Confirms Candidacy
¶3. (SBU) Macri openly discussed his ambitions for the presidency in
2011 at several points in the conversation (he again confirmed his
candidacy in public on February 2). He described his presidency of
the Boca Juniors Soccer Club as having been an outstanding
political education (dealing with issues like access to press and
locker rooms, distribution of seats, and business decisions in
front of a membership of about 15,000) and said that the Club's
national following was his greatest political asset. "If I receive
political support outside of Buenos Aires," he said, "in 90% of the
cases it is for managing Boca and in 10% for being Mayor of Buenos
Aires." 4. (SBU) Macri believed there was a regional swing underway toward the right, beginning with the election of Sebastian Pinera in
Chile, someone Macri described in friendly terms as a wide ranging
intellect who always knew more than anyone whatever the topic, from
culture, sports, business, government, and history. Macri believed
that Jose Serra would win the presidency in Brazil, and hoped to
follow in the regional trend himself in 2011. Kirchners Finished, but Dangerous 5. (C) Beginning with a discussion of the President Fernandez de Kirchner's precipitous firing of Central Bank President Martin Redrado (reftel A), Macri lamented what he described as the
President and first spouse Nestor Kirchner's continuing assault on
government institutions and fiscal responsibility. The first
couple's aggressive style had turned most people off, he said,
something he rediscovered virtually every day when he went
door-to-door in the city to meet citizens. Even those of the lower
middle class (the Kirchners' political base) were frustrated and
fed up with the national government On the political front, a
broad political opposition was in agreement on the dangers posed by
the Kirchner's but would have to learn to work together to limit
the damage they might cause before 2011. 6. (C) Before the Mayor's arrival, Montenegro had described President Kirchner's firing of Treasury Ministry Prosecutor General Osvaldo Guglielmino as another sign of trouble. (Note: Guglielmino reportedly drafted the firing order against Redrado, and the press speculated that he was being dumped in part because that process went so poorly). Montenegro described the named replacement, Joaquin Da Rocha, as a close ally of Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez. He was the least bad option among the few remaining qualified Kirchnerites, Montenegro concluded, but was not an impressive candidate for the job 7. (C) As he has in the past, Macri pressed on the U.S. approach
to the Kirchners, seemingly urging more open criticism of measures
we considered unwise. Ambassador responded that the Embassy would continue to seek a positive working relationship with the
Government of Argentina while raising in a constructive fashion our
areas of concern. 8. (SBU) Macri shared an interest in further exchanges with U.S. law enforcement to assist his Police Chief in training and guiding the soon-to-be-deployed city police force. Ambassador discussed the benefits of a visit by a successful U.S. big-city police commissioner or former commissioner. Macri and his team also strongly encouraged the United States to consider sending an "emblematic" American, whether from culture or government, to joinin the country's May 25 bicentennial celebrations at the
refurbished Colon theater. 9. (C) Footnote: An influential banker whose daughter works with Macri said that he believes that Macri will eventually pull out of the presidential race. He said that, though Macri has committed fewer political missteps recently, many in Macri's camp realize that his chances to win in 2011 are miniscule and receding. This source said that the electoral alliance that seems to be emerging between Peronist senator Carlos Reutemann and erstwhile Macri ally Francisco de Narvaez will marginalize Macri, as Peronists disaffected with the Kirchners will gravitate naturally to a
Reutemann-de Narvaez alliance. (In this scenario, Reutemann would
run for the presidency and De Narvaez would set aside his
presidential aspirations and compete for the governorship of Buenos
Aires province.) The banker speculated that the 50-year old Macri
will decide that he should abandon a quixotic candidacy in order to
focus on developing a successful record of governance in the City
of Buenos Aires, with a view to the next presidential election in
¶2015.
MARTINEZ
Source: Wikileaks
Created 2010-02-05 18:06
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #0081/01 0361845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051845Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0473
INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000081 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/05 TAGS: PGOV EFIN ECON PREL SCUL AR
SUBJECT: Argentina: Buenos Aires Mayor Macri on Political Plans and Current Situation REF: BUENOS AIRES 25; 09 BUENOS AIRES 1222; 09 BUENOS AIRES 55 CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador hosted prominent opposition leader and Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri, along with four of his cabinet members, to lunch January 28. Macri spoke openly of his planned run for president in 2011. He considered President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and her husband and former President Nestor Kirchner to be politically weak, but warned that they could do significant damage to Argentina's governance institutions unless the opposition united effectively to thwart them. Macri reiterated a request for our help in standing-up the new Buenos Aires Municipal police force, and he encouraged the U.S. Government to send a suitably "emblematic" representative to Argentina's bicentennial celebrations in May. In a separate conversation, a friend and ally of Macri's told the DCM that he thinks that Macri will eventually pull out of the presidential race. End Summary. 2. (U) Ambassador on January 28 hosted Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri to lunch at her residence. Macri was accompanied by four members of his city government team: Chief of Cabinet Dr. Horacio Larreta, Minister for Security Dr. Guillermo Montenegro, new Police Chief Dr. Eugenio Burzaco, and Director for
International Relations Fulvio Pompeo. Deputy Chief of Mission,
Legal Attache, Regional Security Officer and Acting Political
Counselor joined for the Embassy. Macri Confirms Candidacy
¶3. (SBU) Macri openly discussed his ambitions for the presidency in
2011 at several points in the conversation (he again confirmed his
candidacy in public on February 2). He described his presidency of
the Boca Juniors Soccer Club as having been an outstanding
political education (dealing with issues like access to press and
locker rooms, distribution of seats, and business decisions in
front of a membership of about 15,000) and said that the Club's
national following was his greatest political asset. "If I receive
political support outside of Buenos Aires," he said, "in 90% of the
cases it is for managing Boca and in 10% for being Mayor of Buenos
Aires." 4. (SBU) Macri believed there was a regional swing underway toward the right, beginning with the election of Sebastian Pinera in
Chile, someone Macri described in friendly terms as a wide ranging
intellect who always knew more than anyone whatever the topic, from
culture, sports, business, government, and history. Macri believed
that Jose Serra would win the presidency in Brazil, and hoped to
follow in the regional trend himself in 2011. Kirchners Finished, but Dangerous 5. (C) Beginning with a discussion of the President Fernandez de Kirchner's precipitous firing of Central Bank President Martin Redrado (reftel A), Macri lamented what he described as the
President and first spouse Nestor Kirchner's continuing assault on
government institutions and fiscal responsibility. The first
couple's aggressive style had turned most people off, he said,
something he rediscovered virtually every day when he went
door-to-door in the city to meet citizens. Even those of the lower
middle class (the Kirchners' political base) were frustrated and
fed up with the national government On the political front, a
broad political opposition was in agreement on the dangers posed by
the Kirchner's but would have to learn to work together to limit
the damage they might cause before 2011. 6. (C) Before the Mayor's arrival, Montenegro had described President Kirchner's firing of Treasury Ministry Prosecutor General Osvaldo Guglielmino as another sign of trouble. (Note: Guglielmino reportedly drafted the firing order against Redrado, and the press speculated that he was being dumped in part because that process went so poorly). Montenegro described the named replacement, Joaquin Da Rocha, as a close ally of Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez. He was the least bad option among the few remaining qualified Kirchnerites, Montenegro concluded, but was not an impressive candidate for the job 7. (C) As he has in the past, Macri pressed on the U.S. approach
to the Kirchners, seemingly urging more open criticism of measures
we considered unwise. Ambassador responded that the Embassy would continue to seek a positive working relationship with the
Government of Argentina while raising in a constructive fashion our
areas of concern. 8. (SBU) Macri shared an interest in further exchanges with U.S. law enforcement to assist his Police Chief in training and guiding the soon-to-be-deployed city police force. Ambassador discussed the benefits of a visit by a successful U.S. big-city police commissioner or former commissioner. Macri and his team also strongly encouraged the United States to consider sending an "emblematic" American, whether from culture or government, to joinin the country's May 25 bicentennial celebrations at the
refurbished Colon theater. 9. (C) Footnote: An influential banker whose daughter works with Macri said that he believes that Macri will eventually pull out of the presidential race. He said that, though Macri has committed fewer political missteps recently, many in Macri's camp realize that his chances to win in 2011 are miniscule and receding. This source said that the electoral alliance that seems to be emerging between Peronist senator Carlos Reutemann and erstwhile Macri ally Francisco de Narvaez will marginalize Macri, as Peronists disaffected with the Kirchners will gravitate naturally to a
Reutemann-de Narvaez alliance. (In this scenario, Reutemann would
run for the presidency and De Narvaez would set aside his
presidential aspirations and compete for the governorship of Buenos
Aires province.) The banker speculated that the 50-year old Macri
will decide that he should abandon a quixotic candidacy in order to
focus on developing a successful record of governance in the City
of Buenos Aires, with a view to the next presidential election in
¶2015.
MARTINEZ
Source: Wikileaks
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