SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR ROSS' VISIT TO EGYPT

Reference ID 09CAIRO722
Date 2009-04-28 15:03
Released 2010-12-13 21:09
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Embassy Cairo


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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 000722

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR SCOBEY FOR AMBASSADOR ROSS
ABU DHABI PLEASE PASS TO ROSS DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2029
TAGS: PREL PARM KPAL IS LE SU IR EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR ROSS' VISIT TO EGYPT

REF: A. CAIRO 705
¶B. CAIRO 618
¶C. CAIRO 451

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reason 1.4 (b).

¶1. KEY POINTS:

-- (S) President Mubarak sees Iran's attempts to exert
influence throughout the region as Egypt's primary strategic
threat. However, Mubarak's focus on the Iranian threat
differs somewhat from ours. While he will readily admit that
the Iranian nuclear program is a strategic and existential
threat to Egypt and the region, he sees that threat as
relatively "long term." What has seized his immediate
attention are Iran's non-nuclear destabilizing actions such
as support for HAMAS, media attacks, weapons and illicit
funds smuggling, all of which add up in his mind to "Iranian
influence spreading like a cancer from the GCC to Morocco."

-- (S) In particular, Egypt views Iran as an adversary that
is trying to undermine GOE efforts on Palestinian
reconciliation and preventing weapons smuggling to Gaza,
while endangering key GOE interests such as stability in
Lebanon and Sudan.

-- (S/NF) The GOE remains concerned with Iranian efforts to
interfere in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq and Sudan, and Egypt views
the recently dismantled Sinai Hizballah cell as an
unacceptable Iranian escalation.

-- (S) The MFA believes that a harder U.S. line in UN fora on
Israel's nuclear program would strengthen the U.S. position
on demanding Iran cease working to develop nuclear weapons.


¶2. (S) Ambassador Ross, welcome to Egypt. Your visit comes
as Egypt continues its efforts to mediate a permanent
cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, to facilitate
intra-Palestinian negotiations and to stop the smuggling of
arms into Gaza. The GOE realizes that Iran is working to
undermine all of these Egyptian efforts. Many Egyptians see
the new U.S. Administration as a cause for optimism in both
the bilateral relationship and in U.S. engagement with the
region. President Mubarak appears ready to accept President
Obama's invitation to visit Washington within the next
several months, which will mark his first visit to Washington
since April 2004. Special Envoy for the Middle East Senator
George Mitchell has visited Egypt and the region three times.
While President Mubarak unfortunately will not be available,
we have requested meetings for you with Foreign Minister
Aboul Gheit, Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman, Arab League
Secretary-General Amre Moussa, National Democratic Party
Assistant Secretary-General Gamal Mubarak and Interior
Minister Habib Al-Adly.

-----------------
President Mubarak
-----------------

¶3. (S/NF) President Mubarak has made it clear that he sees
Iran as Egypt's -- and the region's -- primary strategic
threat. His already dangerous neighborhood, he has stressed,
has only become more so since the fall of Saddam, who, as
nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall against Iran,
according to Mubarak. He now sees Tehran's hand moving with
ease throughout the region, "from the Gulf to Morocco," as he
told a recent congressional delegation. The immediate threat
to Egypt comes from Iranian conspiracies with Hamas (which he
sees as the "offspring" of his own most dangerous internal
political threat, the Muslim Brotherhood) to stir up unrest
in Gaza, but he is also concerned about Iranian machinations
in Sudan and their efforts to create havoc elsewhere in the
region, including in Lebanon via Hezbollah. While Tehran's
nuclear threat is also a cause for concern, Mubarak is more
urgently seized with what he sees as the rise of pan-Shi'ism
and Iranian attempts to dominate the Middle East.

¶4. (S) The Egyptians have been clear they do not intend to
resume normal diplomatic ties with the Iranians until
specific political and security issues are addressed,
including the renaming of "Islambouli Street" named after
Sadat's assassin. The GOE recognizes that Iran's long arm
has extended into Gaza via Hamas, but the same time, they are
worried that we are going to strike a "grand deal" with the
Iranians. Accordingly, the Egyptian MFA has reported to us
that they are in touch with the Iranians and "listen" to them
on regional issues. The prevailing GOE view remains a
principled rejection of any diplomatic rapprochement, but we

CAIRO 00000722 002 OF 003


believe the Egyptians are maintaining contact in the event
there is a need for a quick shift in their approach. The
Egyptians are also marginally increasing cultural and
economic ties with Iran. The Egyptians are also concerned
about Iranian Shi'a proselytizing in Egypt.

-----------------------
EGIS Chief Omar Soliman
-----------------------

¶5. (S/NF) Soliman, the key GOE advisor on national security
policy after President Mubarak, recently told us that Egypt
has started a confrontation with Hezbollah and Iran and will
not allow Iran to operate in Egypt. Soliman has noted that
after the GOE's recent arrest of a Hizballah cell in the
Sinai, Egypt had sent a clear message to Iran that if they
interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that
EGIS had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria.
Soliman has warned us against only focusing on one issue at
time, such as Iran's nuclear weapons program. He believes
Iran must pay the price for its actions and not be allowed to
interfere in regional affairs. Soliman has offered GOE
cooperation on Iran, and welcomes a U.S.-Egyptian partnership
on combating Iranian influence in the region.

¶6. (S/NF) Soliman recently noted that Iranian financial
support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a month, but that
Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing financial support from
entering Gaza through Egypt. According to Soliman, Iran has
tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam
Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money
from reaching Gaza. Soliman has expressed concern over
Hezbollah's first attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt,
and noted to us that Iran was also trying to recruit support
from the Sinai Bedouins, he claimed, in order to facilitate
arms smuggling to Gaza.

----------------------------
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
----------------------------

¶7. (C) Aboul Gheit has speculated that the new U.S.
Administration will engage with Iran, but will be
disappointed in late 2009 or early 2010 when it realizes that
Iran will not stop its enrichment activities. Aboul Gheit
believes Israel may then attack Iran. According to Aboul
Gheit, the "intransigence" of Israel and Iran will place the
U.S. in an awkward position with the Islamic world. Aboul
Gheit will reiterate President Mubarak's strong opinion that
the only real solution is a nuclear free zone in the Middle
East, which would require Israel to give up its nuclear
weapons. Aboul Gheit believes that while the U.S. may not
perceive a nuclear-armed Israel as a threat, it is so
perceived throughout the Middle East. In the Foreign
Minister's opinion, if the U.S. pushed Israel to renounce
nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Arab governments would be in a
much stronger position to demand that Iran end its nuclear
program.

¶8. (C) MFA officials have made it clear to us that they do
not expect Israel to give up its nuclear weapons in the
absence of comprehensive regional peace; however, the GOE is
frustrated with what it perceives as a lack of political
progress in international fora to advance the Middle East
Resolution that came out of the 1995 Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, which called in part for a
Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ). The GOE's
campaign for progress on the eventual establishment of a
MENWFZ -- even if the ultimate goal remains far in the future
-- will likely guide their approach to the 2009 NPT
Preparatory Conference in May and the 2010 NPT Review
Conference.

------------------------------------
Arab League Secretary-General Moussa
------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Moussa has publicly and privately minimized Iran's
threat, claiming that the Arab world should strengthen its
economic and cultural ties with Iran. Moussa believes that
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses the greatest danger to
the region, and has consistently pressed the U.S. to do more
to stop Israeli settlement activity and advance the political
process between Israelis and Palestinians. The Arab League's
views on the importance of advancing a Middle East nuclear
weapons free zone are similar to those of the MFA. Moussa
also plays an important role in trying to manage intra-Arab
squabbles, including Qatar-Syria vs. Egypt-Saudi Arabia. The
Egyptians have made it clear that they consider the Qataris

CAIRO 00000722 003 OF 003


"nouveau riche upstarts" who are trying to buy their way to
influence via big spending and posing as the "true" champions
of the Palestinian cause by allying themselves with Syria and
Iran. The Qatari attempt to invite Iran to the Doha Arab
League summit incensed the Egyptians, many of whom blamed
Moussa for mismanaging the issue.

----------------------
Interior Minister Adly
----------------------

¶10. (S) Interior Minister General Habib Al-Adly focuses on
counterterrorism and suppressing domestic political
opposition. He will not offer strategic analysis of Iran
role in the region, but should be able to provide details on
the nascent Hizballah cell in the Sinai, which the GOE
recently dismantled and arrested. Adly may also be able to
share information on the steps the GOE is taking to disrupt
the flow of Iranian-supplied arms from Sudan through Egypt to
Gaza. In March, he told us that Egyptian police had killed
arms smugglers trying to transfer weapons from Sudan into
Egypt (ref C). He has described GOE efforts to combat
smuggling over the long Egyptian-Sudanese border region as
"difficult."

-------------
Gamal Mubarak
--------------

¶11. (C) Ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) Assistant
Secretary-General and Presidential son Gamal Mubarak does not
currently play a significant role in Egypt's formal foreign
policy process, focusing instead on NDP matters and economic
development. Gamal's recent trip to Washington raised his
political profile in Egypt, and he is of course a possible
successor to his father. As a UK-trained former
international banker, Gamal is perhaps most at home
discussing economics and the current financial crisis.

-------------------------------
Internal Politics and Economics
-------------------------------

¶12. (SBU) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt,
including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism,
and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human
rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE
remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion,
complaining that any efforts to open up will result in
empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86
seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament. Economic reform is
ongoing although Egypt still suffers from widespread poverty
affecting 35-40% of the population. Egyptian-U.S. trade has
more than doubled in the last four years, reaching almost $9
billion in 2008. The U.S. exports to Egypt about twice as
much as it imports. Egyptian banks operate very
conservatively and have been spared involvement in risky
financial products, but the effects of the global economic
crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global
credit crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports,
Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and remittances -- its largest
sources of revenue -- are all down and likely to continue to
fall.


SCOBEY




Source: Wikileaks