Reference ID 09LONDON1442
Created 2009-06-18 17:05
Released 2011-02-15
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy London
VZCZCXRO2428
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHLO #1442/01 1691750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181750Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2658
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 001442
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER PINS IR UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: XXXXXXXXXXXX SAYS ELECTION PRECLUDED BY "POLITICAL COUP," URGES USG FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PROTESTORS
REF: 08 LONDON 2691 AND PREVIOUS
¶1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX on June 16 told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) and a small group of diplomats that "a majority" of leaders within the government of Iran and the IRGC want the United States, while continuing to avoid interference in Iran, to continue and even strengthen its public messages on human rights, so as to support popular protests in Iran and prevent any consolidation of Ahmedinejad's electoral win. XXXXXXXXXXXX said "a majority" of the IRGC have split from the Basij and from IRGC commander Jafari over the manipulation and aftermath of the June 12 elections. He added that XXXXXXXXXXXX conceived and ordered engineering of the election and of attempted suppression which has followed. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed no senior clergy other than XXXXXXXXXXXX in fact support Ahmedinejad. XXXXXXXXXXXX offered no compromise solution among contending parties in Iran, and indicated throughout that either Moussavi or Ahmedinejad would be politically vanquished. He explicitly played down the prospect of a "civil war" raised by a European interlocutor. End summary.
2.(S) As in the past (ref), XXXXXXXXXXXX appeared at the invitation of the Next Century Foundation (NCF), a small UK policy forum NGO enjoying occasional Embassy support; XXXXXXXXXXXX had just arrived in the UK from XXXXXXXXXXXX late that same day, June 16. The venue was the residence of the German Political Counselor; besides NCF staff, attendees included XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Norwegian, Spanish, and Japanese embassies and a mid-level Whitehall (UK) diplomat.
Events of June 12 and Afterwards: "A Political Coup" ---------------------------------
3.(S) After warning the group against any leaks of his remarks, XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized events in Iran since June 12 as a "political coup," and said "the Islamic Republic has never faced such a situation.8 He emphasized it was "not a military coup," since, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, there was for the most part no involvement by the great majority of IRGC officers; at the same time ,XXXXXXXXXXXXdrew a clear line between the IRGC and the Basij, emphasizing the Basijis' central role in suppression of protestors.
¶4. (S) Asked for an explanation of events since June 12, XXXXXXXXXXXX gave a tense, extended narrative that closely resembled reformist narratives, which Poloff and other posts have reported. XXXXXXXXXXXX said ruling circles on June 12 had fully expected that, due to the political chemistry and excitement generated by the Moussavi-Ahmedinejad debate, Moussavi would emerge a clear winner. The indicia of fraud he listed were similar to what Western observers have cited, but centered on implausible proportions of the vote for Ahmedinejad uniformly throughout Iran and an implausibly fast announcement. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke at length on the democratizing effects worldwide and in Iran of digital technology and said the deliberate interruption of SMS services had been a key factor in inhibiting opposition candidates' supporters from effectively monitoring vote compilation at polling centers.
XXXXXXXXXXXX Version of the Views of "Traditional" Insiders ------------------------------
¶5. (S) Of special interest XXXXXXXXXXXX description of the perceptions of persons inside "traditional revolutionary groups." XXXXXXXXXXXX said this election, Iran's first failed election "after 40 successful elections since the Revolution," had been unique for its "lack of advance clarity." The Iranian electoral norm, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, was that all parties' positions and interests are well defined many months in advance, whereas in this case it had not been clear to insiders, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, whether one of the major candidates, XXXXXXXXXXXXX, would even stand two days before the election. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this atmosphere created a need for certainty, and represented an opportunity for "those who had done this before" (XXXXXXXXXXXX did not explain this point to the larger group but see para. 10 below). Speaking elliptically, and without drawing a clear line between his points, XXXXXXXXXXXX said there were additional elements contributing to insiders' "atmosphere of uncertainty" and the motive and opportunity to "once more" manipulate the June 12 results. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said there were splits for the first time among the conservatives themselves, and not just among reformists, but emphasized strongly that "only a minority (of high-level individuals) supported Ahmedinejad, then and now. XXXXXXXXXXXX LONDON 00001442 002 OF 004 said the television debates were a very new factor and that the atmosphere, and insiders' "sense of control ....changed completely overnight" after the Moussavi-Ahmedinejad debate; "green appeared everywhere."
Where Senior Clerics Stand --------------------------
¶6. (S) He also said the debates produced "an explosion" among the clergy, directed, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, against Ahmedinejad. The late replacement of Interior Minister Pir Mohammadi by Ahmedinejad confederate Mahsouli had also been a worrisome event. Also significant, said XXXXXXXXXXXX in a distinctly positive tone, had been the candid and electrifying remarks in May on Iranian television of XXXXXXXXXXXXX, who had candidly criticized the government's rejectionist foreign policy vis a vis the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted very pointedly that, in his view, there is very little senior clerical support for Ahmedinejad; he said "they remember Ahmedinejad attacked them, and only one -- just one -- in Qom supports him," an apparent reference to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the ultimate denouement will be determined by interplay between the Guardian Council as it deliberates on the candidates' petitions for redress, and the Supreme Leader. This deliberation will be set against a background either of acquiescence by the international community and a lessening of the energy behind current protest levels, or of continued pressure and withholding of legitimacy through mass protest and united, sustained international attention. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that opponents of the Ahmedinejad win can settle for nothing less than a "re-vote," that the ballots as cast June 12 are too tainted for a recount now to have value. He said the United States &must not recognize Ahmedinejad.8
Rafsanjani Said To Be Unwilling to Tolerate A "Third Provocation" ---------------------------------
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly underlined what he called XXXXXXXXXXXX central role in resisting the "coup" and in backing the three aggrieved candidates. He described the June 12 vote manipulation as "a third provocation" against XXXXXXXXXXXX and the community he represents. Without naming the specific provocateurs, but saying the same ones are behind the current manipulation of election results, XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX had chosen not to respond to the electoral manipulations which had undercut him in the previous (2005) presidential elections and the 2007 Majles elections, but that he and "those whom this figure represents.... do not accept a third provocation;" XXXXXXXXXXXX repeated the phrase at several points in the evening. XXXXXXXXXXXX twice during the evening provided a detailed description of the IRGC and the original leaders of the 1979 revolution as being &those who really decide the national interest.8 At one point XXXXXXXXXXXX declared: &Presidents come and go but we remain and we decide what is the interest of the nation and the interest of the revolution.8
XXXXXXXXXXXX Picks the Green Folder -----------------------------
¶9. (S) Poloff, seated next to XXXXXXXXXXXX, offered XXXXXXXXXXXX one set apiece of Farsi language versions of President Obama's Cairo speech and his June 15 remarks (during Prime Minister Berlusconi's visit) on Iran: the two document sets were packaged in a green and a blue folder. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX Points at Jafari, Basij, and XXXXXXXXXXXXX -----------------------------------
¶10. (S) On the margins of the meeting afterwards, speaking to Poloff and to XXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX said IRGC commander XXXXXXXXXXXX has been a principal planner and instigator of election manipulations. Asked about the possible role of XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that "yes, we have serious division;" he said he could not name who in XXXXXXXXXXXX was involved, but emphasized "the large majority" of IRGC officers and rank and file "oppose LONDON 00001442 003 OF 004 what has happened."
Human Rights ------------
¶11. (S) In response to points Poloff made, drawing from NSC's June 16 public guidance, on USG concern over violence, possible vote fraud, the unchanging nature of international security concerns, and USG respect and noninterference in Iranian affairs, XXXXXXXXXXXX immediately and in front of the group asked that USG be very careful not to de-emphasize human rights in its public comments on Iran in the coming days. There was then a lengthy segue, not without irony, into the role human rights should play in U.S. foreign policy in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel/Palestine and Central Asia, followed by XXXXXXXXXXXX return to a request that the USG keep the human rights and safety of "peaceful Iranian demonstrators" at the center of the USG message. XXXXXXXXXXXX praised USG public statements on the elections to date, and agreed the principle of noninterference needs to be constantly repeated, but said the human rights component needed to go "somewhat farther." He argued that a failure to establish a strong and clear signal on human rights would legitimate, and thereby empower, security forces to slowly and quietly crush the current resistance.
Nuclear Engagement: "Cash for Cash" -------------------
¶12. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX asked to comment on prospects for nuclear engagement, politely but immediately dismissed the P5 1 offer as being "not business-like," in that it promises in his view "future U.S. action such as light water reactor or friendly security talks" in exchange for "real action by Iran now -- suspension of enrichment." He then made general remarks about the possibility of "a practical solution," but repeated "it must be business-like" with concrete motivations, and he raised anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism as things "which mean something to Iran -- you must make a real offer." He repeated the mantra "cash for cash" at least four times in describing what in the Iranian view constitutes a "business-like" approach to negotiation.
Personal Disappointment -----------------------
¶13. (S/NF) Poloff informed XXXXXXXXXXXX that, further to XXXXXXXXXXXX earlier expressions of interest at traveling to Washington to brief senior U.S. experts and officials (ref), USG officials were aware of his interest in traveling to the United States. As before Poloff offered to support and expedite the application but noted sharp limitations on Poloff's ability to assist; XXXXXXXXXXXX was visibly disappointed, remarking ruefully XXXXXXXXXXXXX would have to tell people "my Washington connection cannot produce as I wished." XXXXXXXXXXXX politely noted Poloff's pending departure from post and asked for an introduction to the incoming London Iran Watcher -- Poloff made tentative arrangements for introductions to be made in person on June 30, shortly before XXXXXXXXXXXX are due to return from the UK to Iran.
Comment -------
¶14. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXXX (ref). XXXXXXXXXXXX, whom Poloff has observed in a series of similar small group sessions since 2006 (ref), projected his usual smoothly self-confident, dominating presence, but seemed more internally agitated and ill at ease than in previous meetings. As the dinner broke up, his manner with Poloff on the margins in requesting USG public rhetorical support for demonstrators and human rights principles was (not quite but) almost pleading in tone, and far more urgent and solicitous than anything Poloff had previously heard from him. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX LONDON 00001442 004 OF 004
LeBaron
Source: Wikileaks
Years / Embassies of origin
1990
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Abu Dhabi
Addis Ababa
Amman
Ankara
Baghdad
Beirut
Berlin
Bern
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Cairo
Caracas
Damascus
Doha
Iran RPO Dubai
Kuwait
Lima
London
Madrid
Manama
Mexico
Mission USNATO
Moscow
Ottawa
Paris
Reykjavik
Riyadh
Sanaa
Santiago
Sao Paulo
Secretary of State
Sofia
Tel Aviv
Tripoli
Tunis
UNVIE
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
Blog Archive
-
▼
2011
(211)
-
▼
February
(94)
- BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD? SAADI AL-QADHAFI'S EXPORT F...
- LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILD...
- "I'M GOING TO WIN" PAN CANDIDATE FELIPE CALDERON T...
- AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESUMED PRESIDENT ELECT...
- STRENGTHENING CALDERON'S WEAK HAND
- AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT ...
- SRE'S GUTIERREZ TELLS SHANNON BORDER FENCE A BITT...
- MEXICAN ARMY MAJOR ARRESTED FOR ASSISTING DRUG TR...
- (U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation wit...
- (C/NF) GENERAL MEXICAN LEADERSHIP (C-AL9-02352)
- LEADING CENTER-RIGHT ARGENTINE OPPOSITION LEADER M...
- ARGENTINA: CANDID TALK FROM BUENOS AIRES MAYOR MAU...
- Argentina: Buenos Aires Mayor Macri on Political P...
- HUMALA'S LIAISON TO BUSINESS SECTOR MEETS WITH THE...
- FRENCH MFA PUTS SARKOZY'S JULY 10-11 NORTH AFRICA ...
- FRENCH AMBASSADOR,S VIEWS ON TUNISIAN POLITICAL SCENE
- FRENCH MFA OVERVIEW OF NORTH AFRICAN ISSUES
- FRENCH PM FILLON SIGNS EIGHT ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS O...
- FRANCE AND NORTH AFRICA: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
- (U)Secretary Clinton's March 9, 2009 Conversation...
- (C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON ITALY-RUSSIA RELAT...
- (S/NF) BAHRAIN: EMERGENT PRINCES NASIR AND KHALID
- BELARUS: DEMARCHE TO EU MEMBERS ON SANCTIONS POLICY
- E-PINE POLITICAL DIRECTORS, APRIL 30TH MEETING IN ...
- NORDIC AND BALTIC POLITICAL DIRECTORS, OCTOBER 2 C...
- INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE FOR THE APRIL 10 MEETING...
- NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS - LAUNCHING A LISTENING CAMPAIGN
- (U) CUBA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP (C-AL9-00784)
- REQUEST FOR KOREA TO HOLD CIVILIAN U.S.-ORIGIN CO...
- NOTIFICATION OF AFFECTED STATES: HIJACKING OF BELI...
- REQUEST TO ALLIES FOR NEW DEMARCHE TO CHINA REGARD...
- (S) SHIPMENT OF CHINESE ORIGIN GOODS DESTINED FOR ...
- S/E GRATION PARTICIPATES IN FOUR-PARTY TALKS ON S...
- ARAB LEAGUE CONCERN OVER SUMMIT; ISRAELI-PALESTINI...
- LEBANON TRIBUNAL: BAHRAIN SUPPORTIVE; NO FINANCIAL...
- BAHRAIN: UNIFIL COMMITMENT UNLIKELY
- BAHRAIN'S KING HAMAD ON SYRIA, LEBANON AND THE PA...
- BAHRAIN: PREPARATION FOR ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL
- LEBANON: BUILDING ON ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS
- BAHRAIN WILL ATTEND NAHR AL-BARID RECONSTRUCTION ...
- THE SHI'A CLERICAL HIERARCHY IN BAHRAIN
- GENERAL PETRAEUS’ VISIT TO BAHRAIN
- A FIELD GUIDE TO BAHRAINI POLITICAL PARTIES
- German Out-Of-Area Deployment Update
- UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JUNE 7 MEETING WITH ARAB LG...
- EGYPTIAN MFA ON ARAB LG MINISTERIAL; LEBANON; YEMEN
- POLICE BRUTALITY UPDATE: LAWYERS ALLEGE SEVERE TO...
- ISRAELI AND IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH CHILE
- SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS’ VISIT TO BAHRAIN
- BAHRAIN’S RELATIONS WITH IRAN
- GENERAL PETRAEUS’ VISIT TO BAHRAIN
- A FIELD GUIDE TO BAHRAINI POLITICAL
- XXXXXXXXXXXX ARGUES TIME IS RIPE FOR WEST TO MAKE...
- IRAN: DEMOCRACY SMALL GRANTS PROPOSALS RECOMMENDED...
- IRAN WANTS QUIET DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. ON AFGHAN R...
- IRAN - XXXXXXXXXXXX ARGUES FOR: BROADENING ENGAGEM...
- BRITISH PRESS CASE AGAINST IRISL WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
- IRAN ELECTIONS; DISARRAY IN BOTH CONSERVATIVE AND ...
- SUBJECT: KURDISH LEADER DISCUSSES RECENT TURKISH E...
- IRAN ELECTION: XXXXXXXXXXXX CLAIMS MOJTABA IS BEH...
- IRAN: XXXXXXXXXXXX SAYS ELECTION PRECLUDED BY "PO...
- IRAN: XXXXXXXXXXXX MEETS ARAB AMBASSADORS IN LONDON
- (NO SUBJECT, but related to "concerns about Syrian...
- (NO SUBJECT, but related to a review of Syria's 30...
- SYRIAN SCORE CARD: NO GRAND BARGAINS, BUT POSITIVE...
- (NO SUBJECT, but related to the visit of Jordan's ...
- A/S POSNER ENGAGES WITH CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICAL O...
- SCENESETTER FOR FBI DEPUTY DIRECTOR JOHN PISTOLE
- DAS DANIN AND DASD KIMMITT DISCUSS GAZA SMUGGLING ...
- REPAIRING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI COMMUNICATIONS
- CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
- DEFENSE MINISTER BARAK'S DISCUSSIONS IN EGYPT FOC...
- (NO SUBJECT, but related to DEC 2005 Mueller's vis...
- (NO SUBJECT, but related to DIRECTOR MUELLER’S VIS...
- FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER’S VISIT TO EGYPT
- SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CROCKER’S VISIT TO CAIRO
- BRAZIL: IRAN, ARAB WORLD, ON AMORIM'S MIND IN 2008
- (C) UK UNDECIDED ON EU-SYRIA ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
- UK, WITH EU PARTNERS, TO CONDEMN SYRIA AT IAEA BO...
- QADHAFI AND ASAD
- SHIELD S04B-08: SYRIA ARRANGING TO ACQUIRE CW EQU...
- FRENCH CONSIDER THEIR DAMASCUS VISIT A SUCCESS
- ENGAGING SYRIA: INSIGHTS FROM JEAN-CLAUDE COUSSERAN
- ISRAELI OFFICIALS REQUEST USG DEMARCHE SYRIA ON P...
- SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ATTENDS CT DIALOGUE WITH...
- ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT MEETING: SPIELBERG DESIGNATED
- DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ANTI-ISRAEL RESOLUTIONS AT UNGA
- IRANIAN PUGWASH PARTICIPANTS CLAIM TEHRAN INDIFFE...
- (S/NF) UK CONSIDERING ENGAGEMENT WITH HIZBALLAH MI...
- IRAN: READOUT FROM UK LEGISLATORS AND FROM TEHRAN ...
- SYRIAN SUPPORT TO HIZBALLAH - DEMARCHE DELIVERED I...
- DISCOURAGING MORATINOS' SYRIAN STRATEGY
- FRENCH ON PM DE VILLEPIN'S MARCH 13 WORKING VISIT ...
- SUBJECT: GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESO...
-
▼
February
(94)
Top 10 Popular Reports
-
Reference ID 08CAIRO2572 Created 2008-12-30 09:09 Released 2011-01-28 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Cairo VZCZCXRO6679 RR RUEHROV DE ...
-
Reference ID 10CAIRO169 Created 2010-02-08 14:02 Released 2011-01-28 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Cairo VZCZCXRO9007 RR RUEHRO...
-
Reference ID 10STATE13701 Created 2010-02-16 22:10 Released 2011-01-28 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Secretary o...
-
Reference ID 09TELAVIV1324 Date 2009-06-18 08:08 Released 2010-12-07 21:09 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Tel Aviv VZCZCXRO1978 OO RUE...
-
Reference ID 09TELAVIV2502 Date 2009-11-18 14:02 Released 2010-12-06 21:09 Classification SECRET Origin Embassy Tel Aviv VZCZCXRO1504 OO RUE...
-
Reference ID 07BERN171 Created 2007-02-23 14:02 Released 2011-02-18 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Bern VZCZCXRO6253 OO RUEHBC R...
-
Reference ID 08BEIRUT571 Date 2008-04-24 04:58 Released 2010-12-01 19:07 Classification SECRET//NOFORN Origin Embassy Beirut VZCZCXRO7290 PP...
-
Reference ID 08BEIRUT1168 Date 2008-08-08 03:43 Released 2010-12-01 19:07 Classification SECRET//NOFORN Origin Embassy Beirut VZCZCXRO6572 P...
-
Reference ID 09DAMASCUS179 Date 2009-03-10 10:10 Released 2010-11-28 18:06 Classification CONFIDENTIAL Origin Embassy Damascus VZCZCXYZ0001 ...
-
Reference ID 06SAOPAULO269 Created 2006-03-13 20:08 Released 2011-01-28 Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin Consulate ...
No comments:
Post a Comment