AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT CALDERON

Reference ID 06MEXICO5607
Created 2006-09-29 22:10
Released 2011-02-21
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Mexico


R 292203Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3489
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
NSC WASHDC

80245
2006-09-29 22:03:00
06MEXICO5607
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

R 292203Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3489
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
NSC WASHDC


C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 005607


STATE FOR A/S SHANNON; NSC FOR FISK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MX
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT
CALDERON

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA JR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

¶1. (C) During a private dinner with Ambassador and Mrs.
Garza, President-elect Felipe Calderon expressed his grave
concern over the security situation in Mexico. It was
heartrending to see Mexico living through such times, he told
the Ambassador, and improving security would be a key pillar
of his administration. The Ambassador agreed, noting that
Calderon did not want his to be the "narco-sexenio." Gains
on competitiveness, education and employment could be quickly
overshadowed by narcotics-related organized crime. To draw
the investment and energy needed to jump-start Mexico's
economy, foreigners and Mexicans alike had to be reassured
that the rule of law would prevail. The Ambassador impressed
upon the President-elect the need to have a strong security
team in place early. Calderon agreed completely and stressed
his strong desire to continue and improve cooperation with
the U.S. on security matters.

¶2. (C) Calderon confided that he was disappointed with U.S.
border security measures but would adhere to his commitment
not to make these the central issues of the bilateral
relationship. His administration would continue to offer
support to migrants in the U.S., but would not make U.S.
migration reform its defining element. Calderon reiterated
his strong desire to work with the U.S., but also signaled a
desire to re-establish better relations with Latin America.
To that end, he would travel the first week of October to
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile and Brazil. He
pressed again for a meeting with President Bush prior to his
December 1 inauguration, and after U.S. elections.

¶3. (C) Calderon volunteered his grave concern over
Venezuela President Chavez' antics and activities generally.
He segued into worrying about the growing Iran-Venezuela
nexus, offering that these ties could reverberate negatively
throughout the region and beyond. Neither leader could be
trusted, and their capacity for trouble was almost limitless.

¶4. (C) Comment: Calderon hosted the Ambassador in his
private residence, a fairly modest household in a compound of
other privately-owned homes that did not seem to offer
presidential-level security or privacy. Neither was it
staked out by the media, which covers his transition offices
fairly aggressively. His wife, Margarita Zavala, was also
present during the dinner and discussed her role, looking to
distance herself from the model set by Marta Sahagun. The
Ambassador was struck by Calderon's confidence, willingness
to dig right into substance, and readiness to speak frankly
about a range of challenges. Calderon confessed he was
unfamiliar with some key power centers, including business
leaders, something he will work to remedy. But he clearly
has a strategy in this transition period of airing issues,
defining near-term legislative and executive objectives, and
reaching out beyond his core support group to bring others on
board.


GARZA


Source: Wikileaks