RUSSIAN PRISONS

Reference ID 08MOSCOW531
Date 2008-02-27 13:01
Released 2010-12-26 21:09
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Moscow


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DE RUEHMO #0531/01 0581325
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271325Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6820
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE


C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000531

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV TBIO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PRISONS

REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 4543
¶B. MOSCOW 325
¶C. MOSCOW 378

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reason 1.4(d).

¶1. (C) Summary: The Russian prison system combines the
country's emblematic features - vast distances, harsh
climate, and an uncaring bureaucracy - and fuses them into a
massive instrument of punishment. Russia imprisons a greater
portion of its population than almost any other country in
the world (second only to the U.S.). In contrast to other
Western countries, the system is foremost focused on
punishment, not rehabilitation, and while statisics are
difficult to compare, produces a lower rate of recidivism.
Recent prison riots, new prisoner shock tactics, and smuggled
videos of prison mistreatment have highlighted the cruelties
and corruption in the system. Health conditions in Russian
prisons are poor and infection rates for contagious diseases
are much higher than in the general population, but
surprisingly the mortality rate for men in these prisons is
only one-third the rate on the outside - a statistic that
says much more about the dangers of alcoholism and road
safety than it does about healthy living behind bars.
Reports of abuses in the prison system have been answered
with calls for reform, most recently in the Human Rights
Ombudsman's annual report and by the President's Human Rights
Council. While NGO activists such as the embattled Lev
Ponomarev praise the work of Lukin, the insurmountable
challenges posed by the physical and cultural nature of the
prison system mean that efforts to improve conditions or to
alter the character of the system from punishment to
rehabilitation are likely to produce only superficial
improvements. End summary.

------------------------------
Structure of the Prison System
------------------------------

¶2. (U) The Federal Service for the Execution of Punishments
(FSIN), part of the Ministry of Justice, administers more
than 700 Russian jails and prisons across the country (this
cable does not address the military prison system operated by
the Ministry of Defense). There are four levels of
incarceration as prisoners move through the justice system:
temporary police custody facilities for those held pending
charges; pretrial detention facilities (SIZOs) for those
charged with crimes; lower-security correctional labor
colonies (ITKs); and high-security prisons for more dangerous
prisoners and for those who violate the rules of ITKs.
Convicted juveniles serve their sentences in "educational
labor colonies" (VTKs) for juveniles, in almost all cases
separate from adult prisoners.

¶3. (C) According to Lev Ponomarev, who recently established
the NGO "For Prisoners' Rights," the authorities use a
two-tier system of administration. The prison officials and
the guards protect the perimeter of the facilities and
provide the upper layer of security, but then they elevate
select prisoners to act as internal enforcers among the other
prisoners. These elite prisoners receive privileges and
protections in return for enforcing a brutal form of order
within the prisons. Ponomarev called this a "low-risk ghetto
system" for the guards. "If one of their enforcers gets
killed by another, they can just promote a new one. Maybe
even the one that killed the last boss." Ponomarev told us
that the prisoners have little choice, and cited an example
of one member of the National Bolshevik Party who was sent
into solitary confinement for one year for refusing to act as
an enforcer.

¶4. (C) This system of using prisoners to enforce discipline
and order was formally established by the Ministry of Justice
in 2005. According to William Smirnov, a member of the
President's Council on Human Rights, the MOJ formalized a
system that had long existed. Smirnov defended the system,
telling us that "It was not a bad idea, but it was poorly
implemented."

¶5. (C) According to Viktoriya Sergeyeva of Prison Reform
International (PRI) in Moscow, the source of the problems is
the Ministry of Justice and the FSIN. The low pay and low
prestige of prison administrators and guards, combined with a
lack of oversight and accountability, have created an abusive
system rife with cruelty and corruption. Guards use
violence, threats of violence, or the lack of protection to
extort prisoners. Other guards take bribes for allowing
relatives to smuggle in goods to prisoners. Sergeyeva said
that prison administrators knew what was occurring and
probably received a cut from the guards.

-----------

The Inmates
-----------

¶6. (U) According to FSIN statistics, as of July, there were
approximately 889,600 people in the custody of the criminal
justice system, including 63,000 women and 12,100 juveniles.
This rate of 630 prisoners per 100,000 citizens is second in
the world only to the United States (702 per 100,000). The
number of prisoners has increased in recent years. Compared
to July 2005, the total number of prisoners has increased by
101,000 ( 13 percent), the number of women prisoners
increased by 15,000 ( 31 percent), and the number of juvenile
prisoners decreased by 2,400 (-17 percent). Not
surprisingly, most prisoners are poorer and less educated
that the general population; only 1.3 percent of male
prisoners have university degrees, compared to 22.5 percent
of the general population, and nearly 60 percent of convicts
were unemployed prior to their arrests. Seventy percent are
unmarried.

¶7. (C) During the last year, there have been scattered
reports of uprisings in prisons, including a revolt and
jailbreak at the youth prison in Togliatti (Samara Oblast).
According to Ponomarev, this revolt was triggered by the
transfer of a large number of 20 year-old prisoners to an
adult prison. By law, he explained, convicts sentenced
before they turn 18 are sent to youth prisons, where they may
stay until they turn 21, at which time they are transferred
to an adult prison. Other protest actions, such as hunger
strikes, are still common, but Ponomarev described a new
shock tactic whereby prisoners will en masse slice open a
vein on their arms or neck in protest of mass beatings.
While the poor conditions in the prisons have not further
deteriorated in the past few years, the prisoners are
becoming more organized. "Smuggled cell phones are enabling
prisoners to communicate better and to coordinate mass
action," said Ponomarev.

--------------------------------------------- -
Distance, Climate, and Isolation as Punishment
--------------------------------------------- -

¶8. (U) The prison system incorporates Russia's vast distances
and harsh climate into the system of punishment. Although
the law states that prisoners should not be incarcerated
outside the region where they lived or were convicted unless
local prisons are overcrowded, this rule is routinely
disregarded, according to Sergeyeva. Many prisons are
located in isolated regions with harsh climates and use
buildings that are not adequately heated, cooled, or
ventilated. Often, the transfer of prisoners far from their
homes is due to space concerns, but it is also used as a form
of punishment for troublesome prisoners. The best known
example of this treatment is Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, who is
imprisoned in Chita, nearly 3,000 miles from his native
Moscow. His associate, Platon Lebedev is imprisoned nearly
1,200 miles from Moscow above the Arctic Circle. The
Moscow-based Open Health Institute (OHI) reported that this
physical isolation leads to personal isolation, and that
between 50 and 80 percent of all prisoners had not received
any visitors in the prior three months. This isolation from
family and friends has negative repercussions on future
rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

¶9. (U) Due to the nature of this federal (not regional)
system, juveniles and women are more likely to be located far
from their homes. For example, there are only three prisons
in the country for the 1,000 girl prisoners - one in Tomsk
for all of Siberia and the Far East, one in Ryazan, and one
in Belgorod. This great distance makes it almost impossible
for families to have regular contact with their children.

¶10. (U) Prison guards still rely heavily on traditional forms
of violence and deprivation to maintain control. Solitary
confinement for long periods (sometimes longer than one year)
while illegal is reportedly used, and some isolation cells
are too small for the inmate to fully stretch out lying down.
In what Ponomarev said was a typical incident, he showed us
a video filmed by a guard and sent anonymously to For
Prisoners' Rights. The video, since posted on YouTube, shows
prison guards marching out prisoners in a Sverdlovsk Oblast
prison past dogs. Some prisoners were then stripped to the
waist, stretched out over tables, and then beaten with billy
clubs by the guards. "This is routine behavior," said
Ponomarev, "what is different is that it was recorded."
REN-TV aired short segments of the video during an evening
newscast. A recent news report from Kalmykiya claimed that
after a new warden was appointed to a local SIZO, the
Ministry of Justice's special forces visited the prison and
beat up every detainee saying that it was a greeting from the
new warden. Ponomarev said that such reports surfaced
relatively rarely, and that prison administrators will
continue to exploit their remote locations and be able to
ward off scrutiny from the press, NGOs, or government
watchdogs.

¶11. (U) According to Sergeyeva, the recidivism rate in Russia
is only 36 percent (compared to more than 50 percent in the
United States or the United Kingdom). She attributed this
low number to a combination of factors, including the longer
average Russian prison term which keeps men in jail and a
genuine fear of returning to prison. (Note: It is difficult
to evenly compare the U.S. and Russian statistics since U.S.
conditions vary from state to state and from the federal
prisons. End note.) "We still have the problem that when
these prisoners return to society, they have no system of
assistance. The federal budget finances the prisons and the
punishment, but they leave it up to regional and local
government to finance the rehabilitation and health costs.
They break them, and then we own them."

-----------------
Health Conditions
-----------------

¶12. (U) Conditions in pre-detention facilities (SIZOs) are
generally worse than in the prisons. The prison system does
not have enough SIZOs to handle the large number of the
accused, and overcrowding and squalid conditions are
widespread. Many SIZOs lack toilets, and inmates use
buckets. In a well-documented case at the European Court of
Human Rights (Mayzit v. Russia, No. 63378/00), the court
found Russia in violation of the Prohibition of Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment by placing Yuriy Mayzit in severely
overcrowded cells with less than two square meters per person
(the Russian legal minimum is four square meters/person, the
European minimum is seven square meters/person). According
to Human Rights activists and the Ombudsman Lukin, similar
conditions (or worse) exist throughout the system.

¶13. (U) Health conditions in prisons are poor. Overcrowding
is common, the infection rates of resistant TB and HIV/AIDS
are much higher than in the general population, and even
though the TB infection rate has greatly decreased since
1999, the active TB rate among prisoner is still five times
higher than in the civilian population (Ref A). According to
the Open Health Institute (OHI), there were 41,500 inmates
with HIV/AIDS in 2006, approximately ten percent of the cases
in the country. Prisoners with active TB are segregated from
the regular prison population and are given rigorous medical
treatment, but because the treatment of normal TB lasts up to
12 months and even longer for drug-resistant TB, many
prisoners are released before they complete treatment and an
estimated 40 percent fail to continue their treatment on the
outside. A 2005 study by OHI revealed that former prisoners
carry these infections back to the general population upon
their release, and they account for an estimated 20 percent
of new TB cases in the civilian population.

¶14. (U) OHI Deputy Director Aleksey Bobrik reported a
counterintuitive statistic that even though the mortality
rate from infectious diseases was greater in prisons than in
the general population, the overall mortality rate for men in
prison was only one-third that of the general population.
Bobrik and the other OHI researchers attributed this to the
absence of binge drinking, car accidents, and industrial
accidents in prison. Long-term health for inmates, however,
suffers greatly as the poor nutrition, stress, and disease
manifest themselves later in life.

-----------------------
First-Hand Observations
-----------------------

¶15. (SBU) Embassy and Consulate employees have visited
several jails and prisons across Russia and report that
conditions are generally poor. In the Kholmsk pre-trial
detention center on Sakhalin Island, the facilities are
literally crumbling, it is dangerous to walk the hallways,
and the dark living quarters lack every amenity. One
American detainee was initially denied a bed, and his health
deteriorated noticeably during the weeks he was held there.

¶16. (SBU) The facilities that consular staff see are
generally better than the prevailing living conditions,
according to prisoners. Consular officers generally will
meet with prisoners in a waiting room, sometimes under a
guard's watch, but often alone in a room. We have the
greatest access to the prison in Mordovia, which is used for
foreign citizens, but we cannot say that it is typical of the
system. An American citizen convicted of pedophilia used
money and goods sent from the outside to buy the favor and
protection of the prison commandant. He had no complaints
about threats from other prisoners, which is not typical of
Russian prisons where pedophiles are reportedly at the bottom
of the prisoner caste system.

¶17. (SBU) At the women's prison in Mozhaisk (Moscow Oblast)
the Embassy and a visiting DOJ delegation were given a tour
of the prison housing facilities and clothing factory, and
then treated to a bizarre fashion and talent show by the
inmates. Eleven of the 43 women's prisons in the Russian
Federation allow inmates to have children under age three to
live on the prison grounds, and women in the other prisons
who become pregnant are transferred to prisons that allow
children. Only two, Mozhaisk and Mordovia, allow mothers to
live and sleep in the same rooms with their young children.
At age three, the children are moved to family members on the
outside or to orphanages. The facilities at Mozhaisk were
clean, well kept, and the factory where prisoners produced
uniforms for the military, police, and other government
workers appeared to be safe, well lit, and well run.

------------------------------------------
Oversight and Efforts to Reform the System
------------------------------------------

¶18. (C) Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin told the
Ambassador in a February 7 meeting (Ref B) that prison
conditions were one of the most important issues for him, but
that he had difficulty gaining unfettered access to the
prisons and that prison authorities were the main obstacle he
faced in addressing prisoners' human rights complaints. Lukin
said that the FSIN was slowly improving conditions, and that
new construction fixed many of the problems of sanitation and
overcrowding.

¶19. (SBU) On February 14, Lukin issued his 2007 Human Rights
report for Russia which reproached the FSIN for the
deplorable conditions in the prison and for their lack of
cooperation in addressing the abuses. Like the 2006 report,
the 2007 report focuses heavily on abuse in the prison
system, and Lukin noted that almost 20 percent of the total
15,000 complaints that his office received last year were
reports of ill treatment in the prisons. Lukin wrote that his
office had investigated approximately half of the prison
complaints but that he was often stonewalled by prison
authorities in getting evidence. According to Lukin, fewer
than 150 of the 1,500 cases he had brought to the attention
of prison officials resulted in any corrective action.

¶20. (SBU) Lukin proposes several reforms that would address
problems in the system, foremost among them being the
expansion of parole, which would ease the overcrowding of the
system, and change the focus of the prison system from
punishment to rehabilitation. He also proposes minor
changes, such as moving the prison hospital system out of the
Ministry of Justice and into the Ministry of Health. Lukin
noted that Russia already had adequate legislation to address
many of the abuses, such as keeping prisoners near their home
region or providing them with proper medical care; the
problem, however, is that the FSIN often disregards the law.

¶21. (C) Ponomarev and PRI's Alla Pokras both praised the work
of Lukin and Ella Pamfilova, the Chair of the Presidential
Council on Human Rights, but said that the problems in the
system were too great and too severe for them to handle.
Pamfilova told the Ambassador on February 11 that she had
been thwarted in her reform efforts by the Ministry of
Justice (Ref C). Ponomarev noted that Putin met with
Pamfilova on January 11 to discuss problems in the prisons,
but that he offered nothing substantive. Putin was quoted
saying "The situation (in prisons) has been changing slowly
but surely, largely through consistent and systematic efforts
by human rights organizations." Although Ponomarev agreed
that human rights groups were doing most of the work to
reform the system, he disagreed that the situation was
improving, or that human rights organizations could do this
work by themselves. "We can shine a light on this situation,
but the government runs the prisons -- neither we nor Lukin
himself can even gain access to the 40 worst 'torture
prisons.' How can he honestly expect that we could possibly
change this system?"

¶22. (U) On February 22, a Moscow court acting on a complaint
by FSIN Director Kalinin filed a suit against Ponomarev for
defamation. The suit is based upon a November 2006 interview
with Regnum.ru where Ponomarev called FSIN Director Kalinin
the "author" of the system in which select prisoners enforce
order and discipline on others. Ponomarev also described a
network of 40 "torture prisons" and alleged that torture,
beating, and rape (or the threat thereof) were used to
extract confessions and control prisoners. The prosecutor's
complaint did not take issue with Ponomarev's
characterization of the system or the allegations of torture
in the prisons, but focused instead on the fact that it was a
Ministry of Justice decree that established the system, not
Kalinin himself. If found guilty, Ponomarev faces up to
three years of first-hand experience inside the prison system.

-------
Comment
-------

¶23. (C) A system as vast and entrenched as the Russian
prison system will be difficult if not impossible to reform.
The nature of the system, which has not substantively varied
as it has evolved from tsarist prisons to the gulag to
today's system, nurtures the spread of disease, abuse, and
corruption. Observers agree that the combination of
distance, isolation, corruption, and general indifference to
the plight of convicts combine to create a system that is
brutal and will resist attempts to reveal its inner workings,
or to change it.


BURNS





Source: Wikileaks

TOP ASAD SECURITY AIDE ASSASSINATED

Reference ID 08DAMASCUS541
Date 2008-08-03 15:03
Released 2010-12-20 21:09
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Damascus


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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000541

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH

EO 12958 DECL: 08/03/2028
TAGS PGOV, PTER, SY, LE, IS
SUBJECT: TOP ASAD SECURITY AIDE ASSASSINATED

Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Tim Pounds for reasons 1.4(b,d)

-------
Summary
-------

¶1. (S/NF) Syrian Presidential security aide Brigadier General Muhammad Sulayman was assassinated by a sniper late on the evening of August 1 in the coastal city of Tartous. Sulayman enjoyed a reputation among Embassy contacts as having special status and proximity to Bashar. Sulayman was said to have managed special projects for Asad, some of which may have been unknown to the broader Syrian military leadership. Our expectation is that the SARG will try to keep this incident under wraps as long as possible, but that will become more difficult as regional and international press run with the story. End summary.

----------------------------
Details Murky After Official News Blackout
----------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) On August 3, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz cited “senior sources in Damascus” in reporting Sulayman’s assassination on its website, identifying Sulayman as Asad’s “liaison” to Hizballah. Al Hayat and the news ticker Al Bawaba also reported the story. A reliable Embassy press contact said that he had heard of the attack yesterday, and said that the version of the story he had heard was that Sulayman’s entire family had also been killed. According to the contact, Syrian security services quickly cordoned and searched the entire beach neighborhood where the shooting had occurred. Other Embassy sources would say little except that Syria-based reporters are under instructions not to report the story. As of late August 3, all Syrian-based press remains silent.

------------------------
Pointing the SARG Finger
------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) As in other recent assassinations in Syria, speculation about who could have done it will likely be rampant. The most obvious suspects are the Israelis. SARG security services are well aware that the coastal city of Tartous would offer easier access to Israeli operatives than would more inland locations such as Damascus. Sulayman was not a highly visible government official, and the use of a sniper suggests the assassin could visually identify Sulayman from a distance. As Tartous is also close to the northern-most part of the Syrian-Lebanese border, the SARG might blame pro-Saudi Islamist militants from Tripoli or the Nahr al-Barid camp. Some may even go so far as to suggest the (comment: unlikely) possibility that this was an inside job to prevent Sulayman from damaging the Syrian regime.

------------
Implications
------------

¶4. (S/NF) Although officially just a Brigadier General, Sulayman was considered President Asad’s top security aide and was known to manage several special projects for Bashar -- some of which may have been unknown to the broader Syrian military leadership. Sulayman’s proximity to Asad granted him special status in the eyes of more senior Syrian military officials.
DAMASCUS 00000541 002 OF 002

¶5. (S/NF) If the SARG were to suspect an Israeli role in the assassination, it may be reluctant to level public accusations as (1) they may not know who did it; (2) such accusations could impair or end Syria’s nascent peace negotiations with Israel; and (3) publicizing the event would reveal yet another lapse in Syria’s vaunted security apparatus. Syria could seek to retaliate against Israel via proxies and allies in Lebanon or elsewhere. If terrorist groups are suspected, this may prompt a domestic crackdown or counterstrikes on targets within the suspected group.

¶6. (S/NF) Although unlikely, elements within the SARG may suspect or allege a U.S. role. Possible responses could include staged demonstrations against U.S. interests in Syria, retaliatory diplomatic or security measures, or the threat of targeting U.S. installations via proxies. To date, Post has no indications that the SARG is seeking to blame the USG for the assassination, impose retaliatory measures, or retreat from its commitment to ensure security for our facilities and personnel. Additionally, core country team assesses that no immediate, new threats have been identified as a result of post-incident reporting.

----------------------------
Probable Short-term Reaction
----------------------------

¶7. (S/NF) For now, the most likely default SARG response will be to clamp down on information and say nothing while the various security services scramble to identify a culprit and avoid being blamed. However long the Syrians can hold out without saying anything, they will. SARG leaders will likely view any publicity of the assassination as a net loss for the regime.

-------
Comment
-------

¶8. (S/NF) As press in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region reports Sulayman’s assassination, it will be increasingly difficult for the SARG to keep a lid on this high-profile attack. Coinciding with Bashar’s trip to Tehran and on the heels of the latest round of indirect talks with Israel, the assassination will likely weaken advocates of the peace negotiations, including Bashar himself.


CHASE





Source: Wikileaks

SLEIMAN VISIT TO DAMASCUS: AGREEMENT ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, LOTS OF WORK AHEAD

Reference ID 08DAMASCUS579
Date 2008-08-14 16:04
Released 2010-12-20 21:09
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Damascus


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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5280
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000579

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH

EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2028
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SY, LE
SUBJECT: SLEIMAN VISIT TO DAMASCUS: AGREEMENT ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, LOTS OF WORK AHEAD
REF: A. DAMASCUS 526 B. DAMASCUS 541

Classified By: Classified by Pol/Econ Chief Tim Pounds for 1.5 b and d.

¶1. (S) Summary: In a visit that went largely as scripted, Lebanese President Sleiman arrived August 13 in Damascus and issued a joint press statement with President Asad on their decision to establish full diplomatic relations “at the ambassadorial level.” Though there were Syrian concerns that a bus bombing in Tripoli might have led to a postponement, the two leaders held a series of positive meetings and left their FMs with most of the follow-up work. At an August 14 mid-day press conference, FM Salloukh and FM Muallim explained that they and their ministerial counterparts would meet soon to implement this decision through a long list of bilateral committees. Beneath the calm surface, internal debate reportedly intensified among Syrian policymakers over the SARG’s foreign policy course and the future of key security service officials. End Summary

----------------------------------------
Warm Atmospherics, Visit Goes as Planned
----------------------------------------

¶2. (SBU) Pre-visit Syrian editorials and statements waxed eloquently about the special nature of Lebanese-Syrian relations and predicted success in the opening a new chapter between the two countries. A Presidential Palace source spun the visit as a victory in preventing efforts to drive a wedge between Lebanon and Syria. Damascenes awoke to find a two-mile stretch of the Beirut-Damascus highway decorated with Syrian and Lebanese flags, placed side-by-side atop median street lights. FM Muallim told the press that Bashar had instructed all Syrian officials to make the visit “successful and fruitful,” adding “it is up to both parties to decide whether they want to reopen wounds or heal them.” VP Sharaa, adding his deft touch to the pre-visit build-up, said Syria was interested in good relations with Lebanon and welcomed “any Lebanese official,” including PM Siniora. On the issue of prisoners (“the issue of the missing”), Sharaa called for a “solution that reassures both parties; hence, the Lebanese do not complain about having any detainees in Syrian prisons, and vice versa.” The closure of this file, Sharaa added, would mark the “real entry” into new bilateral relations.

¶3. (C) D/FM Miqdad’s Chief of Staff told us during a August 13 courtesy call with incoming and outgoing Charge that there had been concern regarding the possibility of a postponement in the wake of the early morning bus bombing in Tripoli that killed Lebanese civilians and soldiers. The SARG quickly issued a condemnation of the attack, and the joint presidential statement reiterated this sentiment. FM Muallim and Salloukh issued new condemnations in their joint press conference today.

¶4. (SBU) In their August 13 joint statement, Sleiman and Asad agreed on “establishing diplomatic relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic at the ambassadorial level,” in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. It added, “The foreign ministers of the two countries have been tasked, beginning this day, to take the necessary measures in accordance with legislative and legal regulations in the two countries.” The text states that border issues and “missing people from both countries” were also discussed.

¶5. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the two Presidents discussed a wide range of issues for further action, including prisoner releases, border demarcation, and the broad array of economic, political, cultural and other agreements implemented by the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council (Ref A). Asad and Sleiman reportedly agreed in principle that Asad would visit Beirut at some date in the future. The two leaders are trying to build confidence on a basic level by exchanging embassies and ambassadors, but both sides realize the need for political consensus within each country to move forward, XXXXXXXXXXXX reported. Having only recently arrived at a Council of Ministers declaration and a vote of confidence by the Parliament, the Lebanese government needed more time to discuss how to approach the relationship. Having the foreign ministers continue discussions was the logical step, he suggested.
DAMASCUS 00000579 002 OF 002

¶6. (SBU) In addition to the joint Presidential statement, FM Salloukh and Muallim spoke at a joint press conference about the creation of several working committees to implement the establishment of diplomatic relations. Asked about Secretary Rice’s positive characterization of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon, Muallim replied, “This issue was merely a result of bilateral will. If others find it positive, we welcome this.” Follow up actions announced by the FMs include:
-- a commitment by both sides to reactivate joint committees on border demarcation “according to the priorities agreed by both sides.” (Note: Muallim stressed, and Salloukh supported, the necessity of ending Israel’s occupation of the Golan, Shebaa farms, Gajar, and Kfar Shuba.)
-- a commitment to control borders, combat smuggling, and coordinate more closely on border administration.
-- agreement to reactivate joint committees on “missing citizens” in both countries.
-- agreement to reactivate commercial relations and to create a “common market.”
-- agreement to review bilateral agreements “objectively.”

---------------------------------------
Report of Mounting Tensions Inside SARG
---------------------------------------

¶7. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, General Mohamad Sulayman’s assassination remains a frequent source of controversy in internal SARG deliberations. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that tempers flared during an August 12 Higher Policy Council meeting when high level security service officials openly questioned the government’s continuation of indirect negotiations with Israel and its “generosity” with Lebanon. The spark that reportedly set off this discussion was FM Muallim’s presentation on potential deliverables that would strengthen President Sleiman’s hand, to include release of Lebanese prisoners. The security service chiefs claimed that Syria would make concessions and not receive any tangible gains from engaging Lebanon or talking indirectly to Israel.

¶8. (S) Underlying this tense exchange was frustration within the security services that the SARG was all but ignoring the assassination of Sulayman (ref B), XXXXXXXXXXXX noted. Security service officials were suggesting that “if the Israelis did it” (i.e., killed Sulayman, why was the SARG continuing the dialogue? XXXXXXXXXXXX added, “And if it was an inside job, people are wondering about their future.” Bashar was thus under increasing pressure to provide assurances to his security chiefs about their positions and about the SARG’s intention not to make premature concessions, such as public deliverables that would strengthen Sleiman’s position within the GOL. Bashar’s brother Maher was “somewhere in the middle” of this debate and was seeking to play consensus maker and would likely make efforts to satisfy security service chiefs that Sleiman visit had strengthened the regime’s prestige, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.

¶9. (S) Comment: As expected, the Sleiman visit was long on symbolism and short on commitment to take immediate concrete actions. While this meeting marked a historic precedent, the absence of any public mention of agreed timelines suggests the exchange of ambassadors could be a prolonged process. Unless Asad and Sleiman agreed privately to expedite ministry-to-ministry talks, progress on other issues (prisoners, borders, bilateral agreements) is unlikely to move rapidly. Nonetheless, the SARG will play up Sleiman’s visit to demonstrate that Syria has met a key French demand for further engagement. Internal SARG ripples from the Sulayman assassination could lead to a confrontation, but thus far the regime has contained these tensions from spilling over into the public sphere. The Palace’s spin of the visit as a success in blocking efforts to drive a wedge between Lebanon and Syria suggests an attempt to satisfy hard-liners that the regime’s image has been bolstered.



CORBIN






Source: Wikileaks

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR YADLIN COMMENTS ON GAZA, SYRIA AND LEBANON

Reference ID 07TELAVIV1733
Date 2007-06-13 16:04
Released 2010-12-19 21:09
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Tel Aviv


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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001733

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS KWBG LE SY IS
SUBJECT: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR YADLIN COMMENTS ON
GAZA, SYRIA AND LEBANON

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. During a June 12 meeting with the
Ambassador, IDI Director MG Amos Yadlin said that Gaza was
"number four" on his list of threats, preceded by Iran,
Syria, and Hizballah in that order. Yadlin said the IDI has
been predicting armed confrontation in Gaza between Hamas and
Fatah since Hamas won the January 2006 legislative council
elections. Yadlin felt that the Hamas military wing had
initiated the current escalation with the tacit consent of
external Hamas leader Khalid Mishal, adding that he did not
believe there had been a premeditated political-level
decision by Hamas to wipe out Fatah in Gaza. Yadlin
dismissed Fatah's capabilities in Gaza, saying Hamas could
have taken over there any time it wanted for the past year,
but he agreed that Fatah remained strong in the West Bank.
Although not necessarily reflecting a GOI consensus view,
Yadlin said Israel would be "happy" if Hamas took over Gaza
because the IDF could then deal with Gaza as a hostile state.
He dismissed the significance of an Iranian role in a
Hamas-controlled Gaza "as long as they don't have a port."
Regarding predictions of war with Syria this summer, Yadlin
recalled the lead-up to the 1967 war, which he said was
provoked by the Soviet Ambassador in Israel. Both Israel and
Syria are in a state of high alert, so war could happen
easily even though neither side is seeking it. Yadlin
suggested that the Asad regime would probably not survive a
war, but added that Israel was no longer concerned with
maintaining that "evil" regime. On Lebanon, Yadlin felt that
the fighting in the Nahr Al-Barid camp was a positive
development for Israel since it had "embarrassed" Hizballah,
adding that IDI had information that the Fatah Al-Islam
terrorist group was planning to attack UNIFIL before it
blundered into its confrontation with the LAF. End Summary.

Gaza Fighting Not Israel's Main Problem
---------------------------------------

¶2. (S) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol Couns and DATT,
called on IDI Director Major General Amos Yadlin June 12.
Noting reports of fierce fighting between Hamas and Fatah in
Gaza that day, the Ambassador asked for Yadlin's assessment.
Yadlin described Gaza as "not Israel's main problem," noting
that it ranked fourth in his hierarchy of threats, behind
Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. Yadlin described Gaza as
"hopeless for now," commenting that the Palestinians had to
realize that Hamas offered no solution. IDI analysts, he
said, had predicted a confrontation in Gaza since Hamas won
the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January
¶2006. Yadlin commented that Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas and Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh had become
personally close despite their ideological differences, but
neither leader had control over those forces under them.

¶3. (S) Yadlin explained that both Fatah and Hamas contained
many factions. The Hamas military wing had been frustrated
since the signing of the Mecca Agreement in January, but
there were also many armed groups in Gaza that were not under
the control of either party. Yadlin cited the example of the
Dughmush clan, which had shifted from Fatah to the Popular
Resistance Committees to Hamas before becoming an armed
entity opposed to all of them. After May 15, the Hamas
military wing had sought to export the fighting to Sderot by
launching waves of Qassam rockets. One week later, as a
result of IDF retaliation, they realized the price was too
high and reduced the Qassam attacks.

¶4. (S) In response to the Ambassador's question, Yadlin said
he did not think that day's Hamas attacks on Fatah security
forces were part of a premeditated effort to wipe out Fatah
in Gaza. Instead, they probably represented an initiative of
the military wing with the tacit consent of Khalid Mishal in
Damascus. Mishal was still considering the costs and
benefits of the fighting, but the situation had become so
tense that any incident could lead to street fighting without
any political decision.

Gaza and West Bank Separating
-----------------------------

¶5. (S) The Ambassador asked Yadlin for his assessment of
reports that Fatah forces had been ordered not to fight back.
Yadlin said Mohammed Dahlan had 500 men and the Presidential
Guard had 1,500 more. They understand that the balance of
power favors Hamas, which "can take over Gaza any time it
wants to." Yadlin said he would be surprised if Fatah
fights, and even more surprised if they win. As far as he
was concerned, this had been the case for the past year. The
situation was different in the West Bank, however, where
Fatah remained relatively strong and had even started to

TEL AVIV 00001733 002 OF 002


kidnap Hamas activists. Yadlin agreed that Tawfiq Tirawi had
a power base in the West Bank, but he added that Fatah was
not cohesive.

¶6. (S) The Ambassador commented that if Fatah decided it has
lost Gaza, there would be calls for Abbas to set up a
separate regime in the West Bank. While not necessarily
reflecting a consensus GOI view, Yadlin commented that such a
development would please Israel since it would enable the IDF
to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal
with Hamas as a non-state actor. He added that Israel could
work with a Fatah regime in the West Bank. The Ambassador
asked Yadlin if he worried about a Hamas-controlled Gaza
giving Iran a new opening. Yadlin replied that Iran was
already present in Gaza, but Israel could handle the
situation "as long as Gaza does not have a port (sea or air)."

War with Syria "Could Happen Easily"
------------------------------------

¶7. (S) Noting Israeli press speculation, the Ambassador
asked Yadlin if he expected war with Syria this summer.
Recalling the 1967 war, Yadlin commented that it had started
as a result of the Soviet Ambassador in Israel reporting on
non-existing Israeli preparations to attack Syria. Something
similar was happening again, he said, with the Russians
telling the Syrians that Israel planned to attack them,
possibly in concert with a U.S. attack on Iran. Yadlin
stated that since last summer's war in Lebanon, Syria had
engaged in a "frenzy of preparations" for a confrontation
with Israel. The Syrian regime was also showing greater
self-confidence. Some Syrian leaders appeared to believe
that Syria could take on Israel military, but others were
more cautious. The fact that both sides were on high alert
meant that a war could happen easily, even though neither
side is seeking one. In response to a question, Yadlin said
he did not think the Asad regime would survive a war, but he
added that preserving that "evil" regime should not be a
matter of concern.

Fighting in Nahr al-Barid Positive for Israel
---------------------------------------------

¶8. (S) The Ambassador asked Yadlin for his views on the
fighting in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in northern
Lebanon. Although Yadlin was called to another meeting and
did not have time to elaborate, he answered that the fighting
was positive for Israel because it had embarrassed Hizballah,
which had been unable to adopt a clear-cut position on the
Lebanese Army's action, and because the Fatah al-Islam
terrorist organization had been planning to attack UNIFIL and
then Israel before it blundered into its current
confrontation with the LAF. He also agreed that the
confrontation was strengthening the LAF, in fact and in the
eyes of the Lebanese people, which was also good.

¶9. (S) Comment: Yadlin's relatively relaxed attitude toward
the deteriorating security situation in Gaza represents a
shift in IDF thinking from last fall, when the Southern
Command supported a major ground operation into Gaza to
remove the growing threat from Hamas. While many media
commentators continue to make that argument, Yadlin's view
appears to be more in synch with that of Chief of General
Staff Ashkenazi, who also believes that the more serious
threat to Israel currently comes from the north.



JONES





Source: Wikileaks

PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL

Reference ID 09TELAVIV1688
Date 2009-07-30 10:10
Released 2010-12-19 21:09
Classification SECRET
Origin Embassy Tel Aviv


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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL

REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on
July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli
political-military relationship, and to discuss among other
issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI
interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to
review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress,
and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on
potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect,
the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on
August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential
F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to
express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to
Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss
U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns
over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any
policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher
sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to
other "options on the table." Other issues raised by GOI
officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control
system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides
agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November
in Israel. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director
General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos
Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu,
and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5
Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At
the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General
Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and
Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also
participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited
Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.

U.S.-Israeli Relationship
-------------------------

¶3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the
U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the
significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in
his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors
appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this
important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG
Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in
the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting
the number of misunderstandings in the future.

Qualitative Military Edge
-------------------------

¶4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that
Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate
Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and
prefers such sales originate from the United States instead
of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel
continues to stress the importance of identifying potential
risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for
this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the
official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S.
arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).

¶5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in
reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress.
A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an
assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not
releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to
the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and
welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such
comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the
report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated
the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it
was difficult to comment on the report's results without
reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that
respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the
QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.

¶6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that
moderate Arab countries could in the future become
adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in
the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the
MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar,
the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs
on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the
argument that these countries could become future foes.
Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession
concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a
perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and
Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel
moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a
fixture in the region.

¶7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos
Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President
Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was
ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military
led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and
exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy." He added that
there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women
are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel
"is too thin, too superficial." On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said
that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief
priority is the survival of the regime.

¶8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer
non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential
transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including
the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a
working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an
Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in
town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss
the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was
not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on
the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon
-------

¶9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the
opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the
LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections
represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and
its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese
institutions, including the army, was now more important than
ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far
demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems
transferred to Lebanon.

¶10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon
were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence
remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna
Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack
sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential
for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad
said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel.
However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was
certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict
with Hizballah.

¶11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research
argued there has been no dramatic change in the political
arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in
the elections. They said the fragile political situation in
Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an
unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be
tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a
reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy
Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces
tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a
Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA
DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from
investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing
by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese
and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations
had praised the GOI's restraint in these cases.

¶12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be
the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community
against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered
that the results were indicative of several factors,
including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable
opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah
might be a bit chastened following the elections, as
suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try
and undermine the March 14 coalition.

¶13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also
acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However,
he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the
Shi'ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF
must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about
ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also
said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt
smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.

¶14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation
measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an
"accidental engagement" by the IAF. Overall, he was
skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said
the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation
regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with
respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to
coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in
Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro
offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it
proved too difficult on short notice to bring together
interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF,
A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political
Military Group talks later in the fall.

Iran
----

¶15. (S) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI's
primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear
to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In
separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel's
preeminent priority is to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons
program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race
across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical

that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to
"establish a new empire" and pointing to Iranian support for
Hizballah and "Hamastan." Buchris added that the United
States' desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by
tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of
time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military
strike, Buchris said "all options must remain on the table,"
and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was
ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it
may be.

¶16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was
unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary
Clinton's July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on
Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran
-- but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S
Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to
engage will only help bolster international support for
increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain
situation following the Iranian elections -- it was unclear
at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our
offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the
engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United
States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later
this fall.

¶17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the
Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat --
we should take advantage of this commonality, he said.
During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors
expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the
Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated
for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear
and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that
assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel's QME,
but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well
as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also
helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie
with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.

¶18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special
envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not
believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris
that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary
Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran
has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special
envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S
Shapiro said -- in any case, much of the discussion will be
behind the scenes.

¶19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary
Clinton's trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States
would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab
countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already
conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy
Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised
the Secretary's Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that
the Secretary's comments did not indicate a new policy
approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions -- not as a concession -- and that
journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of
the statement than was intended.

¶20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia's potential sale of the
S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian
interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran,
and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the
system would not be delivered for political reasons.
However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this
political calculation should the United States continue to
pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to
put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue
alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
but he personally had doubts about their intelligence
capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the
Syrian nuclear project.

Peace Process
-------------

¶21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority
was doing a "good job" in the West Bank, noting respect for
Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control
of security -- giving them the chance to succeed was
important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of
United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training
the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be
difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah.
Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled -- Amos
Gilad said both sides are "more interested in swallowing one
another" than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions
with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have
not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred
to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell's efforts, but noted
Secretary Clinton's point that a stronger PA will offer an
alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton's
remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will
not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet
principles.

Export Control
--------------

¶22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief
Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an
improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for
improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli
export controls, including enhanced legislation,
cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and
increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780
registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing
licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219
returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey
Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on
export licenses, and explained the system's dispute
resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on
a particular case.

¶23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI
continues to seek assistance in closing export control
loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering
had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that
accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered
in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws,
and planned to raise it during the annual defense export
control working group to be held in Washington in October.
Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to
Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering
issues.

China
-----

¶24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated
that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national
interests with respect to exports to China. He noted,
however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007
a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated
end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same
exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently
stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the
bilateral statement of understanding with the United States.
While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any
requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to
obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often
found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the
Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day
turn-around on all export license requests -- which is not
possible, given the length of time required to obtain an
answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise
the issue in Washington.

JPMG
----

¶25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the
Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November.
GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the
calendar and propose dates.

¶26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.



CUNNINGHAM






Source: Wikileaks

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS

Reference ID 09TELAVIV2482
Date 2009-11-16 08:08
Released 2010-12-19 21:09
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Tel Aviv


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NOFORN
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FLOURNOY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG SY IR SA LE TU
IS
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
(MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
Baidatz. The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
defense exercise. Israeli officials explained that they were
going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
surface were a number of significant dangers. They continued
to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its "axis"
with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS. They also expressed
skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas's future, given
his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
restart peace negotiations. Israeli officials were concerned
about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
SUMMARY

-------------------
Bilateral Relations
-------------------

¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow's trip to Israel came as a number of
high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
issues. On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
Lieberman. In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise. The ASD's visit
also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
Israel's QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.

¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel's assessment of
recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
optimism on the steps moving forward. Amos Gilad
acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
Israel's security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
often clash with broader American security interests in the
region. Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as "the
effective process plus the right mitigations." While not
explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
process that incorporates "intimate dialogue." DG Buchris
thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
upon working groups by the end of November. Vershbow stated
that the technical working group discussions would be
launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
Israeli participation on this issue.

------------------------
Iran Remains Top of Mind
------------------------

¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that
Iran's nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
the greatest strategic threats to Israel. They view Iran as
the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
and HAMAS.

¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment
of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is

rapidly closing. General Baidatz argued that it would take
Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran
would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
within six months. (COMMENT: It is unclear if the Israelis
firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
raise greater urgency from the United States). Amos Gilad
explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
supporting "HAMAStan" in Gaza and "Hezbollahstan" in Lebanon.
Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow. He was
less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials
about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
proposal and Iran's recent equivocation on the agreement.
Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
sufficient. They stated that it was only one stop on the way
to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
work on the newly disclosed site at Qom. They warned that
the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
for Iran if it legitimized in the world's eyes Iran's right
to enrich uranium on its own soil. None of the Israeli
officials expressed surprise about Iran's apparent reversal
on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
nuclear weapons capability.

¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
bottom line. We may need time to ascertain whether Iran's
response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1. However,
he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
likely begin pursuing the pressure track.

¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran's
support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that
there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,
Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
all train together and share knowledge. MG Gantz also
emphasized Iran's role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza. On the Russian delay in
delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
Minister Netanyahu's "secret" visit to Moscow and President
Obama's engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
sanctions on Iran. ASD Vershbow said the Russians' signals
on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
Qom facility.

-------------------
West Bank and Gaza
-------------------

¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the
subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was
widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
assessment of Abbas's future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad
stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is
facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take

difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk
away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating
that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues --
specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed
optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
advancing the relationship. Gilad closed, however, on a
sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.

¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political
discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
Force (PASF). Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern
that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,
and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
PASF more visible control of security. Israeli officials
responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
authority (COMMENT: Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
effect of regular Israeli incursions). MG Gantz cited
Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, they
stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
relationship over the long term. The prospect of poor
Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
unacceptable, and would result in the loss of "strategic
depth" for Israel.

¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to
soley focus on the short-term "here and now," but rathr to
envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
Bank could have for Israel's secrity situation in the
future. Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
coud serve as a "magnet" and help solve the Gaza problem.
He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
information operations campaign to better communicate with
the people of Gaza. Israeli officials offered very little in
the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
the territories, but reinforced Israel's core belief that
HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
with HAMAS opposition. General Baidatz articulated Israel's
concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
reach Tel Aviv. These actions, according to Baidatz and
other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
reconciliation both premature and unrealistic. Ambassador
Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel's
biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
peace talks. Specifically, Gilad stated that political
promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation --
concepts that are never realized -- are only resulting in a
climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy. On this matter,
Gilad mentioned that Egypt's role in pushing reconciliation
is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
junctures.

¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris
emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS's
deliberate use of civilians as human shields. He stated that
the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
before bombing legitimate military targets. He also compared
Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was
necessary to protect its population. In response, ASD
Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.

--------------------
Anxiety Over Turkey
--------------------

¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over
the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
of Israel's participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
exercise. They expressed their belief that the strategic
relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan's
views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
Turkey looks East rather than West. Gilad believes this is
understandable as Turkey's EU accession prospects look
increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
with both regions to succeed.

¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to
contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria. In
his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East. Gilad also
noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
recently to support HAMAS. However, he had a less
pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks' agenda
was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
to Turkey. Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
term, but that Israel would continue to foster the
military-to-military relationship because of its strategic
importance.

¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
might do to improve its relationship with Turkey. Vershbow
explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
mediator. He also commented that Erdogan's ideological views
may lead him to focus on Turkey's Islamic neighbors, but he
is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey's
ties to the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and Israel should be
patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
to play a constructive role in the region. He stated that at
the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.

----------------------------
Quiet on the Northern Border
----------------------------

¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the "quiet"
nature of its northern border -- something they attribute to
the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano. However, according to
Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and ezbollah. The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
within the ranks. On the contrary, Israel believes that
LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
zeal. Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.

¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over
developments within Hezbollah -- specifically, its
relationship with Syria and Iran. General Baidatz spoke of
this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
Hezbollah. According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel's

calculus. Under such a scenario, the looming question for
Israeli policymakers then becomes: "to strike or not to
strike."

-----------------
Optimism on Syria
-----------------

¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence
assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
away from Iran's orbit. He explained that President Assad
used his "negative assets," namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
relationship with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
likely be peace with Israel. ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
could be sustained without Syrian support. Baidatz
acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah's and
Iran's flexibility would be significantly reduced.

-------------------------------
Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
-------------------------------

¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a
complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
continued to train its military for war with Israel. Gilad
stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
Israeli officers. He expressed frustration by describing
Egypt and Israel's "frozen peace" and that neither side knows
anything about the other. He noted that the last high-level
military visit for Egypt was in 1991.

¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt's
counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
Operation CAST LEAD in January. However, they stated that
gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai. Gilad said he was
disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
assistance along borders with Egypt.

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra - Strengthening the Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General
Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,
stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
technological advancements have made the system much more
viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
or Southern Lebanon. Buchris also emphasized the need for
additional USG support to help fund additional production of
Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
North and the South. Buchris also noted progress on the
upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
(Arrow-3 and David's Sling, respectively). In an earlier
meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
electricity plant. Suffering the loss or damage of places
such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
Israel and, therefore, every effort to
stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
be taken.

¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz's initial
impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise. Gantz stressed
the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
had been a success. ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent

developments with Iran. On the larger issue of missile
defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
cooperation, but stated that Russia's realization that the
new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
ask many questions about the system.

-------
Summary
-------

¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow's interlocutors carried a
consistent message emphasizing that: Iran remains Israel's
greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
relative calm on all Israel's borders does not obscure the
fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria. These threats
suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
calm to end one day.

¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.



CUNNINGHAM




Source: Wikileaks

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT

Reference ID 07CAIRO1417
Date 2007-05-14 14:02
Released 2010-12-13 21:09
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy Embassy Cairo


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INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE


C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT

REF: A. CAIRO 671
¶B. CAIRO 974
¶C. 2006 CAIRO 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE
INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY
CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING
TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY
SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS
EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY),
EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER.
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE
POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK'S SUCCESSOR
HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD
POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC
RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO
THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY.

------------------------------
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION
------------------------------

¶2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE
SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE
EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A
SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING
WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY
INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH
PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE
THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN
AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME
MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS,
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE
PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE
PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO
NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH
STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE
DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY."

¶3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE
EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO
THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG
THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS
CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO
ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017),
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET
THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU).
FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE:

-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION;

-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND,

-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN
BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE'S
ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE
SEATS
IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL).

¶4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST
IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN
"INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED
MEMBERS OF EGYPT'S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES,
OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL,
AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO
ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY'S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN
ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76
ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING
PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT"
CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE
NDP'S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE
RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS,
PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE.

--------------------
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------------

¶5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN
SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK
SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE
WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE
PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006
SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I
HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE
SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.

GAMAL MUBARAK
-------------

¶6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE
JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B).
THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN
INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN
FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I
AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE
WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE
PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES
FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT
GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

¶7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS
POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS
QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.
GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK
OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN
PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL
TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN
SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE
PRESIDENT'S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL
LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE
ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT.

¶8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE
THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT'S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952
AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS
HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S
RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY
OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A
POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER,
AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
MUBARAK'S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT,
ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED
THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL
CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE
NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER
LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS.

OMAR SOLIMAN
-------------

¶9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE,
IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED
TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED
HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN,
BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE
TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY
PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS
ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING
APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE
UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD
RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN
ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO
WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME
HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED.

AMRE MOUSSA
-----------

¶10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL
PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER
INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING.
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES,
HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND
PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT,
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK'S DEATH, MOUSSA
COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS
AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.

MILITARY OFFICER
----------------

¶11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG
THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT'S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL
RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A
CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK'S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING
THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY
PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME
LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND
DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN
MUBARAK'S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO
ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR
COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS,
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF
COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.

OPPOSITION MEMBER
-----------------

¶12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,
SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY
SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN
LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL
LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE
THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO'MAN GOMAA,
LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND
SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT
CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK
INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA
IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A
SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY.

DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS
------------------------

¶13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE.
NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS
SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT'S IMPRESSIVE
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE
HEAD OF CAIRO'S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS
RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS
MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY
UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A
CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER.


¶14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA
COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND
MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND
ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA'S DE FACTO CHIEF
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE
GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL
ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE
TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE
UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF
THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY
PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY
GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED
POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR
LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND
WITH NO POWER BASES.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
------------------

¶15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR
EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE
POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE
MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT
OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH
THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING
OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP'S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE
AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN
IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY
POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED.

------------------------
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS
------------------------

¶16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY
BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED
THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS
POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE
HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK'S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR
EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN
EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY.


RICCIARDONE




Source: Wikileaks