LEBANON: JUMBLATT PREOCCUPIED WITH SECURITY ISSUES

Reference ID 08BEIRUT283
Date 2008-02-21 03:28
Released 2010-12-01 19:07
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Beirut



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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000283

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER
DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, PINR, SY, IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT PREOCCUPIED WITH SECURITY ISSUES

REF: A. BEIRUT 205

B. ABU DHABI 222

BEIRUT 00000283 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

1. (C) Security concerns weighed heavily on Druse leader
Walid Jumblatt during a February 22 meeting with the Charge.
He sought U.S. assistance in persuading Saad Hariri to
discuss recent Sunni-Shia clashes with Amal leader Nabih
Berri, pointing to an upcoming Hizballah rally as another
source of potential friction. On the eve of Arab League SYG
Amr Moussa's planned next visit to Lebanon, Hariri reportedly
told Moussa's Chief of Staff that March 14 will not accept a
10/10/10 cabinet formulation. Furthermore, the communique
should state that all UN Security Council Resolutions must be
applied. Jumblatt warned that, despite recent progress with
the Special Tribunal, Syria would not change its behavior
until the Asad regime truly feels threatened. End summary.

2. (S/NF) Charge Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with Druse leader Walid Jumblatt and Telecommunications
Minister Marwan Hamadeh at Jumblatt's residence in Clemenceau
on February 20. Jumblatt, who had been told by Hariri
advisor Ghattas Khoury "not to move," requested the meeting
to catch up on recent developments. (Note: Jumblatt, who
probably is at the top of the list of assassination targets,
told the Charge the previous evening by phone that he was not
scheduling any meetings by phone; the meeting with the Charge
was arranged via messengers. End note.)

SAAD AND BERRI NEED TO TALK
---------------------------

3. (C) Jumblatt's primary message was that, given recent
clashes between the two camps, Future Movement leader Saad
Hariri and Amal leader Nabih Berri needed to talk. Lebanese
Armed Forces G-2 Intelligence Directorate had held a meeting
between members of the two groups, Future Movement and Amal,
to prevent further friction, but there needed to be political
talks in addition to secuity discussions, he stressed. He
had urged Saadto speak with Berri, but Saad's response was a
"lat no."

4. (C) Jumblatt pointed to the Hizballah rally on February 22
to commemorate the assassinations of Hizballah officials,
which SYG Hassan Nasrallah would address, as the next
potential flashpoint. What are they looking for, Hamadeh
asked, open war with Israel? The Shia in south Lebanon don't
want it, he said, and Berri is certainly not looking for an
"adventure" in the south.

5. (C) Referring to the January 27 clashes between the LAF
and Shia demonstrators that resulted in eight deaths and the
subsequent arrest of 19 LAF members, Jumblatt said that the
army must be condemned for the deaths. At the same time, he
added, we are not Norway, and the army needs to be able to
act in these circumstances or risk becoming demoralized. Two
of the LAF personnel who have been detained following the
incident were Shia, he claimed, and were responsible for
killing five of the Shia demonstrators.

NO TO 10/10/10
--------------

6. (C) Noting Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's projected February
22 return to Beirut, Jumblatt stressed that March 14 needed
to have a united position vis-a-vis the initiative. Asked
whether the majority would accept a 10/10/10 cabinet,
Jumblatt did not respond directly, but said that the
opposition would not accept it unless other conditions were
met, including agreement on the name of the next prime
minister, and agreement that the Ministries of the Interior,
Finance, and Justice would go to the opposition.

7. (C) The opposition wants the Ministry of the Interior, he
said, to ensure control over the security and intelligence
services. Furthermore, the opposition will brand Elias Murr
as March 14, thereby ensuring that he does not become

BEIRUT 00000283 002.2 OF 002

Interior Minister. (Note: Currently Defense Minister, Murr
is generally expected to be March 14's choice for Interior
Minister in the new cabinet, to maintain control not only
over the GOL's security apparatus, but also to control key
issues like electoral reform in the run-up to the 2009
parliamentary elections. End note.)

8. (C) Fielding a call from Saad from Saudi Arabia, Jumblatt
reported that Saad had told Moussa's Chief of Staff Hashem
Youssef (who had just arrived in Beirut) that March 14 would
not/not accept 10/10/10. Furthermore, the Arab League
communique should specifically mention the application of all
international resolutions, Saad reportedly told Youssef.
This, Jumblatt commented, reflects the will of the Saudis.

9. (C) Jumblatt also stressed that March 14 needed to have
people in place as soon as the president is elected;
otherwise, he warned, we willbe in situation where the
Siniora government is n caretaker status only, and we have
no LAF comander. This would be especially dangerous for the
Druse, Hamadeh added, since, once Michel Sleiman becomes
president, his Chief of Staff, General Shawki al-Masri (a
Druse) would become acting commander, opening the government
to more attacks that it is abusing its powers at the expense
of the Christians.

OVERCOMING THE SUNNI-SHIA SPLIT
-------------------------------

10. (C) Jumblatt, interrupted several times during the
meeting by phone calls, explained that he was working on a
communique that Lebanon's three Islamic spiritual leaders
(Higher Islamic Shia Council head Qabbalan, Sunni Mufti
Qabbani, and Druse Sheikh Hassan) intended to issue following
their February 20 summit (subsequently postponed). The
communique reportedly denounced the assassinations of former
PM Rafiq Hariri and Hizballah military leader Imad Mougnieh
in such a way that, as Hamadeh put it, it equates a martyr
with a terrorist.

11. (C) Laughing off (unsubstantiated) rumors of Druse
involvement in the Mougnieh assassination, Jumblatt said, if
we have the ability to get Mougnieh, why not Bashar Asad
himself? Hamadeh reasoned that the absence of Syrian
officials at Mougnieh's funeral was due to the Asad regime's
embarrassment that the assassination took place on Syrian
soil. The presence of Iranian FM Mottaki did not go over
well with the Christians, he said, adding that Speaker Berri,
a Shia, was himself was conveniently out of the country the
day of the funeral.

12. (C) Jumblatt criticized Saad's efforts to "import" Sunnis
from the north, suggesting instead that Saad should speak
with independent Shia leaders such as MP Yassine Jaber,
Loukman Slim, and (former Minister of Energy and former Amal
member) Mohamad Youssef Beydoun to build better Sunni-Shia
relations. Naseer al-Assad was also a useful interlocutor.
(Note: Al-Assad already is working with the newly created
March 14 Secretariat, Ref B. End note.) March 14 also
should cultivate other potential supports, such as Lebanese
Kurds; with a population of 100,000 in Lebanon, they are a
"strong" electoral force, he said, and must be with March 14.

SCARING THE SYRIANS
-------------------

13. (C) Jumblatt appeared unimpressed by recent developments
regarding the establishment of the Special Tribunal,
commenting that it would not stop the Syrians. The Tribunal
is a long process, he explained, and Syria needs to feel
scared to change its behavior. Jumblatt then noted the
recent visit of the UAE Prime Minister to both Iran and Syria
(Ref B) commenting that Rami Maklouf's family lived in the
UAE.

SISON


Source: Wikileaks